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THE  NAVY  AS 
A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 


THE  NAVY  AS 
A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 


BY 

REAR  ADMIRAL  BRADLEY  A.  FISKE 

U.    S.   NAVY 

FORMER   AID   FOR   OPERATIONS   OF   THE    FLEET;    PRESIDENT   OF   THE    U.    S.   NAVAL 

INSTITUTE  ;   GOLD  MEDALLIST  OF  THE   U.   S.   NAVAL  INSTITUTE   AND 

THE   FRANKLIN  INSTITUTE   OF  PENNSYLVANIA 

AUTHOR   OF    "ELECTRICITY   IN  THEORY   AND  PRACTICE," 
"WAR   TIME    IN   MANILA,"    ETC. 


WITH   MAP 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S   SONS 

1916 


Copyright,  1916,  by 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


Published  October,  1916 


PREFACE 

What  is  the  navy  for? 

Of  what  parts  should  it  be  composed? 

What  principles  should  be  followed  in  designing,  pre- 
paring, and  operating  it  in  order  to  get  the  maxi- 
mum return  for  the  money  expended? 

To   answer   these  questions  clearly  and  without 
technical  language  is  the  object  of  this  book. 

Bradley  A.  Fiske. 

U.  S.  Naval  War  College, 
Newport,  R.  I.,  September  3,  1916. 


CONTENTS 

PART  I 
GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.    War  and  the  Nations 3 

II.    Naval  A,  B,  C 30 

III.    Naval  Power 45 

rv.    Naval  Preparedness 93 

V.    Naval  Defense iii 

VI.    Naval  Policy 129 

PART  II 
NAVAL  STRATEGY 

VII.    General  Principles 151 

VIII.    Designing  the  Machine 190 

IX.    Preparing  the  Active  Fleet 229 

X.    Reserves  and  Shore  Stations 271 

XI.    Naval  Bases 316 

XII.    Operating  the  Machine 357 


Strategic  Map  of  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
Oceans End  of  volume 

***  Chapters  HI  and  VH  were  published  originally  in  The  U.  S.  Naval  Inslittile;  chapters 
I,  n,  IV,  V,  and  VI  in  The  North  American  Review. 


PART  I 
GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS 


CHAPTER  I 
WAR   AND   THE   NATIONS 

BECAUSE  the  question  is  widely  discussed,  whether 
peace  throughout  the  world  may  be  attained  by 
the  friendly  co-operation  of  many  nations,  and  be- 
cause a  nation's  attitude  toward  this  question  may 
determine  its  future  prosperity  or  ruin,  it  may  be 
well  to  note  what  has  been  the  trend  of  the  nations 
hitherto,  and  whether  any  forces  exist  that  may  rea- 
sonably be  expected  to  change  that  trend.  We  may 
then  be  able  to  induce  from  facts  the  law  which  that 
trend  obeys,  and  make  a  reasonable  deduction  as  to 
whether  or  not  the  world  is  moving  toward  peace.  If 
we  do  this  we  shall  follow  the  inductive  method  of 
modem  science,  and  avoid  the  error  (with  its  perilous 
results)  of  first  assuming  the  law  and  then  deducing 
conclusions  from  it. 

Men  have  always  been  divided  into  organizations, 
the  first  organization  being  the  family.  As  time  went 
on  families  were  formed  into  tribes,  for  self-protection. 
The  underlying  cause  for  the  organization  was  always 
a  desire  for  strength;  sometimes  for  defense,  some- 
times for  offense,  usually  for  both. 

At  times  tribes  joined  in  alliance  with  other  tribes 
to  attain  a  common  end,  the  alliance  being  brought 

3 


4      THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

about  by  peaceful  agreement,  and  usually  ceasing 
after  the  end  had  been  attained,  or  missed,  or  when 
tribal  jealousies  forbade  further  common  effort.  Some- 
times tribes  joined  to  form  one  larger  tribe;  the  union 
being  either  forced  on  a  weaker  by  a  stronger  tribe,  or 
caused  by  a  desire  to  secure  a  strength  greater  and 
more  lasting  than  mere  alliance  can  insure. 

In  the  same  way,  and  apparently  according  to 
similar  laws,  sovereign  states  or  nations  were  formed 
from  tribes;  and  in  later  years,  by  the  union  of  sepa- 
rate states.  The  states  or  nations  have  become  larger 
and  larger  as  time  has  gone  on;  greater  numbers,  not 
only  of  people  but  of  peoples,  living  in  the  same  gen- 
eral localities  and  having  hereditary  ties,  joining  to 
form  a  nation. 

Though  the  forms  of  government  of  these  states 
or  nations  are  numerous,  and  though  the  conceptions 
of  people  as  to  the  purposes  and  functions  of  the 
state  vary  greatly,  we  find  that  one  characteristic  of 
a  state  has  always  prevailed  among  aU  the  states  and 
nations  of  the  world — the  existence  of  an  armed  mili- 
tary force,  placed  under  the  control  of  its  government; 
the  purpose  of  this  armed  force  being  to  enable  the 
government  not  only  to  carry  on  its  administration 
of  internal  matters,  but  also  to  exert  itself  externally 
against  the  armed  force  of  another  state. 

This  armed  force  has  been  a  prominent  factor  in 
the  life  of  every  sovereign  state  and  independent 
tribe,  from  history's  beginning,  and  is  no  less  a  factor 


WAR  AND   THE  NATIONS  5 

now.  No  instance  can  be  found  of  a  sovereign  state 
without  its  appropriate  armed  force,  to  guard  its  sov- 
ereignty, and  preserve  that  freedom  from  external 
control,  without  which  freedom  it  ceases  to  exist  as  a 
sovereign  state. 

The  armed  force  has  always  been  a  matter  of  very 
great  expense.  It  has  always  required  the  anxious 
care  of  the  government  and  the  people.  The  men  com- 
prising it  have  always  been  subjected  to  restraint  and 
discipline,  compelled  to  undergo  hardships  and  dangers 
greater  than  those  of  civil  life,  and  developed  by  a 
training  highly  specialized  and  exacting. 

The  armed  force  in  every  state  has  had  not  only 
continuous  existence  always,  but  continuous,  poten- 
tial readiness,  if  not  continuous  employment;  and 
the  greatest  changes  in  the  mutual  relations  of  nations 
have  been  brought  about  by  the  victory  of  the  armed 
force  of  one  state  over  the  armed  force  of  another  state. 
This  does  not  mean  that  the  fundamental  causes  of 
the  changes  have  been  physical,  for  they  have  been 
psychological,  and  have  been  so  profound  and  so  com- 
plex as  to  defy  analysis;  but  it  does  mean  that  the  ac- 
tual and  immediate  instrument  producing  the  changes 
has  been  physical  force;  that  physical  force  and  physi- 
cal courage  acting  in  conjunction,  of  which  conjunction 
war  is  the  ultimate  expression,  have  always  been  the 
most  potent  instruments  in  the  dealings  of  nations 
with  each  other. 

Is  there  any  change  toward  peaceful  methods  now? 


6      THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

No,  on  the  contrary;  war  is  recognized  as  the 
most  potent  method  still;  the  prominence  of  military 
matters  is  greater  than  ever  before;  at  no  time  in  the 
past  has  interest  in  war  been  so  keen  as  at  the  present, 
or  the  expenditure  of  blood  and  money  been  so  prod- 
igal; at  no  time  before  has  war  so  thoroughly  engaged 
the  intellect  and  energy  of  mankind. 

In  other  words,  the  trend  of  the  nations  has  been 
toward  a  clearer  recognition  of  the  efficacy  of  military 
power,  and  an  increasing  use  of  the  instrumentality 
of  war. 

This  does  not  mean  that  the  trend  of  the  nations 
has  been  regular;  for,  on  the  contrary,  it  has  been 
spasmodic.  If  one  hundred  photographs  of  the  map 
of  Europe  could  be  taken,  each  photograph  represent- 
ing in  colors  the  various  countries  as  they  appeared 
upon  the  map  at  one  hundred  different  times,  and  if 
those  hundred  photographs  could  be  put  on  films 
and  shown  as  a  moving-picture  on  a  screen,  the  result 
would  resemble  the  shifting  colored  pieces  in  a  kaleido- 
scope. Boundaries  advanced  and  receded,  then  ad- 
vanced again;  tribes  and  nations  moved  their  homes 
from  place  to  place;  empires,  kingdoms,  principali- 
ties, duchies,  and  repubKcs  flourished  brilliantly  for  a 
while,  and  then  went  out;  many  peoples  struggled 
for  an  autonomous  existence,  but  hardly  a  dozen  ac- 
quired enough  territory  or  mustered  a  sufficiently 
numerous  population  to  warrant  their  being  called 
"great  nations."     Of  those  that  were  great  nations. 


WAR  AND  THE  NATIONS  7 

only  three  have  endured  as  great  nations  for  eight 
hundred  years;  and  the  three  that  have  so  endured 
are  the  three  greatest  in  Europe  now — the  French,  the 
British,  and  the  German. 

Some  of  the  ancient  empires  continued  for  long 
periods.  The  history  of  practical,  laborious,  and  pa- 
tient China  is  fairly  complete  and  clear  for  more  than 
two  thousand  years  before  our  era;  and  of  dreamy, 
philosophic  India  for  almost  as  long,  though  in  far 
less  authentic  form.  Egypt  existed  as  a  nation,  highly 
military,  artistic,  and  industrious,  as  her  monuments 
show,  for  perhaps  four  thousand  years;  when  she  was 
forced  by  the  barbarians  of  Persia  into  a  condition  of 
dependence,  from  which  she  has  never  yet  emerged. 
The  time  of  her  greatness  in  the  arts  and  sciences  of 
peace  was  the  time  of  her  greatest  military  power; 
and  her  decline  in  the  arts  and  sciences  of  peace  ac- 
companied her  decline  in  those  of  war.  Assyria,  with 
her  two  capitals,  Babylon  and  Nineveh,  flourished 
splendidly  for  about  six  centuries,  and  was  then  sub- 
dued by  the  Persians  under  Cyrus,  after  the  usual 
decline.  The  little  kingdom  of  the  Hebrews,  hardy 
and  warlike  under  Saul  and  David,  luxurious  and 
effeminate  imder  Solomon,  lasted  but  little  more  than 
a  hundred  years.  Persia,  rising  rapidly  by  military 
means  from  the  barbarian  state,  lived  a  brilliant  life 
of  conquest,  cultivated  but  little  those  arts  of  peace 
that  hold  in  check  the  passions  of  a  successful  mili- 
tary nation,  yielded  rapidly  to  the  seductions  of  lux- 


8      THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

ury,  and  fell  abruptly  before  the  Macedonian  Alexan- 
der, lasting  less  than  two  hundred  and  fifty  years. 
Macedonia,  trained  under  Philip,  rose  to  great  mili- 
tary power  under  Alexander,  conquered  in  twelve 
years  the  ten  most  wealthy  and  populous  countries  of 
the  world — nearly  the  whole  known  world;  but  fell 
to  pieces  almost  instantly  when  Alexander  died.  The 
cities  of  Greece  enjoyed  a  rare  pre-eminence  both  in 
the  arts  and  sciences  of  peace  and  in  military  power, 
but  only  for  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  years:  fall- 
ing at  last  before  the  superior  mihtary  force  of  Mace- 
don,  after  neglecting  the  practice  of  the  military  arts, 
and  devoting  themselves  to  art,  learning,  and  philoso- 
phy. Rome  as  a  great  nation  lasted  about  five  hun- 
dred years;  and  the  last  three  centuries  of  her  life 
after  the  death  of  Commodus,  about  192  A.  D.,  illus- 
trate curiously  the  fact  that,  even  if  a  people  be  im- 
moral, cruel,  and  base  in  many  ways,  their  existence 
as  an  independent  state  may  be  continued  long,  if 
military  requirements  be  understood,  and  if  the  mili- 
tary forces  be  preserved  from  the  influence  of  the 
effeminacy  of  the  nation  as  a  whole.  In  Rome,  the 
army  was  able  to  maintain  a  condition  of  considerable 
manliness,  relatively  to  the  people  at  large,  and  thus 
preserve  internal  order  and  keep  the  barbarians  at 
bay  for  nearly  three  hundred  years;  and  at  the  same 
time  exert  a  powerful  and  frequently  deciding  influ- 
ence in  the  government.  But  the  effeminacy  of  the 
people,  especially  of  those  in  the  higher  ranks,  made 


WAR  AND  THE  NATIONS  9 

them  the  creatures  of  the  army  that  protected  them. 
In  some  cases,  the  Emperor  hunself  was  selected  by  the 
army,  or  by  the  Pretorian  Guard  m  Rome;  and  some- 
times the  guard  removed  an  Emperor  of  whom  it  dis- 
approved by  the  simple  expedient  of  killing  him. 

After  the  fall  of  the  Western  Empire  in  476,  when 
Rome  was  taken  by  Odoacer,  a  condition  of  confusion, 
approaching  anarchy,  prevailed  throughout  Europe, 
until  Charlemagne  founded  his  empire,  about  800 
A.  D.,  except  that  Constantinople  was  able  to  stand 
up  against  all  outside  assaults  and  hold  the  Eastern 
Empire  together.  Charlemagne's  empire  united  under 
one  government  nearly  all  of  what  is  now  France, 
Germany,  Austria,  Italy,  Belgium,  and  Holland.  The 
means  employed  by  Charlemagne  to  found  his  em- 
pire were  wholly  military,  though  means  other 
than  mihtary  were  instituted  to  preserve  it.  He  en- 
deavored by  just  government,  wise  laws,  and  the  en- 
couragement of  religion  and  of  education  of  all  kinds 
to  form  a  united  people.  The  time  was  not  ripe,  how- 
ever; and  Charlemagne's  empire  fell  apart  soon  after 
Charlemagne  expired. 

The  rapid  rise  and  spread  of  the  Mohammedan 
religion  was  made  possible  by  the  enthusiasm  with 
which  Mahomet  imbued  his  followers,  but  the  actual 
founding  of  the  Arabian  Empire  was  due  wholly  to 
military  conquest,  achieved  by  the  fanatic  Mussul- 
mans who  lived  after  him.  After  a  little  more  than  a 
hundred  years,  the  empire  was  divided  into  two  cali- 


lo    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

phates.  Brilliant  and  luxurious  courts  were  there- 
after held  by  caliphs  at  Bagdad  and  Cordova,  with 
results  similar  to  those  in  Egypt,  Persia,  Assyria,  and 
Rome;  the  people  becoming  effeminate,  employed  war- 
riors to  protect  them,  and  the  warriors  became  their 
masters.  Then,  effeminacy  spreading  even  to  the  war- 
riors, strength  to  resist  internal  disorders  as  well  as 
external  assaults  gradually  faded,  and  both  caliphates 
fell. 

From  the  death  of  Charlemagne  until  the  fall  of 
Constantinople,  in  1453,  the  three  principal  nations 
of  Europe  were  those  of  France,  Germany,  and  Eng- 
land. Until  that  time,  and  dating  from  a  time  shortly 
before  the  fall  of  Rome,  Europe  was  in  perpetual  tur- 
moil— owing  not  only  to  conflicts  between  nations,  but 
to  conflicts  between  the  Church  of  Rome  and  the 
civil  power  of  the  Kings  and  Emperors,  to  conflicts 
among  the  feudal  lords,  and  to  conflicts  between  the 
sovereigns  and  the  feudal  lords.  The  power  of  the 
Roman  Church  was  beneficent  in  checking  a  too  arro- 
gant and  military  tendency,  and  was  the  main  factor 
in  preventing  an  utter  lapse  back  to  barbarism. 

The  end  of  the  Middle  Ages  and  the  beginning 
of  what  are  usually  caUed  "Modern  Times"  found 
only  four  great  countries  in  the  world — France,  Ger- 
many, Spain,  and  England.  Of  these  Spain  dropped 
out  in  the  latter  part  of  the  sixteenth  century.  The 
other  three  countries  still  stand,  though  none  of  them 
lies  within  exactly  the  same  boundaries  as  when  mod- 


WAR  AND   THE  NATIONS  ii 

em  times  began;  and  Austria,  which  was  a  part  of 
Germany  then,  is  now — with  Hungary — a  separate 
state  and  nation. 

This  very  brief  survey  of  history  shows  that  every 
great  nation  has  started  from  a  small  beginning  and 
risen  sometimes  gradually,  sometimes  rapidly  to  great- 
ness; and  then  fallen,  sometimes  gradually,  some- 
times rapidly,  to  mediocrity,  dependence,  or  extinc- 
tion; that  the  instrument  which  has  effected  the  rise 
has  always  been  military  power,  usually  exerted  by 
armies  on  the  land,  sometimes  by  navies  on  the  sea; 
and  that  the  instrument  which  has  effected  the  actual 
fall  has  always  been  the  military  power  of  an  adver- 
sary. In  other  words,  the  immediate  instrument  that 
has  decided  the  rise  and  the  fall  oj  nations  has  been  mili- 
tary power. 

That  this  should  have  been  so  need  not  surprise 
us,  since  nations  have  always  been  composed  of  human 
beings,  influenced  by  the  same  hopes  and  fears  and 
governed  by  the  same  laws  of  human  nature.  And 
as  the  most  potent  influence  that  could  be  brought 
to  bear  upon  a  man  was  a  threat  against  his  life,  and 
as  it  was  the  province  of  military  power  to  threaten 
life,  it  was  imavoidable  that  military  power  should  be 
the  most  potent  influence  that  could  be  brought  to 
bear  upon  a  nation. 

The  history  of  the  world  has  been  in  the  main  a 
history  of  war  and  a  narrative  of  wars.  No  matter 
how  far  back  we  go,  the  same  horrible  but  stimulating 


12    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

story  meets  our  eyes.  In  ancient  days,  when  every 
weapon  was  rude,  and  manipulated  by  one  man  only, 
the  injury  a  single  weapon  could  do  was  small,  the 
time  required  for  preparation  was  but  brief,  and  the 
time  required  for  recuperation  after  war  was  also 
brief.  At  that  time,  military  power  was  almost  the 
sole  element  in  the  longevity  of  a  tribe,  or  clan,  or  na- 
tion; and  the  warriors  were  the  most  important  men 
among  the  people.  But  as  civilization  increased,  the 
life  not  only  of  individuals  but  of  nations  became 
more  complex,  and  warriors  had  to  dispute  with  states- 
men, diplomatists,  poets,  historians,  and  artists  of 
various  types,  the  title  to  pre-eminence.  Yet  even  in 
savage  tribes  and  even  in  the  conduct  of  savage  wars, 
the  value  of  wisdom  and  cunning  was  perceived,  and  the 
stimulating  aid  of  the  poet  and  the  orator  was  se- 
cured. The  relative  value  of  men  of  war  and  men  of 
peace  depended  during  each  period  on  the  conditions 
prevailing  then — in  war,  warriors  held  the  stage;  in 
peace,  statesmen  and  artists  had  their  day. 

Naturally,  during  periods  when  war  was  the  nor- 
mal condition,  the  warrior  was  the  normal  pillar  of  the 
state.  In  how  great  a  proportion  of  the  time  that  his- 
tory describes,  war  was  the  normal  condition  and  peace 
the  abnormal,  few  realize  now  in  our  country,  because 
of  the  aloofness  of  the  present  generation  from  even 
the  memory  of  war.  Our  last  great  war  ended  in  1865; 
and  since  then  only  the  light  and  transient  touch  of 
the  Spanish  War  has  been  laid  upon  us.    Even  that 


WAR  AND  THE  NATIONS  13 

war  ended  seventeen  years  ago  and  since  then  only  the 
distant  rumblings  of  battles  in  foreign  lands  have  been 
borne  across  the  ocean  to  our  ears. 

These  rumblings  have  disturbed  us  very  little. 
Feeling  secure  behind  the  3,000-mile  barrier  of  the 
ocean,  we  have  lent  an  almost  incredulous  ear  to  the 
story  that  they  tell  and  the  menace  that  they  bear; 
though  the  story  of  the  influence  of  successful  and 
unsuccessful  wars  upon  the  rise  and  fall  of  nations  is 
told  so  harshly  and  so  loudly  that,  in  order  not  to  hear 
it,  one  must  tightly  stop  his  ears. 

That  war  has  not  been  the  only  factor,  however, 
in  the  longevity  of  nations  is  obviously  true;  and  it 
is  also  true  that  nations  which  have  developed  the 
warlike  arts  alone  have  never  even  approximated 
greatness.  In  all  complex  matters,  in  all  processes  of 
nature  and  human  nature,  many  elements  are  pres- 
ent, and  many  factors  combine  to  produce  a  given  re- 
sult. Man  is  a  very  complex  individual,  and  the  more 
highly  he  is  developed  the  more  complex  he  becomes. 
A  savage  is  mainly  an  animal;  but  the  civilized  and 
highly  educated  man  is  an  animal  on  whose  elemental 
nature  have  been  superposed  very  highly  organized 
mental,  moral,  and  spiritual  natures.  Yet  even  a 
savage  of  the  most  primitive  or  warlike  character  has 
an  instinctive  desire  for  rest  and  softness  and  beauty, 
and  loves  a  primitive  music;  and  even  the  most  highly 
refined  and  educated  gentleman  raises  his  head  a  lit- 
tle higher,  and  draws  his  breath  a  little  deeper,  when 


14    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

war  draws  near.  Thus  in  the  breast  of  every  man  are 
two  opposing  forces;  one  urging  him  to  the  action 
and  excitement  of  war,  the  other  to  the  comparative 
inaction  and  tranquillity  of  peace.  On  the  side  that 
urges  war,  we  see  hate,  ambition,  courage,  energy,  and 
strength;  on  the  side  that  urges  peace  we  see  love, 
contentment,  cowardice,  indolence,  and  weakness. 
We  see  arrayed  for  war  the  forceful  faults  and  vir- 
tues; for  peace  the  gentle  faults  and  virtues.  Both 
the  forceful  and  the  gentle  qualities  tend  to  longevity 
in  certain  ways  and  tend  to  its  prevention  in  other 
ways;  but  history  clearly  shows  that  the  forceful  quali- 
ties have  tended  more  to  the  longevity  of  nations  than  the 
gentle.  If  ever  two  nations,  or  two  tribes,  have  found 
themselves  contiguous,  one  forceful  and  the  other  not, 
the  forceful  one  has  usually,  if  not  always,  obtained 
the  mastery  over  the  other,  and  therefore  has  outlived 
it.  If  any  cow  and  any  lion  have  found  themselves 
alone  together,  the  lion  has  outlived  the  cow. 

It  is  true  that  the  mere  fact  of  being  a  lion  has 
not  insured  long  life,  and  that  the  mere  fact  of  beuig  a 
cow  has  not  precluded  it;  and  some  warlike  tribes 
and  nations  have  not  lived  so  long  as  tribes  and  na- 
tions of  softer  fibre.  This  seems  to  have  been  due, 
however,  either  to  the  environments  in  which  the 
two  have  lived,  or  to  the  fact  that  the  softer  nation 
has  had  available  some  forces  that  the  other  did  not 
have.  The  native  Indians  of  North  America  were 
more   warlike  than  the  colonists  from    Europe  that 


WAR  AND,  THE  NATIONS  15 

landed  on  their  shores;  but  the  Indians  were  armed 
with  spears  and  arrows,  and  the  colonists  with  guns. 

Now,  those  guns  were  the  product  of  the  arts  of 
peace;  no  nation  that  had  pursued  a  warlike  life  ex- 
clusively could  have  produced  them  or  invented  the 
powder  that  discharged  them.  This  fact  indicates 
what  a  thousand  other  facts  of  history  also  indicate, 
that  civilization  and  the  peaceful  arts  contribute  to 
the  longevity  of  nations — not  only  by  promoting  per- 
sonal comfort,  and  by  removing  causes  of  internal 
strife,  and  thus  enabling  large  bodies  of  people  to 
dweU  together  happily,  but  also  by  increasing  their 
military  power.  Every  nation  which  has  achieved 
greatness  has  cultivated  assiduously  both  the  arts  of 
peace  and  the  arts  of  war.  Every  nation  which  has 
long  maintained  that  greatness  has  done  so  by  main- 
taining the  policy  by  which  she  acquired  it.  Every 
nation  that  has  attained  and  then  lost  greatness,  has  lost 
it  by  losing  the  proper  balance  between  the  military  and  the 
peaceful  arts;  never  by  exalting  unduly  the  military,  but 
always  by  neglecting  them,  and  thereby  becoming  vulner- 
able to  attack. 

In  other  words,  the  history  of  every  great  nation 
that  has  declined  shows  three  periods,  the  rise,  ,the 
table-land  of  greatness,  and  the  decline.  During  the 
rise,  the  military  arts  hold  sway;  on  the  table-land, 
the  arts  of  peace  and  war  are  fairly  balanced;  during 
the  decline  the  peaceful  arts  hold  sway.  Facilis  de- 
scensus Averni.    The  rise  is  accomplished  by  expend- 


i6    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

ing  energy,  for  which  accompHshment  the  possession 
of  energy  is  the  first  necessity;  the  height  of  the  table- 
land attained  represents  the  amount  of  energy  ex- 
pended; the  length  of  time  that  the  nation  maintains 
itself  upon  this  table-land,  before  starting  on  the  in- 
evitable descent  therefrom,  represents  her  staying 
power  and  constitutes  her  longevity  as  a  great  nation. 

How  long  shall  any  nation  stay  upon  the  table- 
land ?  As  long  as  she  continues  to  adapt  her  life  wisely 
to  her  environment;  as  long  as  she  continues  to  be  as 
wise  as  she  was  while  climbing  up;  for  while  climbing, 
she  had  not  only  to  exert  force,  she  had  also  to  guide 
the  force  with  wisdom.  So  we  see  that,  in  the  ascent, 
a  nation  has  to  use  both  force  and  wisdom;  on  the 
table-land,  wisdom;  in  the  decline,  neither.  Among 
the  nations  of  antiquity  one  might  suppose  that,  be- 
cause of  the  slowness  of  transportation  and  communi- 
cation, and  the  feebleness  of  weapons  compared  with 
those  of  modem  days,  much  longer  periods  of  time 
would  be  required  for  the  rise  of  any  nation,  and  also 
a  longer  period  before  her  descent  began.  Yet  the 
vast  empire  of  Alexander  lasted  hardly  a  day  after  he 
expired,  and  the  Grecian  cities  maintained  their  great- 
ness but  a  century  and  a  half;  while  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  Germany  have  been  great  nations  for 
nearly  a  thousand  years. 

Why  have  they  endured  longer  than  the  others  ? 

The  answer  is  hard  to  find ;  because  many  causes, 
and  some  of  them  obscure,  have  contributed  to  the 


WAR  AND  THE  NATIONS  17 

result.  But,  as  we  observe  the  kind  of  constitution 
and  the  mode  of  Hfe  of  long-Hved  people,  in  order  to 
ascertain  what  kind  of  constitution  and  mode  of  life 
conduce  to  longevity  in  people,  so  perhaps  we  may 
logically  do  the  same  with  nations. 

Observing  the  constitution  and  mode  of  life  of 
the  British,  French,  and  German  nations,  we  are 
struck  at  once  with  the  fact  that  those  peoples  have 
been  by  constitution  active,  ambitious,  intelligent, 
and  brave;  and  that  they  have  observed  in  their  na- 
tional life  a  skilfully  balanced  relation  between  the 
arts  of  peace  and  the  arts  of  war;  neglecting  neither 
and  allowing  neither  to  wax  great  at  the  expense  of 
the  other.  In  all  those  countries  the  first  aim  has 
been  protection  from  both  external  attack  and  internal 
disorder.  Protection  from  external  attack  has  been 
gained  by  military  force  and  highly  trained  diplomacy; 
protection  from  internal  disorder  has  been  gained  first 
by  miHtary  force,  and  second  by  wise  laws,  just  courts, 
and  the  encouragement  of  religion  and  of  those  arts 
and  sciences  that  lead  to  comfort  and  happiness  in 
living. 

China  may  attract  the  attention  of  some  as  an 
instance  of  longevity;  but  is  China  a  nation  in  the 
usual  meaning  of  the  word?  Certainly,  she  is  not  a 
great  nation.  It  is  true  that  no  other  nation  has  actu- 
ally conquered  her  of  late;  but  this  has  been  largely 
by  reason  of  her  remoteness  from  the  active  world, 
and  because  other  nations  imposed  their  will  upon  her, 


1 8    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

without  meeting  any  resistance  that  required  the  use 
of  war  to  overcome.  And  even  China  has  not  hved  a 
wholly  peaceful  life,  despite  the  non-military  charac- 
ter of  her  people.  Her  whole  history  was  one  of  wars, 
like  that  of  other  nations,  until  the  middle  of  the  four- 
teenth century  of  our  era.  Since  then,  she  has  had 
four  wars,  in  all  of  which  she  has  been  whipped:  one 
in  the  seventeenth  century  when  the  country  was  suc- 
cessfully invaded,  and  the  native  dynasty  was  over- 
thrown by  the  Tartars  of  Manchuria;  one  in  1840, 
when  Great  Britain  compelled  her  to  cede  Hong-Kong 
and  to  open  five  ports  to  foreign  commerce,  through 
which  ports  opium  could  be  introduced;  one  in  i860, 
with  Great  Britain  and  France,  that  resulted  in  the 
capture  of  Pekin;  and  one  with  Japan  in  1894.  Since 
that  time  (as  well  as  before)  China  has  been  the  scene 
of  revolutions  and  wide-spread  disturbances,  so  that, 
even  though  a  peace-loving  and  non-resisting  nation, 
peace  has  not  reigned  within  her  borders.  The  last 
dynasty  was  overthrown  in  191 2.  Since  then  a  feeble 
republic  has  dragged  on  a  precarious  existence,  inter- 
rupted by  the  very  short  reign  of  Yuan  Shih  K'ai. 

This  brief  consideration  of  the  trend  of  people  up 
to  the  present  time  seems  to  show  that,  owing  to  the 
nature  of  man  himself,  especially  to  the  nature  of 
large  "crowds"  of  men,  the  direction  in  which  nations 
have  been  moving  hitherto  has  not  been  toward  increas- 
ing the  prevalence  of  peace,  but  rather  toward  increas- 
ing the  methods,  instruments,  and  areas  of  war;  fur- 


WAR  AND  THE  NATIONS  19 

thermore,  that  this  direction  of  movement  has  been 
necessary,  in  order  to  achieve  and  to  maintain  pros- 
perity in  any  nation. 

This  being  the  case,  what  forces  exist  that  may 
reasonably  be  expected  to  change  that  trend? 

Three  main  forces  are  usually  mentioned:  Civi- 
lization, Commerce,  Christianity. 

Before  considering  these  it  may  be  well  to  note 
Newton's  first  law  of  motion,  that  every  body  will 
continue  in  a  state  of  rest  or  of  imiform  motion  in  a 
straight  line  unless  acted  on  by  some  external  force; 
for  though  this  law  was  affirmed  of  material  bodies, 
yet  its  applicability  to  large  groups  of  men  is  striking 
and  suggestive.  Not  only  do  human  beings  have  the 
physical  attributes  of  weight  and  inertia  like  other 
material  bodies,  but  their  mental  organism,  while  of 
a  higher  order  than  the  physical,  is  as  powerfully 
affected  by  external  forces.  And  though  it  is  true 
that  psychology  has  not  yet  secured  her  Newton, 
and  that  no  one  has  yet  formulated  a  law  that  ex- 
presses exactly  the  action  of  the  minds  and  spirits  of 
men  under  the  influence  of  certain  mental  and  moral 
stimuli  or  forces,  yet  we  know  that  our  minds  and 
spirits  are  influenced  by  fear,  hope,  ambition,  hate,  and 
so  forth,  in  ways  that  are  fairly  well  understood  and 
toward  results  that  often  can  be  predicted  in  advance. 

Our  whole  theory  of  government  and  our  laws  of 
business  and  every-day  life  are  founded  on  the  belief 
that  men  are  the  same  to-day  as  they  were  yesterday, 


20    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

and  that  they  will  be  the  same  to-morrow.  The  whole 
science  of  psychology  is  based  on  the  observed  and 
recorded  actions  of  the  human  organism  under  the 
influence  of  certain  external  stimuli  or  forces,  and 
starts  from  the  assumption  that  this  organism  has 
definite  and  permanent  characteristics.  If  this  is  not 
so — if  the  behavior  of  men  in  the  past  has  not  been 
governed  by  actual  laws  which  wiU  also  govern  their 
behavior  in  the  future — then  our  laws  of  government 
are  built  on  error,  and  the  teachings  of  psychology  are 
foolish. 

This  does  not  mean  that  any  man  will  necessarily 
act  in  the  same  way  to-morrow  as  he  did  yesterday, 
when  subjected  to  the  influence  of  the  same  threat, 
inducement,  or  temptation;  because,  without  grappling 
the  thorny  question  of  free  will,  we  realize  that  a  man's 
action  is  never  the  result  of  only  one  stimulus  and  mo- 
tive, but  is  the  resultant  of  many;  and  we  have  no 
reason  to  expect  that  he  will  act  in  the  same  way  when 
subjected  to  the  same  stimulus,  unless  we  know  that 
the  internal  and  external  conditions  pertaining  to  him 
are  also  the  same.  Furthermore,  even  if  we  cannot 
predict  what  a  certain  individual  will  do,  when  ex- 
posed to  a  certain  external  influence,  because  of  some 
differences  in  his  mental  and  physical  condition,  on 
one  occasion  in  comparison  with  another,  yet  when 
we  consider  large  groups  of  men,  we  know  that  indi- 
vidual peculiarities,  permanent  and  temporary,  bal- 
ance each  other  in  great  measure;    that  the  average 


WAR  AND  THE  NATIONS  21 

condition  of  a  group  of  men  is  less  changeable  than 
that  of  one  man,  and  that  the  degree  of  permanency 
of  condition  increases  with  the  number  of  men  in  the 
group.  From  this  we  may  reasonably  conclude  that, 
if  we  know  the  character  of  a  man — or  a  group  of  men 
— and  if  we  know  also  the  line  of  action  which  he — or 
they — ^have  followed  in  the  past,  we  shall  be  able  to 
predict  his — or  their — line  of  action  in  the  future  with 
considerable  accuracy;  and  that  the  accuracy  will 
increase  with  the  number  of  men  in  the  group,  and 
the  length  of  time  during  which  they  have  followed  the 
known  line  of  action.  Le  Bon  says:  "Every  race 
carries  in  its  mental  constitution  the  laws  of  its  des- 
tiny." 

Therefore,  the  line  of  action  that  the  entire  human 
race  has  followed  during  the  centuries  of  the  past  is  a 
good  index — or  at  least  the  best  index  that  we  have — 
to  its  line  of  action  during  the  centuries  of  the  future. 

Now,  men  have  been  on  this  earth  for  many  years; 
and  history  and  psychology  teach  us  that  in  their 
intercourse  with  each  other,  their  conduct  has  been 
caused  by  a  combination  of  many  forces,  among  which 
are  certain  powerful  forces  that  tend  to  create  strife. 
The  strongest  by  far  of  these  forces  is  the  ego  in  man 
himself,  a  quality  divinely  implanted  which  makes  a 
man  in  a  measure  self-protecting.  This  ego  prompts 
a  man  not  only  to  seek  pleasure  and  avoid  trouble 
for  himself,  but  also  to  gain  superiority,  and,  if  pos- 
sible, the  mastery  over  his  fellow  men.     Men  being 


22    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

placed  in  life  in  close  juxtaposition  to  each  other,  the 
struggles  of  each  man  to  advance  his  own  interests 
produce  rivalries,  jealousies,  and  conflicts. 

Similarly  with  nations.  Nations  have  been  com- 
posed for  the  most  part  of  people  having  an  heredity 
more  or  less  common  to  them  all,  so  that  they  are 
bound  together  as  great  clans.  From  this  it  has  re- 
sulted that  nations  have  been  jealous  of  each  other 
and  have  combated  each  other.  They  have  been 
doing  this  since  history  began,  and  are  doing  it  as 
much  as  ever  now. 

In  fact,  mankind  have  been  in  existence  for  so 
many  centuries,  and  their  physical,  moral,  mental, 
and  spiritual  characteristics  were  so  evidently  im- 
planted in  them  by  the  Almighty,  that  it  seems  diffi- 
cult to  see  how  any  one,  except  the  Almighty  himself, 
can  change  these  characteristics  and  their  resulting 
conduct.  It  is  a  common  saying  that  a  man  cannot 
lift  himself  over  the  fence  by  his  boot  straps,  though 
he  can  jump  over  the  fence,  if  it  is  not  too  high.  This 
saying  recognizes  the  fact  that  "a  material  system  can 
do  no  work  on  itself";  but  needs  external  aid.  When 
a  man  pulls  upward  on  his  boot  straps,  the  upward 
force  that  he  exerts  is  exactly  balanced  by  the  down- 
ward reaction  exerted  by  his  boot  straps;  but  when 
he  jumps,  the  downward  thrust  of  his  legs  causes  an 
equal  reaction  of  the  earth,  which  exerts  a  direct  force 
upward  upon  the  man;  and  it  is  this  external  force 
that  moves  him  over  the  fence.     It  is  this  external 


WAR  AND  THE  NATIONS  23 

force,  the  reaction  of  the  earth  or  air  or  water,  which 
moves  every  animal  that  walks,  or  bird  that  flies,  or 
fish  that  swims.  It  is  the  will  of  the  Almighty,  acting 
through  the  various  stimuli  of  nature,  that  causes  the 
desire  to  walk,  and  all  the  emotions  and  actions  of 
men.  If  He  shall  cause  any  new  force  to  act  on  men, 
their  line  of  conduct  will  surely  change.  But  if  He 
does  not — how  can  it  change,  or  be  changed;  how  can 
the  human  race  turn  about,  by  means  of  its  own  power 
only,  and  move  in  a  direction  the  reverse  from  that  in 
which  it  has  been  moving  throughout  all  the  cen- 
turies of  the  past? 

These  considerations  seem  to  indicate  that  na- 
tions, regarded  in  their  relation  toward  each  other, 
will  go  on  in  the  direction  in  which  they  have  been 
going  unless  acted  upon  by  some  external  force. 

Will  civilization,  commerce,  or  Christianity  im- 
part that  force? 

Inasmuch  as  civilization  is  merely  a  condition  in 
which  men  Hve,  and  an  expression  of  their  history, 
character  and  aims,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  it  could 
of  itself  act  as  an  external  force,  or  cause  an  external 
force  to  act.  "Institutions  and  laws,"  says  Le  Bon, 
again,  "are  the  outward  manifestation  of  our  char- 
acter, the  expression  of  its  needs.  Being  its  outcome, 
institutions  and  laws  cannot  change  this  character." 

Even  if  the  civilization  of  a  given  nation  may 
have  been  brought  about  in  some  degree  by  forces 
external  to  that  nation,  yet  it  is  clear  that  we  must 


24    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

regard  that  civilization  rather  as  the  result  of  those 
forces  than  as  a  force  itself.  Besides,  civilization  has 
never  yet  made  the  relations  of  nations  with  each 
other  more  unselfish,  civilized  nations  now  and  in  the 
past,  despite  their  veneer  of  courtesy,  being  fully  as 
jealous  of  each  other  as  the  most  savage  tribes.  That 
this  should  be  so  seems  natural;  because  civilization 
has  resulted  mainly  from  the  attempts  of  individuals 
and  groups  to  enhance  the  pleasures  and  diminish 
the  ills  of  life,  and  therefore  cannot  tend  to  unselfish- 
ness in  either  individuals  or  nations.  Civilization  in 
the  past  has  not  operated  to  soften  the  relations  of 
nations  with  each  other,  so  why  should  it  do  so  now? 
Is  not  modern  civilization,  with  its  attendant  com- 
plexities, rivalries,  and  jealousies,  provocative  of  quar- 
rels rather  than  the  reverse  ?  In  what  respect  is  mod- 
ern civilization  better  than  past  civilization,  except 
in  material  conveniences  due  to  material  improve- 
ments in  the  mechanic  arts?  Are  we  any  more  artis- 
tic, strong,  or  beautiful  than  the  Greeks  in  their 
palmy  days?  Are  we  braver  than  the  Spartans,  more 
honest  than  the  Chinese,  more  spiritual  than  the 
Hindoos,  more  religious  than  the  Puritans?  Is  not 
the  superior  civilization  of  the  present  day  a  mechan- 
ical civilization  pure  and  simple?  And  has  not  the 
invention  of  electrical  and  mechanical  appliances,  with 
the  resulting  insuring  of  communication  and  trans- 
portation, and  the  improvements  in  instruments  of 
destruction,  advantaged  the  great  nations  more  than 


WAR  AND   THE  NATIONS  25 

the  weaker  ones,  and  increased  the  temptation  to 
great  nations  to  use  force  rather  than  decreased  it? 
Do  not  civiUzation's  improvements  in  weapons  of  de- 
struction augment  the  effectiveness  of  warlike  meth- 
ods, as  compared  with  the  peaceful  methods  of  argu- 
ment and  persuasion? 

Diplomacy  is  an  agency  of  civilization  that  was 
invented  to  avoid  war,  to  enable  nations  to  accommo- 
date themselves  to  each  other  without  going  to  war; 
but,  practically,  diplomacy  seems  to  have  caused  al- 
most as  many  wars  as  it  has  averted.  And  even  if  it 
be  granted  that  the  influence  of  diplomacy  has  been 
in  the  main  for  peace  rather  than  for  war,  we  know 
that  diplomacy  has  been  in  use  for  centuries,  that  its 
resources  are  well  understood,  and  that  they  have  all 
been  tried  out  many  times;  and  therefore  we  ought 
to  realize  clearly  that  diplomacy  cannot  introduce 
any  new  force  into  international  politics  now,  or  exert 
an  influence  for  peace  that  will  be  more  potent  in 
the  future  than  the  influence  that  it  has  exerted  in  the 
past. 

These  considerations  seem  to  show  that  we  can- 
not reasonably  expect  civiHzation  to  divert  nations 
from  the  path  they  have  followed  hitherto. 

Can  commerce  impart  the  external  force  neces-. 
sary  to  divert  nations  from  that  path  ? 

Since  commerce  bears  exactly  the  same  relation 
to  nations  now  as  in  times  past,  and  since  it  is  an 
agency  within  mankind  itself,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 


26    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

it  can  act  as  an  external  force,  or  cause  an  external 
force  to  be  applied.  Of  course,  commercial  interests 
are  often  opposed  to  national  interests,  and  improve- 
ments in  speed  and  sureness  of  communication  and 
transportation  increase  the  size  and  power  of  com- 
mercial organizations.  But  the  same  factors  increase 
the  power  of  governments  and  the  solidarity  of  nations. 
At  no  time  in  the  past  has  there  been  more  national 
feeling  in  nations  than  now.  Even  the  loosely  held 
provinces  of  China  are  forming  a  Chinese  nation. 
Despite  the  fundamental  commercialism  of  the  age, 
national  spirit  is  growing  more  intense,  the  present 
war  being  the  main  intensifying  cause.  It  is  true  that 
the  interests  of  commerce  are  in  many  ways  antago- 
nistic to  those  of  war.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  of  all 
the  causes  that  occasion  war  the  economic  causes  are 
the  greatest.  For  no  thing  will  men  fight  more  sav- 
agely than  for  money;  for  no  thing  have  men  fought 
more  savagely  than  for  money;  and  the  greater  the 
rivalry,  the  more  the  man's  life  becomes  devoted  to  it, 
and  the  more  fiercely  he  will  fight  to  get  or  keep  it. 
Surely  of  all  the  means  by  which  we  hope  to  avoid  war, 
the  most  hopeless  by  far  is  conamerce. 

The  greatest  of  all  hopes  is  in  Christianity,  be- 
cause of  its  inculcation  of  love  and  kindliness,  its 
obvious  influence  on  the  individual  in  cultivating  un- 
selfishness and  other  peaceful  virtues,  and  the  fact 
that  it  is  an  inspiration  from  on  high,  and  therefore 
a  force  external  to  mankind.    But  let  us  look  the  facts 


WAR  AND  THE  NATIONS  27 

solemnly  in  the  face  that  the  Christian  religion  has 
now  been  in  effect  for  nearly  two  thousand  years; 
that  the  nations  now  warring  are  Christian  nations, 
in  the  very  foremost  rank  of  Christendom;  that  never 
in  history  has  there  been  so  much  bloodshed  in  such 
wide-spread  areas  and  so  much  hate,  and  that  we  see 
no  signs  that  Christianity  is  employing  any  influence 
that  she  has  not  been  employing  for  nearly  two  thou- 
sand years. 

If  we  look  for  the  influence  of  Christianity,  we 
can  find  it  in  the  dafly  lives  of  people,  in  the  family, 
in  business,  in  pohtics,  and  in  military  bodies;  every- 
where, in  fact,  in  Christian  countries,  so  long  as  we 
keep  inside  of  any  organization  the  members  of  which 
feel  bound  together.  This  we  must  aU  admit,  even  the 
heathen  know  it;  but  where  do  we  see  any  evidence  of 
the  sweetening  effect  of  Christianity  in  the  dealings 
of  one  organization  with  another  with  which  it  has  no 
special  bonds  of  friendship?  Christianity  is  invoked 
in  every  warring  nation  now  to  stimulate  the  patriotic 
spirit  of  the  nation  and  intensify  the  hate  of  the  crowd 
against  the  enemy;  and  even  if  we  think  that  such  in- 
voking is  a  perversion  of  religious  influence  to  un- 
righteous ends,  we  must  admit  the  fact  that  the  Chris- 
tian religion  itself  is  at  this  moment  being  made  to 
exert  a  powerful  influence — not  toward  peace  but 
toward  war !  And  this  should  not  amaze  us;  for  where 
does  the  Bible  say  or  intimate  that  love  among  nations 
will  ever  be  brought  about?    The  Saviour  said:    "I 


28    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

bring  not  peace  but  a  sword."  So  what  reasonable 
hope  does  even  Christianity  give  us  that  war  between 
nations  will  cease  ?  And  even  if  it  did  give  reasonable 
hope,  let  us  realize  that  between  reasonable  hope  and 
reasonable  expectation  there  is  a  great  gulf  fixed. 

Therefore,  we  seem  forced  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  world  will  move  in  the  future  in  the  same  direc- 
tion as  in  the  past;  that  nations  will  become  larger 
and  larger  and  fewer  and  fewer,  the  immediate  instru- 
ment of  international  changes  being  war;  and  that 
certain  nations  will  become  very  powerful  and  nearly 
dominate  the  earth  in  turn,  as  Persia,  Greece,  Rome, 
Spain,  France,  and  Great  Britain  have  done — and 
as  some  other  country  soon  may  do. 

Fortunately,  or  perhaps  unfortunately,  a  certain 
law  of  decadence  seems  to  have  prevailed,  because  of 
which  every  nation,  after  acquiring  great  power,  has 
in  turn  succumbed  to  the  enervating  effects  which 
seem  inseparable  from  it,  and  become  the  victim  of 
some  newer  nation  that  has  made  strenuous  prepara- 
tions for  long  years,  in  secret,  and  finally  pounced 
upon  her  as  a  lion  on  its  prey. 

Were  it  not  for  this  tendency  to  decadence,  we 
should  expect  that  the  nations  of  the  earth  would 
ultimately  be  divided  into  two  great  nations,  and  that 
these  would  contend  for  the  mastery  in  a  world-wide 
struggle. 

But  if  the  present  rate  of  invention  and  develop- 
ment continues,  improvements  in  the  mechanic  arts 


WAR  AND   THE  NATIONS  29 

will  probably  cause  such  increase  in  the  power  of 
weapons  of  destruction,  and  in  the  swiftness  and  sure- 
ness  of  transportation  and  communication,  that  some 
monster  of  efficiency  will  have  time  to  acquire  world 
mastery  before  her  period  of  decadence  sets  in. 

In  this  event,  wars  will  be  of  a  magnitude  besides 
which  the  present  struggle  will  seem  pygmy;  and 
will  rage  over  the  surface  of  the  earth,  for  the  gaining 
and  retaining  of  the  mastery  of  the  world. 


CHAPTER  II 
NAVAL  A,   B,   C 

IN  order  to  realize  what  principles  govern  the  use  of 
navies,  let  us  first  consider  what  navies  have  to  do, 
and  get  history's  data  as  to  what  navies  in  the  past 
have  done.  It  would  obviously  be  impossible  to  re- 
count here  all  the  doings  of  navies. ,  But  neither  is  it 
necessary;  for  the  reason  that,  throughout  the  long 
periods  of  time  in  which  history  records  them,  their 
activities  have  nearly  always  been  the  same. 

In  all  cases  in  which  navies  have  been  used  for  war 
there  was  the  preliminary  dispute,  often  long-contin- 
ued, between  two  peoples  or  their  rulers,  and  at  last 
the  decision  of  the  dispute  by  force.  In  all  cases  the  de- 
cision went  to  the  side  that  could  exert  the  most  force 
at  the  critical  times  and  places.  The  fact  that  the 
causes  of  war  have  been  civil,  and  not  military,  de- 
mands consideration,  for  the  reason  that  some  people, 
confusing  cause  and  effect,  incline  to  the  belief  that 
armies  and  navies  are  the  cause  of  war,  and  that  they 
are  to  be  blamed  for  its  horrors.  History  clearly  de- 
clares the  contrary,  and  shows  that  the  only  role  of 
armies  and  navies  has  been  to  wage  wars,  and,  by  wag- 
ing, to  finish  them. 

It  may  be  well  here,  in  order  to  clear  away  a  pos- 

30 


NAVAL  A,  B,  C  31 

sible  preconception  by  the  reader,  to  try  and  dispel 
the  illusion  that  army  and  navy  officers  are  eager  for 
war,  in  order  that  they  may  get  promotion.  This 
idea  has  been  exploited  by  people  opposed  to  the  de- 
velopment of  the  army  and  navy,  and  has  been  re- 
ceived with  so  much  credulity  that  it  seriously  handi- 
caps the  endeavors  of  officers  to  get  an  unbiassed  hear- 
ing. But  surely  the  fooHshness  of  such  an  idea  would 
promptly  disappear  from  the  brain  of  any  one  if  he 
would  remind  himself  that  simply  because  a  man 
joins  the  army  or  navy  he  does  not  cease  to  be  a  hu- 
man being,  with  the  same  emotions  of  fear  as  other 
men,  the  same  sensitiveness  to  pain,  the  same  dread 
of  death,  and  the  same  horror  of  leaving  his  family 
unsupported  after  his  death.  It  is  true  that  men  in 
armies  and  navies  are  educated  to  dare  death  if  need 
be;  but  the  present  writer  has  been  through  two  wars, 
has  been  well  acquainted  with  army  and  navy  officers 
for  forty-five  years,  and  knows  positively  that,  barring 
exceptions,  they  do  not  desire  war  at  all. 

Without  going  into  an  obviously  impossible  dis- 
cussion of  all  naval  wars,  it  may  be  instructive  to  con- 
sider briefly  the  four  naval  wars  in  which  the  United 
States  has  engaged. 

The  first  was  the  War  of  the  American  Revolu- 
tion. This  war  is  instructive  to  those  who  contend 
that  the  United  States  is  so  far  from  Europe  as  to  be 
safe  from  attack  by  a  European  fleet;  because  the  in- 
tervening distance  was  frequently  traversed  then  by 


32    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

British  and  French  fleets  of  frail,  slow,  sailing  ships, 
which  were  vital  factors  in  the  war.  Without  the 
British  war-ships,  the  British  could  not  have  landed 
and  supported  their  troops.  Without  the  French  war- 
ships the  French  could  not  have  landed  and  sup- 
ported their  troops,  who,  under  Rochambeau,  were 
also  under  Washington,  and  gave  him  the  assistance 
that  he  wofully  needed,  to  achieve  by  arms  our  in- 
dependence. 

The  War  of  1812  is  instructive  from  the  fact  that, 
though  the  actions  of  our  naval  ships  produced  little 
material  effect,  the  skill,  daring,  and  success  with  which 
they  were  fought  convinced  Europeans  of  the  high 
character  and  consequent  noble  destiny  of  the  Ameri- 
can people.  The  British  were  so  superior  in  sea 
strength,  however,  that  they  were  able  to  send  their 
fleet  across  the  ocean  and  land  a  force  on  the  shores 
of  Chesapeake  Bay.  This  force  marched  to  Washing- 
ton, attacked  the  city,  and  burned  the  Capitol  and 
other  public  buildings,  with  little  inconvenience  to 
itself. 

The  War  of  the  Rebellion  is  instructive  because  it 
shows  how  two  earnest  peoples,  each  believing  them- 
selves right,  can  be  forced,  by  the  very  sincerity  of 
their  convictions,  to  wage  war  against  each  other;  and 
because  it  shows  how  unpreparedness  for  war,  with 
its  accompanying  ignorance  of  the  best  way  in  which 
to  wage  it,  causes  undue  duration  of  a  war  and  there- 
fore needless  suffering.    If  the  North  had  not  closed 


NAVAL  A,   B,   C  33 

its  eyes  so  resolutely  to  the  fact  of  the  coining  strug- 
gle, it  would  have  noted  beforehand  that  the  main 
weakness  of  the  Confederacy  lay  in  its  dependence  on 
revenue  from  cotton  and  its  inability  to  provide  a 
navy  that  could  prevent  a  blockade  of  its  coasts;  and 
the  North  would  have  early  instituted  a  blockade  so 
tight  that  the  Confederacy  would  have  been  forced  to 
yield  much  sooner  than  it  did.  The  North  would  have 
made  naval  operations  the  main  effort,  instead  of  the 
auxiliary  effort;  and  would  have  substituted  for  much 
of  the  protracted  and  bloody  warfare  of  the  land  the 
quickly  decisive  and  comparatively  merciful  warfare 
of  the  sea. 

In  the  Spanish  War  the  friction  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain  was  altogether  about  Cuba. 
No  serious  thought  of  the  invasion  of  either  country 
was  entertained,  no  invasion  was  attempted,  and  the 
only  land  engagements  were  some  minor  engagements 
in  Cuba  and  the  Philippines.  The  critical  operations 
were  purely  naval.  In  the  first  of  these,  Commodore 
Dewey's  squadron  destroyed  the  entire  Far  Eastern 
squadron  of  the  Spanish  in  Manila  Bay;  in  the  second. 
Admiral  Sampson's  squadron  destroyed  the  entire  At- 
lantic squadron  of  the  Spanish  near  Santiago  de  Cuba. 
The  two  naval  victories  compelled  Spain  to  make 
terms  of  peace  practically  as  the  United  States  wished. 
Attention  is  invited  to  the  fact  that  this  war  was 
not  a  war  of  conquest,  was  not  a  war  of  aggression, 
was  not  a  war  of  invasion,  was  not  a  war  carried  on 


34    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

by  either  side  for  any  base  purpose;  but  was  in  its  in- 
tention and  its  results  for  the  benefit  of  mankind. 

The  Russo-Japanese  War  was  due  to  conflicting 
national  policies.  While  each  side  accused  the  other 
of  selfish  ends,  it  is  not  apparent  to  a  disinterested 
observer  that  either  was  unduly  selfish  in  its  policy, 
or  was  doing  more  than  every  country  ought  to  ad- 
vance the  interests  and  promote  the  welfare  of  its 
people.  Russia  naturally  had  a  great  deal  of  interest 
in  Manchuria,  and  felt  that  she  had  a  right  to  expand 
through  the  uncivilized  regions  of  Manchuria,  espe- 
cially since  she  needed  a  satisfactory  outlet  to  the  sea. 
In  other  words,  the  interests  of  Russia  were  in  the  line 
of  its  expanding  to  the  eastward.  But  Japan's  inter- 
ests were  precisely  the  reverse  of  Russia's — that  is, 
Japan's  interests  demanded  that  Russia  should  not 
do  those  things  that  Russia  wanted  to  do.  Japan  felt 
that  Russia's  movement  toward  the  East  was  bringing 
her  entirely  too  close  to  Japan.  Russia  was  too  pow- 
erful a  country,  and  too  aggressive,  to  be  trusted  so 
close.  Japan  had  the  same  feeling  toward  Russia  that 
any  man  might  have  on  seeing  another  man,  heav- 
ily armed,  gradually  coming  closer  to  him  in  the  night. 
Japan  especially  wished  that  Russia  should  have  no 
foothold  in  Corea,  feeling,  as  she  expressed  it,  that  the 
point  of  Corea  under  Russian  power  would  be  a  dagger 
directed  at  the  heart  of  Japan.  This  feeling  about 
Corea  was  the  same  feeling  that  every  country  has 
about  land  near  her;  it  has  a  marked  resemblance  to 


NAVAL  A,  B,  C  35 

the  feeling  that  the  United  States  has  embodied  in  its 
Monroe  Doctrine. 

After  several  years  of  negotiation  in  which  Japan 
and  Russia  endeavored  to  secure  their  respective  aims 
by  diplomacy,  diplomacy  was  finally  abandoned  and 
the  sword  taken  up  instead.  Japan,  because  of  the  su- 
perior foresight  of  her  statesmen,  was  the  first  to  realize 
that  diplomacy  must  fail,  was  the  first  to  realize  that 
she  must  prepare  for  war,  was  the  first  to  begin  ade- 
quate preparation  for  war,  was  the  first  to  complete 
preparation  for  war,  was  the  first  to  strike,  and  in 
consequence  was  the  victor.  Yet  Russia  was  a  very 
much  larger,  richer,  more  populous  country  than  Japan. 

Russia  sent  large  forces  of  soldiers  to  Manchuria 
by  the  trans-Siberian  railroad,  and  Japan  sent  large 
forces  there  by  transports  across  the  Sea  of  Japan. 
Japan  could  not  prevent  the  passage  of  soldiers  by 
the  railroad,  but  Russia  could  prevent  the  passage 
of  transports  across  the  Japan  Sea,  provided  her  fleet 
could  overcome  the  Japanese  fleet  and  get  command 
of  the  sea.  Russia  had  a  considerable  fleet  in  the  Far 
East;  but  she  had  so  underestimated  the  naval  abil- 
ity of  the  Japanese,  that  the  Russian  fleet  proved 
unequal  to  the  task;  and  the  Japanese  gradually  re- 
duced it  to  almost  nothing,  with  very  little  loss  to  them- 
selves. 

Russia  then  sent  out  another  fleet.  The  Japa- 
nese met  this  fleet  on  the  27th  of  May,  1904,  near  the 
Island  of  Tsushima,  between  Corea  and  Japan.    The 


36    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

battle  was  decided  in  about  an  hour,  The  Japanese 
sank  practically  all  the  Russian  ships  before  the  bat- 
tle was  entirely  finished,  with  comparatively  small 
loss  to  Japan.  This  battle  was  carried  on  12,000  miles 
by  sea  route  from  Saint  Petersburg.  No  invasion  of 
Russia  or  Japan  was  contemplated,  or  attempted,  and 
yet  the  naval  battle  decided  the  issue  of  the  war  com- 
pletely, and  was  followed  by  a  treaty  of  peace  very 
shortly  afterward. 

These  wars  show  us,  as  do  all  wars  in  which  navies 
have  engaged,  that  the  function  of  a  navy  is  not  only 
to  defend  the  coast  in  the  sense  of  preventing  an 
enemy  from  landing  on  it,  but  also  to  exert  force  far 
distant  from  the  coast.  The  study  of  war  has  taught 
its  students  for  many  centuries  that  a  merely  passive 
defense  will  finally  be  broken  down,  and  that  the  most 
effective  defense  is  the  "offensive-defensive." 

Perhaps  the  clearest  case  of  a  correct  offensive- 
defensive  is  Nelson's  defense  of  England,  which  he 
carried  on  in  the  Mediterranean,  in  the  West  Indies, 
and  wherever  the  enemy  fleet  might  be,  finally  de- 
feating Napoleon's  plan  for  mvading  England — not 
by  waiting  off  the  coast  of  England,  but  by  attacking 
and  cripplmg  Napoleon's  fleet  off  the  Spanish  coast 
near  Trafalgar. 

The  idea  held  by  many  people  that  the  defense  of 
a  country  can  be  effected  by  simply  preventing  the 
invasion  of  its  coasts,  is  a  Httle  like  the  notion  of  un- 
educated people  that  a  disease  can  be  cured  by  sup- 


NAVAL  A,  B,   C  37 

pressing  its  symptoms.  For  even  a  successful  defense 
of  a  coast  against  invasion  by  a  hostile  force  cannot 
remove  the  inimical  influence  to  a  country's  com- 
merce and  welfare  which  that  hostile  force  exerts,  any 
more  than  palliatives  can  cure  dyspepsia.  Every  in- 
telligent physician  knows  that  the  only  way  to  cure 
a  disease  is  to  remove  its  cause;  and  every  intelligent 
military  or  naval  man  knows  that  history  teaches 
that  the  only  way  in  which  a  country  can  defend 
itself  successfully  against  an  enemy  is  to  defeat  the 
armed  force  of  that  enemy — ^be  it  a  force  of  soldiers 
on  the  land,  or  a  force  of  war-ships  on  the  sea.  In 
naval  parlance,  "our  objective  is  the  enemy's  fleet." 

If  the  duty  of  a  navy  be  merely  to  prevent  the 
actual  invasion  of  its  country's  coasts,  a  great  mistake 
has  been  made  by  Great  Britain,  France,  and  other 
countries  in  spending  so  much  money  on  their  navies, 
and  in  giving  so  much  attention  to  the  education  and 
training  of  their  officers  and  enlisted  men.  To  pre- 
vent actual  invasion  would  be  comparatively  an  easy 
task,  one  that  could  be  performed  by  rows  of  forts 
along  the  coast,  supplemented  by  mines  and  sub- 
marines. If  that  is  the  only  kind  of  defense  required, 
navies  are  hardly  needed.  The  army  in  each  country 
could  man  the  forts  and  operate  the  mines,  and  a 
special  corps  of  the  army  could  even  operate  the  sub- 
marines, which  (if  their  only  office  is  to  prevent  actual 
invasion)  need  hardly  leave  the  "three-mile  limit" 
that  skirts  the  coasts.    If  the  people  of  any  country 


38    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

do  not  care  to  have  dealings  outside;  if  the  nation  is 
willing  to  be  in  the  position  of  a  man  who  is  safe  so 
long  as  he  stays  in  the  house,  but  is  afraid  to  go  out- 
doors, the  problem  of  national  defense  is  easy. 

But  if  the  people  desire  to  prevent  interference 
with  what  our  Constitution  calls  "the  general  wel- 
fare," the  problem  becomes  exceedingly  complex  and 
exceedingly  grave — more  complex  and  grave  than  any 
other  problem  that  they  have.  If  they  desire  that 
their  ships  shall  be  free  to  sail  the  seas,  and  their  citi- 
zens to  carry  on  business  and  to  travel  in  other  lands; 
and  if  they  desire  that  their  merchants  shall  be  able 
to  export  their  wares  and  their  farmers  their  grain,  also 
that  the  people  shall  be  able  to  import  the  things  they 
wish  from  foreign  countries,  then  they  must  be  able 
to  exert  actual  physical  force  on  the  ocean  at  any 
point  where  vessels  carrying  their  exports  and  im- 
ports may  be  threatened.  Naval  ships  are  the  only 
means  for  doing  this. 

The  possibility  that  an  armed  force  sent  to  a 
given  point  at  sea  might  have  to  fight  an  enemy  force, 
brought  about  first  the  sending  of  more  than  one  ves- 
sel, and  later — as  the  mechanic  arts  progressed — the 
increasing  of  the  size  of  individual  vessels,  and  later 
still  the  development  of  novel  types. 

There  are  two  main  reasons  for  building  a  small 
number  of  large  ships  rather  than  a  large  number  of 
small  ships.  The  first  reason  is  that  large  ships  are 
much  more  steady,  reliable,  safe,  and  fast  than  small 


NAVAL  A,  B,  C  39 

ships.  The  second  reason  is  that,  when  designed  for 
any  given  speed,  the  large  ships  have  more  space  avail- 
able for  whatever  is  to  be  carried;  one  15-knot  ship 
of  20,000  tons  normal  displacement,  for  instance,  has 
about  one  and  a  half  times  as  much  space  available 
for  cargo,  guns,  and  what-not,  as  four  1 5-knot  ships  of 
5,000  tons  each.  These  two  reasons  apply  to  merchant 
ships  as  well  as  naval  ships.  A  third  reason  applies 
to  naval  vessels  only,  and  is  that  a  few  large  ships  can 
be  handled  much  better  together  than  a  large  number 
of  small  ships,  and  embody  that  "concentration  of 
force"  which  it  is  the  endeavor  of  strategy  and  tac- 
tics to  secure.  A  fourth  reason  is  the  obvious  one  that 
large  ships  can  carry  larger  guns  than  small  ships. 

The  distinctly  military  (naval)  purpose  for  which 
a  war-ship  is  designed  necessitates,  first,  that  in  addi- 
tion to  her  ability  to  go  rapidly  and  surely  from  place 
to  place,  she  be  able  to  exert  physical  force  against  an 
enemy  ship  or  fort,  and,  second,  that  she  have  protec- 
tion against  the  fire  of  guns  and  torpedoes  from  enemy 
ships  and  forts,  against  bombs  dropped  from  aircraft, 
and  against  mines. 

This  means  that  a  man-of-war,  intended  to  exert 
the  maximum  of  physical  force  against  an  enemy  and 
to  be  able  to  withstand  the  maximum  of  punishment, 
must  have  guns  and  torpedoes  for  offense,  and  must 
have  armor  and  cellular  division  of  the  hull  for  de- 
fense; the  armor  to  keep  out  the  enemy's  shells,  and 
the  cellular  division  of  the  hull  to  prevent  the  admis- 


40    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

sion  of  more  water  than  can  fiill  one  water-tight  com- 
partment in  case  the  ship  is  hit. 

It  must  be  admitted  here  that,  at  the  present 
moment,  torpedoes  hold  such  large  charges  of  explo- 
sive that  the  cellular  division  of  ships  does  not  ade- 
quately protect  them.  This  means  that  a  contest  has 
been  going  on  between  torpedo-makers  and  naval  con- 
structors like  the  contest  between  armor-makers  and 
gunmakers,  and  that  just  now  the  torpedo-makers 
are  in  the  lead.  For  this  reason  a  battleship  needs 
other  protection  than  that  imparted  by  its  cellular 
subdivision.  This  is  given  by  its  "torpedo  defense 
battery"  of  minor  guns  of  about  5-inch  calibre. 

By  reason  of  the  great  vulnerability  of  all  ships 
to  attack  below  the  water-line,  the  torpedo  was  in- 
vented and  developed.  In  its  original  form,  the  tor- 
pedo was  motionless  in  the  water,  either  anchored  to 
the  ground,  or  floating  on  the  surface,  and  was  in  fact 
what  now  is  called  a  "mine."  But  forty-eight  years 
ago  an  Englishman  named  Whitehead  invented  the 
automobile,  auto-steering,  torpedo,  which  still  bears 
his  name.  This  torpedo  is  used  in  all  the  navies,  and 
is  launched  on  its  mission  from  battleships,  battle 
cruisers,  destroyers,  submarines,  and  other  craft  of 
various  kinds. 

Most  torpedoes  are  to  be  found  in  destroyers — 
long,  fast,  frail  vessels,  averaging  about  700  tons  dis- 
placement, that  are  intended  to  dash  at  enemy  ships 
at  night,  or  under  other  favorable  conditions,  launch 


NAVAL  A,  B,  C  41 

their  torpedoes,  and  hurry  away.  The  torpedo  is  "a 
weapon  of  opportunity."  It  has  had  a  long,  slow  fight 
for  its  existence;  but  its  success  during  the  present 
war  has  established  it  firmly  in  naval  warfare. 

The  submarine  has  followed  the  destroyer,  and 
some  people  think  will  supplant  it;  though  its  rela- 
tively slow  speed  prevents  those  dashes  that  are  the 
destroyer's  role.  The  submarine  is,  however,  a  kind 
of  destroyer  that  is  submersible,  in  which  the  necessi- 
ties of  submersibility  preclude  great  speed.  The 
submarine  was  designed  to  accomplish  a  clear  and 
definite  purpose — a  secret  under-water  attack  on  an 
enemy's  ship  in  the  vicinity.  It  has  succeeded  so 
well  in  its  limited  mission  that  some  intelligent  peo- 
ple declare  that  we  need  submarines  only — ignoring 
the  fact  that,  even  if  submarines  could  successfully 
prevent  actual  invasion,  they  could  not  carry  on 
operations  at  a  distance  from  their  base  of  supplies. 
It  is  true  that  submarines  may  be  made  so  large  that 
they  can  steam  at  great  speed  from  place  to  place, 
as  capital  ships  steam  now,  carry  large  supplies  of  fuel 
and  food,  house  their  crews  hygienically,  and  need  no 
"mother  ship"  or  tender.  But  if  submarines  achieve 
such  size,  they  will  be  more  expensive  to  build  and 
run  than  battleships — and  will  be,  in  fact,  submer- 
sible battleships.  In  other  words,  the  submarine  can- 
not displace  the  battleship,  but  may  be  developed 
and  evolved  into  a  new  and  highly  specialized  type 
of  battleship. 


42    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

The  necessity  for  operating  at  long  distances  from 
a  base  carries  with  it  the  necessity  for  supplying  more 
fuel  than  even  a  battleship  can  carry;  and  this  means 
that  colliers  must  be  provided.  In  most  countries 
the  merchant  service  is  so  large  that  colliers  can  be 
taken  from  it,  but  in  the  United  States  no  adequate 
merchant  marine  exists,  and  so  it  is  found  necessary 
to  build  navy  colliers  and  have  them  in  the  fleet. 
The  necessity  for  continuously  supplying  food  and 
ammunition  to  the  fleet  necessitates  supply  ships  and 
ammunition  ships;  but  the  problem  of  supplying  food 
and  ammimition  is  not  so  difficult  as  that  of  supply- 
ing fuel,  for  the  reason  that  they  are  consumed  more 
slowly. 

In  order  to  take  care  of  the  sick  and  wounded,  and 
prevent  them  from  hampering  the  activities  of  the 
well,  hospital  ships  are  needed.  Hospital  ships  should, 
of  course,  be  designed  for  that  purpose  before  being 
constructed;  but  usually  hospital  ships  were  origi- 
nally passenger  ships,  and  were  adapted  to  hospital 
uses  later. 

The  menace  of  the  destroyer — owing  to  the  sea- 
worthiness which  this  type  has  now  achieved,  and  to 
the  great  range  which  the  torpedo  has  acquired — • 
has  brought  about  the  necessity  of  providing  external 
protection  to  the  battleships;  and  this  is  supplied  by 
a  "screen"  of  cruisers  and  destroyers,  whose  duty  is 
to  keep  enemy  destroyers  and  (so  far  as  is  practi- 
cable) the  submarines  at  a  safe  distance. 


NAVAL  A,  B,  C  43 

We  now  see  why  a  fleet  must  be  composed  of  vari- 
ous types  of  vessels.  At  the  present  moment,  the  bat- 
tleship is  the  primary,  or  paramount  type,  the  others 
secondary,  because  the  battleship  is  the  type  that 
can  exert  the  most  force,  stand  the  hardest  punish- 
ment, steam  the  farthest  in  all  kinds  of  weather,  and 
in  general,  serve  her  country  the  best. 

Of  course,  "battleship"  is  merely  a  name,  and 
some  think  not  a  very  good  name,  to  indicate  a  ship 
that  can  take  the  part  in  battle  that  used  to  be  taken 
by  the  "ship  of  the  line."  The  reason  for  its  primacy 
is  fundamental:  its  displacement  or  total  weight — the 
same  reason  that  assured  the  primacy  of  the  ship  of 
the  line.  For  displacement  rules  the  waves;  if  "Bri- 
tannia rules  the  waves,"  it  is  simply  because  Britannia 
has  more  displacement  than  any  other  Power. 

The  fleet  needs  to  have  a  means  of  knowing  where 
the  enemy  is,  how  many  ships  he  has,  what  is  their 
character,  the  direction  in  which  they  are  steaming, 
and  their  speed.  To  accomplish  this  purpose,  "scouts" 
are  needed — ^fast  ships,  that  can  steam  far  in  all  kinds 
of  weather  and  send  wireless  messages  across  great 
distances.  So  far  as  their  scout  duties  go,  such  ves- 
sels need  no  guns  whatever,  and  no  torpedoes;  but 
because  the  enemy  will  see  the  scout  as  soon  as  the 
scout  sees  the  enemy,  and  because  the  enemy  will  try 
to  drive  away  the  scout  by  gun  and  torpedo  fire,  the 
scouts  must  be  armed.  And  this  necessity  is  rein- 
forced by  the  necessity  of  driving  off  an  enemy's  scouts. 


44    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

In  foreign  navies  the  need  for  getting  information  in 
defiance  of  an  enemy's  attempts  to  prevent  it,  and 
to  drive  off  the  armed  scouts  of  an  enemy,  has  been 
one  of  the  prime  reasons  for  developing  "battle  cruis- 
ers," that  combine  the  speed  of  the  destroyer  with  the 
long  steaming  radius  of  the  battleship,  a  battery  al- 
most as  strong,  and  a  very  considerable  protection  by 
armor. 

The  aeroplane  and  the  air-ship  are  recent  acces- 
sions to  the  Ust  of  fighting  craft.  Their  role  in  naval 
warfare  cannot  yet  be  defined,  because  the  machines 
themselves  have  not  yet  reached  an  advanced  stage 
of  development,  and  their  probable  performance  can- 
not be  forecast.  There  is  no  doubt,  however,  in  the 
minds  of  naval  men  that  the  role  of  aircraft  is  to  be 
important  and  distinguished. 


CHAPTER  III 
NAVAL  POWER 

MAHAN  proved  that  sea  power  has  exercised  a 
determining  influence  on  history.  He  proved 
that  sea  power  has  been  necessary  for  commercial 
success  in  peace  and  military  success  in  war.  He 
proved  that,  while  many  wars  have  culminated  with 
the  victory  of  some  army,  the  victory  of  some  navy 
had  been  the  previous  essential.  He  proved  that  the 
immediate  cause  of  success  had  often  resulted  inevi- 
tably from  another  cause,  less  apparent  because  more 
profound;  that  the  operations  of  the  navy  had  pre- 
viously brought  affairs  up  to  the  "mate  in  four  moves,'* 
and  that  the  final  victory  of  the  army  was  the  result- 
ing "checkmate." 

Before  Mahan  proved  his  doctrine,  it  was  felt  in 
a  general  way  that  sea  power  was  necessary  to  the 
prosperity  and  security  of  a  nation.  Mahan  was  not 
the  first  to  have  this  idea,  for  it  had  been  in  the  minds 
of  some  men,  and  in  the  policy  of  one  nation,  for  more 
than  a  century.  Neither  was  Mahan  the  first  to  put 
forth  the  idea  in  writing;  but  he  was  the  first  to  make 
an  absolute  demonstration  of  the  truth.  Newton  was 
not  the  first  man  to  know,  or  to  say,  that  things  near 
the  earth  tend  to  fall  to  the  earth;  but  he  was  the  first 

45 


46    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

to  formulate  and  prove  the  doctrine  of  universal  gravi- 
tation. In  the  same  way,  all  through  history,  we  find 
that  a  few  master  minds  have  been  able  to  group 
what  had  theretofore  seemed  unrelated  phenomena, 
and  deduce  from  them  certain  laws.  In  this  way  they 
substituted  reasoning  for  speculation,  fact  for  fancy, 
wisdom  for  opportunism,  and  became  the  guides  of 
the  human  race. 

The  effect  of  the  acceptance  of  Mahan's  doc- 
trine was  felt  at  once.  Realizing  that  the  influence  of 
sea  power  was  a  fact,  comprehending  Great  Britain's 
secret,  after  Mahan  had  disclosed  it,  certain  other 
great  nations  of  the  world,  especially  Germany,  imme- 
diately started  with  confidence  and  vigor  upon  the 
increase  of  their  own  sea  power,  and  pushed  it  to  a 
degree  before  unparalleled;  with  a  result  that  must 
have  been  amazing  to  the  man  who,  more  than  any 
other,  was  responsible  for  it. 

Since  the  words  "sea  power,"  or  their  translation, 
is  a  recognized  phrase  the  world  over,  and  since  the 
power  of  sea  power  is  greater  than  ever  before,  and  is 
still  increasing,  it  may  be  profitable  to  consider  sea 
power  as  an  entity,  and  to  inquire  what  are  its  leading 
characteristics,  and  in  what  it  mainly  consists. 

There  is  no  trouble  in  defining  what  the  sea  is, 
but  there  is  a  good  deal  of  trouble  in  defining  what 
power  is.  If  we  look  in  a  dictionary,  we  shall  find  a 
good  many  definitions  of  power;  so  many  as  to  show 
that  there  are  many  different  kinds  of  power,  and  that 


NAVAL  POWER  47 

when  we  read  of  "power,"  it  is  necessary  to  know 
what  kind  of  power  is  meant.  Clearly  "sea  power" 
means  power  on  the  sea.  But  what  kind  of  power? 
There  are  two  large  classes  into  which  power  may  be 
divided,  passive  and  active.  Certainly  we  seem  justi- 
fied, at  the  start,  in  declaring  that  the  power  meant 
by  Mahan  was  not  passive,  but  active.  Should  this 
be  granted,  we  cannot  be  far  from  right  if  we  go  a  step 
further,  and  declare  that  sea  power  means  ability  to 
do  something  on  the  sea. 

If  we  ask  what  the  something  is  that  sea  power 
has  ability  to  do,  we  at  once  perceive  that  sea  power 
may  be  divided  into  two  parts,  commercial  power  and 
naval  power. 

The  power  exerted  by  commercial  sea  power  is 
clearly  that  exerted  by  the  merchant  service,  and  is 
mainly  the  power  of  acquiring  money.  It  is  true  that 
the  merchant  service  has  the  power  of  rendering  cer- 
tain services  in  war,  especially  the  power  of  providing 
auxiliary  vessels,  and  of  furnishing  men  accustomed 
to  the  sea;  but  as  time  goes  on  the  power  contrib- 
utable  by  the  merchant  service  must  steadily  de- 
crease, because  of  the  relatively  increasing  power  of 
the  naval  service,  and  the  rapidly  increasing  differ- 
ence between  the  characteristics  of  ships  and  men 
suitable  for  the  merchant  service  and  those  suitable 
for  the  naval  service. 

But  even  in  the  past,  while  the  importance  of  the 
merchant  service  was  considerable  in  the  ways  just 


48    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

outlined,  it  may  perhaps  be  questioned  whether  it 
formed  an  element  of  sea  power,  in  the  sense  in  which 
Mahan  discussed  sea  power.  The  power  of  every 
country  depends  on  all  the  sources  of  its  wealth:  on 
its  agriculture,  on  its  manufacturing  activities,  and 
even  more  directly  on  the  money  derived  from  ex- 
ports. But  these  sources  of  wealth  and  all  sources 
of  wealth,  including  the  merchant  service,  can  hardly 
be  said  to  be  elements  of  power  themselves,  but 
rather  to  be  elements  for  whose  protection  power  is 
required. 

In  fact,  apart  from  its  usefulness  in  furnishing 
auxiliaries,  it  seems  certain  that  the  merchant  service 
has  been  an  element  of  weakness.  The  need  for  navies 
arose  from  the  weakness  of  merchant  sliips  and  the 
corresponding  necessity  for  assuring  them  safe  voy- 
ages and  proper  treatment  even  in  time  of  peace; 
while  in  time  of  war  they  have  always  been  an  anxious 
care,  and  have  needed  and  received  the  protection  of 
fighting  ships  that  have  been  taken  away  from  the 
fleet  to  act  as  convoys. 

If  commercial  sea  power  was  not  the  power  meant 
by  Mahan,  then  he  must  have  meant  naval  power. 
And  if  one  reads  the  pages  of  history  with  patient  dis- 
crimination, the  conviction  must  grow  on  him  that 
what  really  constituted  the  sea  power  which  had  so 
great  an  influence  on  history,  was  naval  power;  not 
the  power  of  simply  ships  upon  the  sea,  but  the  power 
of  a  navy  composed  of  ships  able  to  fight,  manned  by 


NAVAL  POWER  49 

men  trained  to  fight,  under  the  command  of  captains 
skilled  to  fight,  and  led  by  admirals  determined  to 
fight.  Trafalgar  was  not  won  by  the  merchant  ser- 
vice;  nor  Mobile,  Manila,  or  Tsushima. 

If  sea  power  be  essentially  naval  power,  it  may 
be  interesting  to  inquire:  In  what  does  naval  power 
consist  and  what  are  its  principal  characteristics? 

If  one  looks  at  a  fleet  of  war-ships  on  the  sea,  he 
will  be  impressed  consciously  or  imconsciously  with 
the  idea  of  power.  If  he  is  impressed  consciously,  he 
will  see  that  the  fleet  represents  power  in  the  broadest 
sense — power  active  and  power  passive;  power  to  do 
and  power  to  endure;  power  to  exert  force  and  power 
to  resist  it. 

If  he  goes  further  and  analyzes  the  reasons  for 
this  impression  of  power,  he  will  see  that  it  is  not 
merely  a  mental  suggestion,  but  a  realization  of  the 
actual  existence  of  tremendous  mechanical  power, 
under  complete  direction  and  control. 

In  mechanics  we  get  a  definition  of  power,  which, 
like  aU  definitions  in  mechanics,  is  clear,  definite,  and 
correct.  In  mechanics,  power  is  the  rate  at  which 
mechanical  work  is  performed.  It  is  abiUty  to  do  some- 
thing in  a  certain  definite  time. 

Now  this  definition  gives  us  a  clear  idea  of  the 
way  in  which  a  navy  directly  represents  power,  be- 
cause the  power  which  a  navy  exerts  is,  primarily, 
mechanical;  and  any  other  power  which  it  exerts  is 
secondary  and  derived  wholly  from  its  mechanical 


50    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

power.  The  power  of  a  gun  is  due  wholly  to  the  me- 
chanical energy  of  its  projectile,  which  enables  it  to 
penetrate  a  resisting  body;  and  the  power  of  a  mov- 
ing ship  is  due  wholly  to  the  mechanical  energy  of  the 
burning  coal  within  its  furnaces. 

It  may  be  objected  that  it  is  not  reasonable  to 
consider  a  ship's  energy  of  motion  as  an  element  of 
naval  power,  in  the  mechanical  sense  in  which  we  have 
been  using  the  word  "power,"  for  the  reason  that  it 
could  be  exerted  only  by  the  use  of  her  ram,  an  infre- 
quent use.  To  this  it  may  be  answered  that  energy 
is  energy,  no  matter  to  what  purpose  it  is  applied; 
that  a  given  projectile  going  at  a  given  speed  has  a  cer- 
tain energy,  whether  it  strikes  its  target  or  misses  it; 
and  that  a  battleship  going  at  a  certain  speed  must 
necessarily  have  a  certain  definite  energy,  no  matter 
whether  it  is  devoted  to  ramming  another  ship  or  to 
carrying  itself  and  its  contents  from  one  place  to 
another. 

Besides  the  mechanical  power  exerted  by  the 
mere  motion  of  the  ship,  and  often  superior  to  it,  there 
is  the  power  of  her  guns  and  torpedoes. 

Perhaps  the  most  important  single  invention  ever 
made  was  the  invention  of  gunpowder.  Why?  Be- 
cause it  put  into  the  hands  of  man  a  tremendous  force, 
compressed  into  a  very  small  volume,  which  he  could 
use  instantaneously  or  refrain  from  using  at  his  vnW. 
Its  first  use  was  in  war;  and  in  war  has  been  its  main 
employment  ever  since.     War  gives  the  best  field  for 


NAVAL  POWER  51 

the  activity  of  gunpowder,  because  in  war  we  always 
wish  to  exert  a  great  force  at  a  definite  point  at  a  given 
instant;  usually  in  order  to  penetrate  the  bodies  of 
men,  or  some  defensive  work  that  protects  them. 
Gunpowder  is  the  principal  agent  used  in  war  up  to 
the  present  date.  It  is  used  by  both  armies  and  navies, 
but  navies  use  it  in  larger  masses,  fired  in  more  power- 
ful guns. 

Of  course  this  does  not  mean  that  it  would  be 
impossible  to  send  a  lot  of  powder  to  a  fort,  more  than 
a  fleet  could  carry,  and  fire  it;  but  it  does  mean  that 
history  shows  that  forts  have  rarely  been  called  upon 
to  fire  much  powder,  that  their  lives  have  been  serene, 
and  that  most  of  the  powder  fired  on  shore  has  been 
fired  by  infantry  using  muskets — though  a  good  deal 
has  been  fired  by  field  and  siege  artillery. 

Leaving  forts  out  of  consideration  and  searching 
for  something  else  in  which  to  use  gunpowder  on  a 
large  scale,  we  come  to  siege-pieces,  field-pieces,  and 
muskets.  Disregarding  siege-pieces  and  field-pieces, 
for  the  reason  that  the  great  variety  of  types  makes 
it  difiicult  to  compare  them  with  navy  guns,  we  come 
to  muskets. 

Now  the  musket  is  an  extremely  formidable 
weapon,  and  has,  perhaps,  been  the  greatest  single 
contributor  to  the  victory  of  civilization  over  barbar- 
ism, and  order  over  anarchy,  that  has  ever  existed  up 
to  the  present  time.  But  the  enormous  advances  in 
engineering,  including  ordnance,  during  the  last  fifty 


52    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

years,  have  reduced  enormously  the  relative  value  o^ 
the  musket.  Remembering  that  energy,  or  the  ability 
to  do  work,  is  expressed  by  the  formula:  E=  }i  MV^, 
remembering  that  the  projectile  of  the  modern  12-inch 
gun  starts  at  about  2,900  f.  s.  velocity  and  weighs  867 
pounds,  while  the  bullet  of  a  musket  weighs  only  150 
grains  and  starts  with  a  velocity  of  2,700  feet  per  sec- 
ond, we  see  that  the  energy  of  the  12-inch  projectile 
is  about  47,000  times  that  of  the  bullet  on  leaving  the 
muzzle.  But  after  the  bullet  has  gone,  say  5,000  yards, 
its  energy  has  fallen  to  zero,  while  the  energy  of  the 
12-inch  projectile  is  nearly  the  same  as  when  it  started. 

While  it  would  be  truthful,  therefore,  to  say  that 
the  energy  of  the  12-inch  gun  within  5,000  yards  is 
greater  than  that  of  47,000  muskets,  it  would  also  be 
truthful  to  say  that  outside  of  5,000  yards,  millions  of 
muskets  would  not  be  equal  to  one  12-inch  gim. 

Not  only  is  the  12-inch  gun  a  weapon  incompa- 
rably great,  compared  with  the  musket,  but  when 
placed  in  a  naval  ship,  it  possesses  a  portability  which, 
while  not  an  attribute  of  the  gun  itself,  is  an  attribute 
of  the  combination  of  gun  and  ship,  and  a  distinct 
attribute  of  naval  power.  A  12-inch  gun  placed  in  a 
fort  may  be  just  as  good  as  a  like  gun  placed  in  a  ship, 
but  it  has  no  power  to  exert  its  power  usefully  unless 
some  enemy  comes  where  the  gim  can  hit  it.  And 
when  one  searches  the  annals  of  history  for  the  records 
of  whatever  fighting  forts  have  done,  he  finds  that 
they  have  been  able  to  do  very  Httle.    But  a  12-inch 


NAVAL  POWER  53 

gun  placed  in  a  man-of-war  can  be  taken  where  it  is 
needed,  and  recent  history  shows  that  naval  12-inch 
guns,  modern  though  they  are,  have  already  done 
effective  work  in  war. 

Not  only  are  12-inch  guns  powerful  and  port- 
able, but  modern  mechanical  science  has  succeeded 
in  so  placing  them  in  our  ships  that  they  can  be 
handled  with  a  precision,  quickness,  and  delicacy  that 
have  no  superior  in  any  other  branch  of  engineering. 
While  granting  the  difficulty  of  an  exact  comparison, 
I  feel  no  hesitation  in  affirming  that  the  greatest 
triumph  of  the  engineering  art  in  handling  heavy 
masses  is  to  be  found  in  the  turret  of  a  battleship. 
Here  again,  and  even  inside  of  5,000  yards,  we  find  the 
superiority  of  the  great  gun  over  the  musket,  as  evi- 
denced by  its  accuracy  in  use.  No  soldier  can  fire  his 
musket,  even  on  a  steady  platform,  himself  and  target 
stationary,  and  the  range  known  perfectly,  as  accu- 
rately as  a  gun-pointer  can  fire  a  12 -inch  gun;  and  if 
gun  and  target  be  moving,  and  the  wind  be  blowing, 
and  the  range  only  approximately  known,  as  is  always 
the  case  in  practice,  the  advantage  of  the  big  gim  in 
accuracy  becomes  incomparable. 

But  it  is  not  only  the  big  projectile  itself  which  has 
energy,  for  this  projectile  carries  a  large  charge  of  high 
explosive,  which  exploding  some  miles  away  from  where 
it  started,  exerts  a  power  inherent  in  itself,  that  was 
exhibited  with  frightful  effect  at  the  battles  of  Tsu- 
shima and  the  Skagerak. 


54    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

This  brings  us  to  the  auto-torpedo,  a  weapon  re- 
cently perfected;  in  fact  not  perfected  yet.  Here  is 
another  power  that  science  has  put  into  the  hands  of 
naval  men  in  addition  to  those  she  had  already  put 
there.  The  auto-torpedo,  launched  in  security  from 
below  the  water-line  of  the  battleship,  or  from  a  de- 
stroyer or  submarine,  can  be  directed  in  a  straight  line 
over  a  distance  and  with  a  speed  that  are  constantly 
increasing  with  the  improvement  of  the  weapon.  At 
the  present  moment,  a  speed  of  27  knots  over  10,000 
yards  can  be  depended  on,  with  a  probability  that  on 
striking  an  enemy's  ship  below  the  water-line  it  will 
disable  that  ship,  if  not  sink  her.  There  seems  no 
doubt  that,  in  a  very  few  years,  the  systematic  experi- 
ments now  being  applied  to  the  development  of  the 
torpedo  will  result  in  a  weapon  which  can  hardly  be 
called  inferior  to  the  12 -inch  or  even  16-inch  gun  and 
will  probably  surpass  it. 

Controllability. — If  one  watches  a  fleet  of  ships 
moving  on  the  sea,  he  gets  an  impression  of  tremendous 
power.  But  if  he  watches  Niagara,  or  a  thunder-storm, 
he  also  gets  an  impression  of  tremendous  power.  But 
the  tremendous  power  of  Niagara,  or  the  thunder- 
storm, is  a  power  that  belongs  to  Niagara  or  the 
thunder-storm,  and  not  to  man.  Man  cannot  control 
the  power  of  Niagara  or  the  thimder-storm;  but  he 
can  control  the  power  of  a  fleet. 

Speaking,  then,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  human 
being,  one  may  say  that  the  fleet  has  the  element  of 


NAVAL  POWER  55 

controllability,  while  Niagara  and  the  thunder-storm 
have  not.  One  man  can  make  the  fleet  go  faster  or 
slower  or  stop;  he  can  increase  its  power  of  motion 
or  decrease  it  at  his  will;  he  can  reduce  it  to  zero.  He 
cannot  do  so  with  the  forces  of  nature. 

Directability. — Not  only  can  one  man  control  the 
power  of  the  fleet,  he  can  also  direct  it;  that  is,  can 
turn  it  to  the  right  or  the  left  as  much  as  he  wishes. 
But  one  man  cannot  change  the  direction  of  motion 
of  Niagara  or  the  lightning-bolt. 

Power,  Controllability,  and  Directability. — We  may 
say,  then,  that  a  fleet  combines  the  three  elements  of 
mechanical  power,  controllability,  and  directability. 

The  Unit  of  Military  Power. — This  is  an  enormous 
power  that  has  come  into  the  hands  of  the  naval  na- 
tions; but  it  has  come  so  newly  that  we  do  not  appre- 
ciate it  yet.  One  reason  why  we  do  not  and  cannot 
appreciate  it  correctly  is  that  no  units  have  been  es- 
tablished by  which  to  measure  it. 

To  supply  this  deficiency,  the  author  begs  leave  to 
point  out  that,  since  the  military  power  of  every  na- 
tion has  until  recently  been  its  army,  of  which  the  unit 
has  been  the  soldier,  whose  power  has  rested  wholly  in 
his  musket,  the  musket  has  actuaUy  been  the  unit  of 
military  power.  In  all  history,  the  statement  of  the 
number  of  men  in  each  army  has  been  put  forward  by 
historians  as  giving  the  most  accurate  idea  of  their 
fighting  value;  and  in  modern  times,  nearly  all  of 
these  men  have  been  armed  with  muskets  only. 


56    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

It  has  been  said  already  that  the  main  reason 
why  the  invention  of  gunpowder  was  so  important 
was  that  it  put  into  the  hands  of  man  a  tremendous 
mechanical  power  compressed  into  a  very  small  space, 
which  man  could  use  or  not  use  at  his  will.  This  idea 
may  be  expressed  by  saying  that  gunpowder  combines 
power  and  great  controllability.  But  it  was  soon  dis- 
covered that  this  gunpowder,  put  into  a  tube  with  a 
bullet  in  front  of  it,  could  discharge  that  bullet  in  any 
given  direction.  A  musket  was  the  result,  and  it  com- 
bined the  three  requisites  of  a  weapon — mechanical 
power,  controllability,  and  directability. 

While  the  loaded  gun  is  perhaps  the  clearest  ex- 
ample of  the  combination  of  the  three  factors  we  are 
speaking  of,  the  moving  ship  supplies  the  next  best 
example.  It  has  very  much  greater  mechanical  power; 
and  in  proportion  to  its  mass,  almost  as  much  con- 
trollability and  directability. 

The  control  and  direction  of  a  moving  ship  are 
very  wonderful  things;  but  the  very  ease  with  which 
they  are  exercised  makes  us  overlook  the  magnitude 
of  the  achievement  and  the  perfection  of  the  means 
employed.  It  may  seem  absurd  to  speak  of  one  .man 
controlling  and  directing  a  great  ship,  but  that  is 
pretty  nearly  what  happens  sometimes;  for  sometimes 
the  man  at  the  wheel  is  the  only  man  on  board  doing 
anything  at  all;  and  he  is  absolutely  directing  the 
entire  ship.  At  such  times  (doubtless  they  are  rare 
and  short)  the  man  at  the  wheel  on  board,  say  the 


NAVAL  POWER  57 

Vaterland,  is  directing  unassisted  by  any  human  being 
a  mass  of  65,000  tons,  which  is  going  through  the  water 
at  a  speed  of  24  knots,  or  27  miles,  an  hour,  nearly  as 
fast  as  the  average  passenger-train.  In  fact,  it  would 
be  very  easy  to  arrange  on  board  the  Vaterhfid  that 
this  should  actually  happen;  that  everybody  should 
take  a  rest  for  a  few  minutes,  coal-passers,  water-tend- 
ers, oilers,  engineers,  and  the  people  on  deck.  And 
while  such  an  act  might  have  no  particular  value,  per 
se,  and  prove  nothing  important,  yet,  nevertheless,  a 
brief  reflection  on  the  possibility  may  be  interesting, 
and  lead  us  to  see  clearly  into  the  essential  nature  of 
what  is  here  called  "directability."  The  man  at  the 
wheel  on  board  the  Vaterland,  so  long  as  the  fires  burn 
and  the  oil  continues  to  lubricate  the  engines,  has  a 
power  in  his  hands  that  is  almost  inconceivable.  The 
ship  that  he  is  handliag  weighs  more  than  the  870,000 
men  that  comprise  the  standing  army  of  Germany. 

Now  can  anybody  imagine  the  entire  standing 
army  of  Germany  being  carried  along  at  27  miles  an 
hour  and  turned  almost  instantly  to  the  right  or  left 
by  one  man?  The  standing  army  of  Germany  is  sup- 
posed to  be  the  most  directable  organization  in  the 
world;  but  could  the  Emperor  of  Germany  move  that 
army  at  a  speed  of  27  miles  an  hour  and  turn  it  as  a 
whole  (not  its  separate  units)  through  90  degrees  in 
three  minutes? 

The  Vaterland  being  a  merchant  ship  and  not 
fully  representing  naval  power,  perhaps  it  might  be 


58    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

better  to  take,  say,  the  Pennsylvania.  The  weight  is 
about  half  that  of  the  Vaterland,  that  is,  it  is  nearly 
twice  the  weight  of  the  men  of  the  British  standing 
army;  and  the  usual  speed  is  about,  say,  15  knots. 
But  in  addition  to  all  the  power  of  the  ship,  as  a  ship, 
or  an  energy  greater  than  that  of  275,000  muskets, 
she  has  the  power  of  all  the  guns,  twelve  14-inch  guns, 
and  twenty-two  5-inch  guns,  whose  projectiles,  not 
including  the  torpedoes  fired  from  four  torpedo-tubes, 
have  an  energy  at  the  muzzle  equal  to  750,000  muskets, 
seven-eighths  of  all  the  muskets  in  the  German  stand- 
ing army.  Now  any  one  who  has  seen  a  battleship  at 
battle  practice  knows  that  all  the  various  tremendous 
forces  are  under  excellent  direction  and  control.  And 
while  it  cannot  be  strictly  said  that  they  are  abso- 
lutely under  the  direction  and  control  of  the  captain, 
while  it  must  be  admitted  that  no  one  man  can  really 
direct  so  many  rapidly  moving  things,  yet  it  is  cer- 
tainly well  within  the  truth  to  say  that  the  ship  and 
all  it  contains  are  very  much  more  under  the  control 
of  her  captain  than  the  German  standing  army  is  under 
the  control  of  the  Kaiser.  The  captain,  acting  through 
the  helmsman,  chief  engineer,  gunnery  officer,  and 
executive  officer,  can  get  very  excellent  information  as 
to  what  is  going  on,  and  can  have  his  orders  carried 
out  with  very  little  delay;  but  the  mere  space  oc- 
cupied by  an  army  of  870,000  men,  and  the  unavoida- 
ble dispersion  of  its  units  prevent  any  such  exact  con- 
trol. 


NAVAL  POWER  59 

In  other  words,  the  captain  of  the  Pennsylvania 
wields  a  weapon  more  mechanically  powerful  than  all 
the  muskets  of  the  German  standing  army:  and  his 
control  of  it  is  more  absolute  than  is  the  Kaiser's  con- 
trol of  that  army. 

Mechanism  vs.  Men. — Now  what  is  the  essential 
reason  for  the  efficient  direction  exercised  by  the 
helmsman  of  the  Pennsylvania,  and  the  relative  impo- 
tency  of  generals?  Is  it  not  that  the  helmsman  acts 
through  the  medium  of  mechanism,  while  the  generals 
act  through  the  medium  of  men?  A  ship  is  not  only 
made  of  rigid  metal,  but  all  her  parts  are  fastened 
together  with  the  utmost  rigidity;  while  the  parts  of 
an  army  are  men,^  who  are  held  together  by  no  means 
whatever  except  that  which  discipline  gives,  and  the 
men  themselves  are  far  from  rigid.  In  the  nature  of 
things  it  is  impossible  that  an  army  should  be  directed 
as  perfectly  as  a  ship.  The  rudder  of  a  ship  is  a  me- 
chanical appHance  that  can  be  depended  upon  to  con- 
trol the  direction  of  the  ship  absolutely,  while  an  army 
has  no  such  a  thing  as  a  rudder,  or  anything  to  take 
its  place.  Again,  the  rudder  is  only  a  few  hundred 
feet  from  the  helmsman,  and  the  communication  be- 
tween them,  including  the  steering-engine  itself,  is  a 
strong  reliable  mechanism  that  has  no  counterpart  in 
the  army. 

The  control  of  the  main  engines  of  a  ship  is  almost 
as  absolute  as  the  control  of  the  rudder;  and  the  main 
engines  are  not  only  much  more  powerful  than  the  legs 


6o    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

of  soldiers,  but  they  act  together  in  much  greater  har- 
mony. 

Inherent  Power  of  a  Battleship. — Possibly  the 
declaration  may  be  accepted  now  that  a  battleship 
of  30,000  tons,  such  as  the  navies  are  building  now, 
with,  say,  twelve  14-inch  guns  is  a  greater  example 
of  power,  under  the  absolute  direction  and  control  than 
anything  else  existing;  and  that  the  main  reason  is 
the  concentration  of  a  tremendous  amount  of  mechani- 
cal energy  in  a  very  small  space,  all  made  available 
by  certain  properties  of  water.  Nothing  like  a  ship 
can  be  made  to  run  on  shore;  but  if  an  automobile 
could  be  constructed,  carrying  twelve  14-inch  guns, 
twenty-two  5-inch  guns,  and  four  torpedo-tubes,  of  the 
size  of  the  Pennsylvania,  and  with  her  armor,  able  to 
run  over  the  land  in  any  direction  at  20  knots,  pro- 
pelled by  engines  of  31,000  horse-power,  it  could  whip 
an  army  of  a  million  men  just  as  quickly  as  it  could 
get  hold  of  its  component  parts.  Such  a  machine 
could  start  at  one  end  of  an  army  and  go  through  to 
the  other  like  a  mowing-machine  through  a  field  of 
wheat;  and  knock  down  all  the  buildings  in  New  York 
afterward,  smash  all  the  cars,  break  down  all  the 
bridges,  and  sink  all  the  shipping. 

Inherent  Power  of  a  Fleet. — An  idea  of  the  power 
exertable  by  a  fleet  of  modem  ships  may  be  derived 
from  the  following  comparison. 

When  Sherman  made  his  wonderful  march  to  the 
sea  from  Atlanta  to  Savannah,  he  made  a  march  whose 


NAVAL  POWER  6i 

details  are  historically  known,  which  was  unopposed, 
which  was  over  a  flat  country,  in  good  weather,  and 
without  the  aid  of  railroad-trains.  It  was  a  march, 
pure  and  simple;  and  inasmuch  as  men  are  the  same 
now  as  they  were  then,  it  gives  excellent  data  of  the 
way  in  which  purely  military  or  army  power  can  move 
from  one  place  to  another,  while  still  preserving  its  char- 
acter and  exercising  its  Junctions.  Similarly,  when  Ad- 
miral Schroeder,  in  November,  1910,  went  from  the 
east  coast  of  the  United  States  to  the  English  Chan- 
nel, his  march  was  imopposed,  its  details  are  known, 
and  it  gave  an  excellent  illustration  of  how  naval  power 
can  move  from  one  place  to  another,  while  still  preserv- 
ing its  character  and  exercising  its  Junctions. 

Now  General  Sherman  was  a  man  of  world-wide 
fame,  and  so  were  some  of  his  generals,  and  Sherman's 
fame  will  last  for  centuries.  Compared  with  Sherman, 
Admiral  Schroeder  was  obscure;  and  compared  with 
Sherman's  officers.  Admiral  Schroeder's  were  obscure. 
Sherman's  soldiers,  privates  and  aU,  were  made  glori- 
ous for  the  rest  of  their  lives  by  having  been  in  Sher- 
man's march  to  the  sea,  while  Admiral  Schroeder's  sail- 
ors achieved  no  glory  at  all.  So,  the  next  paragraph 
is  not  intended  to  detract  in  the  slightest  from  Sher- 
man and  his  army,  but  simply  to  point  out  the  change 
in  conditions  that  mechanical  progress  has  brought 
about. 

The  statement  of  comparison  is  simply  that  when 
General  Sherman  marched  from  Atlanta  to  the  sea  his 


62    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

army  composed  62,000  men,  and  it  took  him  twenty- 
five  days  to  go  about  230  land  miles  or  200  sea  miles; 
and  when  Admiral  Schroeder  went  from  our  coast  to 
Europe  he  had  16  ships,  and  he  made  the  trip  of  more 
than  3,000  sea  miles  in  less  than  fourteen  days.  Dis- 
regarding twenty-eight  5-inch  guns,  two  hundred  and 
fifty-two  3-inch  gims,  and  a  lot  of  smaller  gims,  and 
disregarding  all  the  torpedoes.  Admiral  Schroeder  took 
eighty-four  12-inch  guns,  ninety-six  8-inch  guns, 
eighty-eight  7-inch  guns,  and  forty-eight  6-inch  guns, 
all  mounted  and  available;  which,  assuming  the  power 
of  the  modern  musket  as  a  unit,  equalled  more  than 
5,000,000  modem  muskets. 

Such  an  enormous  transfer  of  absolute,  definite, 
available  power  would  be  impossible  on  land,  simply 
because  no  means  has  been  devised  to  accomplish  it. 
Such  a  transfer  on  land  would  be  the  transfer  of  ninety 
times  as  many  soldiers  as  Sherman  had  (even  suppos- 
ing they  had  modern  muskets)  over  fifteen  times  the 
distance  and  at  thirty  times  the  speed;  and  as  the 
work  done  in  going  from  one  place  to  another  varies 
practically  as  the  square  of  the  speed,  a  transfer  on 
land  equivalent  in  magnitude  and  speed  to  Schroeder's 
would  be  a  performance  90  x  15  x  30^=1,215,000  times 
as  great  as  Sherman's. 

This  may  seem  absurd,  and  perhaps  it  is;  but 
why?  The  comparison  is  not  between  the  qualities  of 
the  men  or  between  the  results  achieved.  Great  re- 
sults often  are  brought  about  by  very  small  forces,  as 


NAVAL  POWER  63 

when  some  state  of  equilibrium  is  disturbed,  and  vice 
versa.  The  comparison  attempted  is  simply  between 
the  power  of  a  certain  army  and  the  power  of  a  certain 
fleet.  And  while  it  is  true  that,  for  some  purposes, 
such  as  overcoming  small  resistance,  great  power  may 
not  be  as  efficacious  as  feeble  power  or  even  gentle- 
ness, yet,  nevertheless,  it  must  be  clear  that,  for  the 
overcoming  of  great  resistance  quickly  great  power 
must  be  applied. 

The  existence  of  a  certain  power  is  quite  inde- 
pendent of  the  desirability  of  using  it.  The  existence 
of  the  power  is  all  the  writer  wishes  to  insist  upon  at 
present;  the  question  of  its  employment  will  be  con- 
sidered later. 

Not  only  is  the  power  of  a  fleet  immeasurably 
greater  than  that  of  an  army,  but  it  must  always  be 
so,  from  the  very  nature  of  things.  The  speed  of  an 
army,  while  exercising  the  functions  of  an  army,  and 
the  power  of  a  musket,  while  exercising  its  functions 
as  a  weapon  of  one  soldier,  cannot  change  much  from 
what  they  were  when  Sherman  went  marching  through 
Georgia.  But,  thanks  to  mechanical  science,  there 
is  no  limit  in  sight  to  the  power  to  which  a  fleet  may 
attain. 

The  power  of  a  navy  is  of  recent  growth,  but  it 
is  increasing  and  is  going  to  continue  to  increase. 
Every  advance  of  civilization  will  advance  the  navy. 
Every  new  discovery  and  invention  will  directly  or 
indirectly  serve  it.    The  navy,  more  than  any  other 


64    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

thing,  wiU  give  opportunity  for  mechanism  and  to 
mechanism.  Far  beyond  any  possible  imagination  of 
to-day,  it  will  become  the  highest  expression  of  the 
Genius  of  Mechanism,  and  the  embodiment  of  its 
spirit. 

The  amount  of  money  now  being  spent  by  the 
United  States  on  its  navy  is  so  great  that  the  expendi- 
ture can  be  justij&ed  only  on  the  basis  that  great  naval 
power  is  essential  to  the  country. 

Is  it  essential,  and  if  so,  why  ? 

Primary  Use  for  a  Navy. — To  answer  this  wisely, 
it  may  be  well  to  remind  ourselves  that  the  principal 
object  of  all  the  vocations  of  men  is  directly  or  indi- 
rectly the  acquiring  of  money.  Money,  of  course,  is 
not  wealth;  but  it  is  a  thing  which  can  be  so  easily 
exchanged  for  wealth,  that  it  is  the  thing  which  most 
people  work  for.  Of  course,  at  bottom,  the  most  im- 
portant work  is  the  getting  of  food  out  of  the  ground; 
but  inasmuch  as  people  like  to  congregate  together  in 
cities,  the  thing-  taken  out  of  the  ground  in  one  place 
must  be  transported  to  other  places;  and  inasmuch 
as  every  person  wants  every  kind  of  thing  that  he  can 
get,  a  tremendous  system  of  interchange,  through  the 
medium  of  money,  has  been  brought  about,  which  is 
called  "trade."  For  the  protection  of  property  and 
life,  and  in  order  that  trade  may  exist  at  all,  an  enor- 
mous amount  of  human  machinery  is  employed  which 
we  caU  "government."  This  government  is  based  on 
innumerable  laws,  but  these  laws  would  be  of  no  avail 


NAVAL  POWER  65 

unless  they  were  carried  out;  and  every  nation  in  the 
world  has  found  that  employment  of  a  great  deal  of 
force  is  necessary  in  order  that  they  shall  be  carried 
out.  This  force  is  mainly  exercised  by  the  police  of 
the  cities;  but  many  instances  have  occurred  in  the  his- 
tory of  every  country  where  the  authority  of  the  police 
has  had  to  be  supported  by  the  army  of  the  national 
government.  There  is  no  nation  in  the  world,  and 
there  never  has  been  one,  in  which  the  enforcement  of 
the  necessary  laws  for  the  protection  of  the  lives, 
property,  and  trade  of  the  people  has  not  depended 
ultimately  on  the  army;  and  the  reason  why  the  army 
could  enforce  the  laws  was  simply  the  fact  that  the 
army  had  the  power  to  inflict  suffering  and  death. 

As  long  as  a  maritime  country  carried  on  trade 
within  its  own  borders  exclusively,  as  long  as  it  lived 
within  itself,  so  long  as  its  people  did  not  go  to  coun- 
tries oversea,  a  navy  was  not  necessary.  But  when 
a  maritime  country  is  not  contented  to  live  within  its 
own  borders,  then  a  navy  becomes  essential  to  guard 
its  people  and  their  possessions  on  the  highways  of 
the  sea;  to  enforce,  not  municipal  or  national  law,  as 
an  army  does,  but  international  law. 

Now  the  desire  of  the  people  of  a  country  to  ex- 
tend their  trade  beyond  the  seas  seems  in  some  ways 
not  always  a  conscious  desire,  not  a  deliberate  intent, 
but  to  be  an  effort  of  self-protection,  or  largely  an 
effort  of  expansion;  for  getting  room  or  employment. 
As  the  people  of  a  country  become  civilized,  labor- 


66    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

saving  devices  multiply;  and  where  one  man  by 
means  of  a  machine  can  do  the  work  of  a  hundred, 
ninety-nine  men  may  be  thrown  out  of  employment; 
out  of  a  hundred  men  who  till  the  soil,  only  one  man 
may  be  selected  and  ninety-nine  men  have  to  seek 
other  employment.  Where  shall  it  be  gotten?  Evi- 
dently it  must  be  gotten  in  some  employment  which 
may  be  called  "artificial,"  such  as  working  in  a  shop 
of  some  kind,  or  doing  some  manufacturing  work.  But 
so  long  as  a  people  Hve  unto  themselves  only,  each  na- 
tion can  practically  make  and  use  all  the  machinery 
needed  within  its  borders,  and  stiU  not  employ  all  the 
idle  hands;  and  when  the  population  becomes  dense, 
employment  must  be  sought  in  making  goods  to  sell 
beyond  the  sea.  The  return  comes  back,  sometimes 
in  money,  sometimes  in  the  products  of  the  soil  and 
the  mine  and  the  manufactures  of  foreign  lands. 

In  this  way  every  nation  becomes  like  a  great 
business  firm.  It  exports  (that  is,  sells,)  certain  things, 
and  it  imports  (that  is,  buys,)  certain  things;  and  if 
it  sells  more  than  it  buys  it  is  making  money;  if  it 
buys  more  than  it  sells  it  is  spending  money.  This 
is  usually  expressed  by  saying  that  the  "balance  of 
trade"  is  in  its  favor  or  against  it. 

In  a  country  like  the  United  States,  or  any  other 
great  nation,  the  amount  of  exporting  and  importing, 
of  buying  and  selling  almost  every  conceivable  article 
under  the  sun,  is  carried  on  in  the  millions  and  millions 
of  doUars;    and  so  perfect  has  the  organization  for 


NAVAL  POWER  67 

doing  this  business  become  in  every  great  country, 
that  the  products  of  the  most  distant  countries  can 
be  bought  in  ahnost  every  village;  and  any  important 
event  in  any  country  produces  a  perceptible  effect 
wherever  the  mail  and  telegraph  go. 

The  organization  for  effecting  this  in  every  coun- 
try is  so  excellent  and  so  wonderful,  that  it  is  like  a 
machine. 

In  fact,  it  is  a  machine,  and  with  all  the  faults  of 
a  machine.  Now  one  of  the  faults  of  a  machine,  a 
fault  which  increases  in  importance  with  the  complex- 
ity of  the  machine,  is  the  enormous  disturbance  which 
may  be  produced  by  a  cause  seemingly  trivial.  That 
such  is  the  case  with  the  machine  which  the  commerce 
of  every  great  nation  comprises,  every-day  experience 
confirms.  So  long  as  the  steamers  come  and  go  with 
scheduled  regularity,  so  long  will  the  money  come  in 
at  the  proper  intervals  and  be  distributed  through 
the  various  channels;  so  long  will  the  people  live  the 
lives  to  which  they  are  habituated;  so  long  will  order 
reign. 

But  suppose  the  coming  and  going  of  all  the  steam- 
ers were  suddenly  stopped  by  a  blockade.  While  it 
may  be  true  that,  in  a  country  like  the  United  States, 
no  foreign  trade  is  really  necessary;  while  it  may  be 
true  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  would  be  just 
as  happy,  though  not  so  rich,  if  they  had  no  foreign 
trade — yet  the  sudden  stoppage  of  foreign  trade  would 
not  bring  about  a  condition  such  as  would  have  ex- 


68    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

isted  if  we  had  never  had  any  foreign  trade,  but  would 
bring  about  a  chaotic  condition  which  cannot  fitly  be 
described  by  a  feebler  word  than  "horrible."  The 
whole  machinery  of  every-day  life  would  be  disabled. 
Hundreds  of  thousands  of  people  would  be  thrown  out 
of  employment,  and  the  whole  momentum  of  the  rap- 
idly moving  enormous  mass  of  American  daily  life 
would  receive  a  violent  shock  which  would  strain  to 
its  elastic  limit  every  part  of  the  entire  machine. 

It  would  take  a  large  book  to  describe  what  would 
ensue  from  the  sudden  stoppage  of  the  trade  of  the 
United  States  with  countries  over  the  sea.  Such  a 
book  would  besides  be  largely  imaginative;  because 
in  our  history  such  a  condition  has  never  yet  arisen. 
Although  wars  have  happened  in  the  past  in  which 
there  has  been  a  blockade  of  our  coast  more  or  less 
complete,  peace  has  been  declared  before  the  suffer- 
ing produced  had  become  very  acute;  and  further- 
more the  conditions  of  furious  trade  which  now  exist 
have  never  existed  before.  Disasters  would  ensue, 
apart  from  the  actual  loss  of  money,  owing  simply  to 
the  sudden  change.  In  a  railroad-train  standing  still 
or  moving  at  a  uniform  speed,  the  passengers  are  com- 
fortable; but  if  that  same  train  is  suddenly  brought 
to  rest  when  going  at  a  high  speed,  say  by  collision, 
the  consequences  are  horrible  in  the  extreme,  and  the 
horror  is  caused  simply  by  the  suddenness  of  the  change. 
The  same  is  true  all  through  nature  and  human  na- 
ture.   Any  sudden  change  in  the  velocity  of  any  mass 


NAVAL  POWER  69 

has  its  exact  counterpart  in  any  sudden  change  in  the 
conditions  of  living  of  any  man  or  woman,  or  any  sud- 
den change  in  the  conditions  under  which  any  organi- 
zation must  carry  on  its  business.  The  difficulty  is 
not  with  individuals  only,  or  with  the  organizations 
themselves,  and  does  not  rest  solely  on  the  personal 
inability  of  people  to  accommodate  themselves  to  the 
losing  of  certain  conveniences  or  luxuries;  but  it  is  an 
inertia  which  resists  even  the  strenuous  efforts  of  in- 
dividuals and  organizations  to  meet  new  situations 
promptly,  and  to  grapple  effectively  with  new  prob- 
lems. 

Every  organization,  no  matter  how  small,  is  con- 
ducted according  to  some  system,  and  that  system  is 
based  upon  certain  more  or  less  permanent  conditions, 
which,  if  suddenly  changed,  make  the  system  inappli- 
cable. The  larger  the  organization  and  the  more 
complex  it  is,  the  more  will  it  be  deranged  by  any 
change  of  external  conditions  and  the  longer  time  will 
it  take  to  adapt  itself  to  them. 

The  sudden  stoppage  of  our  sea  trade,  including 
our  coasting  trade,  by  even  a  partial  blockade  of  our 
ports,  would  change  practically  all  the  conditions  under 
which  we  live.  There  is  hardly  a  single  organization 
in  the  country  which  would  not  be  affected  by  it. 
And,  as  every  organization  would  know  that  every 
other  organization  would  be  affected,  but  to  a  degree 
which  could  not  possibly  be  determined,  because  there 
would  be  no  precedent,  it  cannot  be  an  exaggeration 


70    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

to  declare  that  the  blockading  of  our  principal  ports 
would,  entirely  apart  from  direct  loss  of  money  and 
other  commodities,  produce  a  state  of  confusion,  out 
of  which  order  could  not  possibly  be  evolved  except 
by  the  raising  of  the  blockade. 

In  addition  to  the  confusion  brought  about,  there 
would,  of  course,  be  the  direct  loss  of  money  and  non- 
receipt  of  imported  things;  but  what  would  probably 
be  the  very  worst  thing  of  all  would  be  the  numbers 
of  men  thrown  out  of  employment  by  the  loss  of  for- 
eign markets.  So  long  as  a  country  can  keep  its  people 
in  employment,  so  long  the  people  will  live  in  comparative 
order.  But  when  there  are  many  unemployed  men  in 
a  country,  not  only  do  their  families  lose  the  means  of 
subsistence,  but  the  very  fact  of  the  men  being  unem- 
ployed leads  them  into  mischief.  Should  the  ports 
of  any  great  commercial  nation  be  suddenly  closed, 
the  greatest  danger  to  the  country  would  not  be  from 
the  enemy  outside,  but  from  the  unemployed  people 
inside,  unless  the  government  gave  them  employ- 
ment, by  enlisting  them  in  an  enormous,  improvised 
army. 

It  will  be  seen,  therefore,  that  the  blockading  of 
the  principal  ports  of  any  purely  commercial  country 
would  be  a  disaster  so  great  that  there  could  not  be  a 
greater  one  except  actual  invasion.  Another  disaster 
might  be  the  total  destruction  of  its  fleet  by  the  enemy's 
fleet;  but  the  only  direct  result  of  this  would  be  that 
the  people  of  the  coimtry  would  have  fewer  ships  to 


NAVAL  POWER  71 

support  and  fewer  men  to  pay.  The  loss  of  the  fleet 
and  the  men  would  not  per  se  be  any  loss  whatever  to 
the  country,  but  rather  a  gain.  The  loss  of  the  fleet, 
however,  would  make  it  possible  for  the  enemy's  fleet 
to  blockade  our  ports  later,  and  thus  bring  about  the 
horrors  of  which  we  have  spoken. 

While  it  is  true  that  an  absolute  blockade  of  any 
port  might  be  practically  impossible  at  the  present 
day,  while  it  is  true  that  submarines  and  torpedo- 
boats  might  compel  blockading  ships  to  keep  at  such 
distance  from  ports  that  many  loopholes  of  escape 
would  be  open  to  blockade  runners,  yet  it  may  be 
pointed  out  that  even  a  partial  blockade,  even  a 
blockade  that  made  it  risky  for  vessels  to  try  to  break 
it,  would  have  a  very  deleterious  effect  upon  the  pros- 
perity of  the  country  and  of  every  man,  woman,  and 
child  within  it.  A  blockade  like  this  was  that  main- 
tained during  the  greater  part  of  the  Civil  War  by  the 
Northern  States  against  the  Southern  States.  This 
blockade,  while  not  perfect,  while  it  was  such  as  to 
permit  many  vessels  to  pass  both  ways,  was  neverthe- 
less so  effective  that  it  made  it  impossible  for  the 
Southern  States  to  be  prosperous,  or  to  have  any  rea- 
sonable hope  of  ever  being  prosperous.  And  while  it 
would  be  an  exaggeration  to  state  that  the  navy  itself, 
unaided  by  the  army,  could  have  brought  the  South 
to  terms;  while  it  would  be  an  exaggeration  to  state 
that  all  the  land  battles  fought  in  the  Civil  War  were 
unnecessary,  that  all  the  bloodshed  and  all  the  ruin  of 


72 


THE  NAVY  AS  A  rf GHTING  MACHINE 


harvests  and  of  homesteads  were  unnecessary,  never- 
theless it  does  seem  that  so  long  as  the  navy  main- 
tained the  blockade  which  it  did  maintain,  the  people 
of  the  South  would  have  been  prevented  from  achiev- 
ing enough  prosperity  to  carry  on  an  independent 
government;  so  that  their  revolt  would  have  failed. 
The  South,  not  being  able  to  raise  the  blockade  by 
means  of  their  navy,  might  have  tried  to  do  so  by  send- 
ing an  army  into  the  Northern  States,  to  whip  the 
Northerners  on  their  o\vn  ground;  but  this  would 
clearly  have  been  impossible. 

The  sentences  above  are  not  written  with  the  in- 
tention of  minimizing  the  services  rendered  by  the 
army  in  the  Civil  War,  or  of  detracting  from  the  glory 
of  the  gallant  officers  and  men  who  composed  it,  or  of 
subtracting  one  jot  or  tittle  from  a  grateful  apprecia- 
tion of  their  hardships  and  bloodshed;  neither  do  they 
dare  to  question  the  wisdom  of  the  statesmen  who  di- 
rected that  the  war  should  be  fought  mainly  by  the 
army.  Their  sole  intention  is  to  point  out  that,  if  a 
meagre  naval  force  could  produce  so  great  an  effect 
against  a  country  mainly  agricultural,  a  very  powerful 
naval  force,  blockading  effectively  the  principal  ports 
of  a  manufacturing  country,  would  have  an  effect  so 
great  that  it  can  hardly  be  estimated. 

It  is  plainly  to  be  seen  that  the  effect  of  a  blockade 
against  a  purely  commercial  country  by  a  modem 
navy  would  be  incomparably  greater  now  than  it  was 
fifty  years  ago,  for  two  very  important  reasons.    One 


NAVAL  POWER  73 

reason  is  that  the  progress  of  modem  engineering  has 
made  navies  very  much  more  powerful  than  they  were 
fifty  years  ago;  and  the  other  reason  is  that  the  same 
cause  has  made  countries  very  much  more  vulnerable 
to  blockade,  because  it  has  made  so  many  millions 
of  people  dependent  upon  manufacturing  industries 
and  the  export  of  manufactured  things,  and  forced 
them  to  live  an  artificial  life.  While  the  United  States, 
for  instance,  does  not  depend  for  its  daily  bread  on 
the  regular  coming  of  wheat  from  over  the  sea,  yet 
millions  of  its  people  do  depend,  though  indirectly, 
upon  the  money  from  the  export  of  manufactured 
things;  for  with  countries,  as  with  people,  habits  are 
formed  both  of  system  and  of  mode  of  life,  which  it 
is  dangerous  suddenly  to  break;  so  that  a  country 
soon  becomes  as  dependent  upon  outside  commerce  as 
a  man  does  upon  outside  air,  and  a  people  suddenly 
deprived  of  a  vigorous  outside  commerce  would  seem 
to  be  smothered  almost  like  a  man  deprived  of  out- 
side air. 

A  rough  idea  of  the  possible  effect  of  a  blockade 
of  our  coast  may  be  gathered  from  the  fact  that  our 
exports  last  year  were  valued  at  more  than  $2,000,000,- 
000;  which  means  that  goods  to  this  amount  were  sold, 
for  which  a  return  was  received,  either  in  money  or  its 
equivalent,  most  of  it,  ultimately,  as  wages  for  labor. 
Of  course  no  blockade  could  stop  all  of  this;  but  it 
does  not  seem  impossible  that  it  could  stop  half  of  it, 
if  our  fleet  were  destroyed  by  the  enemy.     Supposing 


74    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

that  this  half  were  divided  equally  among  all  the  peo- 
ple in  the  United  States,  it  would  mean  that  each 
man,  woman,  and  child  would  lose  about  $io  in  one 
year.  If  the  loss  could  be  so  divided  up,  perhaps  no 
very  great  calamity  would  ensue.  But,  of  course,  no 
such  division  could  be  made,  with  the  result  that 
a  great  many  people,  especially  poor  people,  earn- 
ing wages  by  the  day,  would  lose  more  than  they 
could  stand.  Suppose,  for  instance,  that  a  number 
of  people  earning  about  $900  a  year,  by  employ- 
ment in  export  enterprises,  were  the  people  upon 
whom  the  actual  loss  eventually  fell  by  their  being 
thrown  out  of  employment.  This  would  mean  that 
more  than  a  million  people — men,  women,  and  chil- 
dren— would  be  actually  deprived  of  the  means  of  liv- 
ing. It  seems  clear  that  such  a  thing  would  be  a  na- 
tional disaster,  for  any  loss  of  money  to  one  man  al- 
ways means  a  loss  of  money  or  its  equivalent  to  other 
men  besides.  For  instance:  suppose  A  owes  $20  to  B, 
B  owes  $20  to  C,  C  owes  $20  to  D,  D  owes  $20  to  E, 
E  owes  $20  to  F,  F  owes  $20  to  G,  G  owes  $20  to  H, 
H  owes  $20  to  I,  and  I  to  J.  If  A  is  able  to  pay  B,  and 
does  so,  then  B  pays  C,  and  so  on,  and  everybody  is 
happy.  But  suppose  that  A  for  some  reason,  say  a 
blockade,  fails  to  receive  some  money  that  he  ex- 
pected; then  A  cannot  pay  B,  B  caimot  pay  C,  and 
so  on;  with  the  result,  that  not  only  does  J  lose  his 
$20,  but  nine  men  are  put  in  debt  $20  which  they  can- 
not pay;  with  the  further  result  that  A  is  dunned  by 


NAVAL  POWER  75 

B,  B  is  dunned  by  C,  and  so  on,  producing  a  condition 
of  distress  which  would  seem  to  be  out  of  all  propor- 
tion to  a  mere  lack  of  $20,  but  which  would,  neverthe- 
less, be  the  actual  result.  So  in  this  country  of  100,- 
000,000  people,  the  sudden  loss  of  $1,000,000,000  a 
year  would  produce  a  distress  seemingly  out  of  all  pro- 
portion to  that  sum  of  money,  because  the  individual 
loss  of  every  loser  would  be  felt  by  everybody  else. 

Since  to  a  great  manufacturing  nation,  like  ours, 
the  greatest  danger  from  outside  (except  actual  inva- 
sion) would  seem  to  be  the  sudden  stoppage  of  her  over- 
sea trade  by  blockade,  we  seem  warranted  in  conclud- 
ing that,  since  the  only  possible  means  of  preventing  a 
blockade  is  a  navy,  the  primary  use  for  our  navy  is  to 
prevent  blockade. 

This  does  not  mean  that  a  fleet's  place  is  on  its 
own  coast,  because  a  blockade  might  be  better  pre- 
vented by  having  the  fleet  elsewhere;  in  fact  it  is  quite 
certain  that  its  place  is  not  on  the  coast  as  a  rule,  but  at 
whatever  point  is  the  best  with  relation  to  the  enemy's 
fleet,  until  the  enemy's  fleet  is  destroyed.  In  fact,  since 
the  defensive  and  the  offensive  are  so  inseparably  con- 
nected that  it  is  hard  sometimes  to  tell  where  one  begins 
and  the  other  ends,  the  best  position  for  our  fleet  might 
be  on  the  enemy's  coast.  It  may  be  objected  that  the 
coast  of  the  United  States  is  so  long  that  it  would  be 
impossible  to  blockade  it.  Perhaps,  but  that  is  not 
necessary:  it  would  suffice  to  blockade  Boston,  New- 
port, New  York,  the  Delaware,  the  Chesapeake,  and  the 


76    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

Gulf,  say  with  forty  ships.  And  we  must  remember 
that  blockade  rmming  would  be  much  more  difficult 
now  than  in  the  Civil  War,  because  of  the  increased 
power  and  accuracy  of  modem  gunnery  and  the  ad- 
vent of  the  search-light,  wireless  telegraph,  and  aero- 
plane. 

It  may  also  be  objected  that  the  blockading  of 
even  a  defenseless  coast  would  cost  the  blockading 
country  a  good  deal  of  money,  by  reason  of  the  loss  of 
trade  with  that  country.  True;  but  war  is  always 
expensive,  and  the  blockade  would  be  very  much  more 
expensive  to  the  blockaded  country;  and  though  it 
might  hold  out  a  long  while,  it  would  be  compelled  to 
yield  in  the  end,  not  only  because  of  the  blockade 
itself  but  because  of  the  pressure  of  neutral  countries; 
and  the  longer  it  held  out,  the  greater  the  indemnity 
it  would  have  to  pay.  The  expense  of  blockading 
would  therefore  be  merely  a  profitable  investment. 

The  author  is  aware  that  actual  invasion  of  a  coun- 
try from  the  sea  would  be  a  greater  disaster  than 
blockade,  and  that  defense  against  invasion  has  often 
been  urged  in  Great  Britain  as  a  reason  for  a  great 
navy;  so  that  the  primary  reason  for  a  navy  might 
be  said  to  be  defense  against  invasion.  But  why  should 
an  enemy  take  the  trouble  to  invade  us?  Block- 
ade is  easier  and  cheaper,  and  can  accompUsh  almost 
everything  that  an  enemy  desires,  especially  if  it  be 
enlivened  by  the  occasional  dropping  of  thousand- 
pound  shells  into  Wall  Street  and  the  navy-yard. 


NAVAL  POWER  77 

While,  however,  the  primary  use  of  naval  power 
seems  to  be  to  prevent  blockade,  a  navy,  like  any- 
other  weapon,  may  be  put  to  any  other  uses  which 
circumstances  indicate.  For  instance,  the  Northerners 
in  the  Civil  War  used  the  navy  not  to  prevent  block- 
ade, but  to  make  blockade;  the  Japanese  used  the 
navy  to  cover  the  transportation  of  their  armies  to 
Manchuria  and  Corea;  and  Great  Britain  has  always 
used  her  navy  to  protect  her  trade  routes. 

A  general  statement  of  the  various  uses  of  a  navy 
has  been  put  into  the  phrase  "command  of  the  sea." 

Of  course,  the  probabiHty  of  getting  "command 
of  the  sea,"  or  of  desiring  to  get  it  is  dependent  on 
the  existence  of  a  state  of  war,  and  there  are  some 
who  believe  that  the  probabihty  of  our  becoming  in- 
volved in  a  war  with  a  great  naval  nation  is  too  slight 
to  warrant  the  expense  of  money  and  labor  needed  to 
prepare  the  necessary  naval  power.  So  it  may  be  well 
to  consider  what  is  the  degree  of  probability. 

This  degree  of  probability  cannot  be  determined 
as  accurately  as  the  probabiHties  of  fire,  death,  or  other 
things  against  which  insurance  companies  insure  us; 
for  the  reason  that  wars  have  been  much  less  frequent 
than  fires,  deaths,  etc.,  while  the  causes  that  make 
and  prevent  them  are  much  more  numerous  and  ob- 
scure. It  seems  clear,  however,  that,  as  between  two 
countries  of  equal  wealth,  the  probabiHty  of  war 
varies  with  the  disparity  between  their  navies,  and 
unless  other  nations  are  involved,  is  practically  zero, 


78    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

when  their  navies  are  equal  in  power;  and  that, 
other  factors  being  equal,  the  greatest  probability  of 
war  is  between  two  countries,  of  which  one  is  the  more 
wealthy  and  the  other  the  more  powerful. 

In  reckoning  the  probability  of  war,  we  must  real- 
ize that  the  most  pregnant  cause  of  war  is  the  combina- 
tion of  conflicting  interests  with  disparity  in  power.  And 
we  must  also  realize  that  it  is  not  enough  to  consider 
the  situation  as  it  is  now:  that  it  is  necessary  to  look 
at  least  ten  years  ahead,  because  it  would  take  the 
United  States  that  length  of  time  to  prepare  a  navy 
powerful  enough  to  fight  our  possible  foes  with  reason- 
able assurance  of  success. 

Ten  years,  however,  is  not  really  far  enough  ahead 
to  look,  for  the  simple  reason  that,  while  we  could  get 
a  great  many  ships  ready  in  ten  years,  we  could  not 
get  the  entire  navy  ready  as  will  be  explained  later. 
If,  for  instance,  some  change  in  policies  or  in  interests 
should  make  war  with  Great  Britain  probable  within 
ten  years,  we  could  not  possibly  build  a  navy  that 
could  prevent  our  being  beaten,  and  blockaded,  and 
forced  to  pay  an  enormous  indemnity. 

Is  there  710  probability  of  this?  Perhaps  there  is 
no  great  probability;  but  there  certainly  is  a  possibil- 
ity. In  fact,  it  might  be  a  very  wise  act  for  Great 
Britain,  seeing  us  gradually  surpassing  her,  to  go  to 
war  with  us  before  it  is  too  late,  and  crush  us.  It  has 
often  been  said  that  Great  Britain  could  not  afford 
to  go  to  war  with  us,  because  so  many  of  her  commer- 


NAVAL  POWER  79 

cial  interests  would  suffer.  Of  course,  they  would 
suffer  for  a  while;  but  so  do  the  commercial  interests 
of  competing  railroads  when  they  begin  to  cut  rates. 
Cutting  rates  is  war — commercial  war:  but  it  is  often 
carried  on,  nevertheless,  and  at  tremendous  cost. 

Just  now.  Great  Britain  does  not  wish  to  crush 
us;  but  it  is  certain  that  she  can.  It  is  certain  that 
the  richest  country  in  the  world  lies  defenseless 
against  the  most  powerful;  and  that  we  could  not 
alter  this  condition  in  ten  years,  even  if  we  started  to 
build  an  adequate  navy  now. 

Yet  even  if  the  degree  of  probability  of  war  with 
Great  Britain,  within  say  ten  years,  seems  so  small 
that  we  need  not  consider  her,  are  there  no  other 
great  Powers  with  whom  the  degree  of  probability 
of  war  is  great  enough  to  make  it  wise  for  us  to  con- 
sider them? 

Before  answering  this  question,  let  us  realize 
clearly  that  one  of  the  strongest  reasons  that  leads  a 
country  to  abstain  from  war,  even  to  seek  relief  from 
wrongs,  actual  or  imagined,  is  a  doubt  of  success;  and 
that  that  reason  disappears  if  another  country,  suffi- 
ciently powerful  to  assure  success,  is  ready  to  help  her, 
either  by  joining  openly  with  her,  or  by  seeking  war 
herself  at  the  same  time  with  the  same  country.  As 
we  all  know,  cases  like  this  have  happened  in  the  past. 
Great  Britain  knows  it;  and  the  main  secret  of  her 
wealth  is  that  she  has  always  been  strong  enough  to 
fight  any  two  countries. 


8o    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

It  is  plain  that  a  coalition  of  two  countries  against 
us  is  possible  now.  The  United  States  is  regarded  with 
feelings  of  extreme  irritation  by  the  two  most  warlike 
nations  in  the  world,  one  on  our  eastern  side  and  the 
other  on  the  western.  War  with  either  one  would  call 
for  all  the  energies  of  the  country,  and  the  issue  would 
be  doubtful.  But  if  either  country  should  consider 
itself  compelled  to  declare  war,  the  other,  if  free  at  the 
time,  might  see  her  opportunity  to  declare  war  simul- 
taneously. The  result  would  be  the  same  as  if  we 
fought  Great  Britain,  except  that  our  Pacific  coast 
would  be  blockaded  besides  the  Atlantic,  and  we 
should  have  to  pay  indemnity  to  two  countries  instead 
of  to  one  country. 

A  coalition  between  these  two  countries  would  be 
an  ideal  arrangement,  because  it  would  enable  each 
country  to  force  us  to  grant  the  conditions  it  desires, 
and  secure  a  large  indemnity  besides. 

Would  Great  Britain  interfere  in  our  behalf? 
This  can  be  answered  by  the  man  so  wise  that  he  knows 
what  the  international  situation  and  the  commercial 
situation  will  be  ten  years  hence.    Let  him  speak. 

Will  the  Importance  of  Naval  Power  Increase 
OR  Decrease? 

It  is  clear  that  the  importance  to  a  country  of  a 
navy  varies  with  two  things — the  value  of  that  coun- 
try's foreign  trade  and  the  probability  of  war. 

It  is  also  clear  that,  other  things  being  equal,  the 


NAVAL  POWER  8i 

probability  of  a  country  becoming  involved  in  war 
varies  as  the  value  of  her  foreign  trade;  because  the 
causes  of  friction  and  the  money  at  stake  vary  in  that 
proportion. 

Therefore,  the  importance  to  a  country  of  her  navy 
varies  as  the  square  of  the  value  of  her  foreign  trade. 

In  order  to  answer  the  question,  therefore,  we 
must  first  consider  whether  foreign  trade — sea  trade — 
is  going  to  increase  or  decrease. 

As  to  the  United  States  alone,  the  value  of  our 
exports  is  about  ten  times  what  it  was  fifty  years  ago, 
and  it  promises  to  increase.  But  the  United  States  is 
only  one  country,  and  perhaps  her  increase  in  for- 
eign trade  has  been  due  to  conditions  past  or  passing. 
So  what  is  the  outlook  for  the  future,  both  for  the 
United  States  and  other  countries?  Will  other  coun- 
tries seek  foreign  trade  ? 

Yes.  The  recent  cormnercial  progress  of  Ger- 
many, Argentina,  and  Japan,  shows  the  growing  recog- 
nition by  civilized  and  enterprising  countries  of  the 
benefits  of  foreign  trade,  and  of  the  facilities  for  at- 
taining it  which  are  now  given  by  the  advent  of  large, 
swift,  modern  steamers;  steamers  which  are  becoming 
larger  and  swifter  and  safer  every  year,  more  and  more 
adapted  for  ocean  trade.  For  not  only  have  the  writ- 
ings of  Mahan  brought  about  an  increase  in  the  sea 
power  of  every  great  country;  but  this  increase  has 
so  aroused  the  attention  of  the  engineering  professions 
that  the  improvement  of  ships,  engines,  and  other  sea 


82    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

material  has  gone  ahead  faster  than  aU  the  other  en- 
gineering arts. 

The  reason  why  the  engineering  arts  that  are 
connected  with  the  sea  have  gone  ahead  more  rapidly 
than  any  other  arts  is  simply  that  they  are  given  wider 
opportmiity  and  a  greater  scope.  It  is  inherent  in  the 
very  nature  of  things  that  it  is  easier  to  transport 
things  by  water  than  by  land;  that  water  transporta- 
tion lends  itself  in  a  higher  degree  to  the  exercise  of 
engineering  skiU,  to  the  attainment  of  great  results. 

The  underlying  reason  for  this  difference  seems  to 
be  that  it  is  not  possible  to  make  any  vehicle  to  travel 
on  land  appreciably  larger  than  the  present  automo- 
bile, unless  it  run  on  rails;  whereas  the  floating  power 
of  water  is  such  that  vehicles  can  be  made,  and  are 
made,  as  large  as  65,000  tons.  The  Mauretania,  of  45,- 
000  tons  displacement,  has  been  rimning  for  eight 
years,  larger  vessels  are  even  now  running  and  vessels 
larger  still  will  undoubtedly  be  run;  for  the  larger  the 
ships,  the  less  they  cost  per  ton  of  carrying  power,  the 
faster  they  go,  and  the  safer  they  are. 

Sea  commerce  thus  gives  to  engineers,  scientists, 
and  inventors,  as  weU  as  to  commercial  men,  that  gift 
of  the  gods — opportunity.  The  number  of  ships  that 
now  traverse  the  ocean  and  the  larger  bodies  of  water 
communicating  with  it  aggregate  millions  of  tons,  and 
their  number  and  individual  tonnage  are  constantly 
increasing.  These  vessels  cruise  among  aU  the  impor- 
tant seaports  of  the  world,  and  form  a  system  of  in- 


NAVAL  POWER  83 

tercommunication  almost  as  complete  as  the  system 
of  railroads  in  the  United  States.  They  bring  distant 
ports  of  the  world  very  close  together,  and  make  pos- 
sible that  ready  interchange  of  material  products,  and 
that  facility  of  personal  intercourse  which  it  is  one  of 
the  aims  of  civilization  to  bring  about.  From  a  com- 
mercial point  of  view,  London  is  nearer  to  New  York 
than  San  Francisco,  and  more  intimately  allied  with  her. 

The  evident  result  of  all  this  is  to  make  the  peo- 
ple of  the  world  one  large  community,  in  which,  though 
many  nationalities  are  numbered,  many  tongues  are 
spoken,  many  degrees  of  civilization  and  wealth  are 
found,  yet,  of  all,  the  main  instincts  are  the  same:  the 
same  passions,  the  same  appetites,  the  same  desire 
for  personal  advantage. 

Not  only  does  this  admirable  system  of  intercom- 
munication bring  all  parts  of  the  world  very  closely 
together,  but  it  tends  to  produce  in  all  a  certain  simi- 
larity in  those  characteristics  and  habits  of  thought 
that  pertain  to  the  material  things  of  life.  We  are  all 
imitative,  and  therefore  we  tend  to  imitate  each  other; 
but  the  inferior  is  more  apt  to  imitate  the  superior 
than  vice  versa.  Particularly  are  we  prone  to  imitate 
those  actions  and  quahties  by  which  others  have  at- 
tained material  success.  So  it  is  to  be  expected,  it  is 
already  a  fact,  that  the  methods  whereby  a  few  great 
nations  attained  success  are  already  being  imitated 
by  other  nations.  Japan  has  imitated  so  well  that  in 
some  ways  she  has  already  surpassed  her  models. 


84    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

With  such  an  example  before  her,  should  we  be 
surprised  that  China  has  also  become  inoculated  with 
the  virus  of  commercial  and  political  ambitions?  It 
cannot  be  many  years  before  she  will  be  in  the  run- 
ning with  the  rest  of  us,  with  400,000,000  of  people  to 
do  the  work;  people  of  intelligence,  patience,  endur- 
ance, and  docihty;  people  with  everything  to  gain  and 
nothing  to  lose;  with  the  secret  of  how  to  succeed  al- 
ready taught  by  other  nations,  which  she  can  learn 
from  an  open  book. 

If  Japan  has  learned  our  secret  and  mastered  it  in 
fifty  years,  wiU  China  not  be  able  to  do  it  in  less  than 
fifty  years? 

Before  we  answer  this  question,  let  us  realize 
clearly  that  China  is  much  nearer  to  us  in  civilization 
than  Japan  was  fifty  years  ago;  that  China  has  Japan's 
example  to  guide  her,  and  also  that  any  degree  of  civili- 
zation which  was  acquired  by  us  in  say  one  hundred 
years  will  not  require  half  that  time  for  another  na- 
tion merely  to  learn.  The  same  is  true  of  all  branches 
of  knowledge;  the  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  nature 
which  it  took  Newton  many  years  to  acquire  may 
now  be  mastered  by  any  college  student  in  two 
months.  And  let  us  not  forget,  besides,  that  almost 
the  only  difficult  element  of  civilization  which  other 
people  need  to  acquire,  in  order  to  enter  into  that 
world-wide  competition  which  is  characteristic  of  the 
time  we  live  in,  is  "engineering"  broadly  considered. 
Doubtless  there  are  other  things  to  learn  besides;  but 


NAVAL  POWER  85 

it  is  not  apparent  that  any  other  things  have  contrib- 
uted largely  to  the  so-called  new  civilization  of  Japan. 
Perhaps  Japan  has  advanced  enough  in  Christianity  to 
account  for  her  advance  in  material  power,  but  if  so 
she  keeps  very  quiet  about  it.  It  may  be,  also,  that  the 
relations  of  the  government  to  the  governed  people  of 
Japan  are  on  a  higher  plane  than  they  used  to  be,  but 
on  a  plane  not  yet  so  high  as  in  our  own  country;  but 
has  any  one  ever  seen  this  claimed  or  even  stated  ?  It 
may  be  that  the  people  of  Japan  are  more  kindly, 
brave,  courteous,  and  patriotic  than  they  were,  and 
that  their  improvement  has  been  due  to  their  imitat- 
ing us  in  these  matters;  but  this  is  not  the  belief  of 
many  who  have  been  in  Japan.  One  thing,  however, 
is  absolutely  sure;  and  that  is  that  Japan's  advance 
has  been  simultaneous  mth  her  acquirement  of  the 
engineering  arts,  especially  as  applied  to  military  and 
naval  matters  and  the  merchant  marine. 

But  even  supposing  that  China  does  not  take  part 
in  the  world-wide  race  for  wealth,  we  cannot  shut  our 
eyes  to  the  fact  that  Great  Britain,  Germany,  France, 
Italy,  Japan,  Argentina,  and  the  United  States,  be- 
sides others  like  Sweden,  Norw^ay,  Belgium,  Holland, 
Spain,  and  Portugal,  are  in  the  race  already;  and  that 
several  in  South  America  bid  fair  to  enter  soon.  Not 
only  do  we  see  many  contestants,  whose  numbers  and 
ardor  are  increasing,  but  we  see,  also,  the  cause  of  this 
increasing.  The  cause  is  not  only  a  clearer  apprecia- 
tion of  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from  commerce  across 


86    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

the  water  under  conditions  that  exist  now;  it  is  also  a 
growing  appreciation  of  the  possibilities  of  commerce 
imder  conditions  that  will  exist  later  with  coun- 
tries whose  resources  are  almost  entirely  undeveloped. 
For  four  hundred  years,  we  of  the  United  States,  have 
been  developing  the  land  within  our  borders,  and  the 
task  has  been  enormous.  At  one  time  it  promised  to 
be  the  work  of  centuries;  and  with  the  mechanical  ap- 
pliances of  even  one  hundred  years  ago,  it  would  have 
taken  a  thousand  years  to  do  what  we  have  already 
done.  Mechanical  appliances  of  aU  kinds,  especially 
of  transportation  and  agriculture,  have  made  possible 
what  would,  otherwise,  have  been  impossible;  and 
mechanical  appliances  will  do  the  same  things  in  Tierra 
del  Fuego  and  Zululand. 

Mechanism,  working  on  land  and  sea,  is  opening 
up  the  resources  of  the  world.  And  now,  another 
allied  art,  that  of  chemistry,  more  especially  biology, 
is  in  process  of  removing  one  of  the  remaining  obstacles 
to  fuU  development,  by  making  active  life  possible, 
and  even  pleasant,  in  the  tropics.  It  is  predicted  by 
some  enthusiasts  that,  in  the  near  future,  it  will  be 
healthier  and  pleasanter  to  live  in  the  tropics,  and  even 
do  hard  work  there,  than  in  the  temperate  zone. 
When  this  day  comes,  and  it  may  be  soon,  the  develop- 
ment of  the  riches  of  lands  within  the  tropics  wiU  begin 
in  earnest,  and  wealth  undreamed  of  now  be  realized. 

The  opening  of  the  undeveloped  countries  means 
a  continuing  increase  of  wealth  to  the  nations  that  take 


NAVAL  POWER  87 

advantage  of  the  opportunity,  and  a  corresponding 
backsliding  to  those  nations  that  fail.  It  means  over 
all  the  ocean  an  increasing  number  of  steamers.  It 
means  the  continuing  increase  of  manufacturing  in 
manufacturing  countries,  and  the  increasing  enjoy- 
ment in  them  of  the  good  things  of  all  the  world.  It 
means  in  the  undeveloped  countries  an  increasing  use 
of  the  conveniences  and  luxuries  of  civilization  and 
an  increasing  possession  of  money  or  its  equivalent. 
It  means,  throughout  all  the  world,  an  increase  of 
what  we  call  "Wealth." 

In  discussing  a  subject  so  great  as  sea  trade,  while 
it  may  be  considered  presumptuous  to  look  fifty  years 
ahead,  it  can  hardly  be  denied  that  we  ought  at  least 
to  try  to  look  that  far  ahead.  To  look  fifty  years 
ahead,  is,  after  all,  not  taking  in  a  greater  interval  of 
time  than  fifty  years  back;  and  it  certainly  seems  rea- 
sonable to  conclude  that,  if  a  certain  line  of  progress 
has  been  going  on  for  fifty  years  in  a  perfectly  straight 
line,  and  with  a  vigor  which  is  increasing  very  fast  and 
shows  no  sign  of  change,  the  same  general  line  of  prog- 
ress will  probably  keep  up  for  another  fifty  years.  If 
we  try  to  realize  what  this  means,  we  shall  probably 
fail  completely  and  become  dazed  by  the  prospect. 
We  cannot  possibly  picture  accurately  or  even  clearly 
to  ourselves  any  definite  conditions  of  fifty  years 
hence;  but  we  certainly  are  warranted  in  concluding 
that  by  the  end  of  fifty  years,  practically  all  of  the 
countries  of  the  world,  including  Africa,  will  be  open 


88    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

to  trade  from  one  end  to  the  other;  that  the  volume  of 
trade  wiU  be  at  least  ten  times  as  great  as  it  is  now; 
that  the  means  of  communication  over  the  water  and 
through  the  ah  will  be  very  much  better  than  now; 
and  that  there  will  be  scores  of  appliances,  methods, 
and  processes  in  general  use  of  which  we  have,  as  yet, 
no  inkling,  and  cannot  even  imagine. 

Now  let  us  call  to  mind  the  accepted  proverb  that 
"Competition  is  the  life  of  trade,"  and  this  will  make 
us  see  that,  accompanying  this  stupendous  trade,  ex- 
tending over,  and  into,  every  corner  of  the  world,  there 
will  be  stupendous  competition,  involving  in  a  vast  and 
complicated  net,  every  red-blooded  nation  of  the  earth. 

We  seem  safe  in  concluding,  therefore,  that  the 
importance  of  naval  power  will  increase. 

A  great  deal  is  said  and  written  nowadays  about 
the  ability  of  arbitration  to  make  wars  imnecessary, 
and  a  good  deal  also  about  the  possibility  of  an  agree- 
ment among  the  nations,  whereby  armaments  may  be 
limited  to  forces  adequate  to  insure  that  every  nation 
shall  be  compelled  to  abide  by  the  decision  of  the 
others  in  any  disputed  case. 

In  view  of  the  number,  the  earnestness,  and  the 
prominence  of  many  of  the  men  interested  in  this 
cause;  In  view  of  the  number  of  arbitration  treaties 
that  have  been  already  signed;  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
arbitration  among  nations  will  simply  establish  a  law 
among  them  like  the  law  in  any  civilized  country;  in 
view  of  the  fact  that  individuals  in  their  dealings  with 


NAVAL  POWER  89 

each  other  sometimes  surrender  certain  of  their  claims, 
and  even  rights,  for  the  common  good;  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  nations,  hke  all  business  firms,  like  to  cut 
down  expenses,  and  in  further  view  of  the  fact  that  a 
navy  is  not  directly,  but  only  indirectly,  a  contributor 
to  a  nation's  prosperity,  it  seems  probable  that  arbi- 
tration will  be  more  and  more  used  among  the  nations, 
and  that  armaments  may  be  limited  by  agreement. 
It  is  clear,  however,  that  the  practical  difficulties  in 
the  way  of  making  the  absolute  agreement  required 
are  enormous,  and  that  the  most  enthusiastic  advo- 
cates of  the  plan  do  not  expect  that  the  actual  Hmita- 
tion  of  armaments  will  become  a  fact  for  many  years. 

After  the  necessary  preliminaries  shall  have  been 
arranged,  and  the  conference  takes  place  which  shall 
settle  what  armament  each  nation  may  have,  it  is  plain 
that  it  will  be  to  the  interest  of  each  nation  to  keep 
down  the  armament  of  every  other  nation,  and  to  be 
allowed  as  much  as  possible  itself.  In  this  way,  the 
operation  of  making  the  agreement  will  be  somewhat 
like  the  forming  of  a  trust  among  several  companies, 
and  the  advantage  will  lie  with  that  nation  which  is 
the  most  powerful. 

For  this  reason  it  would  seem  a  part  of  wisdom  for 
each  country  to  enter  the  conference  with  as  large  a 
navy  as  possible. 

Therefore,  the  probability  of  an  approaching  agree- 
ment among  the  nations  as  to  limitation  of  armaments, 
instead  of  being  a  reason  for  abating  our  exertions 


90    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

toward  establishing  a  powerful  navy,  is  really  a  con- 
clusive reason  for  redoubling  them. 

This  brings  us  to  the  important  question,  "how 
powerful  should  our  navy  be?" 

This  may  seem  a  question  impossible  to  answer. 
Of  course  it  is  impossible  to  answer  it  in  terms  of  ships 
and  guns;  but  an  approximate  estimate  may  be  reached 
by  considering  the  case  of  a  man  playing  poker  who 
holds  a  royal  straight  flush.  Such  a  man  would  be  a 
fool  if  he  did  not  back  his  hand  to  the  limit  and  get 
all  the  benefit  possible  from  it.  So  will  the  United 
States,  if  she  fails  to  back  her  hand  to  the  limit,  recog- 
nizing the  fact  that  in  the  grand  game  now  going  on 
for  the  stakes  of  the  commercial  supremacy  of  the 
world,  she  holds  the  best  hand.  She  has  the  largest 
and  most  numerous  seaports,  the  most  enterprising  and 
inventive  people,  and  the  most  wealth  with  which  to 
force  to  success  all  the  various  necessary  undertakings. 

This  does  not  mean  that  the  United  States  ought, 
as  a  matter  either  of  ethics  or  of  policy,  to  build  a  great 
navy  in  order  to  take  unjust  advantage  of  weaker  na- 
tions; but  it  does  mean  that  she  ought  to  build  a  navy 
great  enough  to  save  her  from  being  shorn  of  her 
wealth  and  glory  by  simple  force,  as  France  was  shorn 
in  1871. 

It  is  often  said  that  the  reason  for  Great  Britain's 
having  so  powerful  a  navy  is  that  she  is  so  situated 
geographically  that,  without  a  powerful  navy  to  pro- 
tect her  trade,  the  people  would  starve. 


NAVAL  POWER  91 

While  this  statement  may  be  true,  the  inference 
usually  drawn  is  fallacious:  the  inference  that  if  Great 
Britian  were  not  so  situated,  she  would  not  have  so 
great  a  navy. 

Why  would  she  not?  It  is  certain  that  that 
"tight  little  island"  has  attained  a  world-wide  power, 
and  a  wealth  per  capita  greater  than  those  of  any 
other  country;  that  her  power  and  wealth,  as  compared 
with  her  home  area,  are  so  much  greater  than  those  of 
any  other  country  as  to  stagger  the  understanding; 
that  she  could  not  have  done  what  she  has  done  with- 
out her  navy;  that  she  has  never  hesitated  to  use  her 
navy  to  assist  her  trade,  and  yet  that  she  has  never 
used  her  navy  to  keep  her  people  from  starving. 

In  fact,  the  insistence  on  the  anti-starvation 
theory  is  absurd.  Has  any  country  ever  fought  until 
the  people  as  a  mass  were  starving  ?  Has  starving  any- 
thing to  do  with  the  matter?  Does  not  a  nation  give 
up  fighting  just  as  soon  as  it  sees  that  further  fighting 
would  do  more  harm  than  good  ?  A  general  or  an  ad- 
miral, in  charge  of  a  detached  force,  must  fight  some- 
times even  at  tremendous  loss  and  after  all  hope  of 
local  success  has  fled,  in  order  to  hold  a  position,  the 
long  holding  of  which  is  essential  to  the  success  of  the 
whole  strategic  plan;  but  what  country  keeps  up  a 
war  until  its  people  are  about  to  starve?  Did  Spain 
do  so  in  our  last  war?  Did  Russia  fear  that  Japan 
would  force  the  people  of  her  vast  territory  into  star- 
vation ? 


92     THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

No — starvation  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  case. 
If  some  discovery  were  made  by  which  Great  Britain 
could  grow  enough  to  support  all  her  people,  she  would 
keep  her  great  navy  nevertheless — simply  because  she 
has  found  it  to  be  a  good  investment. 

The  anti-starvation  theory — the  theory  that  one 
does  things  simply  to  keep  from  starving — does  apply 
to  some  tropical  savages,  but  not  to  the  Anglo-Saxon. 
Long  after  starvation  has  been  provided  against,  long 
after  wealth  has  been  secured,  we  still  toil  on.  What 
are  we  toiling  for?  The  same  thing  that  Great  Britain 
maintains  her  navy  for — ^wealth  and  power. 

The  real  reason  for  Great  Britain's  having  a  pow- 
erful navy  applies  with  exact  equality  to  the  United 
States.  Now  that  Great  Britain  has  proved  how  great 
a  navy  is  best  for  her,  we  can  see  at  once  how  great  a 
navy  is  best  for  us.  That  is — since  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States  are  the  wealthiest  countries  in  the 
world,  and  since  the  probability  of  war  between  any 
two  countries  is  least  when  their  navies  are  equal  in 
power — the  maximum  good  would  be  attained  by  mak- 
ing the  United  States  navy  exactly  equal  to  the  Brit- 
ish navy. 


CHAPTER  IV 
NAVAL  PREPAREDNESS 

IN  a  preceding  chapter  I  endeavored  to  show  why  it 
is  that  the  necessities  of  the  naval  defense  of  a  coun- 
try have  caused  the  gradual  development  of  different 
types  of  vessels,  each  having  its  distinctive  work.  If 
those  different  types  operated  in  separate  localities 
they  would  lose  that  mutual  support  which  it  is  the 
aim  of  organization  to  secure,  and  each  separate  group 
could  be  destroyed  in  turn  by  the  combined  groups  of 
an  enemy.  For  this  reason,  the  types  or  groups  are 
combined  in  one  large  fleet,  and  an  admiral  is  placed 
in  command. 

The  command  of  a  fleet  is  the  highest  effort  of 
the  naval  art.  Its  success  in  time  of  war  demands  in 
the  admiral  himself  a  high  order  of  mind  and  nerve 
and  body;  and  it  demands  in  all  the  personnel,  from 
the  highest  to  the  lowest,  such  a  measure  of  trained 
ability  and  character  that  each  shall  be  able  to  dis- 
charge with  skill  and  courage  the  duties  of  his  station. 

In  order  that  the  material  fleet  shall  be  efl&cient 
as  a  whole,  each  material  imit  must  be  efficient  as  a 
unit.  Each  ship  must  be  materially  sound;  each  pump, 
valve,  cylinder,  gun,  carriage,  torpedo,  and  individual 

93 


94    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

appliance,  no  matter  how  small,  must  be  in  condition 
to  perform  its  expected  task.  The  complexity  of  a 
fleet  baffles  any  mental  effort,  by  even  those  most 
familiar  with  it,  to  grasp  it  fuUy.  Each  dreadnaught, 
battle  cruiser,  destroyer,  submarine,  collier,  tender, 
hospital  ship,  scout,  supply  ship,  and  what-not,  is  a 
machine  in  itself,  and  is  fiUed  with  scores — in  some 
cases,  hundreds — of  highly  speciaHzed  machines,  oper- 
ated by  steam,  oil,  air,  electricity,  and  water.  A 
superdreadnaught  is  a  machine  which,  including  the 
machines  inside  of  her,  costs  $15,000,000;  a  battle 
cruiser  more. 

The  personnel  is  nearly  as  complicated  as  the  ma- 
terial. Not  only  are  there  aU  the  various  ranks  of 
commissioned  officers  in  the  line,  medical  corps,  pay 
corps,  marine  corps,  etc.,  but  there  are  ten  kinds  of 
warrant  officers  besides;  while  in  the  enlisted  person- 
nel there  are  ninety-one  different  ''ratings"  in  the 
navy,  and  thirteen  in  the  marine  corps,  besides  tem- 
porary ratings,  such  as  gun-pointer,  gun-trainer,  gun- 
captain,  etc.  Each  rank  and  rating  carries  its  rigidly 
prescribed  duties,  as  weU  as  its  distinctive  uniform 
and  pay.  That  such  a  multitudinous  host  of  types 
and  individuals,  both  material  and  personnel,  can  be 
actuaUy  combined  in  one  unit  fleet,  and  that  fleet 
operated  as  a  mobile  directable  organism  by  its  ad- 
miral, is  a  high  achievement  of  the  human  inteUect. 

How  is  it  done? 

By  discipline,  by  training,  by  knowledge,  by  en- 


NAVAL  PREPAREDNESS  95 

ergy,  by  devotion,  by  will;  by  the  exercise  of  those 
mental,  moral,  and  spiritual  faculties  that  may  be 
grouped  under  the  one  term  "mind":  the  same  power 
that  co-ordinates  and  controls  a  still  more  complex 
machine,  the  organism  of  the  human  body. 

Despite  its  relative  crudeness,  a  fleet  possesses, 
more  fully  than  any  other  fruit  of  man's  endeavor, 
the  characteristics  of  an  organism,  defined  by  Web- 
ster as  "an  individual  constituted  to  carry  on  the  ac- 
tivities of  life  by  means  of  parts  or  organs  more  or 
less  separate  in  function,  but  mutually  dependent." 
And  though  it  must  be  true  that  no  fleet  can  approxi- 
mate the  perfection  of  nature's  organisms,  neverthe- 
less there  is  an  analogy  which  may  help  us  to  see  how 
a  complex  fleet  of  complex  vessels  has  been  slowly 
evolved  from  the  simple  gaUey  fleets  of  earlier  days; 
how  its  various  parts  may  be  mutually  dependent  yet 
severally  independent;  and  how  all  must  be  made  to 
work  as  one  vast  unit,  and  directed  as  one  vast  unit 
by  the  controlling  mind  toward  "the  end  in  view." 

The  common  idea  is  that  an  army  consists  of  a 
number  of  soldiers,  and  a  navy  of  a  number  of  ships. 
This  idea  is  due  to  a  failure  to  realize  that  soldiers  and 
ships  are  merely  instruments,  and  that  they  are  use- 
less instruments  unless  directed  by  a  trained  intelli- 
gence: that  the  first  essential  in  an  army  and  the  first 
essential  in  a  navy  is  mind,  which  first  correctly  esti- 
mates the  situation,  then  makes  wise  plans  to  meet  it, 
then  carries  out  those  plans;  which  organizes  the  men 


96    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

and  designs  the  ships,  and  then  directs  the  physical 
power  exertable  by  the  men  and  the  ships  toward 
"the  end  in  view." 

Owing  to  the  enormous  mechanical  power  made 
available  in  ships  by  the  floating  properties  of  water, 
machinery  is  more  used  by  navies  than  by  armies;  but 
this  does  not  mean  that  machinery  can  take  the  place 
of  men  more  successfully  in  navies  than  in  armies,  ex- 
cept in  the  sense  that  navies  can  use  more  mechanical 
power.  The  abundant  use  of  machines  and  instru- 
ments in  navies  does  not  mean  that  machinery  and  in- 
struments can  take  the  place  of  trained  intelligence — 
but  exactly  the  reverse.  Under  the  guidance  of  trained 
intelligence,  a  machine  or  instrument  can  perform 
wonders.  But  it  is  not  the  machinery  that  does  the 
wonders;  it  is  the  trained  intelHgence  that  devised  the 
instrument  or  machine,  and  the  trained  intelligence 
that  operates  it.  Let  the  trained  intelligence  err,  or 
sleep,  and  note  the  results  that  follow.  The  Titanic^ 
a  mass  of  40,000  tons,  moving  through  the  water  at 
20  knots  an  hour,  a  marvel  of  the  science  and  skiU  of 
man,  crashes  into  an  iceberg,  because  the  trained  in- 
teUigence  directing  her  errs — and  is  reduced  at  once 
to  an  inert  mass  of  iron  and  brass.  The  mighty  fleet 
of  Russia  meets  the  Japanese  fleet  in  Tsushima  Straits; 
and  because  the  trained  intelligence  that  directed  its 
movements  seriously  erred,  in  an  engagement  decided 
in  less  than  an  hour,  is  stripped  of  its  power  and  glory, 
and  transformed  into  a  disorganized  aggregation  of 


NAVAL  PREPAREDNESS  97 

separate  ships — some  sunk,  some  sinking,  some  in 
flight.  The  Japanese  fleet,  on  the  other  hand,  because 
it  is  directed  with  an  inteUigence  more  highly  trained 
than  that  which  directs  the  Russian  fleet,  and  because, 
in  consequence,  the  officers  and  enHsted  men  perform 
their  various  duties  not  only  in  the  actual  battle,  but 
in  preparation  for  it,  with  a  skill  greater  than  that 
used  in  the  Russian  fleet,  suffers  but  little  damage  in 
the  fight — though  the  advantage  in  nimiber  and  size 
of  ships  is  slightly  with  the  Russians.  As  a  consequence 
of  that  battle,  the  war  between  Russia  and  Japan  was 
decided  in  favor  of  Japan,  and  terms  of  peace  were 
soon  agreed  upon.  Russia  lost  practicaUy  all  the  ships 
that  took  part  in  the  battle,  and  several  thousand  of 
her  officers  and  sailors — and  she  lost  the  whole  object 
for  which  she  went  to  war. 

The  difference  between  the  Russian  and  Japanese 
fleets  that  gave  the  victory  to  the  Japanese  was  a  dif- 
ference in  trained  intelligence  and  in  the  relative  de- 
grees of  preparedness  which  that  difference  caused. 

During  the  actual  battle,  the  intelligence  was  that 
of  the  officers  and  men  in  the  respective  fleets,  in  man- 
aging the  two  fleets,  the  ships  themselves,  and  the 
guns,  engines,  and  machines  of  all  kinds  that  those  ships 
contained.  It  is  this  factor — trained  inteUigence — 
that  has  decided  most  of  the  battles  of  history,  and  the 
course  that  nations  thereafter  followed.  Battles  have 
usually  been  fought  between  forces  not  very  different 
in  point  of  numbers  and  material,  for  the  reason  that 


98    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

a  force  which  knew  itself  to  be  weaker  than  another 
would  not  fight  unless  compelled  to  fight;  and  in 
cases  where  two  forces  of  widely  differing  strength 
have  fought,  the  situation  has  usually  been  brought 
about  directly  by  a  superior  intelligence.  In  fact,  one 
of  the  most  frequent  and  important  endeavors  of 
strategy  and  tactics — used  triumphantly  by  Napo- 
leon— has  always  been  such  a  handling  of  one's  forces 
as  to  be  superior  to  the  enemy  at  the  point  of  con- 
tact— to  "get  the  mostest  men  there  the  firstest,"  as 
General  Forrest  is  said  to  have  expressed  it. 

The  effect  of  superior- trained  intelligence  is  great- 
est "at  the  top,"  but  it  can  accomplish  little  unless  a 
fine  intelligence  permeates  the  whole.  A  fine  intelli- 
gence at  the  top  will  so  direct  the  men  below,  will  so 
select  men  for  the  various  posts,  and  will  so  co-ordi- 
nate their  efforts,  that  the  organization  will  resemble  a 
veritable  organism:  all  the  various  organs  fulfilling 
separately  yet  accurately  their  allotted  functions;  all 
the  fire-control  parties,  all  the  gun  crews,  all  the  tor- 
pedo crews,  all  the  engineer  forces  properly  organized 
and  drilled;  aU  the  hulls  of  the  vessels,  all  the  guns, 
all  the  torpedoes,  all  the  multifarious  engines,  ma- 
chines, and  instruments  in  good  material  condition  and 
correctly  adjusted  for  use. 

But  it  is  not  only  in  the  actual  battle  that  fine 
intelligence  is  required;  it  is  required  long  before  the 
battle  and  far  distant  from  the  scene — in  the  "ad- 
miralty" at  home.     The  Japanese  fleet  set  out  fully 


NAVAL  PREPAREDNESS  99 

manned  with  a  highly  trained,  enthusiastic,  and  confi- 
dent personnel;  the  Russian  fleet  set  out  manned  with 
a  poorly  trained  and  discouraged  personnel,  only  too 
well  aware  of  their  defects.  The  issue  at  Tsushima 
was  decided  before  the  respective  fleets  left  their  re- 
spective homes — though  that  issue  was  not  then  known 
to  mortals.  The  battle  emphasized,  but  did  not  prove, 
what  had  been  proved  a  hundred  times  before:  the 
paramount  importance  of  preparedness;  that  when 
two  forces  fight — the  actual  battle  merely  secures  the  deci- 
sion as  to  the  relative  values  of  two  completed  machines^ 
and  their  degrees  of  preparedness  for  use. 

Preparedness  of  material  is  not,  of  course,  so  im- 
portant as  preparedness  of  personnel,  because  if  the 
personnel  is  prepared,  they  wiU  inevitably  prepare  the 
material.  And  the  preparedness  must  pervade  all 
grades:  for  while  it  is  true  that  the  preparedness  of 
those  in  high  command  is  more  important  than  the 
preparedness  of  those  in  minor  posts,  yet  there  is  no 
post  so  lowly  that  its  good  or  its  ill  performance  will 
not  be  a  factor  in  the  net  result.  An  unskilful  oiler 
may  cause  a  hot  bearing  that  will  slow  down  a  battle- 
ship, and  put  out  of  order  the  column  of  a  squadron; 
a  signalman's  mistake  may  throw  a  fleet  into  confu- 
sion. 

Perfect  preparedness  of  personnel  and  material 
is  essential  because  events  follow  each  other  so  rapidly 
in  war  that  no  preparation  can  be  made  after  it  has 
begun.    To  fight  is  the  most  intense  work  a  man  can  do ; 


loo    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

and  a  war  is  nothing  but  a  fight.  No  matter  how  great 
or  how  small  a  war  may  be,  no  war  can  lose  the  essen- 
tial qualities  of  a  fight,  or  (save  in  the  treatment  of 
prisoners)  be  more  brutal  or  less  brutal  when  fought 
between  two  little  savage  tribes,  than  when  fought 
between  two  colossal  groups  of  Christian  nations, 
civilized  to  the  highest  point.  War  is  the  acme  of 
the  endeavor  of  man.  Each  side  determines  that  it 
will  win  at  all  costs  and  at  aU  hazards;  that  nobody's 
comfort,  happiness,  or  safety  shall  receive  the  slightest 
consideration;  that  everybody's  strength  and  courage 
must  be  worked  to  the  limit  by  night  as  well  as  by 
day,  and  that  there  must  be  no  rest  and  no  yielding 
to  any  softening  influence  whatever;  that  the  whole 
strength  and  mind  of  the  nation,  and  of  every  indi- 
vidual in  it,  must  be  devoted,  and  must  be  sacrificed, 
if  need  be,  to  the  cause  at  stake. 

In  war,  a  navy's  primary  duty  has  usually  been  to 
protect  the  coast  and  trade  routes  of  its  country;  and 
in  order  to  do  this,  it  has  had  to  be  able  to  oppose  to 
an  attacking  fleet  a  defending  fleet  more  militarily 
effective.  If  it  were  less  effective,  even  if  no  invasion 
were  attempted,  the  attacking  fleet  could  cripple  or 
destroy  the  defending  fleet  and  then  institute  a  block- 
ade. In  modem  times  an  effective  blockade,  or  at 
least  a  hostile  patrol  of  trade  routes,  could  be  held 
hundreds  of  miles  from  the  coast,  where  the  menace 
of  submarines  would  be  negligible;  and  this  blockade 
would  stop  practically  all  import   and  export  trade. 


NAVAL  PREPAREDNESS  loi 

This  would  compel  the  country  to  live  exclusively  on 
its  own  resources,  and  renounce  intercourse  with  the 
outside  world.  Some  countries  could  exist  a  long  time 
under  these  conditions.  But  they  would  exist  merely, 
and  the  condition  of  mere  existence  would  never  end 
until  they  sued  for  peace;  because,  even  if  new  war- 
ships were  constructed  with  which  to  beat  off  the 
enemy,  each  new  and  untrained  ship  would  be  sunk  or 
captured  shortly  after  putting  out  to  sea  as,  on  June  i, 
1813,  in  Massachusetts  Bay,  the  American  frigate 
Chesapeake  was  captured  and  nearly  half  her  crew  were 
killed  and  wounded  in  fifteen  minutes  by  a  ship  almost 
identical  in  the  material  qualities  of  size  and  arma- 
ment— the  better- trained  British  frigate  Shannon. 

For  these  reasons,  every  nation  that  has  acquired 
and  has  long  retained  prosperity,  has  realized  that 
every  country  liable  to  be  attacked  by  any  navy  must 
either  be  defended  by  some  powerful  country,  or  else 
must  keep  a  navy  ready  to  repel  the  attack  success- 
fully. To  do  this,  the  defending  navy  must  be  ready 
when  the  attack  comes;  because  if  not  ready  then,  it 
will  never  have  time  to  get  ready.  In  regard  to  our 
own  country,  much  stress  is  laid  by  some  intelligent 
people — ^who  forget  the  Chesapeake  and  Shannon — on 
the  3,000  miles  of  water  stretching  between  the  United 
States  and  Europe.  This  3,000  miles  is,  of  course,  a 
factor  of  importance,  but  it  is  not  a  prohibition,  be- 
cause it  can  be  traversed  with  great  surety  and  quick- 
ness— with  much  greater  surety  and  quickness,  for 


I02    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

instance,  than  the  12,000  miles  traversed  by  the 
Russian  fleet,  in  1904,  in  steaming  from  Russia  to 
Japan. 

The  3,000  miles  that  separate  the  United  States 
from  Europe  can  be  traversed  by  a  fleet  more  power- 
ful than  ours  in  from  two  to  three  weeks;  and  the 
fleet  would  probably  arrive  on  our  shores  in  good 
condition,  and  manned  by  full  crews  of  well-trained 
officers  and  men,  habituated  to  their  duties  by  re- 
cent practice  and  thoroughly  ready  to  fight,  as  the 
Shannon  was.  We  could  not  meet  this  fleet  success- 
fully imless  we  met  it  with  a  fleet  more  militarily  effec- 
tive; and  we  could  not  do  this  unless  we  had  in  the 
regular  service  and  the  reserve  a  personnel  of  officers 
and  men  sufficiently  numerous  to  man  immediately 
all  the  vessels  that  would  be  needed,  and  to  man  in 
addition  all  the  shore  stations,  which  would  have  to 
be  expanded  to  a  war  basis.  The  officers  and  enhsted 
men,  of  course,  would  have  to  be  at  least  as  well  trained 
as  the  corresponding  persormel  in  the  attacking  fleet, 
and  have  as  recent  and  thorough  practice  in  their  re- 
spective duties;  for  otherwise,  no  matter  how^  brave 
and  devoted  they  might  be,  the  fate  of  the  American 
fleet  would  be  the  fate  of  the  Chesapeake. 

In  order  to  be  ready  when  war  breaks,  the  first 
essential  is  a  plan  for  preparation.  Preparation  is  di- 
vided naturally  into  two  parts:  first,  preparation  of 
sufficient  material  and  personnel;  second,  prepara- 
tion of  plans  for  the  conduct  of  the  war  after  it  has 


NAVAL  PREPAREDNESS  103 

begun.  These  two  parts  are  both  considered  in  what 
are  technically  called  "War  Plans." 

Preparation  for  war  has  always  been  known  to  be 
essential.  Lack  of  preparation  has  never  been  due  to 
lack  of  knowledge,  but  always  to  neglect.  The  differ- 
ence between  the  wise  and  the  foolish  virgins  was  not 
a  difference  in  knowledge  but  a  difference  in  character. 
The  difference  between  Alexander's  little  army  and 
the  tremendous  army  of  Darius  was  not  so  much  in 
numbers  as  in  preparedness.  Trained  under  Philip  of 
Macedon  for  many  years,  organized  for  conquest  and 
aggression,  prepared  to  meet  any  situation  that  might 
arise,  Philip's  army  carried  Philip's  son  from  victory 
to  victory,  and  made  him  the  master  of  the  world. 
Csesar  was  great  in  peace  as  well  as  war,  but  it  was  by 
Caesar's  army  that  Caesar's  greatness  was  established; 
and  it  was  a  thoroughness  of  preparation  imknown  be- 
fore that  made  Caesar's  army  great.  Napoleon's  suc- 
cesses were  built  on  the  splendid  preparation  of  a  mind 
transcendently  fitted  to  grasp  both  principles  and  de- 
tails, and  on  the  comparatively  unprepared  state  of 
his  opponents. 

The  Great  Elector  began  in  1640  a  course  of  la- 
borious and  scientific  preparation  which  committed 
all  Prussia,  as  well  as  the  army,  to  acquiring  what 
now  we  call  "efficiency."  As  this  plan  developed,  es- 
pecially under  the  Elector's  grandson  King  Frederick 
William,  the  next  King  found  himself,  as  Alexander 
had  done,  the  chief  of  an  army  more  highly  prepared 


104    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

for  war  than  any  other.  By  means  of  that  army  he 
made  himseK  Frederick  the  Great,  and  raised  Prussia 
from  a  minor  position  to  the  first  rank  of  European 
Powers.  Pursuing  Frederick  Wilham's  system  of 
progressive  preparation,  Prussia  continued  her  pros- 
perous course  tiU  WiUiam  I  defeated  Austria,  then 
France,  and  founded  the  German  Empire.  This  does 
not  mean  that  the  only  result  of  developing  national 
efl&ciency  to  its  highest  point  is  to  secure  success  in  war 
— in  fact,  we  know  that  it  is  not.  But  it  does  mean 
that  the  same  quality — efficiency — which  tends  to 
prosperity  in  peace  tends  also  to  victory  in  war. 

Preparing  for  war  was  a  simple  thing  in  the  olden 
days  compared  with  preparing  now,  for  the  reason 
that  the  implements  of  war  are  much  more  numerous 
and  complicated  than  they  used  to  be,  especially  in 
navies.  A  navy  is  not  ready  unless  all  preparations  and 
plans  have  been  made,  tested,  and  kept  up  to  date,  to 
insure  that  all  of  the  vessels  of  every  kind  and  all 
the  shore  stations  will  be  in  material  condition,  fully 
equipped  and  manned  by  a  sufficient  and  efficient  per- 
sonnel of  officers  and  crews,  in  time  to  meet  the  enemy 
on  advantageous  terms,  and  imless  the  central  author- 
ity has  already  decided  what  it  will  do,  when  any 
probable  emergency  shall  arise.  This  was  the  condi- 
tion of  the  German  army  in  1870.  This  was  also  the 
condition  of  the  British  navy,  when  war  broke  out  in 
August,  19 14;  the  British  navy  was  ready;  and  there- 
fore it  was  able  to  assume  command  of  the  sea  at  once, 


NAVAL  PREPAREDNESS  105 

drive  its  enemy's  commerce  from  the  ocean,  and  im- 
prison its  fleets  in  sheltered  ports. 

In  all  countries  the  peace  establishment  of  the 
army  and  nav>^  is  smaller  than  the  war  establishment, 
for  reasons  of  economy,  upon  the  assumption  that 
there  will  be  enough  time  after  war  is  declared  to  get 
on  a  war  basis  before  the  enemy  can  strike.  But  since 
1870,  all  the  military  nations  have  realized  that  the 
vital  struggle  of  a  war  takes  place  before  a  shot  is  fired ; 
that  the  factors  that  decide  which  nation  shall  he  the  vic- 
tor and  which  the  vanquished  are  determined  before  the 
war  begins;  that  they  are  simply  "functions"  of  pre- 
paredness. Germany  was  ready  not  only  for  war  but 
for  victory,  because  her  troops  were  so  much  better 
trained,  organized,  and  equipped  than  those  of  France, 
and  her  war  plans  so  much  more  complete,  that  she 
was  able  to  lay  France  prostrate,  before  the  enormous 
resources  of  that  country  in  men  and  material  could 
rally  in  her  defense. 

The  relative  conditions  in  which  two  opposing 
forces  will  enter  a  war,  and  their  relative  performances 
afterward,  will  depend  upon  the  relative  excellence 
of  the  war  plans  made  for  them,  and  the  thoroughness 
with  which  the  plans  are  tested  before  war  breaks. 
So  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  why  all  the  great  armies 
have  patterned  after  Germany,  and  organized  special 
bodies  of  officers  for  the  preparation  and  execution  of 
war  plans;  and  why  it  is  that  they  endeavor  to  secure 
for  that  peculiar  duty  the  most  thorough  and  Indus- 


io6    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

trious  of  their  officers.  Owing  to  the  nature  of  war 
itself,  the  principles  of  warfare  apply  in  their  essen- 
tials to  navies  as  well  as  to  armies;  and  so  the  navies 
have  patterned  after  the  armies  and  made  plans 
whereby  they  can  get  ready  to  fight  in  fleet  organiza- 
tion on  the  ocean  with  the  greatest  possible  effective- 
ness in  the  shortest  possible  time. 

During  peace  times  every  navy  is  maintained  on 
a  "peace  basis";  only  such  ships  and  other  material 
being  kept  in  full  commission,  and  only  such  a  number 
of  officers  and  enlisted  men  being  actively  employed, 
as  the  appropriations  allotted  by  the  government 
permit.  Those  ships  and  other  material  that  are  not 
actually  in  commission  are  maintained  in  reserve,  a 
condition  of  partial  readiness,  of  which  several  de- 
grees are  recognized,  in  which  a  reduced  number  of 
officers  and  men  are  kept  on  board,  and  the  various 
structures  and  apparatus  are  kept  in  as  high  a  degree 
of  readiness  as  circumstances  will  permit.  In  order 
to  man  in  time  of  war  these  vessels  in  reserve,  and  in- 
sure a  sufficient  personnel  in  the  active  fleet,  a  ''naval 
reserve"  is  organized  in  each  country,  composed  of 
officers  and  men  who  have  had  experience  in  the  regu- 
lar navy.  They  are  compelled  to  undergo  a  specffic 
amount  of  training  each  year,  to  keep  themselves  in 
readiness  at  all  times  to  answer  the  call  for  active  ser- 
vice on  short  notice,  and  to  maintain  such  communi- 
cation with  the  government  as  will  make  it  easy  to 
locate  any  man  at  any  moment. 


NAVAL  PREPAREDNESS  107 

The  act  of  getting  ready,  the  passing  from  a  state 
of  peace  to  a  state  of  readiness  for  fighting,  is  called 
"mobilization."  Mobilization  plans  are  an  impor- 
tant element  in  war  plans,  but  the  details  of  any  mo- 
bilization plan  are  of  such  a  confidential  nature  that 
it  would  not  be  proper  to  discuss  them  in  public  print. 
There  can  be  no  impropriety,  however,  in  making  the 
general  statement  that  in  all  navies  the  endeavor  is 
made  to  keep  the  mobilization  plans  continually  up 
to  date,  and  to  have  them  prepared  in  such  detail 
that  every  officer  and  enlisted  man  in  active  service, 
the  retired  list,  the  naval  reserve,  and  the  naval 
militia,  will  become  instantly  available  for  a  prede- 
termined duty,  and  that  every  shore  station  and 
every  necessary  vessel  will  be  ready  to  take  part.  The 
plans  prescribe  methods  in  very  great  detail  whereby 
the  ships  and  other  vessels  in  reserve  can  be  quickly 
put  into  commission  with  full  crews  of  officers  and  men, 
all  their  various  equipments,  fuel,  and  ammunition 
put  on  board,  and  the  vessels  themselves  sent  out  to 
sea  to  join  the  fleet.  In  addition,  plans  are  made 
whereby  certain  auxiliaries  can  be  fitted  out  at  once 
and  put  into  commission — such  as  supply  ships,  am- 
munition ships,  transports,  colliers,  mine  ships,  hos- 
pital ships,  etc.  The  mass  of  detailed  plans,  orders, 
and  instructions  is  stupendous  and  bewildering.  Years 
of  study,  trial,  and  rectification  are  required  to  get 
them  into  such  condition  that  the  plans  can  be  put 
into  immediate  and  effective  use  when  war  breaks  out. 


I 

io8    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

The  work  must  be  done,  however,  and  with  the  utmost 
thoroughness,  before  war  breaks  out;  otherwise  it  will 
never  be  done,  if  an  active  enemy  is  about,  because 
he  will  strike  at  once — and  then  it  will  be  too  late. 

In  most  of  the  great  naval  countries  the  work  of 
mobilizing  the  fleet  is  comparatively  easy,  for  the  rea- 
son that  the  coast-line  is  short  and  is  not  far  from  any 
part  of  the  interior,  enabling  reserves  to  live  in  fairly 
close  touch  with  the  coast  and  with  naval  affairs,  and 
so  near  the  coast  that  they  can  get  quickly  to  any 
port.  But  the  conditions  in  the  United  States  are 
more  difficult  than  those  in  any  other  country,  because 
of  the  enormous  stretch  of  our  coast,  the  great  aver- 
age distance  from  any  place  in  our  country  to  the  coast, 
the  difficulty  of  getting  a  naval  reserve  that  could 
be  of  practical  use  (owing  to  the  ease  with  which  young 
men  can  make  a  comfortable  living  on  land),  and  the 
perilous  slowness  of  the  nation  as  a  whole  to  realize 
the  necessity  for  preparedness. 

As  an  offset  to  this,  we  have  the  3,000  miles  of 
ocean  between  us  and  Europe,  and  the  5,000  miles 
between  us  and  Asia;  and  on  account  of  this  we  may 
to  a  certain  extent  discount  the  danger  of  attack  and 
the  preparedness  required  to  meet  it.  But  our  dis- 
count should  be  reasonable  and  reasoned  out,  and 
certainly  not  excessive.  Fortunately  the  problem  of 
how  much  time  we  should  allow  for  mobilizing  and 
joining  the  fleet  is  easy,  as  a  moment's  thought  will 
show  us  that  it  must  be  simply  the  two  weeks  needed 


NAVAL  PREPAREDNESS  109 

for  a  fleet  to  come  from  Europe  to  America;  for  we 
must  realize  that  the  report  of  the  sailing  of  the  hostile 
fleet  would  be  the  first  news  we  should  get  of  any  hos- 
tile preparation  or  intent. 

The  general  situation  in  which  every  isolated 
naval  nation  stands  regarding  other  nations  is  not 
complicated,  but  very  plain.  Each  nation  has,  as  pos- 
sible opponents  in  its  policy,  certain  countries.  The 
naval  forces  of  those  countries  and  the  time  in  which 
they  can  be  made  ready  are  known  with  sufficient 
accuracy  for  practical  purposes.  If  any  isolated  naval 
nation  wishes  to  carry  out  a  policy  which  any  of  those 
countries  will  forcibly  oppose  she  must  either  build  a 
navy  equal  to  that  of  the  other  country,  or  else  be  pre- 
pared to  abandon  any  attempt  to  force  her  policies. 
Stating  the  question  in  another  way,  she  can  carry 
out  only  such  policies  as  do  not  require  for  their  en- 
forcement a  navy  stronger  than  she  has. 

It  is  true  that  diplomacy  and  the  jealousies  of 
foreign  powers  unite  to  make  possible  the  averting  of 
war  during  long  periods  of  time.  Diplomacy  averted 
war  mth  Germany  for  forty-three  years,  but  it  could 
not  continue  to  avert  war  eternally.  War  finally  broke 
out  with  a  violence  unparalleled  in  history,  and  pos- 
sessing a  magnitude  proportional  to  the  duration 
of  the  preceding  peace.  "Long  coming  long  last, 
short  notice  soon  past"  is  a  sailor's  maxim  about 
storms;  and  it  seems  not  inapplicable  to  wars.  Cer- 
tain it  is  that  the  frequent  wars  of  savage  tribes  are 


no    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

far  less  terrible  than  the  infrequent  wars  of  enlightened 
powers. 

This  indicates  that,  even  though  a  nation  may  be 
able  to  avert  war  for  a  long  time,  war  will  come  some 
day,  in  a  form  which  the  present  war  foreshadows; 
and  it  suggests  the  possibility  that  the  longer  the  war 
is  averted,  the  more  tremendous  it  wiU  be,  the  greater 
the  relative  unpreparedness  of  a  slothful  nation,  and 
the  sharper  her  punishment  when  war  finally  breaks 
upon  her. 


CHAPTER  V 
NAVAL  DEFENSE 

THERE  has  never  been  a  time  since  Cain  slew  Abel 
when  men  have  not  been  compelled  to  devote  a 
considerable  part  of  their  energies  to  self-defense.  In 
the  early  ages,  before  large  organizations  existed  or 
the  mechanic  arts  had  made  much  progress,  defense 
was  mostly  defense  of  Ufe  itself.  As  time  went  on, 
and  people  amassed  goods  and  chattels,  and  organized 
in  groups  and  tribes,  it  came  to  include  the  defense 
of  property — not  only  the  property  of  individuals, 
but  also  of  the  tribe  and  the  land  it  occupied.  Still 
later,  defense  came  to  include  good  name  or  reputa- 
tion, when  it  was  realized  that  the  reputation,  even  of 
an  organization,  could  not  be  destroyed  without  doing 
it  an  injury. 

At  the  present  day,  owing  to  the  complexity  of 
nations  and  other  organizations,  and  to  the  long  time 
during  which  many  of  them  have  existed,  the  ques- 
tion of  defense  has  become  extremely  difficult.  The 
places  in  which  defense  has  been  brought  to  its  high- 
est excellence  are  the  large  cities  of  the  civilized  coun- 
tries; for  there  we  see  that  defense  of  the  life,  property, 
and  reputation  of  every  individual  has  been  carefully 
provided  for.  This  has  been  made  possible  by  the 
intimate  intermingling  of  the  people,  the  absence  of 


112    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

racial  rivalries,  and  the  fact  that  the  interests  of  all  are 
identical  in  the  matter  of  defense  of  life,  property,  and 
reputation;  since,  no  matter  how  bad  any  individual 
may  be,  he  wishes  that  others  shall  be  good,  in  order 
that  he  himself  may  be  safe. 

The  defense  of  reputation  has  two  aspects:  the 
practical  and  the  sentimental.  The  practical  aspect 
regards  the  defense  of  that  element  of  reputation 
which  affects  ability  to  "make  a  living";  while  the 
sentimental  aspect  is  concerned  with  the  purely  per- 
sonal reputation  of  the  individual,  or  with  the  repu- 
tation of  an  organization  or  a  nation.  The  senti- 
mental aspect  is  much  more  important,  especially  in 
enlightened  nations,  than  is  realized  by  some  who  have 
not  thought  much  about  it;  for  there  is,  fortunately, 
in  every  decent  man  a  craving  for  the  esteem  and 
even  the  affection  of  his  fellow  men;  and  a  knowledge 
that,  no  matter  how  wealthy  or  powerful  he  may  be, 
he  cannot  be  happy  if  he  knows  that  he  is  despised. 

The  fact  that  individuals  organize  to  acquire  the 
strength  of  united  effort  brings  about,  among  organi- 
zations, a  spirit  of  competition  like  that  among  indi- 
viduals. It  is  more  intense,  however,  because  no  man 
alone  can  get  up  the  enthusiasms  that  ten  men  acting 
together  can  get  up,  and  ten  men  cannot  get  up  as 
much  as  a  thousand.  The  longer  any  organization 
is  maintained,  the  sharper  this  spirit  of  rivalry  grows 
to  be,  owing  to  the  feeling  of  clanship  that  propinquity 
and  material  interests  evoke.     Its  acme  is  found  in 


NAVAL  DEFENSE  113 

those  organizations  called  nations,  that  have  lived 
together,  nourished  from  the  same  soil,  for  genera- 
tions; where  the  same  loves  and  jealousies  and  hates 
that  they  now  feel  were  felt  by  their  fathers  and 
their  grandfathers  and  great-grandfathers  for  centuries 
back.  Among  a  people  possessing  the  potentialities 
of  national  solidarity  and  greatness  this  feeling  waxes 
into  a  self-sacrificing  devotion  to  the  nation  and  to 
the  land  that  bore  them. 

That  there  should  be  such  a  thing  is  sometimes 
deplored;  because  patriotism,  like  all  human  quali- 
ties, has  its  bad  side  and  its  unfortunate  effects.  If 
it  were  not  for  patriotism  there  would  probably  be 
no  war,  and  the  greatest  suffering  that  the  world  en- 
dures would  thus  be  obviated.  But  if  it  were  not  for 
patriotism  there  would  be  no  competition  among  na- 
tions; and  in  any  one  nation  there  would  be  no  na- 
tional spirit,  no  endeavor  on  the  part  of  every  man 
to  do  his  part  toward  making  her  strong,  efficient,  and 
of  good  repute  or  toward  making  the  people  indi- 
vidually prosperous  and  happy.  In  the  same  way,  on 
a  smaller  scale,  many  people  deplore  the  necessity  of 
competition  among  organizations,  saying  that  it  is 
ruthless  and  selfish;  that  it  stamps  out  the  indi- 
vidual; that  it  makes  every  man  a  mere  cog  in  a 
money-getting  machine;  that  it  brings  about  strife, 
hatred,  jealousies,  and  sometimes  murders;  that,  if  it 
were  not  for  competition,  all  men  would  live  together 
in  peace. 


114    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

This  may  be  so;  but  if  it  were  not  for  competi- 
tion there  would  probably  be  little  of  that  strenuous 
endeavor  without  which  no  effective  progress  in  ad- 
vancing the  welfare  of  men  has  ever  yet  been  made. 
Of  course,  it  may  be  that  what  we  call  "progress" 
has  really  not  advanced  the  welfare  of  men;  that  the 
savage  in  Samoa  is  as  happy  as  the  miUionaire  in 
New  York;  that  knowledge  itself  is  not  an  unmixed 
benefit;  and  if  we  accept  this  view,  we  may  logically 
declare  that  competition,  progress,  and  patriotism  are 
all  disadvantages.  But  who  will  go  so  far?  It  seems 
to  be  a  fact  that  we  cannot  get  something  for  nothing: 
that  every  plus  has  its  minus,  every  joy  its  pain; 
that  if  men  succeed  in  passing  beyond  the  savage  state, 
and  in  overcoming  the  forces  of  nature,  so  that  they 
can  live  in  houses  with  every  modern  luxury  and 
convenience,  they  must  pay  for  it  by  a  condition  of 
competition  that  causes  personal  jealousies  among  indi- 
viduals, commercial  wars  among  organizations,  physi- 
cal wars  among  nations. 

Yet  the  instinctive  desire  of  every  one  is  for  peace 
and  comfort,  for  the  maximum  of  good  with  the  mini- 
mum of  exertion;  and  therefore  the  normal  person 
dislikes  to  see  interjected  into  human  life  the  abomi- 
nable confusion  of  war.  From  this  it  comes  about  that 
every  nation,  even  if  it  consciously  brings  about  a 
war,  always  endeavors  to  make  it  appear  that  the 
other  party  is  the  aggressor.  For  this  reason  in  every 
country  the  army  and  navy  are  said  to  be  for  the  "de- 


NAVAL  DEFENSE  115 

fense"  of  the  country.  No  nation,  no  matter  how- 
aggressive  its  poHcy  may  secretly  be,  openly  declares 
that  it  intends  to  provoke  aggression.  This  does  not 
mean  that  any  nation  ever  deliberately  raises  an  army 
and  navy  for  aggression,  and  then  consciously  de- 
ceives the  world  in  regard  to  its  intention;  for  men 
are  so  constituted  as  to  feel  more  or  less  unconsciously 
that  their  interests  and  desires  are  proper  and  those 
of  their  opponent  wrong;  and  every  nation  is  so  firmly 
persuaded  of  the  righteousness  of  its  own  policies  as 
to  feel  that  any  country  which  exhibits  antagonism 
toward  these  policies  is  trying  to  provoke  a  fight. 

Now  these  policies,  especially  after  a  nation  has 
adhered  to  them  for  long,  seem  vital  in  her  eyes,  and 
they  usually  are  so.  To  Great  Britain,  whose  major 
policy  is  that  she  must  be  mistress  of  the  seas,  it 
is  vital  that  she  should  be.  Her  people  are  sur- 
rounded by  the  ocean,  and  unless  they  are  willing 
simply  to  eke  out  an  agricultural  existence,  it  is  essen- 
tial that  she  should  be  able  to  manufacture  articles, 
send  them  out  in  ships  to  all  parts  of  the  world,  and 
receive  in  return  money  and  the  products  of  other 
lands.  In  order  that  she  may  be  able  to  do  this,  she 
must  feel  sure  that  no  power  on  earth  can  restrain 
the  peaceful  sailing  to  and  fro  of  her  exporting  and 
importing  ships.  This  assurance  can  be  had  only 
through  physical  force;  it  can  be  exerted  only  by  a 
navy.  Germany  has  been  gradually  coming  into  the 
same  position,   and   the  same  clear  comprehension, 


ii6    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

owing  to  the  increase  of  her  population,  the  growth 
of  their  desire  for  wealth,  and  their  realization  of  the 
control  by  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  of 
large  areas  of  the  surface  of  the  earth.  Germany's 
determination  to  break  down,  at  least  in  part,  that 
overpowering  command  of  the  sea  which  Great  Britain 
wields  has  been  the  result.  The  ensuing  rapid  growth 
and  excellence  of  Germany's  navy  and  merchant 
marine  brought  Germany  and  England  into  sharp 
competition.  Military  and  naval  men  have  seen  for 
years  that  these  competing  nations  would  have  to  go 
to  war  some  day  in  '' self-defense." 

In  the  minds  of  some  people  the  idea  of  what  con- 
stitutes "defense"  is  rather  hazy,  and  "defense"  is 
deemed  almost  synonymous  with  "resistance."  Per- 
haps the  clearest  idea  of  what  constitutes  "defense" 
is  given  in  a  sentence  in  Webster's  Dictionary,  that 
reads:  "The  inmates  of  a  fortress  are  defended  by 
its  guns,  protected  by  its  walls,  and  guarded  against 
surprise  by  sentries." 

The  distinction  is  important,  and  the  partially 
aggressive  character  of  defense  it  indicates  is  exem- 
plified in  all  walks  of  human  and  brute  life.  Any  ani- 
mal, no  matter  how  peaceably  inclined,  will  turn  on 
his  aggressor — unless,  indeed,  he  runs  away.  No  one 
ever  saw  any  brute  oppose  a  merely  passive  resistance 
to  attack.  Every  man  recognizes  in  himself  an  in- 
stinct to  hit  back  if  he  is  hit.  If  it  be  an  instinct,  it 
must  have  been  implanted  in  us  for  a  reason;    and 


NAVAL  DEFENSE  117 

the  reason  is  not  hard  to  find  in  the  universal  law  of 
self-protection,  which  cannot  be  satisfied  with  the 
ineffectual  method  of  mere  parrying  or  resisting. 

Naval  defense,  like  military  defense,  therefore, 
is  not  passive  defense  only,  but  contains  an  element 
of  "offense"  as  well.  When  the  defense  contains  in 
large  measure  the  element  of  offense,  it  is  said  in  mili- 
tary parlance  to  be  "offensive-defensive";  and  the 
most  effective  defensive  is  this  offensive-defensive. 
When  a  defending  force  throws  off  its  defensive  atti- 
tude entirely  and  advances  boldly  to  attack,  it  is  said 
to  have  "assumed  the  offensive";  but  even  this  as- 
sumption, especially  if  it  be  temporary — as  when  a 
beleaguered  garrison  makes  a  sortie — does  not  rob  the 
situation  of  its  defensive  character. 

For  these  reasons  the  dividuig  line- between  of- 
fense and  defense  is  very  vague;  and  it  is  x  %de  more 
vague  through  a  realization  by  all  military  people  that 
the  offense  has  certain  decided  advantages  over  the 
defense  (unless  the  defense  has  the  advantage  of  posi- 
tion); so  that  when  strained  relations  between  two 
nations  come,  each  is  so  fearful  that  the  other  will 
take  the  offensive  first,  when  the  two  nations  are  near 
each  other,  that  it  is  apt  to  take  the  offensive  first — 
in  real  self-defense!  A  striking  illustration  is  the 
action  of  certain  European  Powers  in  the  latter  part 
of  July,  1 9 14. 

In  addition  to  the  sincere  convictions  of  either 
party,  there  is  also  apt  to  be  considerable  yielding  to 


ii8    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

the  temptation  to  persuade  the  world  that  the  other 
party  is  the  aggressor,  merely  to  get  the  sympathy 
that  usually  goes  to  the  innocent  victim — the  sup- 
port of  what  Bismarck  called  "the  imponderables." 
Few  wars  have  been  frankly  "offensive,"  like  the 
conquests  of  Alexander,  Caesar,  and  Pizarro,  at  least 
in  modern  times;  each  side  has  usually  claimed  (and 
often  sincerely  believed)  that  its  action  was  demanded 
in  self-defense  and  that  its  cause  was  just. 

To  some  in  the  United  States  naval  defense  means 
merely  defense  against  invasion.  This  notion  is  of 
recent  growth,  and  certainly  was  not  held  by  the 
framers  of  our  Constitution.  Section  8  of  Article  I 
defines  the  powers  of  Congress;  and  although  eight 
of  the  eighteen  paragraphs  deal  exclusively  with  mea- 
sures of  d'^^'^Tise  o.n  s^,  and  land,  only  one  of  those 
paragraphs  (the  fifteenth)  deals  with  invasion.  The 
first  paragraph  reads: 

The  Congress  shall  have  power  to  lay  and  collect  taxes, 
duties,  imposts,  and  excises,  to  pay  the  debts  and  provide  for  the 
common  defense  and  general  welfare  of  the  United  States  ;  but 
all  duties,  imposts,  and  excises  shall  be  uniform  throughout  the 
United  States. 

The  juxtaposition  of  the  words  "common  defense" 
and  "general  welfare"  in  this  admirably  written  para- 
graph could  hardly  have  been  accidental,  or  have 
been  due  to  any  other  cause  than  a  juxtaposition  of 
those  ideas  in  the  minds  of  the  Constitution's  framers. 


NAVAL  DEFENSE  119 

And  what  more  natural  connection  can  there  be  be- 
tween any  two  ideas  than  between  those  of  common 
defense  and  general  welfare,  since  the  general  welfare 
of  no  country  has  ever  continued  long  unless  it  was 
defended.  Now  the  general  welfare  of  every  mari- 
time power  has  always  been  intimately  concerned 
with  its  sea-borne  commerce.  It  is  only  by  means  of 
sea-borne  commerce,  for  instance,  that  Americans 
can  live  in  the  way  Americans  wish  to  live.  "  General 
welfare"  means  more  than  mere  existence.  A  mere 
existence  is  the  life  a  savage  lives.  Furthermore,  the 
general  welfare  of  a  country  requires  the  safety  of  its 
exported  and  imported  goods  while  on  the  sea,  and 
includes  the  right  of  its  citizens  to  travel  with  safety 
in  every  land,  to  buy  and  sell  in  foreign  ports,  to  feel 
a  proper  measure  of  self-respect  and  national  respect 
wherever  they  may  go,  and  to  command  from  the  peo- 
ple of  the  lands  they  visit  a  proper  recognition  of  their 
claims  to  justice. 

Naval  defense  may,  therefore,  be  said  to  consist 
of  three  parts: 

ist — Defense  of  the  coast  against  bombardment 
and  invasion. 

2d — ^Defense  of  the  trade  routes  traversed  by 
ships  carrying  the  exports  and  imports  of  the  country. 

3d — Defense  of  the  national  policy,  including  de- 
fense of  the  nation's  reputation,  honor,  and  prestige. 

Of  these,  defense  of  the  coast  against  bombard- 
ment and  invasion  is  the  easiest,  and  defense  of  the 


I20    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

national  policy  the  most  difficult;  because  in  pre- 
venting bombardment  and  invasion  the  defender  has 
the  strategical  advantage  of  being  nearer  home  than 
the  adversary;  while  in  the  defense  of  a  country's 
policy,  a  naval  force  may  have  to  "assume  the  offen- 
sive," and  go  even  to  the  far  distant  coasts  of  the 
enemy — as  the  Russian  fleet  went  to  Tsushima,  where 
it  met  its  death. 

In  that  part  of  naval  defense  which  is  concerned 
with  trade  routes,  the  strategical  advantage  must  go, 
in  general,  to  that  side  which  is  the  nearer  to  the  lo- 
cality where  the  decisive  battle  may  occur. 

In  laying  down  a  policy  of  naval  defense,  how- 
ever, it  is  not  necessary  to  consider  these  three  parts 
separately,  because  no  nation  can  ever  teU  whether 
in  the  distant  future  its  naval  defense  will  have  to  be 
used  directly  for  any  one  of  the  three,  or  for  all.  In 
general  terms,  it  may  be  stated  that  in  nearly  all  naval 
wars  the  fleet  has  been  used  more  for  the  defense  of 
the  nation's  policy  than  for  the  actual  defense  of  the 
coasts  or  the  trade  routes.  This  does  not  mean  that 
there  has  never  been  a  bombardment  or  invasion,  or 
that  the  defense  of  trade  routes  may  not  have  been  the 
cause  of  the  war  itself;  but  it  does  mean  that  in  actual 
wars  bombardment  or  invasion  has  been  rare,  the  cap- 
ture of  merchant  vessels  has  played  a  minor  part,  and 
the  deciding  events  have  been  battles  between  two 
fleets,  that  were  often  far  from  the  land  of  either. 

Owing  to  the  fact  that  within  modern  times  most 


NAVAL  DEFENSE  121 

of  the  important  countries  of  the  world  have  been 
those  of  continental  Europe,  with  frontiers  contigu- 
ous, and  in  fact  identical,  the  defense  of  a  country  has 
been  largely  committed  to  the  army,  and  most  of  the 
wars  have  been  on  land.  The  country  standing  in 
exception  to  this  has  been  Great  Britain,  whose  iso- 
lated and  insular  situation  demanded  a  defense  that 
was  strictly  naval.  The  tremendous  advance  in  re- 
cent times  of  the  engineering  arts,  by  which  ships 
became  larger  and  faster,  and  able  to  carry  more  pow- 
erful and  accurate  guns  than  ever  before,  has  en- 
hanced the  value  of  naval  power  and  enabled  Great 
Britain  to  reach  all  over  the  surface  of  the  earth,  and 
become  more  powerful  than  any  continental  nation. 
Thus  she  has  made  out  of  the  very  weakness  of  her 
position  a  paramount  tower  of  strength. 

Naval  defense  was  taken  up  systematically  in 
Great  Britain  in  the  eighth  century  by  King  Off  a,  to 
whom  is  credited  the  maxim,  "He  who  would  be  se- 
cure on  land  must  be  supreme  at  sea";  but  it  must 
have  dropped  to  a  low  ebb  by  1066,  for  William  of 
Normandy  landed  in  England  unopposed.  Since  that 
time  Great  Britain's  naval  defense,  committed  to  her 
navy,  has  increased  steadUy  in  effectiveness  and  power, 
keeping  pace  with  the  increase  in  the  national  inter- 
ests it  defended,  and  utilizing  all  the  growing  resources 
of  wealth  and  science  which  the  world  afforded.  Until 
the  present  crisis,  Great  Britain's  naval  defense  did 
its   most   important   work   during   Napoleon's    time. 


122    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

when  Great  Britain's  standing,  like  the  standing  of 
every  other  European  nation,  was  subjected  to  a 
strain  that  it  could  hardly  bear.  So  keenly,  however, 
did  the  nation  and  the  nation's  great  leader,  Pitt,  real- 
ize the  situation  that  the  most  strenuous  measures 
were  adopted  to  keep  the  navy  up,  press-gangs  even 
visiting  the  houses  of  subjects  of  the  King,  taking  men 
out  and  putting  them  by  force  on  board  his  Majesty's 
ships.  But  the  British  navy,  even  more  than  the 
British  army,  brought  Great  Britain  safe  out  of  the 
Napoleonic  danger,  and  made  the  British  the  para- 
mount nation  of  the  world. 

Since  then  Great  Britain  has  waxed  more  and 
more  powerful,  her  avowed  policy  being  that  her  navy 
should  be  equal  to  any  other  two;  realizing  that  her 
aloofness  in  point  of  national  characteristics  and  policy 
from  all  other  nations  made  it  possible  that  a  coali- 
tion of  at  least  two  great  nations  might  be  pitted 
against  her  at  a  time  when  she  could  not  get  an  ally. 
Accompanying  the  growth  of  the  British  navy  has 
been  the  establishment  of  British  foreign  trade,  Brit- 
ish colonies,  and  British  bases  from  which  the  na\^ 
could  work,  and  the  general  making  of  a  network  of 
British  commerce  and  British  power  over  the  surface 
of  the  earth.  No  other  nation  has  ever  dominated  so 
large  a  part  of  the  surface  of  the  globe  as  has  Great 
Britain  during  the  last  two  centuries;  and  she  has  done 
it  by  means  of  her  naval  power.  This  naval  power  has 
been,  in  the  language  of  Great  Britain,  for  the  "im- 


NAVAL  DEFENSE  123 

perial  defense";  not  for  coast  defense  alone,  but  for  the 
defense  of  all  the  imperial  interests,  commercial  and 
political,  and  even  the  imperial  prestige.  And  this 
defense  of  prestige,  it  may  here  be  remarked,  is  not  a 
vainglorious  defense,  not  an  exhibition  of  a  swagger- 
ing, swashbuckling  spirit,  but  a  recognition  of  the 
fact  that  the  minds  of  men  are  so  constituted  that 
the  prestige  of  an  individual,  an  organization,  or  a 
nation  has  a  practical  value  and  is  an  actual  force. 
No  government  that  appreciates  its  responsibilities 
will  willingly  risk  the  prestige  of  the  nation  which  it 
governs,  because  it  knows  that  any  weakening  of  it 
will  be  followed  by  a  weakening  of  influence  and  a 
consequent  increase  of  difficulty  in  attaining  some 
"end  in  view." 

The  greatness  of  the  British  navy,  compared  with 
that  of  the  British  army  and  the  other  elements  of 
Great  Britain's  government,  has  taken  on  magnified 
dimensions  during  the  last  half  century.  So  long  as 
war-ships  used  sails  as  their  principal  motive  power, 
so  long  were  they  forced  to  employ  methods  of  con- 
struction and  equipment  that  forbade  the  efficient 
employment  of  high-power  gims,  the  attainment  of 
great  speed,  and  the  use  of  instruments  of  precision; 
so  long,  in  other  words,  was  their  military  effective- 
ness prevented  from  increasing  greatly.  But  when  the 
British  navy  decided  to  abandon  sail  power  alto- 
gether and  propel  their  ships  by  steam,  a  new  phase 
was  entered  upon,  in  which  every  resource  of  the  en- 


124    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

gineering  arts  and  the  physical  sciences  was  called 
into  requisition;  and  now,  on  board  a  dreadnaught, 
battle  cruiser,  destroyer,  or  submarine,  can  be  found  the 
highest  examples  of  mechanical  and  electrical  art  and 
science.  Every  material  resource  which  the  brain  and 
wealth  of  man  can  compass  is  enlisted  in  her  naval 
defense;  and  in  order  to  take  advantage  of  the  rapid- 
ity and  certainty  of  movement  they  afiford  for  oper- 
ating fleets  and  ships,  there  has  been  a  great  advance 
in  methods  of  operation,  or,  in  military  parlance, 
"staff  work."  To  assist  this  work,  the  radio,  the 
cable,  and  even  the  humble  typewriter  have  con- 
tributed their  essential  share,  with  the  result  that 
to  Great  Britain's  naval  defense  there  has  been  de- 
voted an  extraordinary  degree  of  efficiency,  continu- 
ous effort,  a  more  varied  activity,  and  a  larger  ex- 
penditure of  money  than  to  any  other  object  of  man's 
activity. 

The  United  States  navy,  to  which  is  committed 
the  naval  defense  of  the  United  States,  has  followed 
the  same  lines  as  the  British;  and  its  task,  while  in 
some  ways  easier,  is  in  other  ways  more  difficult.  Per- 
haps the  chief  reason  why  the  naval  defense  of  Great 
Britain  is  so  difficult  is  the  extreme  closeness  of  her 
borders  to  the  borders  of  her  possible  foes — for  the 
English  Channel  is  only  twenty-three  miles  across 
from  Dover  to  Calais.  And  yet  the  very  narro^vness 
of  the  Channel  there  lends  a  certain  element  of  assis- 
tance to  the  defender  of  either  coast  against  an  enemy 


NAVAL  DEFENSE  125 

like  Germany,  because  it  enables  the  defender,  by  sim- 
ply protecting  that  narrow  area,  to  prevent  an  enemy 
from  passing  to  the  sea  or  from  it,  except  by  going 
aromid  the  British  Isles.  But  while  it  is  interesting 
thus  to  compare  the  tasks  of  two  navies  by  compar- 
ing the  lengths  of  coast  line,  populations,  wealth,  and 
areas  of  their  countries,  or  their  distances  from  pos- 
sible antagonists,  such  comparisons  are  really  mis- 
leading; for  the  reason  that  all  nations  are  on  a  par 
in  regard  to  the  paramount  element  of  national  de- 
fense, which  is  defense  of  national  policy.  It  was  as 
important  to  Belgium  as  it  was  to  Germany  to  main- 
tain the  national  policy,  and  the  army  of  Belgium  was 
approximately  as  strong  as  that  of  Germany  in  pro- 
portion to  her  wealth,  area,  and  population;  but  nev- 
ertheless the  Belgium  army  was  routed,  and  Belgium 
was  conquered  by  the  German  army. 

Much  has  been  written  to  prove  that  the  sole 
reason  for  the  possession  of  the  paramount  navy  by 
Great  Britain  is  that  the  soil  of  Great  Britain  can- 
not support  her  people.  In  an  essay,  entitled  "Naval 
Power,"  which  I  contributed  to  the  United  States 
Naval  Institute  in  191 1,  the  fallacy  of  this  was  shown; 
and  it  was  pointed  out  that  even  if  Great  Britain  grew 
more  than  enough  to  feed  her  people,  life  could  be 
made  unendurable  to  the  60,000,000  living  there  (or 
to  the  people  in  any  civilized  and  isolated  country) 
by  an  effective  blockading  fleet.  The  question  of  how 
great  a  navy  any  country  needs  depends,  not  on  the  size, 


126    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

but  on  the  policies  of  that  country ,  and  on  the  navies  of 
the  countries  that  may  oppose  those  policies.  The  navy 
that  a  country  needs  is  a  navy  that  can  defend  its 
poUcies,  both  offensively  and  defensively.  If,  for  in- 
stance, the  United  States  does  not  wish  to  enforce  any 
policy  that  Great  Britain  would  oppose,  or  to  oppose 
any  policy  that  Great  Britain  would  enforce,  then  we 
may  leave  her  navy  out  of  consideration.  But  if  we 
decide  that  we  must  maintain  a  certain  poHcy  which 
a  certain  country  may  oppose,  then  we  must  have  a 
navy  at  least  equal  to  hers;  because  we  do  not  know 
whether  we  should  have  to  meet  that  navy  near  our 
coast,  or  near  hers,  or  far  away  from  both.  For  the 
reason,  furthermore,  that  a  war  with  a  European  Power 
might  occur  at  a  period  of  strained  relations  with 
some  Asiatic  Power,  we  must  realize  the  temptation 
to  that  Asiatic  Power  to  seize  the  opportunity  and  at- 
tack us  on  the  Pacific  side,  knowing  that  we  should 
need  aU  our  navy  on  the  Atlantic  side.  This  seems  to 
mean  that  in  order  to  have  an  effective  naval  defense 
(since  we  are  precluded  by  our  policy  from  having 
European  allies  and  no  South  American  country  could 
give  us  any  effective  naval  help)  we  must  have  on  each 
ocean  a  fleet  as  strong  as  that  of  any  nation  on  that 
ocean  against  whose  wishes  we  may  have  to  enforce 
a  policy — or  against  whose  policy  we  may  have  to 
oppose  resistance. 

The  essential  requirement  of  any  defense  is  that 
it  shall  be  adequate;   because  an  inadequate  defense 


NAVAL  DEFENSE  127 

will  be  broken  down,  while  the  attack  will  retain  a 
large  proportion  of  its  original  strength.  In  the 
United  States  Naval  Institute,  in  1905,  the  present 
writer  showed,  by  means  of  a  series  of  tables,  how, 
when  two  forces  fight,  the  force  which  is  originally  the 
more  powerful  will  become  gradually  more  powerful, 
relatively  to  the  weaker,  as  the  fight  goes  on.  That, 
for  instance,  if  two  forces  start  with  the  relative  pow- 
ers of  10  and  8,  the  weaker  force  will  be  reduced  so 
much  more  rapidly  than  the  stronger  that  when  it  has 
been  reduced  to  zero  the  stronger  force  will  have  a 
value  of  5.69.  The  values  mentioned  indicated  the 
actual  fighting  strength — strength  made  up  of  all  the 
factors — material,  physical,  and  psychic — that  con- 
stituted it.  Of  course,  none  of  these  factors  can  ever 
be  accurately  compared;  but  nevertheless  the  tables 
seemed  to  prove  that  in  a  contest  between  two  forces 
whose  total  strengths  are  as  10  and  8  one  force  will 
be  reduced  to  zero,  while  the  other  will  be  reduced 
not  quite  one-half. 

One  of  the  lessons  drawn  was  "the  folly  of 
ineffectual  resistance."  Doubtless  a  clearer  lesson 
would  have  been  "the  folly  of  ineffectual  prepared- 
ness"; because,  when  the  decision  as  to  resistance  or 
non-resistance  is  forced  upon  a  nation,  the  matter  is 
so  urgent,  the  military,  political,  and  international 
conditions  so  complex,  and  the  excitement  probably 
so  intense,  that  a  wise  decision  is  very  difficult  to 
reach;  whereas  the  question  of  what  constitutes  effec- 


128    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

tual  preparedness  is  simple,  and  needs  merely  to  be 
approached  with  calm  nerves  and  an  open  mind. 

Inasmuch  as  the  psychic  element  in  defense  is 
the  strongest  single  element,  it  is  apparent  that  if  the 
decision  is  reached  to  prepare  an  effectual  defense  the 
nation  must  be  absolutely  united,  and  must  appre- 
ciate at  its  fuU  value  the  debilitating  influence  of  op- 
position to  the  measure;  for,  no  matter  how  much 
money  a  nation  may  expend,  no  matter  how  many 
lives  it  may  sacrifice,  its  defense  cannot  have  an  effi- 
ciency proportional  to  the  effort  if  a  considerable  num- 
ber of  its  citizens  are  permitted  to  oppose  it. 

In  our  own  country  there  has  been  so  much  talk- 
ing and  writing  recently  about  defense,  that  there  is 
danger  of  the  question  coming  to  be  considered  aca- 
demic; though  no  question  is  more  practical,  no  ques- 
tion is  more  urgent. 

Defense  must  defend. 


CHAPTER   VI 
NAVAL  POLICY 

EVERY  country  that  has  a  satisfactory  navy  has 
acquired  it  as  the  result  of  a  far-seeing  naval 
policy,  not  of  opportunism  or  of  chance.  The  coun- 
try has  first  studied  the  question  thoroughly,  then  de- 
cided what  it  ought  to  do,  then  decided  how  to  do  it. 

Naval  policy  has  to  deal  with  three  elements: 
material,  personnel,  and  operations,  which,  though 
separate,  are  mutually  dependent.  A  clear  compre- 
hension of  their  actual  relations  and  relative  weights 
can  be  obtained  only  by  thorough  study;  but  with- 
out that  comprehension  no  wise  naval  policy  can  be 
formulated,  and  therefore  no  satisfactory  navy  can 
be  established. 

The  most  obvious  thing  about  a  navy  is  its  ma- 
terial: the  ponderous  battleships,  the  picturesque  de- 
stroyers, the  submarines,  the  intricate  engines  of  mul- 
tifarious types,  the  radio,  the  signal-flags,  the  torpedo 
that  costs  $8,000,  the  gun  that  can  sink  a  ship  10  miles 
away. 

The  United  States  navy  ever  since  its  beginning 
in  1775  has  excelled  in  its  material;  the  ships  have  al- 
ways been  good,  and  in  many  cases  they  have  sur- 
passed those  of  similar  kind  in  other  navies.     This 

129 


I30    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

has  been  due  to  the  strong  common  sense  of  the  Ameri- 
can people,  their  engineering  skill,  and  their  inventive 
genius.  The  first  war-ship  to  move  under  steam  was 
the  American  ship  Demologos,  sometimes  called  the 
Fulton  the  First,  constructed  in  1813;  the  first  elec- 
tric torpedoes  were  American;  the  first  submarine  to 
do  effective  work  in  war  was  American;  the  first  tur- 
ret ship,  the  Monitor,  was  American;  the  first  war- 
ship to  use  a  screw  propeller  was  the  Princeton,  an 
American;  the  naval  telescope-sight  was  American. 
American  ships  now  are  not  only  well  constructed,  but 
all  their  equipments  are  of  the  best;  and  to-day  the 
American  battleship  is  the  finest  and  most  powerful 
vessel  of  her  class  in  the  world. 

Our  personnel,  too,  has  always  been  good.  The 
American  seaman  has  always  excelled,  and  so  has  the 
American  gunner.  No  ships  have  ever  been  better 
handled  than  the  American  ships;  no  naval  battles  in 
history  have  been  conducted  with  more  skill  and  dar- 
ing than  those  of  American  ships;  no  exploits  in  his- 
tory surpass  those  of  Gushing,  Hobson,  and  Decatur. 

In  operations,  however,  in  the  handling  of  the 
navy  as  a  whole,  we  have  never  excelled;  though  no 
better  individual  fleet  leaders  shine  in  the  pages  of  all 
history  than  Farragut  and  Dewey.  The  strategical 
operating  of  our  material  and  personnel  has  not  been 
in  accordance  with  carefully  laid  plans,  but  has  been 
left  largely  to  the  inspiration  of  the  commander  on  the 
spot,  both  in  peace  and  in  war.    Material  has  suffered 


NAVAL  POLICY  131 

from  lack  of  a  naval  policy,  but  only  quantitatively, 
because  material  is  a  subject  that  the  people  imder- 
stand.  Personnel  has  suffered  more,  because  the  peo- 
ple fail  to  realize  the  amount  of  training  needed  to 
make  a  personnel  competent  to  perform  their  tasks 
successfully,  in  competition  with  the  highly  trained 
men  of  other  navies.  But  operations  have  suffered 
incomparably  more  than  material  and  personnel;  be- 
cause naturally  the  people  do  not  comprehend  the  su- 
preme importance  of  being  ready,  when  war  breaks 
out,  to  operate  the  material  and  personnel  skilfully 
against  an  active  enemy,  in  accordance  with  well-pre- 
pared strategic  plans;  nor  do  they  realize  how  diffi- 
cult and  long  would  be  the  task  of  preparing  and  test- 
ing out  those  plans.  Therefore,  they  fail  to  provide 
the  necessary  administrative  machinery.* 

In  fact,  the  kind  and  amount  of  machinery  needed 
to  conduct  operations  skiffully  and  quickly  cannot  be 
decided  wisely  until  the  country  adopts  some  naval 
policy;  and  in  naval  policy  the  United  States  must 
be  admitted  to  have  lagged  behind  almost  every  other 
civilized  country.  Spurred  as  we  were  to  exertion  by 
the  coming  of  the  Revolutionary  War,  we  constructed 
hastily,  though  with  skill,  the  splendid  ships  that  did 
service  in  that  war.  But  after  the  war,  interest  in  the 
navy  waned;  and  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  enormous 
tribute  demanded  by  the  pirates  of  the  Barbary  coast 

*  Since  this  was  written,  the  Congress  has  so  enlarged  the  scope  of  the 
Office  of  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  as  to  make  it  a  General  Staff. 


132    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

from  our  government,  and  a  realization  of  the  fact 
that  not  only  was  it  cheaper  to  build  ships  and  fight 
the  pirates  than  to  pay  the  tribute,  but  paying  the 
tribute  was  a  disgraceful  act,  our  navy  would  have 
run  down  even  more  than  it  did.  Yet  even  with  this 
warning,  1812  found  our  navy  in  a  desperate  condi- 
tion. Rallying  to  the  emergency,  though  too  late  to 
accomplish  much  practical  result,  we  built  a  number 
of  excellent  ships,  against  the  votes  of  many  highly 
influential  men  in  Congress.  These  ships  did  gallant 
service,  and  redeemed  the  reputation  of  Americans 
from  the  oft-repeated  charge  of  being  cowards  and 
merely  commercial  men,  though  they  were  too  few  to 
prevent  the  blockade  which  British  squadrons  main- 
tained on  our  Atlantic  coast.  After  the  war,  the 
navy  was  again  allowed  to  deteriorate;  and  although 
our  ships  were  excellent,  and  the  officers  and  men  were 
excellent,  and  although  the  war  with  Mexico  supplied 
some  stimulation,  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  caught  us 
in  a  very  bad  predicament.  The  country  rose  to  this 
emergency  too  slowly,  as  before;  but  the  enemy  were 
even  less  prepared  than  we,  so  that  during  the  four 
years  of  the  Civil  War  we  were  able  to  construct,  man, 
and  buy  several  hundred  ships  of  various  kinds;  with 
the  result  that,  at  the  end  of  the  war,  our  navy,  if  not 
quite  so  powerful  as  Great  Britain's,  was  at  least  very 
close  to  it,  and  with  a  recent  experience  in  actual  war 
which  the  British  navy  did  not  possess. 

After  that  war,  the  same  story  was  repeated.    The 


NAVAL  POLICY  133 

people  convinced  themselves  that  they  would  never 
again  be  forced  to  go  to  war;  that  they  had  seen  the 
folly  of  it,  and  the  misery  of  it,  and  would  devote 
themselves  thereafter  to  the  delightful  pursuits  of 
peace.  Gradually  the  fighting  ships  of  the  ironclad 
class  were  allowed  to  go  to  pieces;  gradually  even  the 
larger  ships  of  the  wooden  sailing  class  fell  into  disre- 
pair; gradually  the  idea  of  war  faded  from  the  minds 
even  of  naval  officers;  gradually  squadrons  and  fleets, 
as  such,  were  broken  up,  and  our  ships  were  to  be  found 
scattered  singly  over  all  the  seas,  and  swinging  idly 
at  their  anchors  in  pleasant  ports. 

Fortunately,  Admiral  Luce  and  a  very  few  other 
ofScers  had  learned  the  salient  lessons  of  war  during 
the  Rebellion,  and  sturdily  stood  up  against  the  de- 
cadent tendency  of  the  times.  Against  much  opposi- 
tion. Luce  succeeded  in  founding  the  Naval  War  Col- 
lege at  Newport,  where  the  study  of  war  as  an  art  in 
itself  was  to  be  prosecuted,  and  in  enlisting  Captain 
Mahan  in  the  work.  In  a  few  years  Mahan  gave  to 
the  world  that  epochal  book,  "  The  Influence  of  Sea 
Power  upon  History"  (embodying  his  lectures  before 
the  War  College) ,  which  stirred  the  nations  of  Europe 
to  such  a  realization  of  the  significance  of  naval  his- 
tory, and  such  a  comprehension  of  the  efficacy  of  naval 
power,  that  they  entered  upon  a  determined  competi- 
tion for  acquiring  naval  power,  which  continues  to 
this  day. 

Meanwhile,  a  little  before  1880,  the  people  be- 


134    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

came  aroused  to  the  fact  that  though  the  country  was 
growing  richer,  their  navy  was  becoming  weaker, 
while  the  navies  of  certain  European  countries  were 
becoming  stronger.  So  they  began  in  1880  the  con- 
struction of  what  was  then  called  "the  new  navy." 
The  construction  of  the  new  ships  was  undertaken 
upon  the  lines  of  the  ships  then  building  abroad,  which 
were  in  startling  contrast  with  the  useless  old-fash- 
ioned American  ships  which  then  were  flying  our  flag. 

The  construction  of  the  material  of  the  navy  has 
progressed  since  then,  but  spasmodically.  At  every 
session  of  Congress  tremendous  efforts  have  been 
made  by  people  desiring  an  adequate  navy,  and  tre- 
mendous resistance  has  been  made  by  people  who  be- 
lieved that  we  required  no  navy,  or  at  least  only  a  lit- 
tle navy.  The  country  at  large  has  taken  a  bystand- 
er's interest  in  the  contest,  not  knowing  much  about 
the  pros  and  cons,  but  feeling  in  an  indolent  fashion 
that  we  needed  some  navy,  though  not  much.  The 
result  has  been,  not  a  reasonable  policy,  but  a  succes- 
sion of  unreasonable  compromises  between  the  aims 
of  the  extremists  on  both  sides. 

Great  Britain,  on  the  other  hand,  has  always  re- 
garded the  navy  question  as  one  of  the  most  difficult 
and  important  before  the  country,  and  has  adopted, 
and  for  centuries  has  maintained,  a  definite  naval 
policy.  This  does  not  mean  that  she  has  followed  a 
rigid  naval  policy;  for  a  naval  policy,  to  be  efficient, 
must  be  able  to  accommodate  itself  quickly  to  rapid 


NAVAL  POLICY  135 

changes  in  international  situations,  and  to  meet  sud- 
den dangers  from  even  unexpected  quarters — as  the 
comparatively  recent  experience  of  Great  Britain 
shows.  At  the  beginning  of  this  century  the  British 
navy  was  at  the  height  of  its  splendor  and  self-confi- 
dence. Britannia  ruled  the  waves,  and  Britannia's 
ships  and  squadrons  enforced  Britannia's  policies  in 
every  sea.  The  next  most  powerful  navy  was  that  of 
France;  but  it  was  not  nearly  so  large,  and  seemed  to 
be  no  more  efficient,  in  proportion  to  its  size.  Owing 
to  Britain's  wise  and  continuing  policy,  and  the  ex- 
cellence of  the  British  sailor  and  his  ships,  the  British 
navy  proudly  and  almost  tranquilly  held  virtual  com- 
mand of  all  the  seas. 

But  shortly  after  this  century  began,  British  offi- 
cers discerned  a  new  and  disturbing  element  gradually 
developing  on  the  horizon.  The  first  thing  which 
roused  their  attention  to  it  was  the  imexpected  at- 
tack of  the  Japanese  torpedo-boats  on  the  Russian 
squadron  in  Port  Arthur.  No  war  had  been  declared, 
and  the  Russian  squadron  was  riding  peacefully  at 
anchor.  The  suddenness  of  the  attack,  and  the  dis- 
tinct though  incomplete  success  which  it  achieved, 
startled  the  British  into  a  realization  of  the  fact  that 
there  had  been  introduced  into  warfare  on  the  sea 
methods  and  tactics  requiring  a  higher  order  of  prepa- 
ration than  had  ever  before  been  known;  that  the 
scientific  methods  which  the  Germans  employed  so 
effectively  on  land  in  1870  had  been  adapted  by  the 


136    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

Japanese  to  naval  warfare,  and  would  necessitate  the 
introduction  into  naval  policies  of  speedier  methods 
than  had  hitherto  been  needed. 

Another  event  which  had  happened  shortly  be- 
fore showed  that  naval  policies  would  have  to  be  modi- 
fied, if  they  were  to  utilize  recent  advances  in  scientific 
methods.  This  event  w^as  the  unprecedented  success 
at  target  practice  of  H.  M.  S.  Terrible,  commanded 
by  Captain  Sir  Percy  Scott,  which  proved  that  by  a 
long  and  strenuous  training  and  the  adoption  of  in- 
struments of  precision,  it  was  possible  to  attain  a  skill 
in  naval  gunnery  never  attained  before.  Up  to  this 
moment  the  British  navy  had  almost  despised  gun- 
nery. Inheriting  the  traditions  brought  down  from 
Howe,  Rodney,  and  Nelson,  permeated  with  the  ideals 
of  the  "blue- water  school,"  proud  of  being  British 
seamen,  proud  of  the  pure  white  of  their  ships,  en- 
amoured of  the  stimulating  breeziness  of  the  quarter- 
deck and  bridge,  imbued  with  almost  a  contempt  for 
such  mathematical  sciences  as  were  not  directly  used 
in  practical  navigation,  British  naval  officers  exalted 
seamanship  as  the  acme  of  their  art,  and  took  little 
interest  in  gunnery.  AU  the  battles  of  the  past  had 
been  won  by  dash  and  seamanship  and  dogged  per- 
sistence. Ships  had  always  fought  close  alongside 
each  other.  No  science  had  ever  won  any  naval  bat- 
tle of  the  past,  so  why  should  they  bother  with  science 
now — and  why  should  they  bother  with  target  prac- 
tice, except  just  enough  to  insure  that  the  battery  was 


NAVAL  POLICY  137 

in  order,  and  that  the  men  were  not  afraid  of  their 
gims?  Besides,  target  practice  dirtied  the  ship — a 
sacrilege  to  the  British  naval  officer. 

But  the  events  of  the  war  between  Japan  and 
Russia,  especially  the  naval  battles  of  Port  Arthur, 
August  10,  1904,  and  the  Sea  of  Japan,  May  27, 
1905,  riveted  their  attention  on  the  fact  that  some- 
thing more  than  seamanship  and  navigation  and  clean 
ships  would  be  needed,  if  the  British  navy  was  to  main- 
tain its  proud  supremacy  on  the  sea;  for  in  these 
battles,  overwhelming  victories  were  won  purely  by 
superior  skill  in  gunnery,  strategy,  and  tactics. 

To  these  causes  of  awakening  was  added  one  still 
greater,  but  of  like  import — the  rapid  rise  of  the  Ger- 
man navy  from  a  position  of  comparative  unimpor- 
tance to  one  which  threatened  the  British  navy  itself. 
The  fact  became  gradually  evident  to  British  officers 
that  the  German  navy  was  proceeding  along  the  same 
lines  as  had  proceeded  the  German  army.  Realizing 
the  efficiency  of  the  German  Government,  noting  the 
public  declarations  of  the  German  Emperor,  observ- 
ing the  excellence  of  the  German  ships,  the  skill  of 
the  German  naval  officers,  and  the  extraordinary  en- 
ergy which  the  German  people  were  devoting  to  the 
improvement  of  the  German  navy — the  British  navy 
took  alarm. 

So  did  the  other  navies. 

Beginning  about  1904,  Great  Britain  set  to  work 
with  energy  to  reform  her  naval  policy.     Roused  to 


138    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

action  by  the  sense  of  coming  danger,  she  augmented 
the  size  and  number  of  vessels  of  aU  types;  increased 
the  personnel  of  all  classes,  regular  and  reserve; 
scrapped  all  obsolete  craft;  built  (secretly)  the  epochal 
Dreadnaughl,  and  modernized  in  all  particulars  the 
British  navy.  In  every  great  movement  one  man 
always  stands  pre-eminent.  The  man  in  this  case 
was  Admiral  Sir  John  Fisher,  first  sea  lord  of  the 
admiralty,  afterward  Lord  Fisher.  Fisher  brought 
about  vital  changes  in  the  organization,  methods,  and 
even  the  spirit  of  the  navy.  He  depleted  the  over- 
grown foreign  squadrons,  concentrated  the  British 
force  in  powerful  fleets  near  home,  established  the 
War  College,  inculcated  the  study  of  strategy  and 
tactics,  appointed  Sir  Percy  Scott  as  inspector  of  tar- 
get practice,  put  the  whole  weight  of  his  influence  on 
the  side  of  gunnery  and  efficiency,  placed  officers  in 
high  command  who  had  the  military  idea  as  distin- 
guished from  the  idea  of  the  "blue- water  school,"  and 
imbued  the  entire  service  with  the  avowed  idea  that 
they  must  get  ready  to  fight  to  the  death,  not  the 
French  navy,  with  its  easy-going  methods,  but  the 
German  navy,  allied  perhaps  with  some  other.  At 
the  admiralty  he  introduced  methods  analogous  to 
those  of  the  General  Staff,  to  maintain  the  navy 
ready  for  instant  service  at  all  times,  to  prepare  and 
keep  up  to  date  mobilization  plans  in  the  utmost  de- 
tail, and  to  arrange  plans  for  the  conduct  of  war  in 
such  wise  that  after  a  war  should  break  out,  all  the 


NAVAL  POLICY  139 

various  probable  situations  would  have  been  studied 
out  in  advance. 

The  work  required  at  the  admiralty,  and  still 
more  in  the  fleet — night  and  day  and  in  all  weathers — 
taxed  mental  and  physical  endurance  to  the  limit;  but 
the  result  was  complete  success;  for  when  war  broke 
out  on  the  ist  of  August,  1914,  the  British  navy  was 
absolutely  ready.  Many  complaints  have  appeared 
in  print  about  the  unreadiness  of  Great  Britain;  but 
no  one  who  knows  anything  of  the  facts  supposes  that 
these  criticisms  include  Great  Britain's  navy. 

The  United  States  navy  in  the  early  part  of  this 
century  occupied,  relatively  to  others,  a  very  ill-de- 
fined position;  but  the  increased  interest  taken  in  it 
by  our  people  after  the  Spanish  War,  combined  with 
the  destruction  of  the  flower  of  the  Russian  fleet  in 
the  Russo-Japanese  War,  and  the  crushing  blow  in- 
flicted on  the  French  navy  by  the  maladministration  of 
CamiUe  PeUetan,  resulted  in  placing  our  navy,  about 
three  years  ago,  in  a  position  second  only  to  Great 
Britain's — a  position  which  it  recently  has  lost.  Ow- 
ing to  a  common  origin  and  language,  our  navy  has 
always  foUowed  the  British  navy,  though  at  a  some- 
what respectful  distance;  and  whfle  it  is  true  that  in 
point  of  mechanical  inventions  we  are  ahead,  in  sea- 
manship, navigation,  and  engineering  on  a  par,  and 
in  gunnery  and  tactics  not  far  behind,  yet  we  must 
admit  that  in  policy  and  in  policy's  first  cousin,  strat- 
eg}^,  we  are  very  far  in  the  rear. 


I40    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

There  are  many  reasons  why  this  should  be,  the 
first  being  that  the  British  navy  has  nearly  always 
lived  under  more  stimulating  conditions  than  we,  be- 
cause the  probability  of  war  has  seemed  greater,  and 
because  the  United  States  has  underestimated  what 
reasonable  probability  there  has  been,  and  failed  to 
realize  how  tremendously  difficult  would  be  the  task 
of  getting  ready  for  it.  Owing  to  the  present  war,  our 
people  have  gradually  come  to  see  that  they  must  get 
more  ships  and  other  material;  but  they  realize  this 
as  only  a  measure  of  urgency,  and  not  as  a  matter  of 
policy.  If  the  emergency  passes  us  by  in  safety,  the 
people  may  see  in  this  fact  only  a  confirmation  of 
their  notion  that  war  can  be  postponed  ad  infinitum^ 
and  may  therefore  fail  to  take  due  precautions  for  the 
future.  If  so,  when  we  at  last  become  involved  in  a 
sudden  war,  we  shall  be  as  unprepared  as  now;  and, 
relatively  to  some  aggressive  nation  which,  foreseeing 
this,  may  purposely  prepare  itself,  we  shall  be  more 
unprepared. 

A  curious  phase  of  the  navy  question  in  our  coun- 
try is  the  fact  that  very  few  people,  even  the  most 
extreme  partisans  for  or  against  a  large  navy,  have 
ever  studied  it  as  a  problem  and  endeavored  to  arrive 
at  a  correct  solution.  Few  have  realized  that  it  is  a 
problem,  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  word;  and  that 
unless  one  approaches  it  as  such  his  conclusions  can- 
not be  correct  except  by  accident. 

In  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  and  equally  in 


NAVAL  POLICY  141 

Japan,  the  question  has  been  taken  up  as  a  concrete 
problem,  just  as  definite  as  a  problem  in  engineering. 
They  have  used  for  solving  it  the  method  called  "The 
Estimate  of  the  Situation,"  originated  by  the  Ger- 
man General  Staff,  which  is  now  adopted  in  all  the 
armies  and  navies  of  civilized  countries  for  the  solu- 
tion of  military  problems.  Previous  to  the  adoption 
of  this  method  the  general  procedure  had  been  such 
as  is  now  common  in  civil  life,  when  a  number  of  peo- 
ple forming  a  group  desire  to  make  a  decision  as  to 
what  they  will  do  in  any  given  contingency.  The 
usual  procedure  is  for  some  one  to  suggest  that  a  cer- 
tain thing  be  done,  then  for  somebody  else  to  suggest 
that  something  else  be  done,  and  so  on;  and  then 
finally  for  the  group  to  make  a  decision  which  is  virtu- 
ally a  compromise.  This  procedure  is  faulty,  and  the 
decisions  resulting  are  apt  to  be  unwise;  because  it  is 
quite  possible  that  some  very  important  factors  may 
be  overlooked,  and  equally  possible  that  some  other 
factors  be  given  undue  weight.  Furthermore,  a  mea- 
sure advocated  by  a  man  who  has  the  persuasive  and 
emotional  abilities  of  the  orator  is  more  apt  to  be  fa- 
vorably considered  than  a  measure  advocated  by  a 
man  not  possessing  those  abilities. 

In  the  "Estimate  of  the  Situation"  method,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  orator  has  no  opportunity,  because 
the  procedure  is  simply  an  accurate  process  of  reason- 
ing. It  is  divided  into  four  parts.  The  first  part  con- 
sists of  a  careful  study  of  the  "mission,"  ending  in  a 


142    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

clear  determination  of  what  the  "mission"  really  is — 
that  is,  what  is  the  thing  which  it  is  desired  to  do  ?  The 
second  part  consists  of  a  careful  study,  and  eventually 
a  clear  comprehension,  of  the  difficulties  in  the  way; 
the  third  part  consists  of  a  careful  study,  and  even- 
tually a  clear  comprehension,  of  what  facilities  are 
available  with  which  to  overcome  the  difficulties;  the 
fourth  part  consists  of  a  careful  study  of  the  mission, 
difficulties  and  facilities,  in  their  mutual  relations,  and 
a  "decision"  as  to  what  should  therefore  be  done. 

Military  and  naval  people  are  so  thoroughly  con- 
vinced of  the  value  of  this  method  that  they  always 
employ  it  when  making  important  decisions,  writing 
down  the  various  factors  and  the  successive  steps  in 
regular  order  and  in  complete  detail. 

In  this  country,  while  naval  and  military  people 
use  this  method  in  their  comparatively  minor  prob- 
lems, the  country  at  large  does  not  use  it  in  deciding 
the  major  problem — that  is,  in  deciding  how  much 
navy  they  want,  and  of  what  composition.  They  do 
not  take  even  the  first  step  toward  formulating  a  naval 
policy,  because  they  do  not  study  the  "mission"  of 
the  navy — that  is,  they  do  not  study  the  international 
and  national  situations  and  their  bearing  on  the  need  for 
a  navy.  Yet  until  they  do  this  they  will  not  be  in  a 
sufficiently  informed  condition  of  mind  to  determine 
what  the  "mission"  is — that  is,  what  they  wish  the 
navy  to  be  able  to  do — ^because,  before  they  can  for- 
mulate the  mission  they  must  resolve  what  foreign 


NAVAL  POLICY  143 

navy  or  navies  that  mission  must  include.  If  they 
decide  that  the  mission  of  the  navy  is  to  guard  our 
coast  and  trade  routes  against  the  hostile  efforts  of 
Liberia  the  resulting  naval  policy  will  be  simple  and 
inexpensive;  while  if  they  conclude  that  the  mission 
of  our  navy  is  to  guard  our  coast  and  trade  routes 
against  the  hostile  acts  of  any  navy  the  resulting  naval 
policy  will  be  so  difficult  and  costly  as  to  tax  the 
brain  and  wealth  of  the  country  to  a  degree  that  will 
depend  on  the  length  of  time  that  will  elapse  before  the 
date  at  which  the  navy  must  be  ready  to  fulfil  that  mission. 

This  factor  reminds  us  of  another  factor:  the 
minimum  time  in  which  the  navy  can  get  ready  to  fulfil 
a  given  mission  (for  instance,  to  protect  us  against  any 
navy);  and  we  cannot  decide  the  mission  correctly 
without  taking  this  factor  into  account.  For  exam- 
ple, it  would  be  foolish  to  decide  that  the  mission  of 
our  navy  is  to  protect  us  now  against  any  navy,  in- 
cluding the  greatest,  when  it  would  take  us  at  least 
twenty  years  to  develop  and  train  a  navy  to  accom- 
plish that  task;  and  it  would  be  equally  foolish  to  de- 
cide that  the  mission  is  to  protect  us  against  any  navy 
except  the  greatest,  because  such  a  decision  could  rest 
on  no  other  ground  than  present  improbability  of  con- 
flict with  the  greatest  navy,  or  improbability  for  the 
very  few  years  ahead  (say  two  or  three)  which  we  poor 
mortals  can  forecast. 

This  reasoning  seems  to  indicate  that  the  first 
step  in  formulating  a  naval  policy  for  the  United  States 


144    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

is  to  realize  that  any  conclusion  as  to  which  navies 
should  be  included  in  the  mission  of  our  navy  must 
not  exclude  any  navy  about  whose  peaceful  conduct 
toward  us  we  can  entertain  a  reasonable  doubt,  dur- 
ing the  period  of  time  which  we  would  require  to  get  ready 
to  meet  her.  For  instance,  inasmuch  as  it  would  take 
us  at  least  twenty  years  to  get  ready  to  protect  our- 
selves against  the  hostile  efforts  of  the  British  navy, 
we  cannot  exclude  even  that  navy  from  a  considera- 
tion of  the  mission  of  our  own,  unless  we  entertain  no 
doubt  of  the  peaceful  attitude  of  that  navy  toward  us 
for  at  least  that  twenty  years. 

Clearly,  the  problem  is  not  only  very  important 
but  very  difficult — ^perhaps  the  most  difficult  single 
problem  before  the  country;  and  for  this  reason,  naval 
officers  have  long  marvelled  that  the  leading  minds  of 
the  country  do  not  undertake  it.  Perhaps  one  reason 
is  that  they  do  not  know  how  difficult  it  is:  that  they 
do  not  realize  the  extraordinary  complexity  of  mod- 
em ships  and  engines,  and  the  trained  skill  required 
to  handle  them;  that  they  do  not  realize  what  Great 
Britain  now  realizes,  that  we  must  prepare  for  one  of 
the  most  stupendous  struggles  ever  carried  on;  that 
we  must  have  a  personnel  both  of  officers  and  enlisted 
men  trained  to  the  liighest  point,  because  they  will 
have  to  meet  officers  and  enlisted  men  trained  to  the 
highest  point;  that  the  training  must  be  such  that  the 
skill  produced  can  be  exercised  by  night  and  day,  in 
cold  and  heat,  in  storm  and  calm,  under  circumstances 


NAVAL  POLICY  145 

of  the  utmost  possible  difficulty  and  danger;  that, 
while  it  takes  four  years  to  build  a  ship  and  get  her 
into  the  fleet  as  an  effective  unit,  it  takes  much  longer 
to  train  an  enlisted  petty  officer  as  he  should  be  trained, 
and  a  lifetime  to  train  officers  of  the  upper  grades. 
Perhaps  also  our  leading  minds  do  not  realize  the  in- 
tellectual requirements  of  the  higher  realms  of  the 
naval  art,  or  comprehend  what  the  examples  of  Alex- 
ander, Caesar,  Napoleon,  Nelson,  and  Farragut  prove: 
that,  in  the  real  crises  of  a  nation'' s  life  her  most  valuable 
asset  is  the  trained  skill  in  strategy  that  directs  the  move- 
ments of  her  forces. 

Further  than  this,  they  may  not  realize  that  the 
greater  the  danger  which  they  must  avert,  the  earlier 
they  must  begin  to  prepare  for  it,  because  the  more 
work  in  preparation  will  have  to  be  performed;  and 
yet  realization  of  this  truth  is  absolutely  vital,  as  is 
also  realization  of  the  fact  that  we  have  no  military 
power  as  our  ally,  and  therefore  must  be  ready  to 
meet  alone  a  hostile  attack  (though  perhaps  in  the  far- 
distant  future)  from  any  foreign  power.  To  see  that 
this  is  true  it  is  merely  necessary  to  note  the  facts  of 
history,  and  observe  how  nations  that  have  long  been 
on  terms  of  friendship  have  suddenly  found  themselves 
at  war  with  each  other;  and  how  countries  which  have 
always  been  hostile  have  found  themselves  fighting 
side  by  side.  In  the  present  war,  Great  Britain  is 
allied  with  the  two  countries  toward  which,  more  than 
toward  any  other,  she  has  been  hostile;    and  she  is 


146    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

fighting  the  country  to  which,  more  than  any  other, 
she  is  bound  by  ties  of  consanguinity  and  common  in- 
terests. The  history  of  war  is  so  filled  with  alternations 
of  peace  and  war  between  every  pair  of  contiguous 
countries  as  to  suggest  the  thought  that  the  mere  fact 
of  two  countries  having  interests  that  are  common  is 
a  reason  why  their  respective  shares  in  those  interests 
may  conflict;  that  countries  which  have  no  common 
interests  have  nothing  to  fight  about;  that  it  is  only 
for  things  in  which  two  nations  are  interested,  and 
which  both  desire,  that  those  two  nations  fight. 

If  our  estimate  of  the  situation  should  lead  us  to 
the  decision  that  we  must  prepare  our  navy  in  such  a 
way  that,  say  twenty  years  hence,  it  will  be  able  to 
protect  the  country  against  any  enemy,  we  shall  then 
instinctively  adopt  a  policy.  The  fact  of  having  ahead 
of  us  a  definite,  difficult  thing  to  do,  will  at  once  take 
us  out  of  the  region  of  guesswork,  and  force  us  into 
logical  methods.  We  shall  realize  the  problem  in  its 
entirety;  we  shall  see  the  relation  of  one  part  to  an- 
other, and  of  all  the  parts  to  the  whole;  we  shall  real- 
ize that  the  deepest  study  of  the  wisest  men  must  be 
devoted  to  it,  as  it  is  in  all  maritime  countries  except 
our  own.  The  very  difficulties  of  the  problem,  the 
very  scope  and  greatness  of  it,  the  fact  that  national 
failure  or  national  success  will  hinge  on  the  way  we 
solve  it,  will  call  into  action  the  profoundest  minds  in 
all  the  nation.  We  shall  realize  that,  more  than  any 
other  problem  before  the  country,   this  problem  is 


NAVAL  POLICY  147 

urgent;  because  in  no  other  problem  have  we  so  much 
lost  time  to  make  up  for,  and  in  no  other  work  of  the 
government  are  we  so  far  behind  the  great  nations 
that  we  may  have  to  contend  against. 

Great  Britain  was  startled  into  a  correct  estimate 
of  the  situation  ten  years  ago,  and  at  once  directed 
perhaps  the  best  of  her  abiHty  to  meet  it.  Certain  it 
is  that  no  other  department  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment is  in  such  good  condition  as  the  navy;  in  no 
other  department  has  the  problem  been  so  thoroughly 
understood,  and  so  conscientiously  worked  out,  or 
the  success  been  so  triumphant. 

The  imderlying  reason  for  this  is  not  so  much  the 
individual  courage  and  ability  of  the  officers  and  men, 
or  even  their  skill  in  handling  their  ships  and  squad- 
rons, as  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  has  followed  a 
definite  naval  policy;  so  that  the  British  nation  has 
had  a  perfectly  clear  realization  of  what  it  wishes  the 
navy  to  do,  and  the  navy  has  had  a  perfectly  clear 
realization  of  how  to  do  it. 

The  United  States  has  not  yet  made  a  correct 
estimate  of  the  naval  situation;  she  has  not  yet 
reached  the  point  that  Great  Britain  reached  ten  years 
ago.  Great  Britain  apprehended  the  danger,  and  took 
action  before  it  was  too  late.  Shall  the  United  States 
take  action  now  or  wait  until  it  is  too  late? 


PART  II 
NAVAL  STRATEGY 


CHAPTER  VII 
GENERAL  PRINCIPLES 

STRATEGY  is  difficult  of  definition;  but  though 
many  definitions  have  been  made,  and  though 
they  do  not  agree  together  very  well,  yet  all  agree  that 
strategy  is  concerned  with  the  preparation  of  military 
forces  for  war  and  for  operating  them  in  war — while 
tactics  is  the  immediate  instriunent  for  handling  them 
in  battle.  Strategy  thinks  out  a  situation  beforehand, 
and  decides  what  preparations  as  to  material,  per- 
sonnel, and  operations  should  be  made. 

Many  books  have  been  written  on  strategy,  mean- 
ing strategy  as  applied  to  armies,  but  very  few  books 
have  been  written  on  naval  strategy.  The  obvious 
reasons  are  that  armies  in  the  past  have  been  much 
larger  and  more  important  than  navies;  that  naval 
men  have  only  recently  had  the  appliances  on  board 
ship  for  writing  on  an  extensive  scale;  and  that  the 
nature  of  their  occupation  has  been  such  that  continu- 
ous application  of  the  kind  needed  for  thinking  out 
principles  and  expounding  them  in  books,  has  only 
recently  been  possible. 

Most  of  the  few  existing  books  on  naval  strategy 
deal  with  it  historically,  by  describing  and  explain- 
ing the  naval  campaigns  of  the  past  and  such  land 


152    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

campaigns  as  illustrate  principles  that  apply  to  sea 
and  land  alike.  Perhaps  the  best  books  are  those  of 
Darrieus  and  Mahan. 

Until  about  fifty  years  ago,  it  was  only  by  experi- 
ence in  actual  war,  supplemented  by  laborious  study 
of  the  campaigns  of  the  great  commanders,  and  the 
reading  of  books  on  strategy  which  pointed  out  and 
expounded  the  principles  uivolved  in  them,  that  one 
could  arrive  at  any  clear  idea  of  strategy. 

But  wars  have  fortunately  been  so  infrequent, 
the  information  about  them  has  often  been  so  conflict- 
ing, and  so  many  results  have  been  due  to  chance,  that, 
in  default  of  experience,  the  mere  reading  of  books 
did  not  lead  to  very  satisfactory  results,  except  in  the 
case  of  geniuses;  and  therefore  war  problems  and  war 
games  were  devised,  in  which  the  various  factors  of 
material  and  personnel  were  represented,  and  made  as 
true  to  life  as  possible. 

The  tactical  games  resulting,  which  naval  strate- 
gists now  play,  employ  models  of  the  various  craft 
used  in  war,  such  as  battleships,  submarines,  etc.,  and 
are  governed  by  rules  that  regulate  the  movements 
of  those  craft  on  a  sort  of  big  chess-board,  several  feet 
square,  that  represents  an  area  of  water  several  miles 
square.  The  strategic  games  and  problems  are  based 
on  principles  similar  to  those  on  which  the  tactical 
games  are  based,  in  the  sense  that  actual  operations 
are  carried  on  in  miniature;  but  naturally,  the  stra- 
tegical operations  cover  several  hundred  miles,  and 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  153 

sometimes  thousands.  The  aim  of  both  the  tactical 
and  the  strategic  games  is  to  determine  as  closely  as 
possible  the  laws  that  decide  victory  or  defeat;  and 
therefore,  for  any  country,  the  material,  personnel 
and  operations  it  should  employ.  Naturally  the  re- 
sults obtained  are  not  quite  so  convincing  as  those  of 
actual  war  or  battle;  but  they  are  more  convincing 
than  can  be  attained  in  any  other  way,  as  yet  devised, 
especially  as  many  of  the  operations  of  the  game-board 
that  turn  out  well  in  games  are  tried  out  afterward 
by  the  fleet  in  peace  maneuvers.  War  games  and 
problems  may  be  compared  to  the  drawings  that  an 
architect  makes  of  a  house  which  some  one  wants  to 
build;  the  plans  and  drawings  are  not  so  realistic  as  a 
real  house,  but  they  are  better  than  anything  else; 
and,  like  the  war  games,  they  can  be  altered  and  re- 
altered  untU  the  best  result  seems  to  have  been  at- 
tained, considering  the  amount  of  money  allowed, 
and  other  practical  conditions. 

The  idea  of  devising  war  games  and  war  problems 
seems  to  have  originated  with  Von  Moltke;  certainly 
it  was  first  put  in  practice  by  his  direction.  Shortly 
after  he  became  chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Prus- 
sian army  in  1857,  he  set  to  work  to  carry  out  the 
ideas  which  he  had  had  in  mind  for  several  years,  whUe 
occupying  minor  posts,  but  which  he  had  not  had  the 
power  to  enforce.  It  seems  to  have  become  clear  to 
his  mind  that,  if  a  chess-player  acquired  skill,  not  only 
by  playing  actual  games  and  by  studying  actual  games 


154    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

played  by  masters,  but  also  by  working  out  hypo- 
thetical chess  problems,  it  ought  to  be  possible  to  devise 
a  system  whereby  army  officers  could  supplement 
their  necessarily  meagre  experience  of  actual  war,  and 
their  necessarily  limited  opportunities  for  studying 
with  full  knowledge  the  actual  campaigns  of  great 
strategists,  by  working  out  hypothetical,  tactical,  and 
strategic  problems.  Von  Moltke  succeeded  in  devis- 
ing such  a  system  and  in  putting  it  into  successful 
operation.  Hypothetical  problems  were  prepared,  in 
which  enemy  forces  were  confronted  with  each  other 
under  given  circumstances  of  weather,  terrain,  and 
distances,  each  force  with  its  objective  known  only  to 
itself:  for  instance,  you  are  in  command  of  such  and 
such  a  force  at  such  and  such  a  place;  you  have  re- 
ceived orders  to  accomplish  such  and  such  a  purpose; 
you  receive  information  that  the  enemy,  comprising 
such  and  such  troops,  was  at  a  certain  time  at  a  cer- 
tain place,  and  marching  in  a  certain  direction.  What 
do  you  do? 

Classes  of  army  officers  were  formed,  and  com- 
pelled to  work  out  the  problems  exactly  as  boys  at 
school  were  compelled  to  work  out  problems  in  arith- 
metic. The  skill  of  individual  officers  in  solving  the 
problems  was  noted  and  recorded;  and  the  problems 
themselves,  as  time  went  on  and  experience  was  gained, 
were  made  more  and  more  to  conform  to  probable 
situations  in  future  wars  with  Austria,  France,  and 
other  countries,  actual  maps  being  used,  and  the  exact 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  155 

nature  and  magnitude  of  every  factor  in  each  problem 
being  precisely  stated. 

By  such  work,  the  pupils  (officers)  acquired  the 
same  kind  of  skiU  in  solving  strategic  and  tactical 
problems  that  a  boy  acquires  in  solving  problems  in 
arithmetic — a  skill  in  handling  the  instruments  em- 
ployed. Now  the  skill  acquired  in  solving  any  kind  of 
problem,  like  the  skill  developed  in  any  art,  such  as 
baseball,  fencing,  or  piano-playing,  does  not  give  a 
man  skill  merely  in  doing  a  thing  identically  like  a 
thing  he  has  done  before:  such  a  skill  would  be  use- 
less, for  the  reason  that  identical  conditions  almost 
never  recur,  and  identical  problems  are  never  pre- 
sented. Similar  conditions  often  recur,  however,  and 
similar  problems  are  often  presented;  and  familiarity 
with  any  class  of  conditions  or  problems  imparts  skill 
in  meeting  any  condition  or  any  problem  that  comes 
within  that  class.  If,  for  instance,  a  man  memorizes 
the  sums  made  by  adding  together  any  two  of  the  digits, 
he  is  equipped  to  master  any  problem  of  addition;  and 
if  he  will  practise  at  adding  numbers  together,  he  will 
gradually  acquire  a  certain  ability  of  mind  whereby 
he  can  add  together  a  long  row  of  figures  placed  in  a 
sequence  he  never  saw  before,  and  having  a  sum  he 
never  attained  before.  Or  a  pianist,  having  acquired 
the  mastery  of  the  technic  of  the  keyboard  and  the 
ability  to  read  music,  can  sit  down  before  a  piano  he 
never  sat  at  before  and  play  off  instantly  a  piece  of 
music  he  never  saw  before. 


156    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

Doubtless  Moltke  had  ideas  of  this  kind  in  mind 
when  his  plans  for  educating  strategists  and  tacticians 
by  problems  on  paper  and  by  games  were  ridiculed  by 
the  unimaginative,  and  resisted  by  the  indolent;  and 
certainly  no  man  was  ever  proved  right  more  glori- 
ously than  Moltke.  In  the  war  with  Austria  in  1866, 
the  Prussian  army  defeated  the  Austrian  at  Sadowa  or 
Koniggratz  in  nineteen  days  after  the  declaration  of 
war.  In  the  war  with  France  in  1870,  the  Prussian 
army  routed  the  French  and  received  the  surrender  of 
Napoleon  III  in  seven  weeks  and  two  days,  not  be- 
cause of  superior  courage  or  experience  in  war,  but  by 
more  scientific  strategy.  As  Henderson  says:  "Even 
the  French  generals  of  divisions  and  brigades  had  had 
more  actual  experience  (in  war)  than  those  who  led  the 
German  army  corps.  Compared  with  the  German  rank 
and  file,  a  great  part  of  their  non-commissioned  officers 
and  men  were  veterans,  and  veterans  who  had  seen 
much  service.  Their  chief  officers  were  practically 
familiar  with  the  methods  of  moving,  supplying,  and 
maneuvering  large  masses  of  troops;  their  marshals 
were  valiant  and  successful  soldiers.  And  yet  the  his- 
tory of  modern  warfare  records  no  defeats  so  swift 
and  complete  as  those  of  Koniggratz  and  Sedan.  The 
great  host  of  Austria  was  shattered  in  seven  weeks; 
the  French  Imperial  army  was  destroyed  in  seven 
weeks  and  three  days;  and  to  all  intents  and  purposes 
the  resistance  they  had  offered  was  not  much  more 
effective  than  that  of  a  respectable  militia.    But  both 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  157 

the  Austrian  and  the  French  armies  were  organized 
and  trained  under  the  old  system.  Courage,  experi- 
ence, and  professional  pride  they  possessed  in  abun- 
dance. Man  for  man,  in  all  virile  qualities,  neither  offi- 
cers nor  men  were  inferior  to  their  foes.  But  one  thing 
their  generals  lacked,  and  that  was  education  for  war. 
Strategy  was  almost  a  sealed  book  to  them,"  Also, 
"Moltke  committed  no  mistake.  Long  before  war 
had  been  declared  every  possible  precaution  had  been 
made.  And  these  included  much  more  than  arrange- 
ments for  rapid  mobilization,  the  assembly  of  superior 
numbers  completely  organized,  and  the  establishment 
of  magazines.  The  enemy's  numbers,  armaments, 
readiness,  and  efficiency  had  been  submitted  to  a  most 
searching  examination.  Every  possible  movement 
that  might  be  made,  however  unlikely,  had  been  fore- 
seen; every  possible  danger  that  might  arise,  how- 
ever remote,  discussed  and  guarded  against";  also, 
''That  the  Prussian  system  should  be  imitated,  and 
her  army  deprived  of  its  monopoly  of  high  efficiency, 
was  naturally  inevitable.  Every  European  state  has 
to-day  its  college,  its  intelligence  department,  its 
schools  of  instruction,  and  its  course  of  field  maneu- 
vers and  field  firuig." 

Strategy  may  be  divided  into  two  parts,  war 
strategy  and  preparation  strategy;  and  of  these  two, 
preparation  strategy  is  by  far  the  more  important. 

War  strategy  deals  with  the  laying  out  of  plans 


158    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

of  campaign  after  war  has  begun,  and  the  handling  of 
forces  until  they  come  into  contact  with  the  enemy, 
when  tactics  takes  those  forces  in  its  charge.  It  deals 
with  actual  situations,  arranges  for  the  provisioning, 
fuelling,  and  moving  of  actual  forces,  contests  the  field 
against  an  actual  enemy,  the  size  and  power  of  which 
are  fairly  well  known — and  the  intentions  of  which  are 
sometimes  known  and  sometimes  not.  The  work  of 
the  strategist  in  war  is  arduous,  pressing,  definite,  and 
exciting;  and  results  are  apt  to  follow  decisions  quickly. 
He  plays  the  greatest  and  oldest  game  the  world  has 
ever  known,  with  the  most  elaborate  instruments,  and 
for  the  largest  stakes.  In  most  wars,  the  antagonists 
have  been  so  nearly  equal  in  point  of  personnel  and 
material  that  the  result  has  seemed  to  be  decided  by 
the  relative  degrees  of  skill  of  the  strategists  on  both 
sides.  This  has  been  the  verdict  of  history;  and  vic- 
torious commanders  in  all  times  and  in  all  lands  have 
achieved  rarer  glories,  and  been  crowned  with  higher 
honors,  than  any  other  men. 

Preparation  strategy  deals  with  the  laying  out  of 
plans  for  supposititious  wars  and  the  handling  of  sup- 
posititious forces  against  supposititious  enemies;  and 
arranges  for  the  construction,  equipment,  mobilization, 
provisioning,  fuelling,  and  moving  of  supposititious 
fleets  and  armies.  War  strategy  is  vivid,  stimulating 
and  resultful;  preparation  strategy  is  dull,  plodding, 
and — for  the  strategist  himself — apparently  result- 
less.    Yet  war  strategy  is  merely  the  child  of  prep- 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  159 

aration  strategy.  The  weapons  that  war  strategy  uses, 
preparation  strategy  put  into  its  hands.  The  funda- 
mental plans,  the  strength  and  composition  of  the 
forces,  the  training  of  ofi&cers  and  men,  the  collection 
of  the  necessary  material  of  all  kinds,  the  arrange- 
ments for  supplies  and  munitions  of  all  sorts — the  very 
principles  on  which  war  strategy  conducts  its  opera- 
tions— are  the  fruit  of  the  tedious  work  of  preparation 
strategy.  Alexander  reaps  the  benefit  of  the  pre- 
liminary labors  of  his  father,  Philip;  William  is  made 
German  Emperor  by  the  toil  of  Moltke. 

The  work  of  laying  out  a  supposititious  campaign, 
involving  supposititious  operations  against  a  suppos- 
ititious enemy,  requires  of  the  strategist  a  thorough 
estimate  of  the  situation,  including  a  careful  estimate 
of  the  forces  of  the  enemy,  in  material  and  personnel, 
and  of  the  strategy  that  will  probably  govern  his  opera- 
tions— whether  he  will  act  on  the  defensive,  or  assume 
the  offensive;  if  he  is  to  act  on  the  defensive,  how  and 
where  wiU  he  base  his  forces,  how  far  will  he  operate 
away  from  his  own  shores  ?  And  if  he  is  to  act  on  the 
offensive,  what  direction  will  his  operations  take;  will 
he  secure  an  advance  base;  and  if  so,  where?  And 
as  the  character  of  the  enemy's  operations  will  depend 
on  the  personnel  of  the  enemy  General  Staff  and  of 
the  high  commanders  afloat,  who  comprise  the  person- 
nel, and  what  are  their  characteristics? 

To  decide  these  questions  correctly  requires  con- 
siderable acquaintance  with  the  enemy  country,  its 


i6o    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

navy  and  its  policy,  a  full  knowledge  of  the  strategy, 
personnel,  and  material  of  that  navy,  and  a  sound  con- 
ception of  strategy  itself.  But  to  decide  the  ques- 
tions correctly  is  essential,  because  the  decision  will 
form  the  basis  of  the  future  plans. 

Naturally,  as  the  plan  is  entirely  supposititious  and 
is  to  take  effect  at  some  indefinite  time  in  the  future, 
all  the  factors  that  will  be  in  existence  at  that  time  can- 
not be  foretold  exactly,  and  therefore  must  be  esti- 
mated. This  will  necessitate  several  alternate  h}^oth- 
eses;  and  a  war  plan  including  mobilization  and 
operations  must  be  made  out,  based  on  each  hypothe- 
sis. For  instance,  on  the  hypothesis  that  the  enemy 
will  take  the  offensive,  one  set  of  plans  will  have  to  be 
prepared  on  the  basis  that  we  shall  also  take  the  offen- 
sive, and  another  on  the  basis  that  circumstances  may 
be  such  at  that  time  as  to  make  it  wise  for  us  to  resort 
to  the  defensive;  while  on  the  hypothesis  that  the 
enemy  is  to  remain  on  the  defensive,  a  set  of  plans  very 
different  from  the  other  two  as  to  both  mobilization 
and  operations  must  be  devised. 

Each  set  of  the  plans  just  suggested  may  also  have 
to  be  divided  into  two  or  more  parts.  On  the  basis 
that  the  enemy  will  remain  on  the  defensive,  for  in- 
stance, the  circumstances  when  the  hour  for  action 
comes,  such  as  the  fact  of  his  being  quite  unprepared, 
may  indicate  the  advisability  of  an  attack  on  him  as 
sudden  as  it  can  be  made;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
circumstances  such  as  the  fact  of  his  being  thoroughly 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  i6i 

prepared  may  render  it  necessary  for  us  to  send  a 
larger  force  than  we  could  get  ready  quickly,  espe- 
cially if  the  enemy  coast  be  far  away,  and  may  therefore 
indicate  the  advisability  of  deliberate  movements, 
and  even  a  protracted  delay  before  starting. 

But  no  matter  what  plan  is  to  be  followed,  a  de- 
tailed plan  for  every  probable  contingency  must  be 
prepared;  and  it  must  be  elaborated  in  such  detail 
that  it  can  be  put  into  operation  instantly  when  the 
fateful  instant  comes;  because  the  enemy  will  put  his 
plans  into  operation  at  the  same  time  we  do,  and  the 
one  whose  plans  are  executed  first  will  take  a  long  step 
toward  victory. 

Not  only  must  the  plans  provide  some  means 
whereby  the  plans  themselves  shall  get  into  full  opera- 
tion instantly  when  war  breaks;  other  plans  must  also 
provide  that  all  the  acts  which  those  plans  contemplate 
must  be  performed.  Not  only  must  the  plans  pro- 
vide that  all  the  prearranged  orders  for  putting  the 
Kearsarge  into  full  commission  shall  be  instantly  sent 
by  mail,  telegraph,  and  telephone  to  the  proper  officials, 
but  other  plans  must  also  provide  means  whereby  the 
officers  and  men  shall  actually  march  on  board  the 
Kearsarge,  her  ensign  and  commission  pennant  be  dis- 
played, all  the  fuel,  ammunition,  provisions,  and  equip- 
ment be  on  board  and  the  Kearsarge  sail  at  once,  and 
join  the  commander-in-chief  at  sea. 

Doubtless  the  most  complicated  and  comprehen- 
sive plans  are  those  for  sending  a  large  expedition  on 


i62    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

an  offensive  mission  to  a  far-distant  coast,  especially 
if  that  coast  be  guarded  by  an  efficient  navy,  if  it  have 
outlying  islands  that  would  afford  good  bases  for  her 
destroyers  and  submarines,  and  if  there  are  not  good 
harbors  which  our  fleet  could  seize  as  advance  bases, 
from  which  to  prosecute  its  future  operations.  The 
complexity  of  the  task  of  planning  such  an  expedition, 
taking  due  account,  but  not  exaggerated  account,  of 
all  the  factors,  favorable  and  adverse,  is  appalling; 
but  the  task  must  be  undertaken  and  accomplished. 
The  most  tedious  part  is  the  logistics — the  arrange- 
ments for  supplying  the  fleet  on  the  way  and  in  the 
distant  theatre  of  operations  with  the  necessary  pro- 
visions, equipment,  and  ammunition  and,  above  all, 
the  fuel.  The  average  superdreadnaught  consumes 
about  460  tons  of  coal  per  day  at  full  speed,  and  about 
108  tons  at  10  knots;  and  coal  or  other  fuel  for  all  the 
dreadnaughts,  battle  cruisers,  cruisers  of  various 
classes,  scouts,  destroyers,  submarines,  ships,  air- 
craft of  different  kinds,  hospital  ships,  ammunition 
ships,  transports,  and  the  fuel  ships  themselves,  must 
be  provided  by  means  that  must  not  fail. 

While  the  work  of  planning  an  offensive  move- 
ment to  a  distant  coast  is  the  most  tedious  and  com- 
plex, the  work  of  planning  a  defensive  measure  against 
a  sudden  attack  on  the  coast  needs  the  most  concen- 
tration of  effort;  for  whatever  the  plans  require  to 
be  done  must  be  done  at  once.  This  necessitates  that 
the  orders  to  be  issued  must  be  as  few  as  possible;  that 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  163 

they  be  as  concise  and  clear  as  possible;  that  the 
things  to  be  done  be  as  few  and  as  simple  as  possible, 
and  that  aU  possible  foresight  be  exercised  to  prevent 
any  confusion  or  misunderstanding,  or  any  necessity 
on  the  part  of  any  one  for  requesting  more  instruc- 
tions. 

When  the  fateful  instant  comes,  the  final  com- 
mand to  mobihze  puts  into  execution  whichever  of 
the  plans  already  made  is  to  be  followed;  and  for  this 
reason  it  is  clear  that  the  various  plans  must  be  kept 
separate  from  each  other,  and  each  set  of  plans  must 
include  all  the  various  orders  that  must  be  signed  for 
carrying  it  into  effect,  including  the  particular  word 
or  phrase  that  directs  the  execution  of  that  particular 
set  of  plans. 

It  is  the  story  that  the  final  order  to  the  British 
navy  in  the  early  part  of  August,  1914,  was  the  word 
"Go."  All  the  units  went  immediately,  understand- 
ingly,  unitedly;  and  the  greatest  machine  the  world 
has  ever  known  was  almost  instantly  in  operation  at 
full  speed.  No  such  stupendous  feat,  physically  con- 
sidered, had  ever  been  done  before.  The  mobiliza- 
tion of  the  Prussian  army  in  1870  and  of  the  German 
army  about  August  i,  191 4,  were  as  great  perform- 
ances mentally  and  strategically,  but  not  physically, 
by  reason  of  the  relative  feebleness  of  the  forces  set 
in  motion.  This  relative  feebleness  was  due,  of  course, 
to  the  insignificance  of  muskets  compared  to  navy 
guns,  of  railway-trains  compared  to  battleships,  etc. — 


i64    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

an  insignificance  far  from  being  neutralized  by  the 
greater  number  of  the  units,  for  one  14-inch  shell  has 
an  energy  equal  to  that  of  about  60,000  muskets,  and 
no  army  contains  anythmg  approximatmg  the  pow- 
erfulness  of  a  battleship. 

Not  only,  however,  must  the  strategist  make 
plans  in  peace  for  preparations  that  culminate  in  mo- 
bihzation,  and  simply  insure  that  the  navy  shall  be 
ready  in  material  and  personnel  when  war  breaks; 
he  must  also  make  plans  for  operating  the  navy  stra- 
tegically afterward,  along  each  of  the  various  lines  of 
direction  that  the  war  may  take.  In  other  words,  the 
work  of  preparation  strategy  in  making  war  plans 
may  be  divided  into  two  parts — mobiHzation  and  opera- 
tion. 

The  plans  of  mobilization  deal  naturally  with  all 
the  activities  concerned,  material  and  personnel,  and 
endeavor  to  arrange  a  passing  from  a  state  of  peace 
to  a  state  of  war  in  the  quickest  possible  time,  and 
with  the  least  chance  of  errors  and  omissions.  A 
considerable  degree  of  imagination  is  required,  an  al- 
most infinite  patience,  and  a  perfect  willingness  to 
work  indefinitely  without  any  reasonable  expectation 
of  getting  tangible  results.  A  more  hopeless  task  can 
hardly  be  given  any  man  or  body  of  men  than  that  of 
working  out  plans,  general  and  detailed,  day  after  day, 
for  contingencies  that  will  probably  never  happen, 
and  to  guard  against  dangers  that  wiU  probably  never 
come;     preparing    tables,    diagrams,    and    schedules 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  165 

which  are  ahnost  certainly  doomed  to  rest  forever  in 
the  sepulchre  of  the  confidential  files. 

Yet  this  work  is  basic.  Perhaps  it  is  for  that  reason 
that  it  is  obscure  and  dull;  basic  work  is  apt  to  be  so. 
The  spectacular  success  of  an  individual  in  any  walk 
of  life  is  often  but  the  crowning  of  the  unrecognized, 
and  often  utterly  unknown  work — of  other  men. 

Strategy  is  not  a  science  only;  it  is  an  art  as  well; 
and  although  the  art  cannot  be  practised  in  its  per- 
fection until  after  the  science  is  well  comprehended, 
yet  the  art  of  strategy  was  born  before  the  science 
was.  This  is  true  of  all  those  departments  of  man's 
activity  that  are  divided  into  sciences  and  arts,  such 
as  music,  surgery,  government,  navigation,  gunnery, 
painting,  sculpture,  and  the  rest;  because  the  funda- 
mental facts — say  of  music — cannot  even  attract  at- 
tention until  some  music  has  been  produced  by  the 
art  of  some  musician,  crude  though  that  art  may  be; 
and  the  art  cannot  advance  very  far  until  scientific 
methods  have  been  appHed,  and  the  principles  that 
govern  the  production  of  good  music  have  been  found. 
The  unskilled  navigators  of  the  distant  past  pushed 
their  frail  craft  only  short  distances  from  the  land, 
guided  by  art  and  not  by  science;  for  no  science  of 
navigation  then  existed.  But  the  knowledge  gradu- 
ally gained,  passing  first  from  adept  to  pupil  by  word 
of  mouth,  and  afterward  recorded  on  the  written  and 
then  the  printed  page,  resulted  first  in  the  realization 


i66    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

of  the  fact  that  various  apparently  unrelated  phe- 
nomena were  based  on  the  same  underlying  principles; 
and  resulted  later  in  the  perception,  and  still  later  in 
the  definite  expression,  of  those  underlying  principles. 
Using  these  principles,  the  navigator  expanded  the 
limits  of  his  art.  Soon  we  see  Columbus,  superbly  bold, 
crossing  the  unknown  ocean;  and  Magellan  piercing 
the  southern  tip  of  the  American  continent  by  the 
straits  that  now  bear  his  name. 

But  of  all  the  arts  and  sciences,  the  art  and  sci- 
ence that  are  the  oldest  and  the  most  important;  that 
have  caused  the  greatest  expenditure  of  labor,  blood, 
and  money;  that  have  been  the  immediate  instru- 
ments of  more  changes  and  greater  changes  in  the 
history  of  the  world  than  any  other,  are  the  art  and 
the  science  of  strategy. 

Until  the  time  of  Moltke  the  art  of  strategy,  like 
most  arts,  was  more  in  evidence  than  the  science.  In 
fact,  science  of  any  kind  is  a  comparatively  recent 
product,  owing  largely  to  the  more  exact  operations  of 
the  mind  brought  about  by  the  birth  of  the  science 
of  measurement,  and  the  ensuing  birth  and  develop- 
ment of  the  mechanic  arts.  Before  Moltke's  time 
campaigns  were  won  by  wise  preparation  and  skilful 
execution,  as  they  are  now;  but  the  strategical  skill 
was  acquired  by  a  general  or  admiral  almost  wholly 
by  his  own  exertions  in  war,  and  by  studying  the 
campaigns  of  the  great  commanders,  and  reflecting 
upon  them  with  an  intensity  that  so  embedded  their 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  167 

lessons  in  his  subjective  mind  that  they  became  a 
part  of  him,  and  actions  in  conformity  with  those  les- 
sons became  afterward  almost  automatic.  Alexander 
and  Napoleon  are  perhaps  the  best  illustrations  of 
this  passionate  grasping  of  military  principles;  for 
though  both  had  been  educated  from  childhood  in 
military  matters,  the  science  of  strategy  was  almost 
non-existent  in  concrete  form,  and  both  men  were 
far  too  young  to  have  been  able  to  devote  much  time 
or  labor  to  it.  But  each  was  a  genius  of  the  highest 
type,  and  reached  decisions  at  once  immediate  and 
wise,  not  by  inspiration,  but  by  mental  efforts  of  a 
pertinacity  and  concentratedness  impossible  to  ordi- 
nary men. 

It  was  because  Von  Moltke  realized  this,  realized 
the  folly  of  depending  on  abihty  to  get  geniuses  on 
demand,  and  reaHzed  further  the  value  of  ascertain- 
ing the  principles  of  strategy,  and  then  expressing 
them  so  clearly  that  ordinary  men  could  grasp  and  use 
them,  that  he  conceived  and  carried  into  execution 
his  plan;  whereby  not  only  actual  battles  could  be 
analyzed,  and  the  causes  of  victory  and  defeat  in  each 
battle  laid  bare  to  students,  but  also  hypothetical  wars 
and  battles  could  be  fought  by  means  of  problems 
given. 

The  first  result  of  a  course  of  study  of  such  wars 
and  battles,  and  practice  with  such  problems,  was  a 
skill  in  decision  a  little  like  that  developed  in  any 
competitive  game,   say  tennis,   whist,   chess,  poker, 


i68    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

boxing,  and  the  like — whereby  any  action  of  your  ad- 
versary brings  an  instantaneous  and  almost  auto- 
matic reply  from  you,  that  you  could  not  have  made 
so  skilfully  and  quickly  before  you  had  practised  at  the 
game;  and  yet  the  exact  move  of  your  adversary, 
under  the  same  conditions,  you  had  never  seen  before. 
Of  course,  this  skill  was  a  development,  not  of  the 
science,  but  of  the  art,  as  mere  skill  always  is;  but  as 
skill  developed,  the  best  methods  for  obtaining  skill 
were  noted;  and  the  principles  governing  the  attain- 
ment of  success  gradually  unveiled  themselves,  and 
were  formulated  into  a  science. 

Naturally,  strategy  is  not  an  exact  science  like 
mathematics,  physics,  or  engineering — at  least  not 
now.  Whether  it  ever  will  be  cannot  be  foretold. 
The  reason  that  strategy  (like  medicine  and  most 
other  sciences  concerning  human  beings)  is  not  an 
exact  science  is  simply  because  it  involves  too  many 
unknown  quantities — quantities  of  which  our  knowl- 
edge is  too  vague  to  permit  of  our  applying  exact 
methods  to  them,  in  the  way  in  which  we  apply  exact 
methods  to  the  comparatively  well-known  quantities 
and  elements  in  the  so-called  "exact  sciences."  But 
a  science  may  be  a  science  even  if  it  is  not  an  exact 
science;  we  may  know  certain  important  principles 
sufficiently  well  to  use  them  scientifically,  even  if  we 
do  not  know  them  with  sufficient  exactness  to  permit 
us  to  use  them  as  confidently  as  we  should  like.  We 
may  know,  for  instance,  that  it  is  folly  to  divide  a 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  169 

military  force  in  the  presence  of  an  active  enemy  into 
such  small  forces,  and  at  such  distances  apart,  as  to 
let  the  enemy  defeat  each  small  force,  one  after  the 
other,  even  if  we  do  not  know  exactly  how  far  it  would 
be  safe  to  separate  two  forces  of  a  given  size,  in  the 
presence  of  an  enemy  of  a  given  power.  It  is  well  to 
know  a  fact  in  general  terms,  even  if  we  do  not  know 
it  in  precise  terms:  it  is  well  to  know  in  general  terms 
that  we  must  not  take  prussic  acid,  even  if  we  do  not 
know  exactly  how  much  is  needed  to  kill. 

So  the  studies  and  problems  instituted  by  Von 
Moltke,  and  copied  in  all  the  armies  and  navies  of  the 
world,  have  brought  about  a  science  of  strategy  which 
is  real,  even  though  not  exact,  and  which  dweUs  in 
the  mind  of  each  trained  strategist,  as  the  high  tribunal 
to  which  all  his  questions  are  referred  and  by  whose 
decisions  he  is  guided;  just  as  the  principles  of  medi- 
cine are  the  guide  alike  of  the  humblest  and  the  most 
illustrious  practitioner,  wherever  the  beneficent  art  of 
medicine  is  practised. 

It  is  clear  that,  in  order  to  be  skilful  in  strategy 
(in  fact,  in  any  intellectual  art),  not  only  must  a  man 
have  its  scientific  principles  firmly  imprinted  on  his 
mind,  but  he  must  make  its  practice  so  thoroughly 
familiar  to  his  mental  muscles  that  he  can  use  strategy 
as  a  trained  soldier  uses  his  musket — automatically. 
Inasmuch  as  any  man  requires  years  of  study  and 
practice — say,  of  chess — ^in  order  to  play  chess  well 
enough  to  compete  successfully  with  professional  chess- 


I70    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

players,  it  seems  to  follow  that  any  man  must  require 
years  of  study  and  practice  of  the  more  complicated 
game  of  strategy,  in  order  to  play  strategy  well  enough 
to  compete  successfully  with  professional  strategists. 
The  game  of  chess  looks  easy  to  a  beginner;  in  fact, 
the  kind  of  game  that  he  thinks  chess  to  be  is  easy. 
But  after  he  has  learned  the  moves,  he  finds  the  in- 
tricacies of  the  game  developing  more  rapidly  than  he 
can  master  them,  and  discovers  that  chess  is  a  game 
which  some  men  spend  their  lifetime  studying.  The 
full  realization  of  this  fact,  however,  does  not  come  to 
him  until  after  defeats  by  better  players  have  forced 
into  his  consciousness  the  almost  infinite  number  of 
combinations  possible,  the  difficulty  of  deciding  on 
the  correct  move  at  any  juncture,  and  the  conse- 
quences that  follow  after  wrong  moves. 

So  with  strategy.  The  ease  and  certainty  with 
which  orders  can  be  transmitted  and  received,  the 
precision  with  which  large  forces  can  be  quickly  des- 
patched from  place  to  place,  and  the  tremendous 
power  exertable  by  those  forces,  tend  to  blind  the 
mind  to  the  fact  that  transferring  any  force  to  any 
place  is  merely  making  a  "move,"  and  that  the 
other  player  can  make  moves,  too.  If  a  man 
were  never  to  be  pitted  in  strategy  against  another 
player,  either  in  games  or  in  actual  war,  the  "infinite 
variety"  of  strategy  would  never  be  disclosed  to  his 
intelligence;  and  after  learning  how  to  make  the 
moves,  he  might  feel  willing  to  tackle  any  one.    Illus- 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  171 

trations  of  this  tendency  by  people  of  great  self-con- 
fidence are  numerous  in  history,  and  have  not  been 
missing  even  in  the  present  war,  though  none  have 
been  reported  in  this  country  as  occurring  on  the 
Teuton  side.  There  has  always  been  a  tendency  on 
the  part  of  a  ruling  class  to  seize  opportunities  for 
mihtary  glory,  and  the  ambition  has  often  been  dis- 
proportioned  to  the  accompanying  ability  and  knowl- 
edge— sometimes  on  the  part  of  a  King,  prince,  or  man 
of  high  nobility,  sometimes  on  the  part  of  a  minister, 
sometimes  on  the  part  of  an  army  or  navy  man,  who 
has  been  indebted  to  political  or  social  influence  for 
his  place.  But  within  the  past  fifty  years,  especially 
since  the  establishment  of  the  General  Staff  in  Prus- 
sia and  the  studies  of  Von  Moltke,  the  overshadow- 
ing importance  of  strategy  has  been  understood,  the 
necessity  of  comprehending  its  principles  and  prac- 
tising its  technic  has  been  appreciated,  and  attempts 
to  practise  strategy  by  persons  inexpert  in  strategy 
have  been  deprecated. 

The  game  of  strategy,  while  resembling  in  many 
ways  the  game  of  chess,  differs  from  it,  of  course,  in 
the  obvious  element  of  personal  danger.  It  also  dif- 
fers from  it  in  an  equally  important  but  less  obvious 
way — its  relation  to  the  instruments  employed;  for 
in  chess  those  instruments  (pieces)  are  of  a  number 
and  character  fixed  by  the  rules  of  the  game;  whereas 
in  strategy  the  number  and  character  of  the  instru- 
ments (ships,  etc.)  employed  are  determined  by  strat- 


172    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

egy  itself,  assisted  by  engineering.  Germany  realizes 
this,  and  therefore  has  established  and  followed  a 
system  whereby  the  character  of  the  various  material 
and  personnel  units  of  the  navy,  and  even  the  num- 
ber of  them  (under  the  restrictions  of  the  money  al- 
lotted), are  decided  by  a  body  of  men  who  are  highly 
trained  in  strategy  and  engineering. 

There  is  an  intimate  connection  between  policy 
and  strategy,  and  therefore  between  naval  policy  and 
naval  strategy;  and  while  it  is  difficult  to  draw  the 
line  exactly  which  separates  policy  and  strategy,  it 
may  be  said  in  general  that  poHcy  is  the  concern  of 
the  government,  and  strategy  is  the  concern  of  the 
navy  and  army,  to  be  employed  by  them  to  carry  out 
the  policy. 

As  naval  policy  and  naval  strategy  are  so  inti- 
mately connected  in  their  essence,  it  is  apparent  that 
the  naval  policy  of  a  country  and  its  naval  strategy 
should  be  intimately  connected  in  fact;  for  the  policy 
cannot  be  properly  carried  out  if  the  strategy  that 
tries  to  execute  it  is  not  good,  or  if  the  policy  requires 
more  naval  force  or  skill  than  the  navy  can  bring  to 
bear;  and  the  strategy  cannot  be  good  if  it  is  called 
upon  to  execute  a  policy  impossible  to  execute,  or  if 
the  exact  end  in  view  of  the  poHcy  is  not  distinctly 
known.  Some  of  the  greatest  mistakes  that  have 
been  made  by  governments  have  been  made  because 
of  a  lack  of  co-ordination  between  the  government 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  173 

and  its  navy,  so  that  the  policy  and  the  strategy  could 
not  work  together.  We  see  an  illustration  of  this 
throughout  the  history  of  France,  whose  civil  and 
naval  authorities  have  not  worked  harmoniously  to- 
gether, whose  naval  strategy  has  apparently  been  op- 
portunistic and  short-sighted,  and  whose  navy  in  con- 
sequence has  not  been  so  successful  as  the  large  sums 
of  money  spent  upon  it  might  lead  one  to  expect. 

Across  the  English  Channel  we  see  a  totally  differ- 
ent state  of  things.  In  Great  Britain  the  development 
of  the  navy  has  been  going  on  for  more  than  twelve 
hundred  years,  ever  since  King  Off  a  declared  that  "he 
who  would  be  secure  at  home  must  be  supreme  at  sea." 
For  about  eight  hundred  years  thereafter  the  develop- 
ment was  carried  on  energetically,  but  in  an  opportu- 
nistic fashion,  following  the  requirements  of  the  hour. 
In  1632,  however,  the  Board  of  Admiralty  was  estab- 
lished; and  with  occasional  interruptions,  especially 
prior  to  1708,  the  board  has  continued  in  existence 
ever  since.  A  coherent  policy  of  development  has 
thereby  been  assured,  and  a  wisdom  of  strategy  es- 
tablished which  more  than  any  other  single  factor  has 
made  Great  Britain  the  mistress  of  the  seas,  and  al- 
most the  mistress  of  the  world. 

The  wisdom  of  her  strategy  has  been  due  largely 
to  the  fact  of  the  close  touch  maintained  between  the 
civil  government,  including  Parliament,  and  the  navy; 
for  by  its  very  constitution  the  Board  of  Admiralty 
includes  some  of  the  highest  officers  of  Parliament,  the 


174    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

cabinet,  and  the  navy.  Its  presiding  officer  is  a 
member  of  the  cabinet,  and  also  member  of  ParHa- 
ment;  four  of  the  officers  are  naval  officers,  high  in 
rank,  character,  and  attainments;  and  the  junior  civil 
lord  is  a  civilian  versed  in  naval  matters.  All  the 
orders  for  great  movements  of  the  fleets  and  ships  are 
directed  by  this  board  and  signed  by  its  secretary,  the 
board,  by  a  fiction  of  the  law,  being  considered  an 
individual  replacing  the  lord  high  admiral — which  it 
did,  in  1632.  The  board  is  supposed  to  meet  every 
day  with  all  the  members  present,  the  vote  of  each 
member  carrying  as  much  weight  as  that  of  any  other 
member.  Naturally,  the  first  lord  of  the  admiralty 
being  a  cabinet  officer  and  a  member  of  Parliament, 
has  a  far  greater  influence  on  broad  questions  than 
any  other  member;  and  the  first  sea  lord  being  the 
person  of  the  most  experience  in  naval  matters,  has 
the  most  weight  on  strictly  naval  questions.  Theoret- 
ically, however,  neither  of  these  gentlemen  can  carry  a 
measure  opposed  to  the  others;  and  any  member, 
even  a  junior,  has  equal  opportunity  with  the  others 
to  bring  up  and  discuss  any  question  and  to  attempt 
to  procure  its  passage  by  the  fuU  board;  but  in  1869  the 
first  lord  at  that  time,  Mr.  Childers,  brought  about 
a  change  whereby  the  first  lord  was  made  personaUy 
responsible  to  the  government.  This  vastly  increased 
the  power  of  the  first  lord,  relatively  to  the  others. 

Two  other  navies,  the  German  and  the  Japanese, 
which  with  the  British,  are  the  most  efficient  navies 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  175 

in  the  world,  have  systems  somewhat  different  from 
the  British.  In  Germany  and  Japan  the  Emperor  is 
the  head  of  the  navy,  and  there  is  no  civilian  between 
him  and  it.  In  Germany  there  is  no  minister  of 
marine,  unless  the  Emperor  himself  may  be  said  to 
be  the  minister,  which  he  practically  is;  and  the  navy 
is  divided  into  three  parts,  each  under  an  admiral. 
The  three  parts  are  the  General  Staff,  which  deals  with 
war  plans  and  fundamental  questions;  the  naval  cabi- 
net, which  deals  with  matters  of  personnel;  and  the 
administrative  section,  which  has  to  do  with  questions 
of  material,  including  money,  and  the  getting  of  money 
from  Parliament.  In  Japan  the  minister  of  marine 
is  by  law  a  naval  officer,  and  under  him  is  a  chief  of 
staff,  also  a  naval  officer.  The  minister  of  marine  has 
the  direction  of  the  navy  as  a  whole,  but  the  ideas 
of  the  chief  of  staff  are  supposed  to  be  carried  out  in 
matters  that  are  strictly  naval.  The  Japanese  naval 
officer  has  a  higher  regard  for  the  office  of  chief  of 
staff  than  for  that  of  minister  of  marine,  because  it 
is  given  for  professional  excellence  only. 

It  might  seem  at  first  sight  that  in  Germany  and 
Japan  there  would  be  danger  of  a  lack  of  co-ordina- 
tion between  the  civil  and  the  naval  authorities,  and  a 
tendency  for  the  navy  to  become  unduly  self-assertive. 
Of  course,  one  reason  why  there  is  no  such  danger  is 
that  the  governments  of  those  countries  are  controlled 
by  men  who,  though  civilians,  have  great  knowledge 
of  international  affairs,  and  of  military  and  naval  sub- 


176    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

jects;  another  reason  is  that  the  navy  is  so  vital  a 
matter,  accurate  knowledge  about  it  is  so  general,  and 
interest  in  it  so  wide-spread  and  intense,  that  there  is 
no  great  gulf  fixed  between  naval  people  and  civilians. 
Still  another  reason  is  the  fact  that  in  each  country 
the  Emperor  is  trained  in  military  and  naval  duties 
as  well  as  in  civil  duties,  and  therefore  can  effect  in  his 
own  person  the  co-ordination  of  the  civil  and  the  naval 
authority:   that  is,  of  policy  and  strategy. 

Such  automatic  and  complete  co-ordination  is 
desirable  not  only  in  preventing  the  unnatural  barrier 
between  the  civil  and  the  military  authority  which  ex- 
ists in  some  countries  such  as  ours,  but  in  lightening 
the  labors  and  enlightening  the  deliberations  of  the 
strategists.  If,  for  instance,  a  bold  policy  is  to  be  en- 
forced, and  a  large  sum  of  money  allotted  for  material 
and  personnel,  the  strategists  will  be  led  to  recommen- 
dations different  from  those  to  which  they  would  be 
led  if  a  cautious  policy  were  to  be  pursued,  and  a  small 
sum  of  money  to  be  allotted. 

Germany  did  not  turn  her  eyes  seriously  toward 
the  navy  until  the  Emperor  William  II  read  Mahan's 
book,  "The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History." 
Previous  to  that  epochal  event,  Germany  had  relied 
on  her  army  to  protect  her  interests  and  enforce  her 
rights,  being  led  thereto  by  the  facts  of  her  history 
and  the  shortness  of  her  coast-line.  But  the  strategi- 
cally trained  mind  of  William  grasped  at  once  the  situa- 
tion laid  bare  by  Mahan;    and  his  miUtary  training 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  177 

led  him  to  quick  decision  and  prompt  action.  The 
necessary  machinery  was  soon  set  in  motion,  with  the 
amazing  result  that  in  twenty  years  the  German  navy 
became  the  second  in  power  and  perhaps  the  first  in 
efficiency  in  the  world. 

Was  this  feat  accomplished  by  prodigal  expendi- 
tures in  building  vessels  and  other  material  of  all 
kinds,  and  enHsting  and  commissioning  a  large  num- 
ber of  officers  and  men?  No,  the  expense  was  less 
than  that  of  building  our  navy,  even  if  a  Uberal  allow- 
ance be  made  for  the  relative  cheapness  of  things  in 
Germany;  and  the  mere  enlisting  and  commissioning 
of  officers  and  men  was  the  simplest  part  of  the  under- 
taking. 

How  was  it  accomplished?  In  the  simplest  way 
imaginable:  by  following  Moltke's  plan  of  solving 
hypothetical  war  problems,  and  adapting  the  military 
war  game  {Kriegspiel)  to  naval  forces;  playing  num- 
berless war  games,  and  deciding  from  those  games  the 
naval  strategy  best  adapted  to  Germany's  needs — ^not 
only  in  matters  of  general  principle,  not  only  as  to  tac- 
tics, training,  education,  co-operation  with  the  army, 
and  the  size  of  fleet  required  to  carry  out  the  policy 
of  the  nation — but  also  as  to  the  composition  of  the 
fleet,  relative  proportions  of  vessels  of  the  various 
types,  and  the  characteristics  of  each  type.  Nothing 
was  left  to  chance;  nothing  was  decided  by  guessing; 
no  one  man's  dictum  was  accepted.  The  whole  prob- 
lem was  attacked  in  its  entirety,  and  a  general  solu- 
tion found;   and  after  this,  the  various  divisions  and 


1 78    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

subdivisions  of  the  problem  were  attacked  and  solved, 
in  obedience  to  the  same  principles,  in  accordance 
with  the  results  obtained  at  Kriegspiel. 

If  a  very  large  and  compHcated  engine  of  new  pat- 
tern is  to  be  built  by  any  engineering  company,  no 
casting  of  the  smallest  kind  is  made  until  general  plans 
have  been  outlined,  detailed  plans  prepared  from 
these,  and  then  "working  plans"  made  for  the  work- 
men. From  the  working  plans,  the  workmen  con- 
struct the  various  parts;  sometimes  in  number  sev- 
eral hundred.  Finally,  the  whole  intricate  machine  is 
put  together,  and  the  motive  power  applied.  Then 
all  the  parts,  great  and  small,  begin  theh  allotted 
tasks,  each  part  perfectly  adapted  to  its  work,  not  too 
large  and  not  too  smaU;  all  working  together  in  ap- 
parent confusion,  but  in  obedience  to  law — fulfilling 
exactly  the  will  of  the  designing  engineer.  So,  the 
vast  and  new  machine  of  the  German  navy  was  de- 
signed in  the  drafting-room  of  the  Kriegspiel;  and 
though  it  has  been  gradually  strengthened  and  en- 
larged since  then,  each  strengthening  piece  and  each 
addition  has  been  designed  in  accordance  with  the 
original  plan,  and  has  therefore  harmonized  with  the 
original  machine.  Thus  the  navy  has  expanded 
smoothly,  symmetrically,  purposefully.  No  other  re- 
sult was  to  be  expected:  the  strategy  having  been 
correct,  the  result  was  correct  also. 

Perhaps  one  contributing  factor  to  the  success 
of  the  German  navy  has  been  her  staff  of  officers  highly 
trained  in  strategy  by  Kriegspiel,  tha,t  insures  not  only 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  179 

sound  advice  in  general,  but  also  insures  that  at  any 
time,  night  or  day,  a  body  of  competent  officers  shall 
be  ready  at  the  admiralty  to  decide  what  action 
should  be  taken,  whenever  any  new  situation  is  re- 
ported. This  factor  is  most  important;  because  in 
naval  and  military  operations,  even  in  time  of  peace, 
but  especially  in  war,  events  follow  each  other  so 
rapidly,  and  momentous  crises  develop  so  suddenly, 
that  the  demand  for  action  that  shall  be  both  wise 
and  instantaneous  is  imperative.  The  chess-player 
can  linger  long  over  his  decisions,  because  his  oppo- 
nent cannot  make  his  next  move  meanwhile;  but  in 
warfare  no  such  rule  or  condition  can  exist.  In  war, 
time  is  as  vital  a  factor  as  any  other:  and  the  strate- 
gist, who,  like  Napoleon,  can  think  faster  and  decide 
more  quickly  and  accurately  than  his  antagonist  is, 
ceteris  paribus,  sure  to  win;  and  even  if  ceteris  are  not 
quite  paribus,  his  superior  quickness  and  correctness 
will  overcome  great  handicaps  in  material  and  per- 
sonnel, as  the  lives  of  all  the  great  strategists  in  his- 
tory, especially  Alexander  and  Napoleon,  prove  con- 
vincingly. To  bring  a  preponderating  force  to  bear 
at  a  given  point  ahead  of  the  enemy — to  move  the 
maximum  of  force  with  the  maximum  of  celerity — ^has 
always  been  the  aim  of  strategy:  and  probably  it 
always  will  be,  for  the  science  of  strategy  rests  on  prin- 
ciples, and  principles  never  change. 

Thus  while  we  see  in  Great  Britain's  navy  an 
example  of  the  effect  of  a  strategy  continuous  and 


i8o    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

wise,  conducted  for  three  hundred  years,  we  see  in 
the  Japanese  and  German  navies  equally  good  exam- 
ples of  a  strategy  equally  wise,  but  of  brief  duration, 
which  started  with  the  example  of  the  British  navy, 
and  took  advantage  of  it. 

The  German  and  Japanese  navies  did  not  follow 
the  British  navy  slavishly,  however;  for  the  national 
military  character  of  their  people  required  the  intro- 
duction and  control  of  more  military  and  precise  meth- 
ods than  those  of  the  primarily  sailor  navy  of  Great 
Britain.  We  see,  therefore,  a  curious  similarity  be- 
tween the  German  and  Japanese  navies,  and  very 
clear  evidence  in  each  of  the  engrafting  of  purely  mili- 
tary ideals  on  maritime  ideas.  And  we  see  not  only 
this,  we  see  the  reaction  on  the  British  navy  itseh  of 
the  ideals  of  the  German  and  the  Japanese,  and  a  de- 
cided change  during  the  last  ten  years  from  the  prin- 
ciples of  "the  blue- water  school";  as  evidenced  mainly 
by  the  institution  of  a  Naval  War  College,  includmg 
a  war  staff,  the  employment  at  the  admiralty  of  Gen- 
eral Staff  methods,  though  without  the  name;  and 
the  introduction  into  naval  methods,  especially  naval 
gunnery,  of  mathematical  procedures. 

Previous  to  the  Japanese-Russian  War,  ten  years 
ago,  the  strategy  of  the  British  navy  may  be  charac- 
terized as  physical  rather  than  mental,  depending  on  a 
superior  number  of  ships  and  men;  those  ships  and 
men  being  of  a  very  high  grade  individually,  and 
bound  together  by  a  discipline  at  once  strict  and  sym- 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  i8i 

pathetic.  All  the  personnel  from  the  highest  admiral 
to  the  humblest  sailor  prided  themselves  on  being 
"British  seamen,"  comrades  of  the  sea,  on  whom  their 
comitr^'  placed  her  ultimate  reliance.  Maneuvers  on 
a  large  scale  were  held,  target  practice  was  carried  on 
with  regularity — and  navy  ships  carried  the  banner  of 
Saint  George  over  every  sea,  and  displayed  it  in  every 
port.  Tactics  and  seamanship  filled  the  busy  days 
with  driUs  of  many  kinds;  but  strategy,  though  not 
quite  forgotten,  did  not  command  so  large  a  portion 
of  the  officers'  time  and  study  as  it  did  in  Germany 
and  Japan.  The  rapid  success  of  the  Germans  and 
Japanese,  however,  in  building  up  their  navies,  as  in- 
stanced by  the  evident  efficiency  of  the  German  fleet 
almost  under  the  nose  of  England,  and  the  triumph  of 
the  Japanese  fleet  in  Tsushima  Strait  startled  the 
British  navy  out  of  her  conservatism,  and  caused  her 
to  proceed  at  full  speed  toward  the  modernization  of 
her  strategy.  With  the  quick  decision  followed  by 
quick  action  that  characterizes  the  seaman  every- 
where, the  British  instituted  a  series  of  reforms,  and 
prosecuted  their  efforts  with  such  wisdom  and  such 
vigor,  that,  in  the  brief  space  of  ten  years,  the  British 
navy  has  been  almost  revolutionized.  As  in  all  such 
movements,  the  principal  delay  was  in  bringing  about 
the  necessary  mental  changes;  the  mental  changes 
having  been  accomplished,  the  material  changes  fol- 
lowed automatically. 

The  change  whereby  the  German  and  Japanese 


i82    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

navies  became  preceptors  to  their  preceptor  is  like 
changes  that  occur  in  every-day  life,  and  is  one  of 
many  illustrations  of  how  a  young  and  vigorous  indi- 
vidual or  organization,  endowed  with  proper  energy 
and  mentality,  can  appropriate  whatever  is  valuable 
for  its  purposes  from  its  elders,  and  reject  whatever 
those  elders  have  had  fastened  on  them  by  circum- 
stances or  tradition,  and  develop  a  superior  existence. 
It  is  a  Httle  like  the  advantage  which  a  comparatively 
new  city  like  Washington  has  over  an  old  city  like 
Boston,  in  being  started  after  it  was  planned,  instead 
of  being  started  haphazard,  without  being  planned 
at  all. 

The  United  States  navy  was  started  not  like  the 
city  of  Washington,  but  like  the  city  of  Boston.  It 
was  modelled  on  the  British  navy;  but  since  the  United 
States  has  never  taken  an  interest  in  its  navy  at  all 
comparable  with  that  taken  by  Great  Britain  in  its 
navy,  and  since  our  navy  has  been  built  up  by  suc- 
cessive impulses  from  Congress  and  not  in  accordance 
with  a  basic  plan,  the  lack  of  harmoniousness  among 
its  various  parts  reminds  one  of  Boston  rather  than 
of  Washington.  Owing  to  the  engineering  and  inven- 
tive genius  of  our  people  and  the  information  we  got 
from  Europe,  inferiority  has  not  occurred  in  the  units 
of  the  material:  in  fact,  in  some  ways  our  material  is 
perhaps  the  best  of  all.  Neither  has  inferiority  been 
evidenced  in  the  personnel,  as  individuals;  for  the  ex- 
cellent physique  and  the  mental  alertness  of  the  Ameri- 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  183 

can  have  shown  themselves  in  the  navy  as  well  as  in 
other  walks  of  life. 

In  strategy,  however,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
we  have  little  reason  to  be  proud.  We  do  very  well  in 
the  elementary  parts  of  the  naval  profession.  In  navi- 
gation, seamanship,  gunnery,  and  that  part  of  inter- 
national law  that  concerns  the  navy  we  are  as  good  as 
any.  But  of  the  higher  branches,  especially  of  strat- 
egy, we  have  little  clear  conception.  How  can  we 
have?  Strategy  is  one  of  the  most  complex  arts  the 
world  contains;  the  masters  in  that  art  have  borne 
such  names  as  Alexander,  Caesar,  Nelson,  and  Napo- 
leon. Naval  strategy  is  naval  chess,  in  which  battle- 
ships and  other  craft  take  the  place  of  queens  and 
other  pieces.  But  it  is  a  more  complicated  game  than 
chess,  for  the  reason  that  not  only  are  there  more  kinds 
of  "pieces,"  but  the  element  of  time  exerts  a  power- 
ful influence  in  strategy  while  it  does  not  even  exist  in 
chess.  The  time  element  has  the  effect  not  only  of 
compHcating  every  situation,  but  also  of  compelling 
intense  concentration  of  mind,  in  order  to  make  de- 
cisions quickly;  and  often  it  forces  decisions  without 
adequate  time  for  consideration,  under  circumstances 
of  the  utmost  excitement,  discomfort,  and  personal 
peril. 

One  dislikes  intensely  to  criticise  his  own  country, 
even  to  himself.  But  when  a  naval  officer  is  studying 
— as  he  should  continually  do — what  must  be  done, 
in  order  to  protect  his  country  from  attack  by  some 


i84    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

foreign  foe,  it  would  be  criminal  folly  for  him  to  esti- 
mate the  situation  otherwise  than  honestly;  and  to  do 
this,  it  is  necessary  to  try  to  see  where  his  country  is 
weak  and  where  strong,  relatively  to  the  possible  foes 
in  question.  If  we  do  this,  and  compare  the  strate- 
gical methods  employed  by — say  Germany  and  us — we 
are  forced  to  admit  that  the  German  methods  are  bet- 
ter adapted  to  producing  economically  a  navy  j5tted  to 
contend  successfully  in  war  against  an  enemy.  In 
Germany  the  development  of  the  navy  has  been 
strictly  along  the  lines  of  a  method  carefully  devised 
beforehand;  in  our  country  no  method  whatever  is 
apparent,  at  least  no  logical  method.  Congress,  and 
Congress  alone,  decides  what  vessels  and  other  craft 
shall  be  built,  how  many  officers  and  men  shall  wear 
the  uniform.  It  is  true  that  they  consult  the  report  of 
the  secretary  of  the  navy,  and  ask  the  opinions  of 
some  naval  officers;  and  it  is  true  that  the  secretary  of 
the  navy  gets  the  opinions  of  certain  naval  officers  in- 
cluding the  General  Board,  before  making  his  report. 
But  both  the  secretary  and  Congress  estimate  the 
situation  from  their  own  points  of  view,  and  place 
their  own  value  on  the  advice  of  naval  officers.  And 
the  advice  of  these  naval  officers  is  not  so  valuable, 
possibly,  as  it  might  be;  for  the  reason  that  it  is  really 
irresponsible,  since  the  advisers  themselves  know  that 
it  will  not  be  taken  very  seriously.  The  difference 
between  the  advice  of  men  held  responsible  for  the  re- 
sults of  following  their  advice,  and  the  advice  of  men 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  185 

not  so  held  responsible,  is  well  recognized,  and  is  dis- 
cussed fully  in  the  reports  of  the  Moody  and  the  Swift 
Boards  on  the  organization  of  the  Navy  Department. 
Furthermore,  our  officers  do  not  have  the  machinery 
of  the  Kriegspiel  to  help  them.  It  is  true  that  at  the 
Naval  War  College,  a  war-game  apparatus  is  installed 
and  that  war  games  are  played,  and  war  problems 
solved;  but  the  officers  there  are  very  properly  en- 
gaged in  the  regular  work  of  a  war  college,  in  edu- 
cating officers  in  the  principles  of  warfare,  and  have 
little  time  for  other  work.  It  is  also  true  that  the 
war  games  and  problems  there  do  lead  occasionally  to 
recommendations  by  the  War  College  to  the  General 
Board  as  to  various  matters;  but  the  connection  be- 
tween the  conclusions  of  the  War  College  and  the  de- 
cisions of  Congress  via  the  General  Board  and  the 
secretary  of  the  navy  is  so  fragile  and  discontinuous, 
that  it  may  truthfully  be  said  that  the  influence  of 
the  war  games  at  our  War  College  has  but  a  faint  re- 
semblance to  the  determining  force  of  the  Kriegspiel  in 
Berlin. 

It  is  often  said  that  Germany  is  an  empire  and 
the  United  States  a  republic,  and  that  therefore  the 
military  methods  of  Germany  cannot  be  employed 
here.  The  inference  is  not  necessarily  correct,  how- 
ever, as  is  shown  by  the  excellence  of  the  army  of 
France;  for,  France,  although  a  republic,  insists  that 
military  strategy  only  shall  control  and  direct  the 
army.    The  American  Congress  can  do  the  same  with 


i86    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

the  American  navy.  Whether  Congress  shall  so  de- 
cide or  not,  the  decision  will  undoubtedly  be  wise;  and 
we  of  the  navy  will  do  our  utmost  to  make  the  navy 
all  it  should  be.  In  this  connection,  it  should  be  noted 
that: 

1.  Germany  has  been  following  a  certain  strategic 
system  regarding  the  navy;  we  a  system  different 
from  that  of  any  other  navy,  which  has  been  used  now 
for  about  one  hundred  and  forty  years.  Both  sys- 
tems have  been  in  operation  for  a  time  sufficiently 
long  to  warrant  our  comparing  them,  by  comparing 
the  results  they  have  achieved. 

2.  The  German  navy  has  been  in  existence  a 
much  shorter  time  than  the  American  navy,  belongs 
to  a  much  less  populous  and  wealthy  country,  and  yet 
is  not  only  about  30  per  cent  larger  in  material,  and 
more  than  100  per  cent  larger  in  trained  personnel, 
but  if  we  judge  by  maneuvers  carried  on  in  both  peace 
and  war,  is  much  better  in  organization,  morale,  and 
capacity  for  doing  naval  work  upon  the  ocean.  We 
do  not,  of  course,  know  what  Germany  has  been  doing 
since  the  war  began  on  August  i,  191 4;  but  aU  ac- 
counts show  that  Germany,  like  all  the  other  belliger- 
ent Powers,  has  been  adding  units  of  material  and 
personnel  to  her  navy  much  more  rapidly  than  they 
have  been  destroyed;  as  well  as  perfecting  her  strat- 
egy, under  the  influence  of  the  war's  stimulus.  Leaving 
out  of  consideration,  however,  what  she  may  have  been 
doing  since  the  war  began,  and  neglecting  any  unau- 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  187 

thenticated  accounts  of  her  status  before  it  started, 
we  know  positively  that  in  1913  the  maneuvers  of  the 
German  fleet  were  executed  by  a  force  of  21  battle- 
ships, 3  battle  cruisers,  5  small  cruisers,  6  flotillas  of 
destroyers  (that  is  66  seagoing  torpedo  vessels),  11 
submarines,  an  airship,  a  number  of  aeroplanes  and 
special  service  ships,  and  22  mine-sweepers — all  in  one 
fleet,  all  under  one  admiral,  and  maneuvered  as  a 
unit.  This  was  nearly  three  years  ago,  and  we  have  never 
come  anywhere  near  such  a  performance.  In  January, 
1916,  the  United  States  Atlantic  fleet,  capable  as  to 
both  material  and  personnel  of  going  to  sea  and  ma- 
neuvering together,  consisted  of  15  battleships  and  23 
destroyers,  2  mine-depot  ships,  and  i  mine-training 
ship,  and  4  tugs  fitted  as  mine-sweepers — ^with  no  sub- 
marines, no  aircraft  of  any  kind,  no  scouts  (unless 
the  Chester  be  so  considered,  which  was  cruising  alone 
off  the  coast  of  Liberia,  and  the  Birmingham,  which 
was  flag-ship  to  the  destroyer  flotilla).  This  was  the 
only  fleet  that  we  had  ready  to  fight  in  January,  19 16; 
because,  although  more  battleships  could  have  been  put 
into  commission,  this  could  have  been  done  only  by 
putting  out  of  commission  certain  smaller  vessels, 
such  as  cruisers  and  gunboats;  and  the  battleships 
would  have  had  to  be  put  into  commission  very  hur- 
riedly, filled  up  with  men  fresh  from  other  ships,  and 
no  more  ready  to  fight  in  the  fleet  against  an  enemy 
(whose  ships  were  fully  manned  with  well-trained  offi- 
cers and  men,  accustomed  to  the  details  of  their  re- 


i88    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

spective  ships,  and  acquainted  with  each  other)  than 
the  Chesapeake  was  ready  to  fight  the  Shannon. 

3.  In  case  our  system  is  not  so  good  as  that  of — 
say  Germany — or  of  any  other  country  having  a  sys- 
tem equally  excellent,  we  shall  never  be  able  to  con- 
tend successfully  against  that  navy,  under  equal 
strategic  conditions,  unless  we  have  an  excess  over 
her  in  numbers  of  personnel  and  material  sufficient 
to  counteract  our  inferiority  in  efficiency. 

The  efficiency  of  a  navy  or  an  army  is  exactly 
what  the  strategic  system  makes  it.  Eleven  thousand 
Greeks  under  Miltiades,  highly  efficient  and  thor- 
oughly trained,  defeated  100,000  Persians  at  Mara- 
thon. A  Greek  fleet  under  Themistocles  defeated  and 
almost  destroyed  a  much  larger  Persian  fleet  at  Sal- 
amis.  With  an  army  of  less  than  35,000  men,  but 
highly  trained  by  Philip  of  Macedon,  his  father,  Alex- 
ander, in  only  twelve  years  conquered  ten  of  the  most 
wealthy  and  populous  countries  of  the  world.  Caesar, 
Alaric,  Attila,  Charlemagne,  and  all  the  great  mili- 
tary men  from  the  greatest  antiquity  down  to  the 
present  moment  have  trained  and  organized  bodies  of 
soldiers  and  sailors,  under  systems  suited  to  the  times, 
and  then  waged  successful  war  on  peoples  less  militarily 
efficient.  Cortez  conquered  Mexico,  and  Pizarro  con- 
quered Peru;  the  British,  French,  and  Spanish  sub- 
dued the  Indians  of  North  America,  and  during  the 
latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  nearly  all  the  land 
in  the  world  that  was  "unoccupied"  by  Europeans 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  189 

or  their  descendants  was  taken  in  possession  by  Euro- 
pean Powers.  Great  Britain  is  now  mistress  of  about 
one-quarter  of  the  land  and  the  population  of  the 
globe.  Russia,  France,  Germany,  and  the  United 
States  govern  most  of  the  remainder. 

These  results  were  brought  about  almost  solely 
by  the  exercise  of  military  force: — and  of  this  force, 
physical  courage  was  not  a  determining  element,  be- 
cause it  was  just  as  evident  in  the  conquered  as  in  the 
conquerors.  The  determining  element  was  strategy 
that  (under  the  behest  of  policy)  prepared  the  mili- 
tary and  naval  forces  in  material  and  personnel  before 
they  were  used,  and  directed  their  operations,  while 
they  were  being  used. 

Of  all  the  single  factors  that  have  actually  and 
directly  made  the  history  of  the  world,  the  most  im- 
portant factor  has  been  strategy. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE 

THE  most  important  element  connected  with  a 
navy  is  the  strategy  which  directs  it,  in  accor- 
dance with  which  all  its  plans  are  laid — ^plans  for  prep- 
aration before  war  and  plans  for  operations  during 
war.  Strategy  is  to  a  navy  what  mind  is  to  a  man.  It 
determines  its  character,  its  composition,  its  aims; 
and  so  far  as  external  conditions  will  permit,  the  re- 
sults which  it  accomplishes. 

It  is  possible  for  certain  features  connected  with  a 
navy  to  be  good,  even  if  the  strategy  directing  it  be 
faulty;  or  for  those  features  to  be  faulty,  even  if  the 
strategy  directing  it  be  good.  Experience  has  shown, 
however,  that,  in  any  organization  the  influence  of 
the  men  at  the  top,  and  the  effect  of  the  policy  they 
adopt,  is  so  great  that  the  whole  organization  will  in 
the  main  be  good  or  bad  according  to  the  kind  of  men 
that  control  it,  and  the  methods  they  employ.  The 
better  the  discipline  of  the  organization,  the  more 
completely  the  quality  of  the  management  will  influ- 
ence the  whole,  and  the  more  essential  it  becomes  that 
good  methods  be  employed.  Good  discipline  means 
concentration  of  the  effort  of  the  organization;    and 

the  more  concentrated  any  effort  is,  the  more  neces- 

190 


DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE  191 

sary  that  it  be  directed  aright.  The  simplest  illustra- 
tion of  this  is  seen  in  naval  gunnery;  for  there  the 
effect  of  good  fire-control  is  to  hmit  the  dispersion  of 
the  various  shots  fired,  relatively  to  each  other;  to 
make  a  number  of  shots  fired  simultaneously  to  bunch 
closely  together,  that  is  to  concentrate;  getting  away 
from  the  shotgun  effect,  and  approximating  the  effect 
of  a  single  shot.  Obviously,  if  the  fire-control  and  the 
skill  of  the  gunners  are  so  great  that  the  shots  fall  very 
close  together,  the  chance  of  hitting  the  target  is  less 
than  if  the  shots  did  not  fall  close  together,  if  the  range 
at  which  the  guns  are  fired  is  incorrect.  A  mathe- 
matical formula  showing  the  most  effective  dispersion 
for  a  given  error  in  range  was  pubKshed  in  the  Naval 
Institute  by  Lieutenant-Commander  B.  A.  Long,  U.  S. 
N.,  in  December,  191 2. 

So,  we  see  that  if  the  strategy  directing  a  navy  is 
incorrect,  we  can  accomplish  little  by  improving  the 
discipline,  and  may  do  harm;  when  unwise  orders  have 
been  given  in  the  past,  those  orders  have  sometimes 
been  disobeyed  with  beneficial  effect.  Neither  would 
it  avail  much  to  improve  the  details  of  the  material  or 
personnel,  or  to  spend  much  money;  for  there  is  no 
benefit  to  be  derived  from  building  fine  ships,  if  they 
are  to  be  captured  by  the  enemy.  If  the  Russian  fleet 
sent  to  Tsushima  had  been  weaker  than  it  was,  the  loss 
to  Russia  would  have  been  less. 

Inasmuch  as  strategy,  however,  includes  all  the' 
means  taken  to  make  a  navy  effective,  it  is  obvious 


192    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

that  a  good  strategical  direction  will  be  more  likely  to 
result  in  good  discipline  and  good  material  than  would 
a  poor  strategy.  But  this  is  not  necessarily  so,  for  the 
reason  that  a  strategy  may  be  in  the  main  faulty,  and 
yet  be  good  in  certain  ways — especially  in  attention  to 
details,  for  which  a  high  degree  of  mentality  is  not  re- 
quired. In  the  same  way,  an  individual  who  is  short- 
sighted and  imperfectly  educated  may  be  a  most  ex- 
cellent and  useful  member  of  society,  provided  he  is 
not  permitted  to  use  power  in  matters  beyond  his 
vision.  An  illustration  of  how  an  incorrect  point  of 
view  does  not  necessarily  injure,  but  may  even  benefit 
in  details  is  shown  by  certain  militia  regiments,  which 
are  able  to  surpass  some  regiments  of  the  regular  army 
in  many  details  of  the  drill,  and  in  general  precision 
of  movement. 

In  fact,  a  very  wise  strategical  direction  has  as 
one  of  its  most  important  functions  the  division  of 
study  and  labor  among  various  lines  of  action,  and  in 
deciding  which  lines  are  important  and  which  not: 
and  for  this  reason  may — and  often  does — limit  labor, 
and  therefore  perfection  of  result,  along  lines  which  a 
less  wise  strategy  would  not  limit.  Illustrations  of  the 
casting  aside  of  rigid  and  difficult  forms  of  drill  durmg 
the  past  fifty  years  in  armies,  and  the  substitution  of 
more  easy  methods  are  numerous.  This  does  not  in- 
dicate, however,  that  a  wise  strategy  may  not  encour- 
age rigid  forms  of  drill,  for  the  army  which  is  directed 
with  the  greatest  strategical  skill  is  the  German,  and 


DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE  193 

no  army  has  more  precise  methods,  not  only  of  pro- 
cedure, but  of  drill.  The  Prussian  army  of  Frederick 
William  which  Frederick  the  Great  inherited  was  not 
more  rigidly  drilled  in  some  particulars  than  the  Ger- 
man army  of  to-day,  fought  by  Frederick  the  Great's 
great-great-great-grandnephew,  William  11. 

So  we  see  that  a  wise  and  far-sighted  strategy 
does  not  necessarily  either  frown  on  or  encourage  at- 
tention to  details;  it  merely  regulates  it,  deciding  in 
each  case  and  for  each  purpose  what  degree  of  atten- 
tion to  detail  is  best. 

The  most  obvious  work  of  naval  strategy,  and 
therefore  the  work  that  impresses  people  most,  is  in 
directing  naval  forces  against  an  enemy  in  war.  But 
it  is  clear  that  before  this  can  be  done  effectively 
strategy  must  first  have  made  plans  of  preparation 
in  time  of  peace;  and  it  is  equally  clear  that,  previous 
to  this,  strategy  must  first  determine  the  units  of  the 
force  and  their  relation  to  each  other:  it  must,  in  other 
words,  design  the  machine. 

Evidently,  therefore,  the  work  of  strategy  is  three- 
fold: first,  to  design  the  machine;  second,  to  prepare  it 
for  war;  and,  third,  to  direct  its  operations  during  war. 

A  navy  being  a  machine  composed  of  human  and 
material  parts,  it  is  clear  that  the  work  of  designing  it 
correctly  should  take  account  of  all  the  parts  at  the 
outset;  and  not  only  this — the  whole  design  should 
be  completed  before  any  parts  are  made  and  put  to- 
gether if  the  best  results  are  to  be  obtained.    This 


194    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

is  the  practice  in  making  material  machines  in  manu- 
facturing establishments — and  no  other  practice  there 
could  be  successfully  pursued.  It  is  the  outcome  of 
the  experience  of  tens  of  thousands  of  men  for  many 
years — and  the  result  of  the  expenditure  of  tons  of 
money. 

This  remark  as  to  manufacturing  establishments 
does  not  include  the  development  of  new  ideas,  for 
which  experimentation  or  original  research  is  needed; 
because  it  is  sometimes  necessary,  when  venturing 
into  untrodden  fields,  to  test  out  by  mere  trial  and 
error  certain  parts  or  features  before  determining 
enough  of  their  details  to  warrant  incorporating  them 
in  the  drawing  of  the  whole  machme.  Similarly,  some 
experiments  must  be  made  in  the  methods,  organiza- 
tion, and  material  of  the  naval  machine;  but  in  this 
case,  as  in  the  case  of  manufacturing  establishments, 
the  experimental  work,  no  matter  how  promising  or 
alluring,  must  be  recognized  as  of  unproved  and  doubt- 
ful value;  and  no  scheme,  plan,  or  doctrine  must  be 
incorporated  in  the  naval  machine,  or  allowed  to  pose 
as  otherwise  than  experimental,  until  successful  trials 
shall  have  put  it  beyond  the  experimental  stage. 

The  naval  machine  consists  obviously  of  two  parts, 
the  personnel  and  the  material;  these  two  parts  being 
independent,  and  yet  mutually  dependent,  like  the 
parts  of  any  other  organism.  Obviously,  the  parts  are 
mutually  dependent  not  only  in  the  quantitative  sense 
that  the  more  numerous  the  material  parts  the  more 


DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE  195 

numerous  must  be  the  persomiel  to  operate  them, 
but  also  in  the  qualitative  sense  that  the  various 
kinds  of  material  determine  the  various  kinds  of  per- 
sonnel that  must  be  provided  to  operate  them  with 
success.  Gunners  are  needed  to  handle  guns,  and  en- 
gineers to  handle  engines. 

In  this  respect,  personnel  follows  material.  In 
the  galley  days  only  two  kinds  of  personnel  were 
needed — sailors  to  handle  the  galleys  (most  of  these 
being  men  merely  to  pull  on  oars) — and  soldiers  to 
fight,  when  the  galleys  got  alongside  of  the  enemy. 
Ship  organization  remained  in  a  condition  of  great 
simplicity  until  our  Civil  War;  for  the  main  effort  was 
to  handle  the  ships  by  means  of  their  sails,  the  han- 
dling of  the  simple  battery  being  a  very  easy  matter. 
Every  ship  was  much  like  every  other  ship,  except  in 
size;  and  in  every  ship  the  organization  was  simple 
and  based  mostly  on  the  necessities  of  handling  the 
ship  by  sails. 

The  first  important  change  from  this  condition 
followed  the  departure  of  the  Confederate  ironclad 
Virginia  (Merrimac)  carrying  10  guns  and  300  men 
from  the  Norfolk  Navy  Yard  on  the  8th  of  March, 
1862,  and  her  sinking  hardly  two  hours  afterward  the 
Union  sloop  of  war  Cumberland,  carrying  24  guns  and 
376  men;  and  then  destroying  by  fire  the  Union 
frigate  Congress,  carrying  50  guns  and  434  men.  The 
second  step  was  taken  on  the  following  day,  when  the 
Union  Monitor,  2  guns  and  49  men,  defeated  the  Mer- 


196    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

rimac.  These  two  actions  on  two  successive  days  are 
the  most  memorable  naval  actions  in  history  from  the 
standpoint  of  naval  construction  and  naval  ordnance, 
and  perhaps  of  naval  strategy;  because  they  insti- 
tuted a  new  era — the  era  of  mechanism  in  naval  war. 

The  next  step  was  the  successful  attack  by  the 
Confederate  "fish- torpedo  boat"  David,  on  the  Union 
ironclad  Housatonic  in  Charleston  harbor  on  February 
17,  1864;  and  the  next  was  the  sinking  of  the  Con- 
federate ironclad  Albemarle  by  a  spar  torpedo  carried 
on  a  little  steam-launch  commanded  by  Lieutenant 
W.  B.  Gushing,  U.  S.  N.,  on  October  27,  1864. 

These  four  epochal  events  in  our  Civil  War  dem- 
onstrated the  possibilities  of  mechanism  in  naval 
warfare,  and  led  the  way  to  the  use  of  the  highly 
specialized  and  scientific  instruments  that  have  played 
so  important  a  part  in  the  present  war.  During  the 
half-century  that  has  intervened  since  the  Monitor  and 
Merrimac  ushered  in  the  modem  era,  since  the  five 
brave  crews  of  the  David  lost  their  lives,  and  since 
Gushing  made  his  amazing  victory,  a  contest  be- 
tween the  sailor  and  the  scientist  has  been  going  on, 
as  to  which  shall  be  deemed  the  ultimate  master  of 
the  sea.  As  in  many  contests,  the  decision  has  gone 
unqualifiedly  to  neither;  for  he  who  sails  the  sea  and 
braves  its  tempests,  must  be  in  heart  and  character  a 
sailor — and  yet  he  who  fights  the  scientific  war-craft 
of  the  present  day  cannot  be  merely  a  sailor,  like  him 
of  the  olden  kind,  but  must  be  what  the  New  York 


DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE  197 

Times,  a  few  years  ago,  laughingly  declared  to  be  a 
combination  quite  unthinkable,  ''a  scientific  person 
and  a  sailor." 

Each  year  since  the  fateful  8th  of  March,  1862, 
has  seen  some  addition  to  the  fighting  machinery  of 
navies.  Some  appliances  have  been  developed  gradu- 
ally from  their  first  beginnings,  and  are  to-day  sub- 
stantially what  they  were  at  first — but  of  course  im- 
proved; among  these  are  the  turret,  the  automobile 
torpedo,  the  telescope-sight,  the  submarine,  and  the 
gyrocompass.  Many  other  appliances  found  favor 
for  a  while  and  then,  having  demonstrated  the  value 
of  what  they  attempted  and  did  perform,  were  gradu- 
ally supplemented  by  improved  devices,  doing  the 
same  thing,  but  in  better  ways;  in  this  class  are  many 
forms  of  interior-communication  apparatus,  especi- 
ally electrical.  Still  other  appliances  are  adaptations 
to  ship  and  naval  life  of  devices  used  in  civil  life — 
such  as  the  telephone,  electric  light,  and  radio. 

Each  of  these  appliances  has  required  for  its 
successful  use  the  educating  of  men  to  use  it,  and  fre- 
quently the  creation  and  organization  of  entirely  new 
branches  of  the  service;  an  illustration  is  the  radio 
corps  in  each  of  our  large  ships.  At  the  present  time 
the  attitude  of  officers  and  of  the  department  itself  is 
so  much  more  favorable  to  new  appliances  that  a  clear 
probability  of  a  new  device  being  valuable  is  a  sufficient 
stimulus  to  bring  about  the  education  of  men  to  use 
it;   but  a  very  few  years  ago  many  devices  were  lost 


198    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

to  us  because  they  were  considered  "not  adapted  to 
naval  use."    Now  we  endeavor  to  adapt  them. 

The  present  complexity  of  our  material  is  there- 
fore reflected  in  the  complexity  of  the  organization  of 
our  personnel;  and  as  it  is  the  demands  of  material 
that  regulate  the  kind  of  personnel,  and  as  a  machine 
must  be  designed  and  built  before  men  can  learn  to 
use  it,  it  follows  that  our  personnel  must  lag  behind 
our  material — that  our  material  as  material  must 
be  better  than  our  personnel  as  personnel. 

It  may  be  answered  that  all  our  material  is  first 
invented,  then  designed,  and  then  constructed  by 
men;  that  men  create  our  material  appliances  (though 
not  the  matter  of  which  they  are  composed),  that  the 
created  cannot  be  better  than  the  creator,  and  that 
therefore  it  is  impossible  for  our  material  to  be  bet- 
ter than  our  personnel.  But  to  this  objection  it  may 
be  pointed  out  that  only  a  very  small  proportion  of 
our  personnel  are  employed  in  creating;  that  most  of 
them  are  engaged  merely  in  using  the  material  with 
whatever  degree  of  skill  they  possess,  and  that,  if  a 
man  uses  an  instrument  with  perfect  skill,  he  then 
succeeds  merely  in  getting  out  of  that  instrument  all 
that  there  is  in  it.  A  soldier's  musket,  for  instance,  is 
a  very  perfect  tool — very  accurate,  very  powerful, 
very  rapid;  and  no  marksman  in  the  world  is  so  skil- 
ful that  he  can  shoot  the  musket  with  all  the  accuracy 
and  speed  of  which  the  gun  itself  is  capable. 

This  indicates  that  the  personnel  of  a  nav>'  is 


DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE  199 

harder  to  handle  than  the  material,  and  that  there- 
fore the  most  effort  is  required  to  be  expended  on  the 
personnel.  The  strength  of  any  system  depends  on 
the  strength  of  its  weakest  part;  in  any  organism, 
human  or  material,  effort  is  best  expended  on  the  weak 
points  rather  than  on  the  strong. 

Recognition  of  this  principle  is  easy,  but  carrying 
out  the  principle  in  practice  is  most  difhcult.  One 
reason  is  the  difficulty  of  seeing  always  where  the 
weak  spot  is;  but  a  greater  difficulty  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  principle  as  above  stated  must  be  modified 
by  the  consideration  that  things  which  are  important 
need  attention  more  than  things  that  are  unimportant. 
A  weak  point  in  any  organism  deserves  attention  more 
than  a  strong  point  of  the  same  order  of  importance, 
or  than  a  strong  point  in  the  same  class;  but  not, 
necessarily  more  than  a  strong  point  of  a  higher  order 
of  importance,  or  a  strong  point  in  another  class.  It 
may  be  more  beneficial,  for  instance,  to  drill  an  in- 
effective turret  crew  than  to  try  to  reduce  friction  in 
a  training  gear  already  nearly  frictionless;  or  it  may 
be  more  beneficial  to  overcome  the  faults  of  a  medio- 
cre gun-pointer  than  to  develop  still  more  highly  the 
skill  already  great  of  another  gun -pointer;  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  it  may  be  less  beneficial  to  drill  boat 
crews  at  boat-sailing,  even  if  they  need  it,  than  to 
drill  them  at  landing  as  armed  forces  on  the  beach, 
though  they  may  do  that  pretty  well;  or  it  may  be 
better  not  to  have  boat  drill  at  all  and  to  get  under 


200    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

way  for  fleet  drill,  even  though  the  ships  are  very  ex- 
pert at  it. 

It  is  true  that  in  any  endeavor  where  many  things 
are  to  be  done,  as  in  a  navy,  it  is  important  that  noth- 
ing be  neglected;  and  yet,  under  the  superintendence 
of  any  one,  there  are  some  things  the  doing  of  which 
requires  priority  over  other  things.  The  allotting  of 
the  scientifically  correct  amount  of  time,  energy,  and 
attention  to  each  of  the  various  things  claiming  one's 
attention  is  one  of  the  most  difficult,  and  yet  one  of 
the  most  important  problems  before  any  man.  It  re- 
quires an  accurate  sense  of  proportion. 

Naturally  the  problem  increases  in  complexity 
and  importance  the  higher  the  position,  and  the 
greater  the  number  of  elements  involved — being  more 
difficult  and  important  for  instance  in  the  office  of  the 
commander-in-chief  of  a  fleet,  whose  time  and  atten- 
tion have  to  be  divided  among  multitudinous  matters, 
than  in  that  of  captain  of  a  single  ship.  For  this  rea- 
son, the  higher  one  is  in  position,  the  more  imperative  it 
is  that  he  understand  all  elements  involved,  and  estimate 
properly  their  various  weights.  The  success  or  non-suc- 
cess of  a  man  in  high  authority  depends  largely  on 
how  his  sense  of  proportion  leads  him  to  allot  his  time. 

But  a  matter  fully  as  important  as  the  allotment 
of  tune  and  attention  to  the  consideration  of  various 
matters  by  the  various  members  of  the  personnel  is 
the  allotment  of  money  for  the  various  items,  especi- 
ally of  the  material;  for,  after  all,  every  navy  depart- 


DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE  201 

ment  or  admiralty  must  arrange  its  demands  for  ships, 
guns,  men,  etc.,  with  reference  to  the  total  amount  of 
money  which  the  nation  will  allot.  For  this  purpose, 
only  one  good  means  of  solution  has  thus  far  been  de- 
vised— the  game-board. 

The  game-board,  naturally,  tries  out  only  the 
units  that  maneuver  on  the  ocean;  it  does  not  try 
out  the  mechanism  inside  those  units,  because  they 
can  be  tried  out  best  by  engineering  methods.  The 
province  of  the  game-board  is  merely  to  try  out  on  a 
very  small  scale,  under  proper  conventions  or  agree- 
ments, things  that  could  not  be  tried  out  otherwise, 
except  at  great  expense,  and  very  slowly;  to  afford  a 
medium,  half-way  between  actual  trials  with  big  ships 
and  mere  unaided  reasoning,  for  arriving  at  correct 
conclusions.  When  the  game-board  is  not  used,  peo- 
ple conferring  on  naval  problems  can  do  so  only  by 
forming  pictures  in  their  own  minds,  endeavoring  to 
describe  those  pictures  to  the  others  (in  which  en- 
deavor they  rarely  perfectly  succeed)  while  at  the 
same  time,  trying  to  see  the  pictures  that  are  in  the 
minds  of  the  others — and  then  comparing  all  the 
pictures.  The  difficulty  of  doing  this  is  shown  by  a 
little  paragraph  in  "The  Autocrat  of  the  Breakfast 
Table,"  in  which  Dr.  Holmes  points  out  that  when 
John  and  Thomas  are  talking,  there  are  really  six  per- 
sons present — the  real  John,  the  person  John  thinks 
himself  to  be,  the  person  Thomas  thinks  him  to  be, 
the  real  Thomas,  the  person  Thomas  thinks  himself 


202    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

to  be,  and  the  person  John  thinks  him  to  be.  The  con- 
ditions surrounding  John  and  Thomas  are  those  of  the 
simplest  kind,  and  the  conversation  between  them  of 
the  most  uncomplicated  character.  But  when — not 
two  people  but — say  a  dozen  or  more,  are  considering 
highly  complicated  questions,  such  as  the  House  Naval 
Committee  discuss  when  officers  are  called  to  testify 
before  them,  no  two  of  the  twenty  congressmen  can 
form  the  same  mental  picture  when  an  officer  uses  the 
word — say  "fleet."  The  reason  is  simply  that  very 
few  of  the  congressmen  hearing  that  word  have  ever 
seen  a  fleet;  none  of  them  know  exactly  what  it  is, 
and  every  one  forms  a  picture  which  is  partly  the  re- 
sult of  all  his  previous  education  and  experience; 
which  are  different  from  the  previous  education  and 
experience  of  every  other  congressman  on  the  com- 
mittee. Furthermore,  no  one  of  the  officers  uses  words 
exactly  as  the  other  officers  do;  and  the  English  lan- 
guage is  too  vague  (or  rather  the  usual  interpretation 
put  on  words  is  too  vague)  to  assure  us  that  even  ordi- 
nary words  are  mutually  understood.  For  instance, 
the  question  is  asked:  "Do  you  consider  it  probable 
that  such  or  such  a  thing  would  happen?"  Now 
what  does  the  questioner  mean  by  "probable,"  and 
what  does  the  officer  think  he  means?  Mathemat- 
ically, the  meaning  of  "probable"  is  that  there  is  more 
than  50  per  cent  of  chance  that  the  thing  would 
happen;  but  who  in  ordinary  conversation  uses  that 
word   in   that  way?    That  this   is  not  an  academic 


DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE  203 

point  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  if  the  answer  is 
"no"  the  usual  inference  from  the  answer  is  that 
there  is  no  need  for  guarding  against  the  contingency. 
Yet  such  an  inference,  if  the  word  "probable"  were 
used  correctly  by  both  the  questioner  and  the  an- 
swerer, would  be  utterly  unjustified,  because  the 
necessity  for  taking  precautions  against  a  danger 
depends  not  so  much  on  its  probability  or  improbabil- 
ity, as  on  the  degree  of  its  probability;  and  to  an  equal 
degree  on  the  greatness  of  the  danger  that  impends. 
If  the  occurrence  of  a  small  mishap  has  a  probability 
say  of  even  75  per  cent,  there  may  be  little  necessity 
of  guarding  against  it;  while  if  the  danger  of  total 
destruction  has  a  probability  as  low  as  even  i  per 
cent,  we  should  guard  against  it  sedulously. 

The  more  complicated  the  question,  the  more 
elements  involved,  the  more  difficult  it  is  to  settle  it 
wisely  by  mere  discussion.  The  effort  of  the  imagina- 
tion of  each  person  must  be  directed  not  so  much  to 
getting  a  correct  mental  picture  of  what  the  words 
employed  describe,  as  to  getting  a  correct  picture  of 
what  the  person  using  the  words  desires  them  to 
describe.  Any  person  who  has  had  experience  in  dis- 
cussions of  this  character  knows  what  an  effort  this 
is,  even  if  he  is  talking  with  persons  whom  he  has 
known  for  years,  and  with  whose  mental  and  lingual 
characteristics  he  is  well  acquainted:  and  he  also 
knows  how  much  more  difficult  it  is  when  he  is  talk- 
ing with  persons  whom  he  knows  but  slightly. 


204    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

It  may  here  be  pointed  out  how  greatly  the  imagi- 
nations of  men  differ,  and  how  little  account  is  taken 
of  this  difference  in  e very-day  life.  In  poetry  and  fic- 
tion imagination  is  recognized;  and  it  is  also  recog- 
nized to  some  extent  in  painting,  inventing,  and,  in 
general,  in  "the  arts."  But  in  ordinary  life,  the  dif- 
ference among  men  in  imagination  is  almost  never 
noticed.  Yet  a  French  proverb  is  "point  d'  imagina- 
tion, point  de  grand  general";  and  Napoleon  indi- 
cated a  danger  from  untrained  imagination  in  his 
celebrated  warning  to  his  generals  not  to  make  "pic- 
tures" to  themselves  of  difficulties  and  disasters. 

The  difference  in  imagination  among  men  is  shown 
clearly  by  the  difference — and  often  the  differences — 
between  inventors  and  engineers,  and  the  scarcity 
of  men  who  are  both  inventors  and  engineers.  Erics- 
son repudiated  the  suggestion  that  he  was  an  inven- 
tor, and  stoutly  and  always  declared  he  was  an  engi- 
neer. This  was  at  a  time,  not  very  long  ago,  when  it 
was  hardly  respectable  to  be  an  inventor;  when,  even 
though  men  admitted  that  some  inventors  had  done 
valuable  work,  the  work  was  supposed  to  be  largely 
a  chance  shot  of  a  more  or  less  crazy  man.  Yet  Erics- 
son was  an  inventor — though  he  was  an  engineer.  So 
were  Sir  William  Thompson  (afterward  Lord  Kelvin), 
Helmholtz,  Westinghouse,  and  a  very  few  others;  so 
are  Edison  and  Sperry.  Many  inventors,  however, 
live  in  their  imaginations  maialy — some  almost  wholly. 
Like  Pegasus,  they  do   not   like  to  be  fastened  to  a 


DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE  205 

plough  or  anything  else  material.  Facts,  figures,  and 
blue-prints  fill  their  souls  with  loathing,  and  bright 
generalities  dehght  them.  The  engineer,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  a  man  of  brass  and  iron  and  logarithms;  in 
imagination  he  is  blind,  in  flexibility  he  resembles  re- 
inforced concrete.  He  is  the  antipodes  of  the  inven- 
tor; he  despises  the  inventor,  and  the  inventor  hates 
him.  Fortunately,  however,  there  is  a  little  bit  of  the 
inventor  in  most  engineers,  and  a  trace  of  the  engineer 
in  most  inventors;  while  in  some  inventors  there  is  a 
good  deal  of  the  engineer.  And  once  in  a  while  we 
meet  a  man  who  carries  both  natures  in  his  brain. 
That  man  does  marvels. 

Despite  the  great  gulf  normally  fixed,  however, 
between  the  engineer  and  the  inventor,  most  of  the 
definite  progress  of  the  world  for  the  past  one  hun- 
dred years  has  been  done  by  the  co-ordination  of  the 
two;  a  co-ordination  accomplished  by  "the  man  of 
business." 

Now  the  inventor  and  engineer  type  do  not  exist 
only  in  the  world  of  engineering  and  mechanics,  though 
it  is  in  that  world  that  they  are  the  most  clearly 
recognized;  for  they  exist  in  all  walks  of  life.  In  Ht- 
erature,  inventors  write  novels;  in  business  life,  they 
project  railroads;  in  strategy,  they  map  out  new  lines 
of  effort.  In  literature,  the  engineer  writes  cyclopae- 
dias; in  business,  he  makes  the  projected  railroads  a 
success;  in  strategy,  he  works  out  logistics  and  does 
the  quantitative  work. 


2o6    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

In  that  part  of  strategy  of  which  we  are  now  think- 
ing— the  designing  of  the  naval  machine — the  inventor 
and  the  engineer  clearly  have  two  separate  lines  of 
work:  one  line  the  conceiving,  and  the  other  line  the 
constructing,  of  strategic  and  tactical  methods,  and 
of  material  instruments  to  carry  out  those  methods. 
Clearly,  these  two  lines  of  work  while  independent  are 
mutually  dependent;  and,  if  properly  carried  out  are 
mutually  assistant.  The  coworking  of  the  inventor 
and  the  engineer  is  a  little  like  that  coworking  of 
theory  and  practice,  which  has  been  the  principal  fac- 
tor in  bringing  about  the  present  amazing  condition 
of  human  society  commonly  called  "Modern  CiviH- 
zation." 

The  shortcomings  of  human  speech  are  most  evi- 
dent in  discussing  complicated  matters;  and  for  this 
reason  speech  is  supplemented  in  the  engineering  arts 
by  drawings  of  different  kinds.  No  man  ever  lived 
who  could  describe  a  complicated  machine  accurately 
to  a  listener,  unless  that  machine  differed  but  little 
from  a  machine  with  which  the  listener  was  acquainted. 
But  hand  a  drawing  of  even  a  very  complicated  ma- 
chine to  a  man  who  knows  its  language — and  the  whole 
nature  of  the  object  is  laid  bare  to  him;  not  only 
its  general  plan  and  purpose,  but  its  details,  with  all 
their  dimensions  and  even  the  approximate  weights. 
So,  when  the  forces  representing  a  comphcated  naval 
situation  are  placed  upon  the  game-board,  aU  the  ele- 
ments of  the  problem  appear  clearly  and  correctly  to 


DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE  207 

each  person;  the  imagination  has  little  work  to  do,  and 
the  chance  for  misunderstanding  is  almost  negligible. 
Of  course,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  game-board 
can  decide  questions  with  absolute  finality.  It  can- 
not do  this;  but  that  is  only  because  conditions  are 
represented  with  only  approximate  realism,  because 
the  rules  of  the  game  may  not  be  quite  correct,  and 
because  sufficient  correct  data  cannot  be  procured. 
The  difficulties  of  securing  absolute  realism  are  of 
course  insuperable,  and  the  difficulties  of  getting  abso- 
lutely correct  data  are  very  great.  The  more,  how- 
ever, this  work  is  prosecuted,  the  more  clearly  its  diffi- 
culties will  be  indicated,  and  therefore  the  more 
effectively  the  remedies  can  be  provided.  The  more 
the  game-board  is  used  both  on  ship  and  shore,  the 
more  ease  will  be  found  in  getting  correct  data  for 
it,  and  the  more  correctly  conclusions  can  then  be 
deduced. 

These  remarks,  while  intended  for  tactical  games, 
seem  to  apply  to  strategical  games  as  well;  for  both 
the  tactical  and  the  strategical  games  are  simply  en- 
deavors to  represent  actual  or  probable  situations  and 
occurrences  in  miniature,  by  arbitrary  symbols,  in 
accordance  with  well-understood  conventions. 

War  games  and  war  problems  have  not  yet  been 
accepted  by  some;  for  some  regard  them  as  games 
pure  and  simple  and  as  academic,  theoretical,  and 
unpractical.  It  may  be  admitted  that  they  are  aca- 
demic and  theoretical;  but  so  is  the  science  of  gunnery, 


2o8    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

and  so  is  the  science  of  navigation.  In  some  ways, 
however,  the  lessons  of  the  game-board  are  better 
guides  to  future  work  than  "practical"  and  actual 
happenings  of  single  battles:  for  in  single  battles 
everything  is  possible,  and  some  things  happen  that 
were  highly  improbable  and  were  really  the  result  of 
accident.  After  nearly  every  recent  war  there  has 
been  a  strong  move  made  toward  the  adoption  of  some 
weapon,  or  some  method,  that  has  attained  success 
in  that  war.  For  instance,  after  our  Civil  War,  many 
monitors  were  built,  and  the  spar  torpedo  was  installed 
in  all  our  ships;  after  the  battle  of  Lissa,  the  ram  was 
exploited  as  the  great  weapon  of  the  future;  the  Japa- 
nese War  estabhshed  the  heavily  armed  and  armored 
battleships  on  a  secure  foundation;  and  the  early 
days  of  the  present  war  caused  a  great  rush  toward 
the  submarine.  Yet,  in  most  cases,  the  success  was  a 
single  success  or  a  very  few  successes,  and  was  a  little 
like  the  throw  of  a  die,  in  the  sense  that  the  result  was 
caused  in  great  measure  by  accident;  that  is,  by 
causes  beyond  the  control  of  man,  or  by  conditions 
that  would  probably  not  recur. 

The  game  calls  our  attention  to  the  influence  of 
chance  in  war,  and  to  the  desirabihty  of  our  recogniz- 
ing that  influence  and  endeavoring  to  eliminate  it, 
when  reasoning  out  the  desirabihty  or  undesirability 
of  a  certain  weapon  or  a  certain  method.  Of  course, 
every  thoughtful  person  realizes  that  few  effects  in 
life  are  due  to  one  cause  only,  and  that  most  effects 


DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE  209 

are  due  to  a  combination  of  many  causes;  so  that,  if 
any  weapon  or  method  succeeds  or  fails,  it  is  illogical 
to  infer  from  that  one  fact  that  the  weapon  or  method 
is  good  or  bad.  A  common  illustration  is  the  well- 
known  fact  that  a  marksman  may  hit  the  target  when 
his  aim  is  too  high  or  too  low,  provided  that  he  has 
erroneously  set  his  sight  enough  too  low  or  too  high  to 
compensate;  whereas  if  he  had  made  only  one  error 
instead  of  two,  he  would  have  missed.  "Two  wrongs 
cannot  make  a  right,"  but  two  errors  can  compensate 
each  other,  and  often  do.  The  theory  of  the  Prob- 
ability of  Errors  recognizes  this.  In  fact,  if  it  were  not 
true  that  some  errors  are  plus  and  some  minus,  all 
errors  in  gunnery  (in  fact  in  everything)  would  be  ad- 
ditive to  each  other,  and  we  should  live  in  a  world  of 
error. 

The  partial  advantage  of  the  game-board  over 
the  occurrences  of  actual  war,  for  the  purpose  of  study- 
ing strategy,  lies  largely  in  its  ability  to  permit  a 
number  of  trials  very  quickly;  the  trials  starting 
either  with  identical  situations,  or  with  certain  changes 
in  conditions.  Of  course,  the  game-board  has  the 
tremendous  disadvantage  that  it  presents  only  a  pic- 
ture, and  does  not  show  a  real  performance;  but  the 
more  it  is  used,  and  the  more  fleets  and  game-boards 
work  together,  the  more  accurate  the  picture  will  be- 
come, and  the  more  correctly  we  shall  learn  to  read  it. 

One  limitation  of  the  game-board  is  that  it  can 
represent  weather  conditions  only  imperfectly — and 


2IO    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

this  is  a  serious  limitation  that  may  or  may  not  be 
remedied  as  time  goes  on.  The  theory  of  the  game- 
board  is  in  fact  in  advance  of  the  mechanism,  and  is 
waiting  for  some  bright  inventive  genius  for  the  rem- 
edy. Until  this  happens,  the  imagination  must  do  the 
best  it  can,  and  the  effect  of  a  certain  kind  of  weather 
under  the  other  conditions  prevaihng  will  have  to  be 
agreed  upon  by  the  contestants. 

The  term  "war  game"  is  perhaps  unfortunate, 
for  the  reason  that  it  does  not  convey  a  true  idea  of 
what  a  "war  game"  is.  The  term  conveys  the  idea  of 
a  competitive  exercise,  carried  on  for  sport;  whereas 
the  idea  underlying  the  exercise  is  of  the  most  serious 
kind,  and  has  no  element  of  sport  about  it,  except  the 
element  that  competition  gives.  A  war  game  may 
be  simply  a  game  of  sport — and  sometimes  it  is  so 
played;  but  the  intention  is  to  determine  some  doubt- 
ful point  of  strategy  or  tactics,  and  the  competitive 
element  is  simply  to  impart  reaHsm,  and  to  stimulate 
interest.  When  two  ofi&cers,  or  two  bodies  of  officers, 
find  themselves  on  different  sides  of  a  certain  ques- 
tion, they  sometimes  "put  it  on  the  game-board,"  to 
see  which  side  is  right. 

This  statement  applies  most  obviously  to  tactical 
games;  but  it  applies  to  strategic  games  as  well;  for 
both  are  inventions  designed  to  represent  in  miniature 
the  movements  of  two  opposing  forces.  The  main 
difference  between  strategic  and  tactical  games  is 
the  difference  in  size.     Naturally,  the  actual  means 


DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE  211 

employed  are  different,  but  only  so  different  as  the 
relative  areas  of  movement  necessitate.  In  the  stra- 
tegic games,  the  opposing  forces  are  far  apart,  and  do 
not  see  each  other;  in  the  tactical  games,  they  oper- 
ate within  each  other's  range  of  vision. 

War  games  when  played  for  the  purpose  of  de- 
termining the  value  of  types  of  craft  and  vessels  of  all 
kinds,  may  take  on  almost  an  infinite  variety  of  forms; 
for  the  combinations  of  craft  of  different  kinds  and 
sizes,  and  in  different  numbers,  considered  in  connec- 
tion with  the  various  possible  combinations  of  weather, 
climate,  and  possible  enemy  forces,  are  so  numerous 
as  to  defy  computation. 

In  practice,  however,  and  in  a  definite  problem, 
the  number  of  factors  can  be  kept  down  by  assuming 
average  conditions  of  weather,  using  the  fairly  well- 
known  enemy  force  that  would  appear  in  practice,  and 
pla}dng  games  in  which  the  only  important  variable 
is  the  kind  of  vessel  in  question.  For  instance,  in  the 
endeavor  to  ascertain  the  value  of  the  battle  cruiser, 
games  can  be  played  in  which  battle  cruisers  are  only 
on  one  side,  or  in  which  they  are  more  numerous,  or 
faster  or  more  powerful  on  one  side  than  on  the  other. 

Naturally,  the  games  cannot  be  as  valuable  prac- 
tically as  they  otherwise  would  be,  unless  they  con- 
sider the  amount  of  money  available.  For  instance,  if 
games  are  played  to  ascertain  the  most  effective  num- 
ber and  kinds  of  craft  for  which  to  ask  appropriations 
from  Congress  at  next  session,  the  solution,  unless  a 


212    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

money  limit  were  fixed,  would  be  impossible.  In  other 
words,  the  amount  of  money  to  be  expended  must  be 
one  of  the  known  or  assumed  factors  in  the  problem. 

As  this  amount  can  never  be  known,  it  must  be 
assumed;  and,  in  order  that  the  whole  value  of  the 
games  may  not  be  lost,  in  case  the  amount  assumed 
were  incorrect,  it  is  necessary  to  assume  a  number  of 
possible  sums,  the  upper  limit  being  above  the  prob- 
able amount  to  be  received,  and  the  lower  limit  below 
it,  and  then  work  out  the  answer  to  the  problem, 
under  each  assumption. 

Of  course,  this  procedure  would  be  laborious,  but 
most  procedures  are  that  bring  about  the  best  results. 
Suppose  that  such  a  procedure  were  followed  for,  say, 
a  year,  and  that  a  number  of  plans,  all  worked  out, 
were  presented  to  Congress  when  it  met:  plan  No.  i, 
for  instance,  consisting  of  such  and  such  craft  showing 
(according  to  the  results  of  the  games)  the  best  pro- 
gramme, if  $100,000,000  were  to  be  appropriated  for 
the  increase  of  the  navy;  plan  No.  2,  if  $90,000,000 
were  to  be  appropriated;  plan  No.  3,  if  $80,000,000 
were  to  be  appropriated,  and  so  on.  Each  plan  being 
concisely  and  clearly  stated,  and  accompanied  by 
drawings,  sketches,  and  descriptions,  Congress  could 
easily  and  quickly  decide  which  plan  it  would  adopt. 

This  scheme  would  have  the  obvious  advantage 
over  the  present  scheme  that  the  professional  ques- 
tions would  be  decided  by  professional  men,  while  the 
financial    question    would    be    decided   by   Congress, 


DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE  213 

which  alone  has  the  power  to  decide  it.  At  present, 
the  laymen  on  the  House  Naval  Committee  spend  la- 
borious days  interrogating  singly,  and  on  different 
days,  various  naval  officers,  who  naturally  do  not  al- 
ways agree.  Finally,  the  House  Naval  Committee  de- 
cides on  a  programme  and  recommends  it  to  the  House. 
The  House  discusses  it  most  seriously  (the  professional 
points  more  seriously  than  the  financial  point),  and 
decides  on  something.  Then  the  Senate  Committee, 
using  the  House  decision  as  a  basis,  recommends  some- 
thing to  the  Senate,  and  the  Senate  then  decides  on 
something  more  or  less  like  what  the  Senate  Commit- 
tee recommends.  Then  the  whole  question  is  decided 
by  a  Conference  Committee  of  three  senators  and 
three  members  of  the  House.  It  is  to  be  noted  that 
this  committee  decides  not  only  how  much  money 
the  country  shall  spend  on  the  navy,  but  also  what 
kinds  of  vessels  navy  officers  shall  use  to  fight  in  the 
country's  defense;  how  many  officers  there  shall  be, 
and  how  they  shall  be  divided  among  the  various 
grades ! 

Attention  is  requested  here  to  the  ease  with  which 
a  decision  can  be  made,  provided  one  does  not  take  into 
account  all  of  the  factors  of  a  problem,  or  if  he  is  not  thor- 
oughly acquainted  with  them;  and  attention  is  also  re- 
quested to  the  impossibility  of  making  a  wise  deci- 
sion (except  by  chance)  unless  one  understands  all  the 
factors,  takes  all  into  consideration,  and  then  com- 
bines tham  all,  assigning  to  each  its  proper  weight. 


214     IHE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

From  one  point  of  view,  every  problem  in  life  is  like  a 
problem  in  mathematics;  for  if  all  the  factors  are  added, 
subtracted,  multiplied,  and  divided  correctly  (that  is, 
if  they  are  combined  correctly),  and  if  correct  values 
are  assigned  to  them,  the  correct  answer  is  inevitable. 
In  most  of  the  problems  of  life,  however,  certainly  in 
the  problems  of  strategy,  we  do  not  know  aU  of  the 
factors,  and  cannot  assign  them  their  exactly  proper 
weights;  and  therefore  we  rarely  get  the  absolutely 
correct  answer.  The  best  that  any  man  can  do  is  to 
estimate  the  factors  as  accurately  as  he  can,  judge  as 
correctly  as  he  can  their  interaction  on  each  other, 
and  then  make  his  own  conclusion  or  decision. 

When  a  man  can  do  this  well  in  the  ordinary 
affairs  of  life,  he  is  said  to  be  "a  man  of  good  judg- 
ment"; when  he  can  do  it  well  in  a  certain  line  of 
work — say  investments  in  real  estate — he  is  said  to 
have  good  judgment  in  real  estate.  The  use  of  the 
word  "judgment"  here  is  excellent,  because  it  expresses 
the  act  of  a  judge,  who  listens  patiently  to  all  the  evi- 
dence in  a  case  and  then  gives  his  decision.  And  the 
act  of  the  judge,  and  the  act  of  any  man  in  coming 
carefully  to  any  decision,  consist  mainly  in  estimating 
the  relative  values  of  all  the  factors,  and  their  rela- 
tions to  each  other  ("sizing  them  up"  is  the  expres- 
sive slang),  and  then  perceiving  with  more  or  less  cor- 
rectness what  the  answer  is.  Some  men  do  not  have 
good  judgment;  some  men  highly  educated,  briUiant, 
and  well-meaning,  seem  never  to  get  quite  the  correct 


DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE  215 

answer  to  any  problem  in  life.  They  are  said  to  be 
unsuccessful  and  no  one  knows  why.  Perhaps  they 
lack  that  instinctive  sense  of  proportion  that  some 
men  have — a  sense  as  real  as  an  "ear  for  music";  or 
perhaps  they  lack  a  willingness  or  a  capability  to  think 
about  a  situation  with  sufficient  intentness  to  force  a 
clear  picture  of  the  situation  with  all  its  various  fea- 
tures upon  the  mental  retina. 

The  ability  to  make  a  mental  picture,  be  it  of  a 
machine,  of  any  group  of  material  objects,  such  as  the 
various  units  of  a  fleet  organized  as  such,  or  of  any 
other  situation,  varies  with  different  men;  but  Uke 
every  other  kind  of  abiHty,  it  can  be  strengthened  by 
practice,  and  assisted  by  appropriate  means.  In  the 
engineering  arts,  the  practice  is  gotten  by  observing 
and  remembering  actual  machines;  and  the  assistance 
is  given  by  drawings  of  different  kinds.  In  strat- 
egy, the  practice  is  given  by  observing  and  remember- 
ing the  movements  of  actual  fleets;  and  the  assis- 
tance by  means  of  drawings  of  different  kinds,  and  by 
war  problems,  and  the  game-board.  The  game-board 
represents  a  number  of  successive  pictures,  and  is  not 
very  different  in  principle  from  moving-pictures.  In 
fact,  the  suggestion  has  been  made  repeatedly  for  sev- 
eral years  and  is  now  in  process  of  development  that 
the  various  situations  in  tactical  games  might  advan- 
tageously be  photographed  on  films  and  afterward 
projected  in  rapid  succession  on  a  screen. 

One  of  the  curious  limitations  of  the  naval  game 


2i6    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

board,  both  in  tactical  and  strategic  games,  is  that  it 
takes  no  account  of  personnel;  that  it  assumes  that  all 
the  various  units  are  manned  by  crews  that  are  ade- 
quate both  in  numbers  and  in  training.  Of  course,  it 
would  be  impracticable  to  test  say  the  relative  values 
of  kinds  of  vessels,  unless  all  the  factors  of  the  prob- 
lem were  the  same,  except  the  two  factors  that  were 
competing.  Therefore  the  limitation  mentioned  is  not 
mentioned  as  a  criticism,  but  simply  to  point  out  that 
the  game-board,  in  common  with  most  of  the  other 
means  of  discussion  in  naval  matters,  has  gradually 
led  people  to  think  of  naval  matters  in  terms  of  ma- 
terial units  only.  That  such  an  unfortunate  state  of 
affairs  has  come  to  pass  can  be  verified  by  reading  al- 
most any  paper,  even  professional,  that  speaks  about 
navies;  for  one  will  be  confronted  at  once  with  the 
statement  that  such  and  such  a  navy  consists  of  such 
and  such  ships,  etc.  Since  when  has  a  navy  consisted 
of  brass  and  iron?  Since  when  has  the  mind  and 
character  of  man  taken  a  place  subordinate  to  matter  ? 
At  what  time  did  the  change  occur  whereby  the  instru- 
ment employed  dominated  the  human  being  who  em- 
ployed it?  That  this  is  not  an  academic  point,  or  an 
unimportant  thing  to  bear  in  mind  is  evidenced  by 
countless  facts  in  history.  In  order  not  to  tire  the 
reader,  mention  wiU  be  made  of  only  one  fact,  the  well- 
known  fight  between  the  American  frigate  Chesapeake^ 
and  the  British  frigate  Shannon  to  which  I  have  al- 
ready referred.     These  two  ships  were  almost  identical 


DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE  217 

in  size  and  in  the  number  and  kinds  of  guns,  and  in 
the  number  of  officers  and  crew,  and  the  battle  was 
fought  on  June  i,  181 3,  in  Massachusetts  Bay,  under 
circumstances  of  weather  and  other  conditions  that 
gave  no  advantage  to  either.  If  material  and  num- 
bers of  personnel  were  the  only  factors  in  the  fight, 
the  fight  would  have  continued  very  long  and  ended 
in  a  draw.  Did  these  things  occur?  No,  the  Ches- 
apeake was  captured  in  a  little  less  than  fifteen  min- 
utes after  the  first  gun  was  fired,  and  nearly  half  her 
crew  were  kiUed  or  wounded ! 

It  would  be  tiresome  to  recount  all  the  battles 
both  on  sea  and  land,  in  which  smaller  forces  defeated 
forces  numerically  greater;  but  it  may  not  be  possi- 
ble by  any  other  means  to  force  the  fact  on  the  atten- 
tion— even  sometimes  of  naval  officers — that  material 
vessels,  guns,  etc.,  are  merely  instruments,  and  that 
the  work  gotten  out  of  any  instrument  depends  not 
only  on  the  instrument  itself,  but  on  the  skiU  with 
which  it  is  employed.  Usually,  when  thinking  or 
speaking  of  the  power  of  any  instrument  (or  means  or 
method  or  organization)  we  mean  the  power  of  which 
it  is  capable;  that  is,  the  result  which  it  can  produce, 
if  used  with  100  per  cent  of  skill.  Possibly,  we  are 
subconsciously  aware  that  we  assume  perfect  skill; 
but  whether  we  are  or  not,  we  have  become  so  accus- 
tomed to  the  tacit  acceptance  of  the  phrase,  "other 
things  being  equal,"  that  we  have  come  to  forget  that 
other  things  may  not  be  equal  at  all;   and  that  they 


2i8    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

certainly  will  not  be  on  the  day  of  trial,  if  we  forget 
or  undervalue  those  other  things,  while  our  antagonist 
does  not. 

Let  us  always  remember,  then,  that  the  effective 
work  gotten  out  of  any  means  or  instrument  is  the 
product  of  the  maximum  capabiHty  of  the  means  or 
instrument  and  the  skill  with  which  it  is  used;  that, 
for  instance,  if  two  fleets  fight,  which  are  numerically 
equal  in  material  and  personnel,  but  in  which  the  skill 
of  the  personnel  of  the  A  fleet  is  twice  as  great  as  the 
skill  of  the  personnel  of  the  B  fleet,  the  A  fleet  will  be 
twice  as  powerful  as  the  B  fleet. 

It  may  be  objected  that  it  would  be  absurd  to 
assume  the  skill  of  the  personnel  in  one  fleet  as  twice 
as  great  as  that  of  the  personnel  in  the  other  fleet,  but 
it  can  easily  be  shown  that  even  so  great  a  dispropor- 
tion is  not  impossible,  provided  the  skill  in  one  fleet 
is  very  great.  The  value  of  superior  skiU  naturally 
becomes  important  where  the  difficulties  are  great. 
A  very  simple  iUustration  is  in  firing  a  gun;  for  even 
if  the  skiU  of  one  marksman  be  greater  than  that  of 
another,  it  will  be  unimportant,  if  the  target  is  so 
large  and  so  close  that  even  the  inferior  marksman 
can  hit  it  at  each  shot.  The  probabflity  of  hitting  a 
target — so  far  as  overs  and  shorts  are  concerned  (or 
deviations  to  the  left  and  right) — varies  with  the  frac- 
tion ^,  where  a  is  the  half  height  (or  width)  of  the 
target,  and  y  is  the  mean  error.  The  greater  the  size 
of  the  target,  and  the  less  the  mean  error,  the  greater 


DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE  219 

the  probability  of  hitting.  The  size  of  the  two  targets 
being  fixed,  therefore,  the  smaller  the  mean  error  the 
greater  the  probabiHty  of  hitting.  The  probability 
of  hitting,  however  (as  can  be  seen  by  the  formula), 
does  not  increase  greatly  with  the  decrease  of  error, 
except  in  cases  where  ^  is  small,  where  the  mean  error 
is  large  relatively  to  the  width  or  height  of  the  target. 
For  instance,  if  ^  is  .1  in  one  case,  and  .2  in  another 
case,  the  probability  is  practically  double  in  the  sec- 
ond case;  whereas,  if  Ms  i  in  one  case,  and  2  in  an- 
other, the  probability  increases  only  55  per  cent;  while 
if  it  is  2  in  one  case  and  4  in  the  other,  the  probabiHty 
of  hitting  increases  only  12  per  cent. 

This  means  that  if  two  antagonists  engage,  the 
more  skilful  should,  and  doubtless  will,  engage  imder 
difficult  conditions,  where  y  is  considerable  relatively 
to  a;  for  instance,  at  long  range.  Suppose  that  he 
engages  at  such  a  range  that  he  can  make  10  per  cent 
of  hits — that  is,  make  90  per  cent  of  misses;  and  that 
his  misses  relatively  to  the  enemy's  is  as  90  to  95 — so 
that  the  enemy  makes  95  per  cent  of  misses.  This 
does  not  seem  to  be  (in  fact  it  is  not)  an  extreme  case : 
and  yet  A  will  hit  B  twice  as  often  as  B  will  hit  A. 
In  other  words,  the  effective  skill  of  A  will  be  twice 
that  of  B, 

This  illustrates  the  effect  of  training — because  all 
that  training  in  handling  any  instrument  can  do  is  to 
attain  as  closely  as  possible  to  the  maximum  output 
of  the  instrument;    and  as  the  maximum  output  is 


220    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

attained  only  when  the  instrument  is  handled  exactly 
as  it  should  be  handled,  and  as  every  departure  is 
therefore  an  error  in  handling,  we  see  that  the  effect  of 
training  is  merely  to  diminish  errors. 

That  this  illustration,  drawn  from  gunnery,  is 
appHcable  in  general  terms  to  strategy  seems  clear,  for 
the  reason  that  in  every  strategical  situation,  no  mat- 
ter how  simple  or  how  complex,  there  is,  and  can  be 
only  one  best  thing  to  do;  so  that  the  statement  of 
any  strategic  situation,  if  followed  by  a  question  as 
to  what  is  the  best  thing  to  do,  becomes  a  problem, 
to  which  the  answer  is — the  best  thing  to  do.  Of  course, 
in  most  strategic  problems,  there  are  so  many  factors 
almost  unknown,  and  so  many  factors  only  imper- 
fectly known,  that  we  can  rarely  ascertain  mathemat- 
ically what  is  the  best  thing  to  do.  Nevertheless, 
there  must  be  a  best  thing  to  do,  even  if  we  never  as- 
certain exactly  what  it  is.  Now  in  arriving  at  the  de- 
cision as  to  the  best  thing  to  do,  one  estimates  the 
weight  of  each  factor  and  its  bearing  on  the  whole.  If 
one  estimates  each  factor  correctly,  that  is,  if  he  makes 
no  errors  in  any  estimate,  and  if  he  makes  no  error  in 
summing  up,  he  will  make  an  absolutely  correct  deci- 
sion; and  any  departure  from  correctness  in  decision 
can  result  from  no  other  cause  than  from  errors  in  his 
various  estimates  and  in  their  final  summation.  In 
other  words,  skill  in  strategy  is  to  be  attained  by  the 
same  process  as  is  skill  in  other  arts:  by  ehminating 
errors. 


DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE  221 

So,  when  we  take  the  decisions  of  the  game-board 
and  the  war  problem,  we  must  not  allow  ourselves  to 
forget  that  there  has  been  a  tacit  assumption  that 
the  numbers  and  the  skill  of  the  personnel  have  been 
equal  on  the  two  sides;  and  we  must  supplement  our 
decision  as  to  the  best  material  to  be  employed  by 
another  decision  as  to  how  we  shall  see  to  it  that 
the  assumption  of  equality  of  personnel  shall  be  real- 
ized in  fact — or  rather  that  it  shall  be  realized  in  fact 
that  our  personnel  shall  get  the  maximum  of  effective- 
ness out  of  the  material. 

In  designing  the  machine,  therefore,  we  are  con- 
fronted with  the  curious  fact  that,  in  general,  we  must 
design  the  various  material  parts  before  designing  the 
personnel  parts  that  are  to  operate  them. 

The  most  obvious  characteristic  of  the  personnel 
parts  is  that  the  number  of  personnel  parts  shall  be 
sufficient  to  operate  the  material  parts. 

To  ascertain  the  number  of  personnel  parts,  the 
only  means  is  actual  trial;  though  naturally,  if  we  have 
previously  ascertained  the  number  of  men  needed  to 
operate  any  kind  of  mechanism,  say  a  certain  kind 
and  size  of  gun,  we  can  estimate  quite  accurately  the 
number  needed  to  operate  a  similar  gun,  even  if  it  dif- 
fer somewhat  from  the  other  gun.  After  the  gun  is 
tried,  however,  we  may  have  to  change  our  original 
estimate,  not  only  because  the  estimate  may  have 
been  in  error,  but  because  the  requirement  of  operating 
the  gun  may  have  changed.    For  instance,  the  require- 


222    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

ments  of  fire-control  have  within  very  recent  years 
compelled  the  addition  of  a  considerable  number  of 
men  to  the  complements  of  battleships. 

Now  the  need  of  supplying  enough  men  to  oper- 
ate successfully  any  instrument  or  mechanism  is  abso- 
lute, for  the  reasons  that  the  number  of  things  to  be 
done  is  fixed,  and  that  an  insufficient  number  of  men 
in  the  ratio  for  instance  of  9  to  8  may  mean  a  falhng 
off  in  the  output  of  the  machine  much  greater  than  in 
the  ratio  of  9  to  8.  A  simple  illustration  may  be 
taken  from  the  baseball  game;  for  it  is  obvious  that 
the  output  of  a  baseball  team,  in  competition  with 
other  teams,  would  fall  off  in  a  much  greater  ratio  than 
of  9  to  8,  by  leaving  out  one  member  of  the  nine. 
Another  illustration,  or  rather  an  analogy,  may  be 
found  in  machinery  made  of  rigid  metal — say  a  steam- 
engine;  for  the  omission  of  almost  any  part  in  an 
engine  would  entirely  stop  its  operation. 

Not  only,  however,  must  we  see  that  the  number 
of  personnel  parts  is  sufficient,  we  must  see  that  they 
are  correctly  divided  among  the  various  material  parts; 
otherwise  there  will  be  too  many  in  one  place  and  too 
few  in  another;  and  while  it  is  better  to  have  too 
many  men  than  too  few,  too  many  men  prevent  the 
attainment  of  the  maximum  effect. 

The  effect  of  having  too  few  men,  however,  is  not 
merely  in  Hmiting  the  effectiveness  of  the  output  of 
the  machine;  for,  if  carried  to  a  considerable  degree, 
it  prevents  due  care  of  the  material  parts  themselves, 


DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE  223 

and  causes  those  material  parts  to  deteriorate.  This 
deterioration  may  take  the  form  of  actual  wasting 
away  as  by  rust;  but  even  if  the  deterioration  does 
not  advance  so  far  as  actual  wastage,  it  may  easily, 
and  often  does,  advance  to  the  stage  where,  although 
not  evidenced  by  visible  rust  or  by  any  other  indica- 
tion, so  long  as  the  mechanism  is  not  operated  at  its 
normal  rate,  it  declares  itself  very  clearly  as  soon  as 
the  mechanism  is  tried  in  service.  For  this  reason,  all 
mechanicians  reahze  that  it  is  better  for  every  mech- 
anism not  to  he  idle,  but  to  be  used  considerably, 
though,  of  course,  without  being  forced  unduly. 

Not  only  also  must  the  personnel  be  sufficient  in 
number  and  correctly  divided,  it  must  be  organized 
in  such  manner  that  the  personnel  itself  will  have 
the  characteristics  of  a  machine,  in  the  sense  that  each 
unit  will  be  so  placed  relatively  to  the  hope  of  reward 
and  the  fear  of  punishment,  that  he  will  do  his  allotted 
tasks  industriously;  that  he  will  have  the  place  in  the 
organization  for  which  his  character  and  abiHties  fit 
him,  and  that  he  will  be  given  such  duties  and  exer- 
cises as  will  fit  him  more  and  more  for  his  position,  and 
more  and  more  for  advancement  to  positions  higher. 

Not  only  this,  we  must  exercise  foresight  in  the 
endeavor  that  the  material  parts  and  the  personnel 
parts  shall  be  ready  at  the  same  time,  so  that  neither 
will  have  to  wait  for  the  other;  and  to  insure  the  im- 
mediate availability  when  war  breaks  out,  of  sufficient 
trained  personnel  to  man  and  fight  effectively  all  the 


224    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

material  units  that  we  shall  need  to  use.  This  raises 
the  question:  "What  units  shall  we  need?"  The 
government  itself  must,  of  course,  decide  this  matter; 
but  it  may  be  pointed  out  that  if  in  any  considerable 
war  every  unit  we  possess  should  not  be  utilized,  the 
navy  could  not  do  as  effective  work  as  it  otherwise 
could  do.  In  the  present  war,  the  belligerents  have 
not  only  utilized  all  the  units  that  they  had,  they  have 
built  very  many  more,  using  the  utmost  possible  dili- 
gence and  despatch.  In  case  we  should  be  drawn  into 
war  with  any  considerable  naval  nation,  all  history 
and  all  reasoning  show  that  we  must  do  the  same. 
Few  considerable  wars  have  been  waged  except  with 
the  greatest  energy  on  each  side;  for  each  side  knows 
that  the  scale  may  be  turned  by  a  trifling  preponder- 
ance on  one  side;  and  that  if  the  scale  once  be  turned, 
it  will  be  practically  impossible  ever  to  restore  the  bal- 
ance. Every  advantage  gained  makes  one  side  rela- 
tively weaker  to  the  other  than  it  was  before,  and  in- 
creases the  chance  that  the  same  side  will  gain  another 
advantage;  gains  and  losses  are  cumulative  in  their 
effect.  For  this  reason,  it  is  essential,  if  we  are  to  wage 
war  successfully,  that  we  start  right,  and  send  each 
unit  immediately  out  to  service,  manned  with  a  highly 
trained  and  skilful  personnel;  because  that  is  what  our 
foe  will  do. 

The  Germans  meet  the  difficulty  of  keeping  their 
personnel  abreast  of  their  material  very  wisely.  They 
utilize  the  winter  months,  when  naval  operations  are 


DESIGNING  THE  MACfflNE  225 

almost  impossible,  for  reorganizing  and  rearranging 
their  personnel;  so  that  when  spring  comes,  they  are 
ready  in  all  their  ships  to  start  the  spring  drilling  on  a 
systematic  plan.  The  crews  being  already  organized, 
and  the  scheme  of  drills  well  miderstood,  the  work  of 
getting  the  recruits  versed  in  their  relatively  simple 
tasks  and  the  more  experienced  men  skilled  in  their 
new  positions  is  quickly  accompHshed,  and  the  fleet 
is  soon  ready  for  the  spring  maneuvers. 

The  fundamental  requirement  of  any  organiza- 
tion of  men  is  that  it  shall  approach  as  closely  as  pos- 
sible the  characteristics  of  an  organism,  in  which  all 
the  parts,  though  independent,  are  mutually  depen- 
dent, each  part  doing  its  appropriate  work  without  in- 
terfering with  any  other,  but  on  the  contrary  assisting 
it.  The  most  complex  organization  in  the  world  is 
that  of  a  navy,  due  primarily  to  the  great  variety  of 
mechanisms  in  it,  and  secondarily  to  the  great  variety 
of  trained  bodies  of  men  for  handhng  those  mechanisms. 
This  variety  extends  from  the  highest  posts  to  the  low- 
est; and  to  make  such  varied  organizations  work  to- 
gether to  a  common  end  is  one  of  the  greatest  achieve- 
ments of  civilized  man.  How  it  is  accompHshed  is  not 
clear  at  first  view.  It  is  not  hard  to  see  how  a  company 
of  soldiers,  drawn  up  in  line,  can  be  made  to  move  as 
one  body  by  order  of  the  captain.  But  how  in  a  bat- 
tleship carrying  a  thousand  men  does  the  coal-passer 
in  the  fire-room  do  as  the  captain  on  the  bridge  desires  ? 
It  may  be  objected  that  he  does  not — that  the  captain 


226    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

has  no  wishes  regarding  the  doings  of  any  coal-passer — 
that  all  the  captain  is  concerned  with  is  the  doings  of 
the  ship  as  a  whole.  True,  in  a  way;  and  yet  if  the 
various  coal-passers,  firemen,  quartermasters,  et  al., 
do  not  do  as  the  captain  wishes,  the  ship  as  a  whole 
will  not.  The  secret  of  the  success  achieved  seems  to 
lie  in  the  knitting  together  of  all  the  personnel  parts 
by  invisible  wires  of  conmion  understanding,  analo- 
gous to  the  visible  wires  that  connect  the  helmsman 
with  the  steering-engine.  In  the  case  of  any  small 
body  of  men,  say  the  force  in  one  fire-room,  the  con- 
necting wire  joining  each  man  to  the  petty  officer  in 
charge  of  that  fire-room  is  almost  visible,  because  the 
petty  officer  is  familiar,  by  experience,  with  the  work 
of  each  man;  for  he  has  done  that  work  himself,  knows 
just  how  it  should  be  done,  and  knows  how  to  in- 
struct each  man.  But  the  more  complicated  the  or- 
ganization is,  the  more  invisible  are  the  communicating 
wires  that  tie  the  men  together,  and  yet  the  more  im- 
portant it  is  that  those  wires  shall  tie  them;  it  is  even 
more  important,  for  instance,  that  the  wires  connect- 
ing the  chief  engineer  with  all  his  force  shall  operate 
than  that  the  wires  in  any  one  fire-room  shall  operate. 
And  yet  not  only  are  there  more  wires,  but  the  wires 
themselves  that  connect  the  chief  engineer  to  aU  the 
men  below  him,  are  longer  and  more  subject  to  de- 
rangement, than  the  wires  that  connect  the  petty  offi- 
cer of  one  fire-room  to  the  individuals  under  him. 

The  chief  engineer,  of  course,  is  not  tied  directly 


DESIGNING  THE  MACHINE  227 

to  his  coal-passers,  but  to  men  close  to  himself;  close 
not  only  in  actual  distance,  but  in  experience,  knowl- 
edge, and  sympathy;  men  who  speak  the  same  lan- 
guages as  he  does,  who  understand  what  he  means 
when  he  speaks,  and  who  speak  to  him  in  ways  he 
understands.  These  men  immediately  under  him  are 
similarly  tied  to  their  immediate  subordinates  by 
wires  of  knowledge,  experience,  and  sympathy — these 
to  their  immediate  subordinates,  and  so  on. 

The  same  statement  applies  to  the  captain  in  his 
relations  with  the  chief  engineer.  The  captain  may 
not  be  an  experienced  engineer  himself;  but  he  is  fa- 
mihar  enough  with  engineering,  with  its  difficulties, 
its  possibiHties,  and  its  aims,  to  converse  with  the 
chief  engineer  in  language  which  both  clearly  under- 
stand. 

The  same  principles  seem  to  apply  throughout 
the  whole  range  of  the  personnel:  so  that,  no  matter 
how  large  the  organization  of  any  navy  may  be,  there 
is — there  must  be,  if  good  work  is  to  be  done — a  net- 
work of  invisible  wires,  uniting  all  together,  by  a 
strong  yet  flexible  bond  of  sympathy. 

And  has  the  material  of  the  navy  no  connection 
with  this  bond?  Who  knows!  Brass  and  steel  are 
said  to  be  Hfeless  matter.  But  does  any  naval  man 
beheve  this  wholly?  Does  any  man  feel  that  those 
battleships,  and  cruisers,  and  destroyers,  and  sub- 
marines are  lifeless  which  he  himself — with  his  own 
eyes — ^has  seen  darting  swiftly,  precisely,  powerfully 


228    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

on  perfect  lines  and  curves,  changing  their  relative 
positions  through  complicated  maneuvers  without  ac- 
cident or  mistake?  Can  we  really  believe  that  they 
take  no  part  and  feel  no  pride  in  those  magnificent 
pageants  on  the  ocean?  From  the  earliest  times,  men 
have  personified  ships,  calling  a  ship  "he"  or  "she," 
and  giving  ships  the  names  of  people,  and  of  states; 
and  is  not  a  ship  with  its  crew  a  living  thing,  as  much 
as  the  body  of  a  man?  The  body  of  a  man  is  in  part 
composed  of  bones  and  muscles,  and  other  parts,  as 
truly  things  of  matter  as  are  the  hull  and  engines  of  a 
ship.  It  is  only  the  spirit  of  life  that  makes  a  man 
alive,  and  permits  the  members  of  his  body,  like  the 
members  of  a  ship,  to  perform  their  appointed  tasks. 

But  even  if  this  notion  seems  fanciful  and  absurd, 
we  must  admit  that  as  surely  as  the  mind  and  brain 
and  nerves  and  the  material  elements  of  a  man  must 
be  designed  and  made  to  work  in  harmony  together, 
so  surely  must  all  the  parts  of  any  ship,  and  all  the 
parts  of  any  navy,  parts  of  material  and  parts  of  person- 
nel, be  designed  and  made  to  work  in  harmony  together; 
obedient  to  the  controlling  mind,  and  sympatheti- 
cally indoctrinated  with  the  wish  and  the  will  to  do  as 
that  mind  desires. 


CHAPTER  IX 
PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET 

JOHN  CLERK,  of  Eldin,  Scotland,  never  went  to 
sea,  and  yet  he  devised  a  scheme  of  naval  tactics, 
by  following  which  the  British  Admiral  Rodney  gained 
his  victory  over  the  French  fleet  between  Dominica 
and  Guadeloupe  in  April,  1782.  Clerk  devised  his 
system  by  the  simple  plan  of  thinking  intently  about 
naval  actions  in  the  large,  disregarding  such  details  as 
guns,  rigging,  masts,  and  weather,  and  concentrating 
on  the  movements  of  the  fleets  themselves,  and  the  do- 
ings of  the  units  of  which  those  fleets  were  made.  He 
assisted  his  mental  processes  by  little  models  of  ships, 
which  he  carried  in  his  pockets,  and  which  he  could, 
and  did,  arrange  on  any  convenient  table,  when  he 
desired  to  study  a  problem,  or  to  make  a  convert. 

He  was  enabled  by  this  simple  and  inexpensive 
device  to  see  the  special  problems  of  fleet  tactics  more 
clearly  than  he  could  have  done  by  observing  battles 
on  board  of  any  ships;  for  his  attention  in  the  ships 
would  have  been  distracted  by  the  exciting  events 
occurring,  by  the  noise  and  danger,  and  by  the  impos- 
sibility of  seeing  the  whole  because  of  the  nearness  of 
some  of  the  parts.     The  amazing  result  was  that  he 

formed  a  clearer  concept  of  naval  tactics  than  any 

229 


230    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

admiral  of  his  time,  finally  overcame  the  natural  prej- 
udice of  the  British  navy,  and  actually  induced  Rod- 
ney to  stake  on  the  suggestion  of  a  non-military  civil- 
ian his  own  reputation  and  the  issue  of  a  great  sea 
fight.  Furthermore,  the  issue  was  crowned  with  suc- 
cess. 

Nothing  could  be  simpler  than  Clerk's  method. 
It  was,  of  course,  applied  to  tactics,  but  similar  methods 
are  now  applied  to  strategy;  for  strategy  and  tactics, 
as  already  pointed  out,  are  based  on  similar  principles, 
and  differ  mainly  in  the  fact  that  strategy  is  larger, 
covers  more  space,  occupies  more  time,  and  involves  a 
greater  number  of  quantities. 

Most  of  the  books  on  naval  strategy  go  into  the 
subject  historically,  and  analyze  naval  campaigns,  and 
also  describe  those  measures  of  foresight  whereby 
nations,  notably  Great  Britain,  have  estabhshed  bases 
all  over  the  world  and  built  up  great  naval  establish- 
ments. These  books  lay  bare  the  reasons  for  the  large 
successes  that  good  naval  strategy  has  attained,  both 
in  peace  and  war,  and  constitute  nearly  all  there  is  of 
the  science  of  naval  strategy. 

These  books  and  this  method  of  treating  naval 
strategy  are  valuable  beyond  measure;  but  officers 
find  considerable  difficulty  sometimes  in  applying  the 
principles  set  forth  to  present  problems,  because  of 
the  paucity  of  data,  the  remoteness  in  time  and  dis- 
tance of  many  of  the  episodes  described,  and  the  con- 
sequent difficulty  of  making  due  allowance  for  them. 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      231 

Now,  no  study  of  naval  strategy  can  be  thoroughly 
satisfactory  to  a  naval  officer  unless  it  assists  him  prac- 
tically to  decide  what  should  be  done  in  order  to  make 
the  naval  forces  of  his  country,  including  himself,  bet- 
ter in  whatever  will  conduce  to  victory  in  the  next  war. 
Therefore,  at  the  various  war  colleges,  although  the 
student  is  given  books  on  strategy  to  study,  the  major 
part  of  the  training  is  given  by  the  applicatory  method, 
an  extension  of  Clerk's,  in  which  the  student  applies 
his  own  skiU  to  solving  war  problems,  makes  his  own 
estimate  of  the  situation,  solves  each  problem  in  his 
own  way  (his  solution  being  afterward  criticised  by 
the  staff),  and  then  takes  part  in  the  games  in  which 
the  solutions  presented  are  tried  out.  This  procedure 
recognizes  the  fact  that  in  any  human  art  and  science 
— say  medicine,  music,  or  navigation — it  is  the  art 
and  not  the  science  by  which  one  gets  results;  that  the 
science  is  merely  the  foundation  on  which  the  art  re- 
poses, and  that  it  is  by  practice  of  the  art  and  not  by 
knowledge  of  the  science  that  skill  is  gained. 

This  does  not  mean,  of  course,  that  we  do  not 
need  as  much  knowledge  of  the  science  of  naval  strat- 
egy as  we  can  get;  for  the  reason  that  the  naval  pro- 
fession is  a  growing  profession,  which  necessitates  that 
we  keep  the  application  of  the  principles  of  its  strategy 
abreast  of  the  improvements  of  the  times,  especially 
in  mechanisms;  which  necessitates,  in  turn,  that  we 
know  what  those  principles  are. 

The    applicatory    method    bears    somewhat    the 


232    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

same  relation  to  the  method  of  studying  books  and 
hearing  lectures  that  exercises  in  practical  navigation 
bear  to  the  study  of  the  theory.  There  is  one  differ- 
ence, however,  as  applied  to  strategy  and  navigation, 
which  is  that  the  science  of  navigation  is  clearly  stated 
in  precise  rules  and  formulae,  and  the  problems  in 
practical  navigation  are  solved  by  assigning  values 
to  quantities  like  a,  b,  c,  d,  etc.,  in  the  formulae,  and 
workmg  out  the  results  by  mathematics;  whereas  in 
strategy,  no  exact  science  exists,  there  are  no  formulae, 
and  even  the  number  of  assured  facts  and  principles  is 
small.  For  this  reason  the  art  of  strategy  is  more  ex- 
tensive and  significant  relatively  to  its  science  than  is 
the  art  of  navigation  to  its  science. 

It  is  a  defect  of  the  historical  system  that  it  tends 
to  make  men  do  as  people  in  the  past  have  done — to 
make  them  work  by  rule.  Clerk's  method  took  no  note 
of  what  had  been  done  before,  but  confined  itself  to 
working  out  what  should  be  done  at  the  moment 
(that  is,  by  what  we  now  call  the  "applicatory 
method"),  taking  account  of  conditions  as  they  are. 
By  combining  the  two  methods,  as  all  war  colleges  do 
now,  officers  get  the  good  results  of  both. 

In  the  studies  and  exercises  at  the  war  colleges, 
note  is  taken  of  the  great  events  that  have  gone  by, 
and  of  the  great  problems  now  presented;  by  study- 
ing the  historical  events,  and  by  solving  war  problems 
of  the  present,  a  certain  knowledge  of  the  science  of 
naval  strategy,  and  a  certain  skill  in  the  art  are  gained. 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      233 

The  studies  and  the  problems  naturally  are  of  war 
situations. 

Yet  every  war  situation  was  the  result  of  mea- 
sures taken  in  time  of  peace.  If  these  measures  had 
been  unwise  on  the  part  of  one  side — say  Blue — in  the 
design  of  certain  craft,  or  the  adoption,  or  failure  of 
adoption,  of  certain  plans,  then  Blue's  strategic  situa- 
tion in  the  war  would  be  more  unfavorable  than  it 
would  have  been  if  the  measures  had  been  wise. 

This  proves  that  it  is  not  only  in  war  that  strat- 
egy should  be  consulted;  that  strategy  should  be  made 
to  perform  important  services  in  peace  as  well;  that 
strategic  considerations  should  be  the  guide  to  all 
measures  great  and  small,  that  not  only  the  major 
operations  in  war,  but  also  the  minor  preparations  in 
peace,  should  be  conducted  in  accordance  with  the 
principles  of  strategy,  and  conform  to  its  requirements. 
By  this  means,  and  by  this  means  only,  does  a  system 
of  preparation  seem  possible  in  which  all  shall  prepare 
with  the  same  end  in  view,  and  in  which,  therefore, 
the  best  results  will  be  secured  in  the  least  time  and 
with  the  least  labor. 

The  naval  machine  having  been  designed,  the 
various  parts  having  been  furnished  by  the  adminis- 
trative agencies  directing  personnel  and  material,  and 
the  consumable  stores  having  been  provided  by  the 
agencies  of  supply  (all  tmder  the  guidance  and  con- 
trol of  strategy,  and  in  accordance  with  the  calcula- 


234    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

tions  of  logistics),  the  next  step  is  the  same  as  that 
with  any  other  machine — to  prepare  the  machine  to 
do  its  work. 

The  work  that  strategy  has  to  do  in  accomphsh- 
ing  the  preparation  is  only  in  planning;  but  this  plan- 
ning is  not  limited  to  general  plarming,  for  it  extends 
to  planning  every  procedure  of  training  and  adminis- 
tration, no  matter  how  great  or  how  small.  It  plans 
the  mobilization  of  the  navy  as  a  whole,  the  exercises 
of  the  fleet,  the  training  of  officers  and  men  to  insure 
that  the  plans  for  mobilization  and  fleet  exercises  shall 
be  efficiently  carried  out,  the  exercises  of  the  various 
craft,  and  of  the  various  mechanisms  of  aU  kinds  in 
those  craft,  and  even  the  drills  of  the  officers  and  men, 
that  insure  that  the  various  craft  and  mechanisms 
shall  be  handled  well.  This  does  not  mean  that  strat- 
egy concerns  itself  directly  with  the  training  of  mess 
cooks  and  coal-passers;  and  it  may  be  admitted  that 
such  training  is  only  under  strategy's  general  guidance. 
It  may  be  admitted,  also,  that  a  considerable  part 
of  the  training  of  men  in  using  mechanisms  is  caused 
by  the  requirements  of  the  mechanism  itself;  that 
practically  the  same  training  is  needed  for  a  water- 
tender  in  the  merchant  service  as  for  a  water-tender 
in  the  navy.  Nevertheless,  we  must  either  declare 
that  the  training  of  mechanicians  in  the  navy  has  no 
relation  to  the  demands  of  preparation  of  the  navy  for 
war,  or  else  admit  that  the  training  comes  under  the 
broad  dominion  of  strategy.    To  admit  this  does  not 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      235 

mean  at  all  that  the  training  of  a  naval  radio  electrician 
is  not  directed  in  its  details  almost  wholly  by  elec- 
trical engineering  requirements;  it  merely  means  that 
the  training  must  be  such  as  to  fulfil  the  requirements 
of  strateg}^,  for  otherwise  it  would  have  no  value.  No 
matter  how  well  trained  a  man  might  be  in  radio  work, 
his  work  would  be  useless  for  naval  purposes,  if  not 
made  useful  by  being  adapted  to  naval  requirements. 
The  fact  that  strategy  controls  the  training  of  radio 
electricians  through  the  medium  of  electrical  means  is 
only  one  illustration  of  another  important  fact,  which 
is  that  in  all  its  operations  strategy  directs  the  meth- 
ods by  which  results  are  to  be  attained,  and  utilizes 
whatever  means,  even  technical  means,  are  the  most 
effective  and  appropriate. 

The  naval  machine  having  been  designed  as  to 
both  personnel  and  material,  strategy  has  nothing  to 
do  with  the  material  in  preparing  the  machine  for 
use,  because  the  material  parts  are  already  prepared, 
and  it  is  the  work  of  engineering  to  keep  those  ma- 
terial parts  in  a  state  of  continual  preparedness. 

It  must  be  noted,  however,  that  the  naval  machine 
differs  from  most  material  machines  in  that  its  various 
parts,  material  as  well  as  personnel,  are  continually 
being  replaced  by  newer  parts,  and  added  to  by  parts 
of  novel  kinds.  Strategy  must  be  consulted,  of  course, 
in  designing  the  characteristics  of  the  newer  and  the 
novel  parts;  but  this  work  properly  belongs  in  the 
designing  stage,  and  not  in  the  preparation  stage. 


236    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

Strategy's  work,  therefore,  in  preparing  the  naval 
machine  for  work  consists  wholly  in  preparing  the  per- 
sonnel. This  preparing  may  be  divided  into  two  parts 
— ^preparing  the  existing  fleet  already  mobilized  and 
preparing  the  rest  of  the  navy. 

Preparing  the  Fleet. — ^The  fleet  itself  is  always 
ready.  This  does  not  mean  that,  in  time  of  profound 
peace,  every  ship  in  the  fleet  has  aU  its  men  on  board, 
its  chain  hove  short,  and  its  engines  ready  to  turn  over 
at  a  moment's  notice;  but  it  does  mean  that  this  con- 
dition is  always  approximated  in  whatever  degree  the 
necessities  of  the  moment  exact.  Normally,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  keep  all  the  men  on  board;  but  whenever, 
or  if  ever,  it  becomes  so  necessary,  the  men  can  be 
kept  on  board  and  everything  made  ready  for  instant 
use.  It  is  perfectly  correct,  therefore,  to  say  that,  so 
far  as  it  may  be  necessary,  a  fleet  in  active  commis- 
sion is  always  ready. 

Training. — Before  this  state  of  readiness  can  be 
attained,  however,  a  great  deal  of  training  has  to  be 
carried  out;  and  this  training  must  naturaUy  be  de- 
signed and  prosecuted  solely  to  attain  this  end.  Un- 
less this  end  be  held  constantly  in  view,  and  unless  the 
methods  of  training  be  adapted  to  attain  it,  the  train- 
ing cannot  possibly  be  effective.  To  go  from  any 
point  to  another  point,  one  must  proceed  in  the  cor- 
rect direction.  If  he  proceeds  in  another  direction,  he 
will  miss  the  point. 

The  training  of  the  fleet  naturally  must  be  in 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      237 

doing  the  things  which  the  fleet  would  have  to  do  in 
war.  To  decide  what  things  these  will  probably  be,  re- 
sort must  be  had  to  the  teachings  of  history,  especially 
the  most  recent  history,  and  to  the  teachings  of  the  war 
problem,  the  chart  maneuver,  and  the  game-board. 

The  part  of  the  personnel  which  it  is  the  most 
important  to  train  is,  of  course,  the  commander-in- 
chief  himself;  and  no  reason  is  apparent  for  suppos- 
ing that  his  training  should  be  conducted  on  princi- 
ples different  from  those  that  control  the  training  of 
every  other  person  in  the  fleet.  Men  being  the  same 
in  general,  their  qualities  differing  only  in  degree,  it 
is  logical  to  conclude  that,  if  a  gun-pointer  or  coxswain 
is  best  trained  by  being  made  first  to  imderstand  the 
principles  that  underHe  the  correct  performance  of  his 
work,  and  then  by  being  given  a  good  deal  of  practice 
in  performing  it,  a  commander-in-chief,  or  a  captain, 
engineer,  or  gunner,  can  be  best  trained  under  a  sim- 
ilar plan.  Knowledge  and  practice  have  always  been 
the  most  effective  means  of  acquiring  skill,  and  prob- 
ably will  continue  to  be  the  best  for  some  time  to  come. 

Owing  to  the  fact  that  navies  have  been  in  exis- 
tence for  many  years,  the  general  qualifications  of  effi- 
cient naval  officers  are  fairly  well  known;  and  they 
have  always  been  the  same  in  the  most  important  par- 
ticulars, though  the  recent  coming  of  scientific  appara- 
tus has  made  available  and  valuable  certain  types  of 
men  not  especially  valuable  before  this  scientffic  ap- 
paratus appeared. 


238    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

In  all  navies,  and  equally  in  all  armies,  the  quali- 
fication that  has  been  the  most  important  has  been 
character.  To  insure,  or  rather  to  do  the  utmost 
toward  insuring,  proper  character  in  its  officers,  all 
countries  for  many  years  have  educated  certain  young 
men  of  the  country  to  be  officers  in  the  army  and  navy, 
and  they  have  educated  young  men  for  no  other  ser- 
vice. If  knowledge  were  the  prime  requirement,  special 
training  for  young  men  would  not  be  needed;  the 
various  educational  institutions  could  supply  young 
men  highly  educated;  and  if  the  government  were  to 
take  each  year  a  certain  number  of  graduates  who  could 
pass  certain  examinations,  the  educational  institu- 
tions would  be  glad  to  educate  young  men  to  pass 
them.  In  securing  young  men  of  proper  education 
and  physique,  little  difficulty  would  be  found.  Special 
schools  could  even  give  sufficient  instruction  in  mih- 
tary  and  maritime  subjects  to  enable  young  men  to 
become  useful  in  minor  positions  on  shipboard  and  in 
camp,  after  a  brief  experience  there.  In  fact,  for  some 
of  the  positions  in  the  army  and  navy,  such  as  those 
in  the  medical  corps  and  others,  military  or  naval 
training  is  not  needed,  or  exacted. 

The  truth  of  these  remarks  is  not  so  obvious  now 
as  it  was  some  years  ago,  and  it  has  never  been  so 
obvious  in  navies  as  in  armies;  because  education  in 
the  use  of  the  numerous  special  appliances  used  in 
ships  could  be  given  less  readily  by  private  instruc- 
tion than  in  the  use  of  the  simpler  appHances  used  in 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      239 

armies.  But  even  now,  and  even  in  the  navy,  the 
course  given  at  Annapolis  is  usually  termed  a  "train- 
ing" rather  than  an  education. 

Yet  even  education,  educators  tell  us,  is  more  a 
matter  of  training  than  a  matter  of  imparting  knowl- 
edge. This  indicates  that  even  for  the  duties  of  civil 
life,  the  paramount  aim  of  educators  is  so  to  train  the 
characters  of  young  men  as  to  fit  them  for  good  citizen- 
ship. 

We  may  assume,  therefore,  that  the  primary  aim 
of  governments  in  preparing  young  men  for  the  army 
and  navy  is  to  develop  character  along  the  line  needed 
for  useful  work  in  those  services. 

What  is  that  line  ? 

Probably  nine  officers  in  ten  would  answer  this 
question  with  the  words,  "the  line  of  duty."  This 
does  not  mean  that  officers  are  the  only  people  who 
should  be  trained  to  follow  the  line  of  duty;  but  it 
does  mean  that,  in  military  and  naval  schools,  the 
training  is  more  devoted  to  this  than  in  other  schools, 
except,  of  course,  those  schools  that  train  young  men 
for  the  priesthood  or  other  departments  of  the  re- 
ligious life.  The  analogy  between  the  clerical  and  the 
military  professions  in  this  regard  has  been  pointed 
out  many  times;  but  perhaps  the  closeness  with  which 
the  medical  profession  approximates  both  in  its  adher- 
ence to  the  line  of  duty  has  not  been  appreciated  as 
fully  as  it  should  be. 

Duty. — The  reason  for  the  predominance  of  the 


240    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

idea  of  duty  over  any  other  in  naval  training  is  due,  of 
course,  to  a  realization  of  the  fact  that  more  can  be 
accomplished  by  officers  having  a  strict  sense  of  duty 
though  otherwise  lacking,  than  by  ofiEicers  having  any 
or  all  the  other  qualifications,  but  lacking  the  sense  of 
duty.  As  an  extreme  instance  of  the  doubtful  value 
of  highly  trained  officers  who  lack  the  sense  of  duty, 
we  need  but  to  point  to  those  traitors  who,  in  the  past, 
have  turned  their  powers  in  the  hour  of  need  against 
the  cause  they  were  engaged  to  fight  for. 

One  cannot  pursue  the  path  of  duty  when  that 
path  becomes  difficult  or  disagreeable  unless  the  sense 
of  duty  is  so  strong  as  to  resist  the  temptation  to  leave 
the  path.  To  train  a  man  to  be  strong  in  this  way,  we 
train  his  character. 

There  are  several  ways  in  which  a  man  is  tempted 
to  leave  the  line  of  duty;  of  these  perhaps  the  most 
important  are  danger,  sloth,  and  love  of  pleasure.  No 
human  being  is  perfectly  strong  along  any  of  these 
lines;  and  some  are  most  tempted  by  danger,  some  by 
sloth,  and  some  by  love  of  pleasure. 

Sloth  and  the  love  of  pleasure  do  not  act  as  hin- 
derances  to  efficiency  in  the  naval  profession  any  more 
than  they  do  in  other  callings.  There  is  no  profession, 
business,  or  vocation,  in  which  a  man's  efficiency  does 
not  depend  largely  on  his  power  of  resistance  to  the 
allurement  of  sloth  and  pleasure.  In  all  walks  of  life, 
including  the  usual  routine  of  the  naval  life,  these  two 
factors  are  the  main  stumbling-blocks  to  the  success 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      241 

of  any  man.  That  is,  they  are  the  main  stumbling- 
blocks  that  training  can  remove  or  lessen;  the  main 
stumbling-blocks  in  the  way  of  his  attaining  that  de- 
gree of  efficiency  for  which  his  mental  and  physical 
abilities  themselves  would  fit  him.  Natural  abilities 
are  not  here  considered;  we  are  considering  merely 
what  training  can  do  to  develop  men  as  they  are  for 
the  naval  life. 

Courage. — Danger  is  the  special  influence  to  divert 
a  man  from  duty's  fine  that  is  distinctive  of  the  army 
and  the  navy;  and  therefore  to  secure  abiUty  to  over- 
come this  influence  is  the  distinct  effort  of  military 
training.  To  train  a  young  man  for  the  army,  the  train- 
ing naturaUy  is  directed  toward  minimizing  the  influ- 
ence of  one  class  of  dangers;  while  to  train  a  young 
man  for  the  navy,  the  training  must  be  directed 
toward  minimizing  the  influence  of  another  class.  Of 
course  training  toward  courage  in  any  fine  develops 
courage  in  other  lines;  but  nevertheless  a  naval  train- 
ing does  not  enable  a  man  to  ride  a  plunging  cavalry 
horse  with  equanimity;  nor  does  training  as  a  cavalry- 
man wholly  fit  a  man  to  brave  the  dangers  of  the  deep 
in  a  submarine. 

Thirty  years  ago,  the  present  writer  showed  Com- 
mander Royal  Bird  Bradford,  U.  S.  N.,  the  wonders 
of  the  U.  S.  S.  Atlanta,  the  first  ship  of  what  Americans 
then  called  "The  New  Navy."  When  I  showed  Brad- 
ford the  conning-tower,  I  remarked  that  many  cap- 
tains who  had  visited  the  Atlanta  had  said  that  they 


242    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

would  not  go  into  the  conning-tower  in  battle.  To 
this  Bradford  replied:  "The  captain  who  would  not 
go  into  the  conning-tower  in  battle  would  be  very 
brave,  but  he'd  be  a  d d  fool." 

The  obvious  truth  of  this  remark,  the  intimate 
connection  which  it  suggested  between  courage  and 
folly,  and  the  fact  often  noted  in  Hfe  that  to  be  brave 
is  often  to  be  foolish,  contrasted  with  the  fact  that  in  all 
history  the  virtue  of  courage  in  men  has  been  more 
lauded  than  any  other  virtue,  suggests  that  a  brief 
inquiry  into  the  nature  and  influence  of  courage  may 
be  interesting. 

The  definitions  of  courage  found  in  the  dictionary 
are  most  unsatisfactory,  except  that  they  say  that  the 
word  "courage"  comes  from  the  Latin  "cor,"  the  heart; 
showing  that  it  is  deemed  a  moral  quality,  rather  than 
physical  or  mental. 

Yet  the  deeds  of  courage  that  history  and  fiction 
tell,  have  been  deeds  of  what  we  call  "physical  cour- 
age," in  which  heroes  and  heroines  have  braved  death 
and  physical  suffering.  Far  in  the  background  are 
deeds  of  "moral  courage,"  though  many  wise  men 
have  told  us  that  "moral  courage"  is  a  quality  higher 
than  "physical  courage,"  and  more  important. 

It  is  a  Httle  difficult  to  make  a  clear  picture  of 
courage  that  is  physical,  as  distinguished  from  cour- 
age that  is  moral;  or  moral  as  distinguished  from  phys- 
ical. Courage  seems  to  be  a  quality  so  clearly  marked 
as  to  be  hardly  qualifiable  by  any  adjective  except  an 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      243 

adjective  indicating  degree — such  as  "great"  or 
''little";  but  if  any  other  adjective  may  be  applied 
to  it,  the  adjective  '^ moral"  seems  to  be  the  only  one. 
For  courage,  no  matter  how  or  why  displayed,  is  from 
its  very  essence,  moral.  Strictly  speaking,  how  can 
there  be  any  courage  except  moral  courage  ?  If  a  man 
braves  death  or  physical  suffering,  the  quality  that 
enables  him  to  brave  it  is  certainly  not  physical;  cer- 
tainly it  does  not  pertain  to  the  physical  body.  The 
"first  law  of  nature"  impels  him  to  escape  or  yield; 
and  it  impels  him  with  a  powerful  force.  If  this  force 
be  not  successfully  resisted,  the  man  will  yield. 

Now  the  act  of  resisting  a  temptation  to  escape  a 
physical  danger  is  due  to  a  more  or  less  conscious  de- 
sire to  preserve  one's  self-respect  and  the  respect  of 
one's  fellow  men;  and  therefore,  the  best  way  in  which 
to  train  a  man  to  be  brave  is  to  cultivate  his  self- 
respect  and  a  desire  to  have  the  respect  of  his  fellow 
men;  and  to  foster  the  idea  that  he  will  lose  both  if 
he  acts  in  a  cowardly  way. 

Naturally,  some  men  are  more  apt  to  be  cowards 
as  regards  physical  dangers  than  are  others;  and  men 
differ  greatly  in  this  way.  Men  of  rugged  physique, 
dull  imagination,  and  sluggish  nerves  are  not  so  prone 
to  fear  of  physical  danger,  especially  danger  far  ahead 
in  the  future,  as  are  men  of  deUcate  physique,  keen 
imagination,  and  highly  strung  nervous  system;  and 
yet  men  of  the  latter  class  sometimes  surpass  men  of 
the  former  class  when  the  danger  actually  arrives — 


244    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

they  seem  to  have  prepared  themselves  for  it,  when 
men  of  the  former  class  seem  in  a  measure  to  be  taken 
by  surprise. 

It  is  the  attainment  of  physical  courage,  or  cour- 
age to  defy  a  threat  of  physical  injury,  that  military 
training  aims  at.  That  it  has  done  so  successfully  in 
the  past,  the  history  of  the  valiant  deeds  of  sailors  and 
soldiers  bears  superabundant  witness.  This  courage 
has  been  brought  out  because  it  was  essential. 
Courage  is  to  a  man  what  strength  is  to  structural 
materials.  No  matter  how  physically  strong  and 
mentally  equipped  a  man  may  be;  no  matter  how 
perfectly  designed  and  constructed  an  engine  may  be, 
neither  the  man  nor  the  engine  will  "stand  up  to  the 
work,"  unless  the  courage  in  the  one  case,  and  the 
strength  of  the  materials  in  the  other  case,  are  ad- 
equate to  the  stress. 

While  perfect  courage  would  enable  a  man  to 
approach  certain  death  with  equanimity,  all  that  is 
usually  demanded  of  a  man  is  that  he  shall  dare  to 
risk  death,  if  need  be.  To  do  this  successfully,  a  great 
assistance  is  a  knowledge  that  even  if  things  look  bad, 
the  danger  is  not  so  great  as  it  appears.  Therefore, 
training  confronts  men  frequently  with  situations  that 
look  dangerous,  but  which  skill  and  coolness  can  avert. 
In  this  way,  the  pupil  becomes  familiar  with  the  face 
of  danger,  and  learns  that  it  is  not  so  terrible  as  it 
seems.  Nothing  else  makes  a  man  so  brave  regarding 
a  certain  danger  as  to  have  met  that  danger  success- 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      245 

fully  before.  This  statement  must  be  qualified  with  the 
remark  that  in  some  cases  a  danger,  although  passed 
successfully,  has  been  known  to  do  a  harm  to  the 
nervous  system  from  which  it  never  has  recovered. 
This  is  especially  the  case  if  it  was  accompanied  with 
a  great  and  sudden  noise  and  the  evidence  of  great 
injury  to  others.  In  cases  like  this,  the  shock  prob- 
ably comes  too  abruptly  to  enable  the  man  to  prepare 
himself  to  receive  it.  The  efficacy  of  a  little  prepara- 
tion, even  preparation  lasting  but  a  few  seconds,  is 
worthy  of  remark.  Two  theories  connecting  fear  and 
trembling  may  be  noted  here:  one  that  a  person 
trembles  because  he  fears;  the  other,  and  later,  that 
trembling  is  automatic,  and  that  a  person  fears  because 
he  trembles. 

But  the  influence  of  fear  is  not  only  to  tempt  a 
man  to  turn  his  back  on  duty  and  seek  safety  in  flight, 
for  it  affects  him  in  many  degrees  short  of  this.  Some- 
times, in  fact  usually,  it  prevents  the  accurate  opera- 
tion of  the  mind  in  greater  or  less  degree.  Here  again 
training  comes  to  the  rescue,  by  so  habituating  a  man 
to  do  his  work  in  a  certain  way  (loading  a  gun  for  in- 
stance) that  he  will  do  it  automatically,  and  yet  cor- 
rectly, when  his  mind  is  almost  paralyzed  for  a  time. 
A  very  few  men  are  so  constituted  that  danger  is  a 
stimulus  to  not  only  their  physical  but  their  mental 
functions;  so  that  they  never  think  quite  so  quickly 
and  so  clearly  as  when  in  great  danger.  Such  men 
are  born  commanders. 


246    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

Discussion  of  such  an  abstract  thing  as  courage 
may  seem  out  of  place  in  a  discussion  of  "Naval 
Strategy";  but  while  it  is  true  that  naval  strategy  is 
largely  concerned  with  mental  operations,  while  cour- 
age is  a  moral  or  spiritual  quality,  yet  strategy  con- 
cerns itself  with  the  securing  of  all  means  to  victory, 
and  of  these  means  courage  is  more  important  than  any 
other  one  thing.  One  plan  or  one  system  of  training 
may  be  better  than  another;  but  they  differ  only  in 
degree,  and  if  one  plan  fails  another  may  be  substi- 
tuted; but  if  courage  be  found  lacking,  there  is  no  sub- 
stitute on  earth.  Now,  if  courage  is  to  be  inculcated  by 
some  system  of  training,  surely  it  is  not  amiss  to  de- 
vote a  few  minutes  to  an  analysis  of  the  nature  of 
courage,  to  seek  what  light  we  can  get  as  to  the  best 
methods  of  training  to  employ. 

Responsibility. — There  is  one  form  of  courage  which 
most  men  are  never  called  upon  to  use,  and  that  is 
willingness  to  take  responsibility.  Most  men  are  never 
confronted  with  a  situation  requiring  them  to  take  it. 
To  naval  men,  however,  the  necessity  comes  often, 
even  to  naval  men  in  the  lower  grades;  for  they  are 
often  confronted  with  situations  in  which  they  can 
accept  or  evade  responsibility.  That  courage  is 
needed,  no  one  can  doubt  who  has  had  experience. 
To  accept  responsibility,  however,  is  not  always  best 
either  for  the  individual  or  for  the  cause;  often  it  were 
better  to  lay  the  responsibility  on  higher  authority, 
by  asking  for  instructions.  But  the  same  remark  is 
true  of  all  uses  of  courage;  it  is  not  always  best  to  be 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      247 

brave,  either  for  the  individual  or  for  the  cause.  Both 
the  individual  and  the  cause  can  often  be  better  served 
by  Prudence  than  by  her  big  brother  Courage.  When, 
however,  the  conditions  require  courage  in  any  form, 
such  as  willingness  to  accept  responsibility,  the  man  in 
charge  of  the  situation  at  the  moment  must  use  cour- 
age, or — fail.  In  such  cases  the  decision  rests  with 
the  man  himself.  He  cannot  shift  it  to  another's 
shoulders,  even  if  he  would.  Even  if  he  decides  and 
acts  on  the  advice  of  others,  the  responsibility  re- 
mains with  him. 

Fro7n  the  Top  Down,  or  from  the  Bottom  Up  ? — 
There  are  two  directions  in  which  to  approach  the 
subject  of  training  the  personnel — from  the  top  down, 
and  from  the  bottom  up.  The  latter  is  the  easier  way; 
is  it  the  better  ? 

The  latter  is  the  easier  way,  because  it  is  quicker 
and  requires  less  knowledge.  In  training  a  turret  crew 
in  this  way,  for  instance,  one  does  not  have  to  con- 
sider much  outside  of  the  turret  itself.  The  ammuni- 
tion can  be  sent  up  and  down,  and  the  guns  can  be 
loaded,  pointed,  and  fired  with  just  as  much  quickness 
and  accuracy  as  is  humanly  practicable,  without  much 
reference  to  the  ship  itself,  the  fleet,  or  the  navy.  In 
fact,  knowledge  of  outside  requirements  hinders  in 
some  ways  rather  than  advances  training  of  this  kind. 
Knowledge,  for  instance,  of  the  requirements  of  actual 
battle  is  a  distinct  brake  on  many  of  the  activities  of 
mere  target  practice. 

But  while  it  is  easier  to  train  in  this  way  all  the 


248    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

various  bodies  of  men  that  must  be  trained,  it  is  obvious 
that  by  training  them  wholly  without  reference  to  the 
requirements  of  the  fleet  as  a  whole,  the  best  result 
that  we  could  expect  would  be  a  number  of  bodies  of 
men,  each  body  well  trained  as  a  unit,  but  the  com- 
bined units  not  trained  at  all  as  component  elements 
of  the  whole.  The  result  would  be  a  Uttle  like  what 
one  would  expect  from  the  efforts  of  an  orchestra  at 
playing  a  selection  which  the  whole  orchestra  had 
never  played  before  together,  but  of  which  each  mem- 
ber of  the  orchestra  had  previously  learned  his  part, 
and  played  it  according  to  his  own  ideas,  without  con- 
sulting the  orchestra  leader. 

By  approaching  the  subject  from  the  other  direc- 
tion, however,  that  is,  from  the  top,  the  training  of 
each  organization  within  the  fleet  is  arranged  with 
reference  to  the  work  of  the  fleet  as  a  whole,  the  vari- 
ous features  of  the  drills  of  each  organization  being 
indicated  by  the  conditions  developed  by  that  work. 
If  this  plan  be  carried  out,  a  longer  time  will  be  re- 
quired to  drill  the  various  bodies  of  men;  but  when  it 
has  been  accomplished,  those  bodies  wiU  be  drilled, 
not  only  as  separate  bodies,  but  as  sympathetic  ele- 
ments of  the  whole. 

Of  course  the  desirability  of  drilling  separate 
divisions  of  a  fleet,  and  separate  ships,  turret  crews, 
fire-control  parties,  and  what-not,  in  accordance  with 
the  requirements  of  fleet  work  does  not  prevent  them 
from  drilling  by  themselves  as  often  as  they  wish — any 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      249 

more  than  the  necessity  of  drilling  in  the  orchestra 
prevents  a  trombone  player  from  practising  on  his  in- 
strument as  much  as  the  police  will  let  him. 

Thus  the  fact  of  keeping  a  fleet  together  does 
more  than  merely  give  opportunity  for  acquiring  skill 
in  handling  the  fleet  itself,  and  in  handling  the  various 
ships  so  that  they  will  work  together  as  parts  of  the 
fleet  machine;  because  it  shows  each  of  the  various 
smaller  units  within  the  ships  themselves  how  to  direct 
its  training. 

For  this  reason,  the  idea  so  often  suggested  of 
keeping  the  fleet  normally  broken  up  into  smaller 
parts,  those  parts  close  enough  together  to  unite  be- 
fore an  enemy  could  strike,  is  most  objectionable.  It 
is  impossible  to  keep  the  fleet  together  all  the  time, 
because  of  needed  repairs,  needed  relaxation,  and  the 
necessity  for  individual  drills  that  enable  a  captain  or 
division  commander  to  strengthen  his  weak  points; 
but  nevertheless  since  the  "mission"  of  training  is  to 
attain  fighting  efficiency  in  the  fleet  as  a  whole,  rather 
than  to  attain  fighting  efficiency  in  the  various  parts; 
and  since  it  can  be  attained  only  by  drilling  the  fleet  as 
a  whole,  the  decision  to  keep  the  fleet  united  as  much 
as  practicable  seems  inevitably  to  follow.  Besides,  the 
statement  cannot  be  successfully  controverted  that 
difficult  things  are  usually  not  so  well  done  as  easy 
things,  that  drills  of  large  organizations  are  more  diffi- 
cult than  drills  of  small  organizations,  and  that  in 
every  fleet  the  drills  that  are  done  the  worst  are 


250    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

the  drills  of  the  fleet  as  a  whole.  How  could  any- 
thing else  be  expected,  when  one  considers  how  much 
more  often,  for  instance,  a  turret  crew  is  exercised  at 
loading  than  the  fleet  is  exercised  at  the  difficult  move- 
ment of  changing  the  "line  of  bearing"? 

The  older  officers  remember  that  for  many  years 
we  carried  on  drills  at  what  we  called  "fleet  tactics," 
though  we  knew  they  were  only  tactical  drills.  They 
were  excellent  in  the  same  sense  as  that  in  which  the 
drill  of  the  manual  of  arms  was  excellent,  or  the  squad 
exercises  given  to  recruits.  They  were  necessary;  but 
beyond  the  elementary  purpose  of  training  in  ship 
handling  in  fleet  movements,  they  had  no  "end  in 
view";  they  were  planned  with  a  limited  horizon, 
they  were  planned  from  the  bottom. 

General  Staff. — In  order  to  direct  the  drills  of  a 
fleet  toward  some  worthy  end,  that  end  itself  must  be 
clearly  seen;  and  in  order  that  it  may  be  clearly  seen, 
it  first  must  be  discovered.  The  end  does  not  exist  as 
a  bright  mark  in  the  sky,  but  as  the  answer  to  a  diffi- 
cult problem;  it  cannot  be  found  by  guessing  or  by 
speculating  or  by  groping  in  the  dark.  Strategy  says 
that  the  best  way  in  which  to  find  it  is  by  the  "esti- 
mate of  the  situation"  method. 

Owing  to  the  fact  that  the  commander-in-chief  and 
all  his  personnel  are,  by  the  nature  of  the  conditions 
surrounding  them,  on  executive  duty,  the  working  out 
of  the  end  in  view  of  any  extensive  drills  seems  the 
task  of  the  Navy  Department;   while  the  task  of  at- 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      251 

taining  it  seems  to  belong  to  the  commander-in-chief. 
Owing  to  the  present  stage  of  electrical  progress,  the 
Navy  Department  has  better  means  of  ascertaining 
the  whole  naval  situation  than  has  the  commander- 
in-chief,  and  if  officers  (General  Staff)  be  stationed  at 
the  department  to  receive  and  digest  all  the  information 
received,  and  decide  on  the  best  procedure  in  each  con- 
tingency as  it  arises,  the  Navy  Department  can  then 
give  the  commander-in-chief  the  information  he  re- 
quires and  general  instructions  how  to  proceed. 

This  does  not  mean  that  the  department  would 
"interfere"  with  the  commander-in-chief,  but  sim- 
ply that  it  would  assist  him.  The  area  of  discretion 
of  the  commander-in-chief  should  not  be  invaded;  for 
if  it  be  invaded,  not  only  may  orders  be  given  without 
knowledge  of  certain  facts  in  the  commander-in-chief's 
possession,  but  the  commander-in-chief  will  have  his 
difficulties  increased  by  the  very  people  who  are  try- 
ing to  help  him.  He  may  be  forced  into  disobeying 
orders,  a  most  disturbing  thing  to  have  to  do;  and  he 
wiU  surely  be  placed  in  a  position  of  continuous  doubt 
as  to  what  is  expected  of  him. 

Of  course,  it  must  be  realized  that  the  difficulties 
of  co-operating  with  a  commander-in-chief  at  sea,  by 
means  of  even  the  most  expert  General  Staff,  are  of 
the  highest  order.  It  is  hard  to  imagine  any  task  more 
difficult.  It  must  be  accomplished,  however,  or  else 
there  will  be  danger  all  the  time  that  the  commander- 
in-chief  will  act  as  he  would  not  act  if  he  had  all  the  in- 


252    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

formation  that  the  department  had.  This  suggests  at 
once  that  the  proper  office  of  the  department  is  merely 
to  give  the  commander-in-chief  information  and  let 
him  act  on  his  own  judgment.  True  in  a  measure;  but 
the  commander-in-chief  must  be  given  some  instruc- 
tions, even  if  they  be  general,  for  the  reason  that  the 
commander-in-chief  is  merely  an  instrument  for  enforc- 
ing a  certain  poHcy.  Clearly,  he  must  know  what  the 
poHcy  is,  what  the  department  desires;  and  the  mere 
statement  of  the  department's  desires  is  of  itself  an 
order.  If  it  is  admitted  that  the  commander-in-chief 
is  to  carry  out  the  orders  of  the  department,  it  remains 
merely  to  decide  in  how  great  detail  those  orders  ought 
to  be. 

No  general  answer  can  be  given  to  the  question: 
"In  what  detail  shall  the  orders  be?"  The  general 
statement  can  be  made,  however,  that  the  instructions 
should  be  confined  as  closely  as  practicable  to  a  state- 
ment of  the  department's  desires,  and  that  this  state- 
ment should  be  as  clear  as  possible.  If,  for  instance, 
the  only  desire  of  the  department  is  that  the  enemy's 
fleet  shall  be  defeated,  no  amplification  of  this  state- 
ment is  required.  But  if  the  department  should  desire, 
for  reasons  best  known  to  itself,  that  the  enemy  should 
be  defeated  by  the  use  of  a  certain  method,  then  that 
should  be  stated  also.  Maybe  it  would  not  be  wise  for 
the  department  to  state  the  method  the  employment 
of  which  is  desired;  maybe  the  commander-in-chief 
would  be  the  best  judge  of  the  method  to  be  employed. 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      253 

But  maybe  circumstances  of  governmental  policy  dic- 
tate the  employment  of  a  certain  method,  even  if 
mihtarily  it  is  not  the  best;  and  maybe  also  the  de- 
partment might  prefer  that  method  by  reason  of  in- 
formation recently  received,  which  it  does  not  have 
time  to  communicate  in  full. 

Now,  if  it  is  desirable  for  the  department  to  give 
the  commander-in-chief  instructions,  running  the  risk 
of  invading  his  "area  of  discretion,"  and  of  doing  other 
disadvantageous  things,  it  is  obvious  that  the  depart- 
ment should  be  thoroughly  equipped  for  doing  it  suc- 
cessfully. This  means  that  the  department  should  be 
provided  not  only  with  the  most  efficient  radio  appara- 
tus that  can  be  secured,  manned,  of  course,  by  the  most 
skilful  operators,  but  also  with  a  body  of  officers  capable 
of  handling  that  particular  part  of  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment's work  which  is  the  concentrated  essence  of  all 
its  work,  the  actual  handling  of  the  naval  forces.  The 
usual  name  given  to  such  a  body  of  officers  is  "  Gen- 
eral Staff." 

Such  bodies  of  officers  have  been  developed  in 
navies  in  recent  years,  by  a  desire  to  take  advantage 
of  electrical  appliances  which  greatly  increase  the  ac- 
curacy and  rapidity  of  communication  over  long  dis- 
tances. In  days  not  long  ago,  before  communication 
by  radio  was  developed,  commanders  on  the  spot  were 
in  possession  of  much  more  information  about  events 
in  their  vicinity,  compared  with  the  Navy  Department, 
than  they  are  now;  and  the  difficulties  and  uncertain- 


254    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

ties  of  communication  made  it  necessary  to  leave  much 
more  to  their  discretion  and  initiative.  The  President 
of  the  United  States  can  now  by  telephone  talk  to  the 
commander-in-chief,  when  he  is  in  home  waters,  and 
every  day  sees  some  improvement  in  this  line.  This 
facility  of  communication  carries  with  it,  of  course,  the 
danger  of  "interfering,"  one  of  the  most  frequent 
causes  of  trouble  in  the  past,  in  conducting  the  opera- 
tions of  both  armies  and  fleets — a  danger  very  real, 
very  insidious,  and  very  important.  The  very  ease 
with  which  interference  can  be  made,  the  trained  in- 
stinct of  the  subordinate  to  follow  the  wishes  of  his 
superior  if  he  can,  the  temptation  to  the  superior  to 
wield  personally  some  military  power  and  get  some 
mihtary  glory,  conspire  to  bring  about  interference. 
This  is  only  an  illustration,  however,  of  the  well-known 
fact  that  every  power  can  be  used  for  evil  as  well  as 
for  good,  and  is  not  a  valid  argument  against  develop- 
ing to  the  utmost  the  communication  between  the 
department  and  the  fleet.  It  is,  however,  a  very  valid 
argument  against  developing  it  unless  there  be  devel- 
oped simultaneously  some  means  like  a  "safety  de- 
vice" for  preventing  or  at  least  discouraging  its  mis- 
use. 

The  means  devised  is  the  General  Staff;  and  in 
some  countries  like  Germany  it  seems  to  work  so 
well  that  (unless  our  information  is  incorrect)  the  Em- 
peror himself  does  not  interfere.  He  gives  the  machine 
a  certain  problem  to  work  out,  and  he  accepts  the  an- 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      255 

swer  as  the  answer  which  has  a  greater  probabiHty  of 
being  correct  than  any  answer  he  could  get  by  other 
means. 

Training  of  the  Staff. — Now,  if  there  is  to  be  at  the 
Navy  Department  a  body  of  men  who  will  work  out 
and  recommend  what  instructions  should  be  given  to 
the  commander-in-chief,  it  seems  obvious  that  that 
body  of  men  should  be  thoroughly  trained.  In  the 
German  army  the  training  of  men  to  do  this  work 
(General  Staff  work)  is  given  only  to  officers  specially 
selected.  Certain  young  officers  who  promise  well  are 
sent  to  the  war  college.  Those  who  show  aptitude 
and  industry  are  then  put  tentatively  into  the  Gen- 
eral Staff.  Those  who  show  marked  fitness  in  their 
tentative  employment  are  then  put  into  the  Gen- 
eral Staff,  which  is  as  truly  a  special  corps  as  is  our 
construction  corps.  How  closely  this  system  is  fol- 
lowed with  the  General  Staff  in  the  German  navy,  the 
present  writer  does  not  know  exactly;  but  his  infor- 
mation is  that  the  system  in  the  navy  is  copied  (though 
with  certain  modffications)  after  the  system  in  the 
army. 

How  can  the  General  Staff  at  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment be  trained?  In  the  same  way  as  that  in  which 
officers  at  the  war  college  are  trained:  by  study  and 
by  solving  war  problems  by  tactical  and  strategical 
games.  The  training  would  naturally  be  more  ex- 
tended, as  it  would  be  a  postgraduate  course. 

There  is  a  difference  to  be  noted  between  games 


256    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

like  war  games  in  which  the  mental  powers  are  trained, 
and  games  like  billiards,  in  which  the  nerves  and  mus- 
cles receive  practically  all  the  training;  and  the  dif- 
ference refers  mainly  to  the  memory.  Games  of  cards 
are  a  little  like  war  games;  and  many  books  on  games 
of  cards  have  been  written,  expoimding  the  principles 
on  which  they  rest  and  giving  rules  to  follow.  These 
books  may  be  said  to  embody  a  science  of  card-playing. 

No  such  book  on  naval  strategy  has  appeared; 
and  the  obvious  reason  is  that  only  a  few  rules  of  naval 
strategy  have  been  formulated.  Staff  training,  there- 
fore, cannot  be  given  wholly  by  studying  books;  but 
possibly  the  scheme  suggested  to  the  department  by 
the  writer,  when  he  was  Aid  for  Operations,  may  be 
developed  into  a  sort  of  illustrative  literature,  which 
can  assist  the  memory. 

By  this  scheme,  a  body  of  officers  at  the  Navy 
Department  would  occupy  their  time  wholly  in  study- 
ing war  problems  by  devising  and  playing  strategical 
and  tactical  games  ashore  and  afloat.  After  each 
problem  had  been  solved  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
staff,  each  distinctive  situation  in  the  approved  solu- 
tion would  be  photographed  in  as  small  a  space  as  prac- 
ticable, preferably  on  a  moving-picture  film.  In  the 
solution  of  problem  99, 'for  instance,  there  might  be 
50  situations  and  therefore  50  photographs.  These 
photographs,  shown  in  appropriate  succession,  would 
furnish  information  analogous  to  the  information  im- 
parted to  a  chess  student  by  the  statement  of  the  sue- 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      257 

cessive  moves  in  those  games  of  chess  that  one  sees 
sometimes  in  books  on  chess  and  in  newspapers.  Now 
if  the  film  photographs  were  so  arranged  that  the  moves 
in  the  approved  solution  of,  say,  problem  99  could  be 
thrown  on  a  screen,  as  slowly  and  as  quickly  as  desired, 
and  if  the  film  records  of  a  few  hundred  such  games 
could  be  conveniently  arranged,  a  very  wide  range  of 
situations  that  would  probably  come  up  in  war  would 
be  portrayed;  and  the  moves  made  in  handling  those 
situations  would  form  valuable  precedents  for  action, 
whenever  situations  approximating  them  should  come 
up  in  war. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  actual  life,  our 
only  real  guide  to  wise  action  in  any  contingency  that 
may  arise  is  a  memory,  more  or  less  consciously  real- 
ized, of  how  a  similar  contingency  has  been  met,  suc- 
cessfully or  unsuccessfully,  in  the  past.  Perhaps  most 
of  us  do  not  realize  that  it  is  not  so  much  experience 
that  guides  us  as  our  memory  of  experiences.  There- 
fore in  the  training  of  both  officers  and  enlisted  men 
in  strategy,  tactics,  seamanship,  gunnery,  engineering, 
and  the  rest,  the  memory  of  how  they,  or  some  one 
else,  did  this  well  and  that  badly  (even  if  the  memory 
be  hardly  conscious)  is  the  immediate  agency  for  bring- 
ing about  improvement. 

Imagine  now  a  strategical  system  of  training  for 
the  navy,  in  which  a  body  of  highly  trained  officers  at 
the  department  will  continuously  regulate  the  exer- 
cises of  the  fleet,  guided  by  the  revelations  of  the 


258    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

Kricgspiel:  the  commander-in-chief  will  direct  the 
activities  of  the  main  divisions  of  the  fleet,  carrying 
out  the  department's  scheme;  the  commander  of  each 
division  will  regulate  the  activities  of  the  units  of  his 
command  in  accordance  with  the  fleet  scheme;  the  of- 
ficer in  command  of  each  unit  of  each  division  will  reg- 
ulate the  activities  of  each  unit  in  his  ship,  destroyer, 
submarine,  or  other  craft  in  accordance  with  the  divi- 
sion scheme;  and  every  suborganization,  in  every  ship, 
destroyer,  or  other  craft  will  regulate  likewise  the 
activities  of  its  members;  so  that  the  navy  will  re- 
semble a  vast  and  efficient  organism,  all  the  parts 
leagued  together  by  a  common  understanding  and  a 
common  purpose;  mutually  dependent,  mutually  as- 
sisting, sympathetically  obedient  to  the  controlling 
mmd  that  directs  them  toward  the  "end  in  view." 

It  must  be  obvious,  however,  that  in  order  that 
the  navy  shall  be  like  an  organism,  its  brain  (the  Gen- 
eral Staff)  must  not  be  a  thing  apart,  but  must  be  of  it, 
and  bound  to  every  part  by  ties  of  sympathy  and 
understanding.  It  would  be  possible  to  have  a  staff 
excellent  in  many  ways,  and  yet  so  out  of  touch  with  the 
fleet  and  its  practical  requirements  that  co-ordination 
between  the  two  would  not  exist.  Analogous  condi- 
tions are  sometimes  seen  in  people  suffering  from  a 
certain  class  of  nervous  ailments;  the  mind  seems  un- 
impaired, but  co-ordination  between  the  brain  and 
certain  muscles  is  almost  wholly  lacking. 

To  prevent  such  a  condition,  therefore,  the  staff 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      259 

must  be  kept  in  touch  with  the  fleet;  and  it  must  also 
permit  the  fleet  to  keep  in  touch  with  the  staff,  by 
arranging  that,  accompanying  the  system  of  training, 
there  shaU  be  a  system  of  education  which  wiU  insure 
that  the  general  plan  will  be  understood  throughout 
the  fleet;  and  that  the  means  undertaken  to  execute 
it  wiU  be  made  sufficiently  clear  to  enable  each  person 
to  receive  the  assistance  of  his  own  inteUigence.  No 
man  can  do  his  best  work  in  the  dark.  Darkness  is  of 
itself  depressing;  while  hght,  if  not  too  intense,  stimu- 
lates the  activities  of  every  living  thing. 

This  does  not  mean  that  every  mess  attendant  in 
the  fleet  should  be  put  into  possession  of  the  war  plans 
of  the  commander-in-chief,  that  he  should  be  given 
any  more  information  than  he  can  assimilate  and  di- 
gest, or  than  he  needs,  to  do  his  work  the  best.  Just 
how  much  information  to  impart,  and  just  how  much 
to  withhold  are  quantitative  questions,  which  can  be 
decided  wisely  by  only  those  persons  who  know  what 
their  quantitative  values  are.  This  is  an  important 
matter,  and  should  be  dealt  with  as  such  by  the  staff 
itself.  To  get  the  maximum  work  out  of  every  man  is 
the  aim  of  training;  to  get  the  maximum  work  that 
shall  be  effective  in  attaining  the  end  in  view,  training 
must  be  directed  by  strategy,  because  strategy  alone 
has  a  clear  knowledge  of  what  is  the  end  in  view. 

Stimuli. — Some  men  are  so  slothful  that  exertion 
of  any  kind  is  abhorrent  to  them;  but  these  men  are 
few,  and  are  very  few  indeed  among  a  lot  of  healthy 


26o    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

and  normal  men  such  as  fill  a  navy.  An  ofiice  boy,  lazy 
beyond  belief  in  the  work  he  is  engaged  to  do,  will  go 
through  the  most  violent  exertions  at  a  baseball  game; 
and  a  darky  who  prefers  a  soft  resting-place  in  the 
shade  of  an  umbrageous  tree  to  laboring  in  the  fields 
will  be  stirred  to  wild  enthusiasm  by  a  game  of  "craps." 

Now  why  are  the  office  boy  and  the  darky  stimu- 
lated by  these  games?  By  the  elements  of  competi- 
tion, chance,  and  possible  danger  they  bring  out  and 
the  excitement  thereby  engendered.  Training,  there- 
fore introduces  these  elements  into  drills  as  much  as  it 
can.  Competition  alone  does  not  sufiice,  otherwise 
all  men  would  play  chess;  competition  and  chance  com- 
bined are  not  enough,  or  gentlemen  would  not  need 
the  danger  of  losing  money  to  make  card  games  inter- 
esting; but  any  game  that  brings  in  all  three  elements 
will  rouse  the  utmost  interest  and  activity  of  which  a 
man  is  capable.  Games  involving  these  three  elements 
are  known  by  many  names;  one  name  is  "poker,"  an- 
other name  is  "business,"  and  another  name  is  "poli- 
tics." There  are  many  other  games  besides,  but  the 
greatest  of  all  is  strategy. 

Now  in  the  endeavor  to  prepare  a  fleet  by  train- 
ing, no  lack  of  means  for  exciting  interest  will  be 
found;  in  fact  no  other  training  offers  so  many  and  so 
great  a  variety  of  means  for  introducing  the  elements 
of  competition,  chance,  and  danger.  The  problem  is 
how  best  to  employ  them. 

To  do  this  successfully,  it  must  be  realized,  of 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      261 

course,  that  the  greatest  single  factor  in  exciting  inter- 
est is  the  personal  factor,  since  comparatively  few  men 
can  get  much  interested  in  a  matter  that  is  impersonal; 
a  boy  is  more  interested  in  watching  a  baseball  game 
in  which  he  knows  some  of  the  players  than  in  watching 
a  game  between  teams  neither  of  which  he  has  ever 
seen;  and  the  men  in  any  ship  are  more  interested  in 
the  competition  between  their  ship  and  some  other 
than  between  any  other  two;  feeling  that  esprit  de 
corps  by  reason  of  which  every  individual  in  every  or- 
ganization personifies  the  organization  as  a  hving  thing 
of  which  he  himself  is  part. 

Strategic  Problems. — The  training  of  the  fleet,  then, 
can  best  be  done  under  the  direction  of  a  trained  staff, 
that  staff  generously  employing  all  the  resources  of 
competition,  chance,  and  danger.  The  obvious  way  to 
do  this  is  to  give  out  to  the  fleet  for  solution  a  con- 
tinual succession  of  strategic  problems,  which  the  en- 
tire fleet  will  be  engaged  in  solving,  and  which  will  be 
the  starting-point  for  all  the  drills  of  the  fleet  and  in 
the  fleet.  (Some  officers  prefer  the  word  "maneuver" 
to  "problem.") 

The  arranging  of  a  continual  series  of  war  prob- 
lems, or  maneuvers  to  be  worked  out  in  the  fleet  by 
"games,"  will  caU  for  an  amount  of  strategical  skill 
second  only  to  the  skill  needed  for  operations  in  war, 
wiU  deal  with  similar  factors  and  be  founded  on  similar 
principles. 

Naturally,  the  war  problems,  before  being  sent  to 


262    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

the  fleet  for  solving,  would  be  solved  first  by  the  staff, 
using  strategical  and  tactical  games,  and  other  appro- 
priate means;  and  inasmuch  as  the  scheme  of  educa- 
tion and  training  is  for  the  benefit  of  the  staff  itself, 
as  well  as  for  the  benefit  of  the  fleet,  certain  members 
of  the  staff  would  go  out  with  the  fleet  to  note  in  what 
ways  each  problem  sent  down  was  defective,  in  what 
ways  good — and  in  what  ways  it  could  be  modified 
with  benefit.  The  successive  situations  and  solutions, 
made  first  by  the  staff  and  subsequently  by  the  fleet, 
can  then  be  photographed  and  made  part  of  the  his- 
tory of  war  problems,  for  the  hbrary  of  the  staff. 

In  laying  out  the  war  problems,  the  staff  wiU  be 
guided  naturaUy  by  the  ends  in  view — first  to  work 
out  solutions  of  strategic,  logistic,  and  tactical  situa- 
tions in  future  wars,  and  second  to  give  opportunity 
to  the  various  divisions,  ships,  turret  crews,  engineers' 
forces,  etc.,  for  drills  that  will  train  them  to  meet  prob- 
able contingencies  in  future  wars. 

This  double  end  wiU  not  be  so  difficult  of  attain- 
ment as  might  at  first  sight  seem,  for  the  reason  that 
the  solution  of  any  problem  which  represents  a  situa- 
tion actually  probable  will  automatically  provide  all 
the  minor  situations  necessary  to  driU  the  various 
bodies;  and  the  more  inherently  probable  a  situation 
is,  the  more  probable  wiU  be  the  situations  in  which 
the  various  flag-officers,  captains,  quartermasters,  en- 
gineers' forces,  turret  crews,  etc.,  will  find  themselves. 

Of  course,  the  prime  difficulty  in  devising  realis- 


PREPARING  THE  ACTR^E  FLEET      263 

tic  problems  is  the  fact  that  in  war  our  whole  fleet 
would  be  employed  together  against  an  enemy  fleet; 
and  as  the  staff  cannot  supply  an  enemy  fleet,  it  must 
either  imagine  an  enemy  fleet,  divert  a  small  part  of 
our  fleet  to  represent  an  enemy  fleet,  or  else  divide  our 
fleet  into  two  approximately  equal  parts,  one  "red," 
and  one  "blue." 

First  Scheme. — The  first  scheme  has  its  usefulness 
in  working  out  the  actual  handling  of  the  fleet  as  a 
whole;  and  considering  the  purposes  of  strategy  only, 
is  the  most  important,  though,  of  course,  "contacts" 
with  the  enemy  cannot  be  simulated.  From  the  stand- 
point of  fleet  tactical  drill,  and  the  standpoint  of  that 
part  of  strategy  which  arranges  for  handling  large 
tactical  situations  with  success,  it  is  useful,  since  it 
provides  for  the  tactical  handling  of  the  entire  fleet. 
This  certainly  is  important;  for  if  the  personnel  are 
to  be  so  trained  that  the  actual  fleet  shall  be  handled 
with  maximum  effectiveness  in  battle,  training  in 
handling  that  actual  fleet  must  frequently  be  had;  the 
fleet  is  a  machine,  and  no  machine  is  complete  if  any 
of  its  parts  is  lacking. 

It  may  be  objected  that  it  is  not  necessary  for  the 
staff  at  the  department  to  devise  such  training,  be- 
cause driUs  of  the  entire  fleet  can  be  devised  and  car- 
ried out  by  the  commander-in-chief;  in  fact  that  that  is 
what  he  is  for.  This,  of  course,  is  partly  true;  and  it 
is  not  the  idea  of  the  author  that  the  staff  in  the  de- 
partment should  interfere  with  any  scheme  of  drills 


264    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

that  the  commander-in-chief  desires  to  devise  and  carry 
out;  but  it  is  his  idea  that  the  stafif  should  arrange 
problems  to  be  worked  out  by  the  fleet,  in  which  the 
tactical  handling  of  the  fleet  should  be  subordinate  to, 
and  carried  out  for,  a  strategic  purpose. 

A  very  simple  drill  would  be  the  mere  transfer  of 
the  fleet  to  a  distant  point,  when  in  supposititious 
danger  from  an  enemy,  employing  by  day  and  night 
the  scouting  and  screening  operations  that  such  a  trip 
would  demand.  Another  drill  would  be  the  massing 
of  previously  separated  forces  at  a  given  place  and 
time;  stiU  another  would  be  the  despatching  of  cer- 
tain parts  of  the  fleet  to  certain  points  at  certain  times. 
The  problems  need  not  be  quite  so  simple  as  these, 
however;  for  they  can  include  aU  the  operations  of  a 
fleet  imder  its  commander-in-chief  up  to  actual  con- 
tact; the  commander-in-chief  being  given  only  such 
information  as  the  approximate  position,  speed,  and 
course  of  the  enemy  at  a  given  time,  with  orders  to 
intercept  him  with  his  whole  force;  or  he  may  be  given 
information  that  the  enemy  has  divided  his  force,  that 
certain  parts  were  at  certain  places  going  in  certain  di- 
rections at  certain  speeds  at  certain  times,  and  he  may 
be  directed  to  intercept  those  supposititious  parts;  that 
is,  to  get  such  parts  of  his  fleet  as  he  may  think  best 
to  certain  places  at  certain  times. 

Of  the  strategic  value  to  the  staff  of  the  practical 
solutions  of  this  class  of  problems  by  the  fleet,  there 
can  be  little  question;   and  the  records  made  if  kept 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      265 

up  to  date,  would  give  data  in  future  wars  for  future 
staffs,  of  what  the  whole  fleet,  and  parts  of  it  acting 
with  the  fleet,  can  reasonably  be  expected  to  accom- 
pHsh,  especially  from  the  standpoint  of  logistics.  And 
it  has  the  advantage  of  dealing  with  only  one  thing; 
the  actual  handling  of  the  actual  fleet,  uncomplicated 
by  other  matters,  such  as  interference  by  an  enemy. 
For  the  reason,  however,  that  it  leaves  out  of  considera- 
tion the  effects  of  scouting  and  of  contacts  with  the 
enemy,  it  is  incomplete. 

Second  Scheme. — To  remedy  this  incompleteness, 
resort  may  be  had  to  the  device  of  detaching  a  few 
vessels  from  the  fleet  and  making  each  represent  a 
force  of  the  enemy;  one  destroyer,  for  instance,  to 
represent  a  division,  four  destroyers  four  divisions, 
etc.  This  scheme  has  the  advantage  that  aU  the  capi- 
tal ships  can  be  handled  together,  and  that,  say  three- 
quarters  of  the  destroyers  can  be  handled  without  much 
artificiality  on  the  assumption  that  four-fourths  are 
so  handled;  whfle  for  merely  strategic  purposes  four 
destroyers,  properly  separated,  can  represent  four 
divisions  of  destroyers  very  truthfully.  This  scheme 
is  useful  not  only  strategically  but  tactically;  for  the 
reasons  that  the  contacts  made  are  actual  and  visible, 
and  that  all  the  personnel  on  each  side  are  put  to  doing 
things  much  like  those  they  would  do  in  war.  The 
scheme  is  extremely  flexible  besides;  for  the  number 
of  ways  in  which  the  fleet  can  be  divided  is  very  great, 
and  the  number  of  operations  that  can  be  simulated 


266    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

with  considerable  accuracy  is  therefore  very  great  also. 
The  training  given  to  the  personnel  of  the  fleet  is  obvi- 
ously more  varied,  interesting,  and  valuable,  than  in 
the  first  scheme;  and  the  records  of  the  solutions 
(games  played)  will  form  instructive  documents  in  the 
offices  of  the  staff,  concerning  situations  which  the 
first  scheme  could  not  bring  out.  These  records,  nat- 
urally, will  not  be  so  simple  as  those  under  the  first 
scheme,  because  many  factors  will  enter  in,  some  of 
which  wiU  bring  up  debatable  points.  For  when  actual 
contact  occurs,  but  only  "constructive"  hits  by  tor- 
pedo and  gun  are  made,  much  room  for  difference  of 
opinion  will  occur,  and  many  decisions  will  be  disputed. 

To  decide  disputed  questions  must,  of  course,  rest 
with  the  staff;  but  those  questions  must  be  decided, 
and  if  correct  deductions  from  the  games  are  to  be 
made,  the  decisions  must  be  correct.  To  achieve  cor- 
rectness in  decision  the  members  of  the  staff  must  be 
highly  trained.  To  devise  and  develop  a  good  scheme 
of  staff  training,  several  years  may  be  required. 

Third  Scheme. — The  third  kind  of  game  is  that  in 
which  the  fleet  is  divided  into  two  parts,  fairly  equal 
in  each  of  the  various  elements,  battleships,  battle 
cruisers,  destroyers,  submarines,  aircraft,  etc.  This 
scheme  gives  opportunity  for  more  realistic  situations 
than  the  other  two,  since  each  side  operates  and  sees 
vessels  and  formations  similar  to  those  that  it  would 
operate  and  see  in  war;  and  it  gives  opportunity  for 
games  which  combine  both  strategical  and  tactical 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      267 

operations  and  situations  to  a  greater  degree  than  do 
the  other  two  schemes.  Its  only  weakness  is  the  fact 
that  the  entire  fleet  is  not  operated  as  a  unit;  not  even 
a  large  fraction,  but  only  about  one-half.  Like  each 
of  the  other  two  schemes,  however,  it  has  its  distinc- 
tive field  of  usefulness. 

Its  main  advantage  is  its  realism — the  fact  that 
two  powerful  naval  forces,  each  composed  of  all  the 
elements  of  a  naval  force,  seek  each  other  out;  or  else 
one  evades  and  the  other  seeks;  and  then  finally  they 
fight  a  fairly  reahstic  battle;  or  else  one  successfully 
evades  the  other;  or  else  minor  actions  occur  between 
detachments,  and  no  major  result  occurs;  just  as 
happens  in  war. 

Strategically,  this  scheme  is  less  valuable  than  the 
other  two;  tactically,  more  so.  For  the  experience  and 
the  records  of  the  staff  this  scheme  is  less  valuable  than 
the  other  two,  but  for  the  training  of  the  fleet  it  is 
more  so. 

Of  course,  the  division  of  games  for  staff  and  fleet 
training  into  three  general  schemes  is  arbitrary,  and 
not  wholly  correct;  for  no  such  division  really  exists, 
and  in  practice  it  would  not  be  observed.  The  thought 
of  the  writer  is  merely  to  point  out  that,  in  a  general 
way,  the  schemes  may  be  divided  into  three  classes, 
and  to  show  the  convenience  of  doing  so — or  at  least 
of  recognizing  that  there  are  three  general  kinds  of 
games,  and  that  each  kind  has  its  advantages  and  like- 
wise its  disadvantages. 


268    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

In  our  navy,  only  three  strategic  problems  or  ma- 
neuvers, devised  at  the  department,  have  been  worked 
out  at  sea — one  in  May,  and  one  in  October,  191 5,  and 
one  in  August,  1916:  all  belonged  in  the  second  cate- 
gory. They  were  devised  by  the  General  Board  and 
the  War  College,  as  we  had  no  staff.  The  solving  of 
the  problems  by  the  commander-in-chief  aroused  the 
greatest  interest  not  only  in  the  fleet,  but  in  the  Navy 
Department,  in  fact,  throughout  the  entire  navy,  and 
to  a  surprising  degree  throughout  the  country,  espe- 
cially among  the  people  on  the  Atlantic  coast.  Dis- 
cussions of  the  utmost  value  were  aroused  and  carried 
on,  and  a  degree  of  co-operation  between  the  depart- 
ment, the  War  CoUege,  and  the  fleet,  never  attained 
before,  was  realized.  If  a  routine  could  be  devised 
whereby  such  problems  could  be  solved  by  practical 
games,  say  once  a  month,  and  the  results  analyzed  and 
recorded  in  moving-picture  form  by  the  staff  in  Wash- 
ington, we  could  see  our  way  in  a  few  years'  time  to  a 
degree  of  efficiency  in  strategy  which  now  we  cannot 
even  picture.  It  would  automatically  indoctrinate  the 
navy  and  produce  a  sympathetic  understanding  and  a 
common  aim,  which  would  permeate  the  personnel  and 
make  the  navy  a  veritable  organism.  It  would  attain 
the  utmost  attainable  by  any  method  now  known. 

Attention  is  respectfully  invited  to  the  fact  that 
at  the  present  time  naval  strategy  is  mainly  an  art; 
that  it  will  probably  continue  so  for  many  years;  that 


PREPARING  THE  ACTIVE  FLEET      269 

whether  a  science  of  naval  strategy  will  ever  be  formu- 
lated need  not  now  concern  us  deeply,  and  that  the 
art  of  naval  strategy,  like  every  other  art,  needs  prac  ■ 
tice  for  its  successful  use.  Naval  strategy  is  so  vague 
a  term  that  most  of  us  have  got  to  looking  on  it  as 
some  mystic  art,  requiring  a  peculiar  and  unusual  qual- 
ity of  mind  to  master;  but  there  are  many  things  to 
indicate  that  a  high  degree  of  skill  in  it  can  be  attained 
by  the  same  means  as  can  a  high  degree  of  skill  in  play- 
ing— say  golf:  by  hard  work;  and  not  only  by  hard 
work,  but  by  doing  the  same  thing — or  similar  things 
— repeatedly.  Now  most  of  us  realize  that  any  largely 
manual  art,  such  as  the  technic  of  the  piano,  needs 
frequent  repetition  of  muscular  actions,  in  order  to 
train  the  muscles;  but  few  of  us  realize  how  fully  this 
is  true  of  mental  arts,  such  as  working  arithmetical  or 
strategical  problems,  though  we  know  how  easy  it  is 
to  "get  rusty"  in  navigation.  Our  mental  muscles  and 
whatever  nerves  co-ordinate  them  with  our  minds 
seem  to  need  fuUy  as  much  practice  for  their  skilful 
use  as  do  our  physical  muscles;  and  so  to  attain  skill 
in  strategy,  we  must  practise  at  it.  This  means  that 
all  hands  must  practise  at  it — not  only  the  staff  in  their 
secret  sanctuary,  not  only  the  commander-in-chief, 
not  only  the  division  commanders,  but,  in  their  respec- 
tive parts,  the  captains,  the  lieutenants,  the  ensigns, 
the  warrant  officers,  the  petty  officers,  and  the  young- 
est recruits.  To  get  this  practice,  the  department, 
through  the  staff,  must  furnish  the  ideas,  and  the  com- 


270    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

mander-in-chief  the  tools.  Then,  day  after  day, 
month  after  month,  and  year  after  year,  in  port  and  at 
sea,  by  night  and  by  day,  the  ideas  assisted  by  the 
tools  will  be  supplying  a  continuous  stimulus  to  the 
minds  of  all.  This  stimulus,  properly  directed  through 
the  appropriate  channels  and  devoted  to  wise  pur- 
poses, will  reach  the  mess  attendant,  the  coal-passer, 
and  the  recruit,  as  well  as  those  in  positions  more  re- 
sponsible (though  not  more  honorable);  and  as  the 
harmony  of  operation  of  the  whole  increases,  as  skill  in 
each  task  increases,  and  as  a  perception  of  the  strategic 
why  for  the  performance  of  each  task  increases,  the 
knowledge  will  be  borne  in  on  all  that  in  useful  occu- 
pation is  to  be  found  the  truest  happiness;  that  only 
uninterested  work  at  any  task  is  drudgery;  that  in- 
terest in  work  brings  skill,  that  skill  brings  pleasure  in 
exerting  it;  and  that  the  greater  the  number  of  men 
engaged  together,  and  the  more  wise  the  system  under 
which  they  work,  the  greater  will  be  the  happiness  of 
each  man,  and  the  higher  the  efficiency  of  the  whole. 


CHAPTER  X 
RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS 

IN  the  preceding  chapter  it  was  pointed  out  that  the 
work  of  preparing  the  naval  machine  for  use  could 
be  divided  into  two  parts :  preparing  the  existing  fleet 
and  preparing  the  rest  of  the  navy. 

The  "rest  of  the  navy"  consists  of  the  Navy  De- 
partment itself,  the  naval  stations,  the  reserve  ships 
and  men,  and  also  the  ships  and  men  that  must  be 
brought  in  from  civil  life.  As  the  department  is  the 
agency  for  preparing  the  naval  stations,  the  reserves, 
and  the  men  and  ships  brought  in  from  civil  life,  it  is 
clear  that  the  work  of  preparing  the  department  will 
automatically  prepare  the  others.  The  work  of  pre- 
paring any  Navy  Department  necessitates  the  prepara- 
tion and  execution  of  plans,  whereby  the  department 
itself  and  all  the  rest  of  the  navy  will  be  able  to  pass 
instantly  from  a  peace  footing  to  a  war  footing;  will 
be  able  to  pass  instantly  from  a  status  of  leisurely  han- 
dling and  supplying  the  existing  fleet  by  means  of  the 
offices,  bureaus,  and  naval  stations,  to  the  status  of 
handling  with  the  greatest  possible  despatch  a  force 
which  will  be  not  only  much  larger,  but  also  much  less 
disciplined  and  coherent. 

In  time  of  peace  a  Navy  Department  which  is 
271 


272    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

properly  administered  for  times  of  peace,  as  most  Navy 
Departments  are,  can,  by  means  of  its  bureaus,  naval 
stations,  offices,  etc.,  handle  the  existing  fleet,  and  also 
these  bureaus,  naval  stations,  offices,  etc.,  by  labors 
which  for  the  most  part  are  matters  of  routine.  The 
department  opens  for  business  at  a  certain  time  in  the 
morning  and  closes  at  a  certain  time  in  the  afternoon. 
During  office  hours  the  various  officials  and  their  clerks 
fill  a  few  busy  hours  with  not  very  strenuous  labor, 
and  then  depart,  leaving  their  cares  behind  them. 
The  naval  stations  are  conducted  on  similar  princi- 
ples; and  even  the  doings  of  the  fleet  become  in  a 
measure  matters  of  routine.  All  the  ordinary  busi- 
ness of  fife  tends  to  routine,  in  order  that  men  may 
so  arrange  their  time,  that  they  may  have  regular  hours 
for  work,  recreation,  and  sleep,  and  be  able  to  make 
engagements  for  the  future. 

But  when  war  breaks  out,  all  routine  is  instantly 
aboHshed.  The  element  of  surprise,  which  each  side 
strives  to  interject  into  its  operations,  is  inherently 
a  foe  to  routine.  In  a  routine  fife,  expected  things  oc- 
cur— it  is  the  office  of  routine  to  arrange  that  ex- 
pected things  shall  occur,  and  at  expected  times;  in  a 
routine  life  one  is  always  prepared  to  see  a  certain 
thing  happen  at  a  certain  time.  Surprise  breaks  in  on 
all  this,  and  makes  unexpected  things  occur,  and 
therefore  finds  men  unprepared.  It  is  the  office  of 
surprise  to  catch  men  unprepared. 

Appreciating  this,  and  appreciating  the  value  of 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     273 

starting  a  war  by  achieving  some  great  success,  and 
of  preventing  the  enemy  from  so  doing,  military  coun- 
tries in  recent  years  have  advanced  more  and  more 
their  preparations  for  war,  even  in  time  of  the  pro- 
foundest  peace,  in  order  that,  when  war  breaks  out, 
they  may  be  prepared  either  to  take  the  offensive  at 
once,  or  to  repel  an  offensive  at  once.  With  whatever 
forces  a  nation  expects  or  desires  to  fight  in  a  war,  no 
matter  whether  it  wiU  begin  on  the  offensive  or  begin 
on  the  defensive,  the  value  to  the  nation  of  those 
forces  will  depend  on  how  soon  they  are  gotten  ready. 
In  a  navy,  the  active  fleet  may  be  considered  always 
ready;  but  the  personnel  and  the  craft  of  various  kinds 
that  must  be  added  to  it  cannot  be  added  to  it  as 
quickly  as  is  desirable — ^because  it  is  desirable  that 
they  should  be  added  immediately,  which  is  impos- 
sible. 

It  is  not  in  the  nature  of  things  that  they  should 
get  ready  as  quickly  as  a  fleet  that  has  been  kept  ready 
always;  but  it  is  essential  that  the  handicap  to  the 
operations  of  the  active  fleet,  due  to  the  tardiness  of 
its  additions,  should  be  kept  as  small  as  possible.  In 
other  words,  whatever  additions  are  to  be  made  to 
the  active  fleet  should  be  made  as  quickly  as  possible. 

When  the  additions  are  made  to  the  fleet  (reserve 
ships  and  men,  ships  and  men  from  civil  life,  etc.)  it  is 
clear  that  those  ships  and  men  should  at  that  time  be 
ready  for  effective  work.  If  the  ships  are  not  in  con- 
dition for  effective  work  by  reason  of  being  out  of 


2  74    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

order,  or  by  reason  of  the  ships  from  civil  life  not  hav- 
ing been  altered  to  suit  their  new  requirements,  or  by 
reason  of  the  men  not  being  thoroughly  drilled  for 
their  new  tasks,  considerable  time  will  have  to  be  lost 
by  the  necessity  of  getting  the  ships  and  the  men  into 
proper  condition — or  else  warlike  operations  will  have 
to  be  entered  into  while  unprepared,  and  the  classic 
Chesapeake-Shannon  tragedy  re-enacted. 

Therefore,  the  endeavor  must  be  strongly  made 
to  have  ready  always  all  the  ships  and  men  that  are  to 
be  added  to  the  fleet;  the  ships  equipped  for  their 
duties  in  the  fleet,  and  the  men  drilled  for  their  future 
tasks. 

The  matter  of  getting  ready  the  navy  ships  that 
are  in  reserve  is  largely  a  matter  of  getting  the  men 
to  man  them,  as  the  ships  themselves  are  kept  in  re- 
pair, and  so  in  a  state  of  readiness,  materially  speak- 
ing. At  least  this  is  the  theory;  and  the  successful 
application  of  the  theory,  when  tested  in  practice,  de- 
pends greatly  on  how  large  a  proportion  of  the  full 
complements  has  been  kept  on  board,  and  on  the 
amount  and  nature  of  the  cruising  which  the  vessels  in 
reserve  have  done.  The  ideal  conditions  cannot  be 
reached,  unless  the  full  complements  have  been  kept 
on  board,  and  the  ships  required  to  make  frequent 
cruises.  Of  course,  such  a  condition  is  never  met  in 
reserve  ships;  there  would  be  no  reason  for  putting 
ships  in  reserve  if  they  were  to  be  so  handled.  The 
more  closely,  however,  a  ship  is  kept  in  that  condi- 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     275 

tion  of  readiness,  the  more  quickly  she  can  be  made 
absolutely  ready  in  her  material  condition. 

Unless  one  reaUzes  how  and  why  ships  deteriorate 
in  material,  it  is  surprising  to  see  how  many  faults  de- 
velop, when  ships  in  reserve,  that  are  apparently  in 
good  condition,  are  put  into  active  service.  Trouble 
is  not  found,  of  course,  with  the  stationary  parts,  like 
the  bottoms,  and  sides,  and  decks,  so  much  as  with 
the  moving  parts,  especially  the  parts  that  have  to 
move  and  be  steam  and  gas  tight  at  the  same  time — 
the  parts  found  mainly  in  the  steam  engineering  and 
ordnance  departments.  Defects  in  the  moving  parts, 
especially  in  the  joints,  are  not  apt  to  be  found  out 
imtil  they  are  moved,  and  often  not  until  they  are 
moved  under  the  pressure  and  with  the  speeds  required 
in  service. 

Now  "in  service"  usually  means  in  service  in 
time  of  peace;  but  the  service  for  which  those  ships  are 
kept  in  reserve  is  war  service,  and  the  requirements 
of  war  service  are  much  more  rigorous  than  those 
of  peace  service.  Objection  may  be  made  to  this  state- 
ment by  remarking  that  engines  turn  around  and 
guns  are  fired  just  the  same  in  war  as  in  peace,  and  that 
therefore  the  requirements  are  identical.  True  in  a 
measure;  but  vessels  and  guns  are  apt  to  be  forced 
more  in  war  than  in  peace;  and  even  if  they  were  not, 
vessels  in  time  of  peace  are  gotten  ready  with  a  consid- 
erable degree  of  deliberation,  are  manned  by  well- 
trained  men,  and  are  sent  to  sea  under  circumstances 


2  76    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

which  permit  of  gradually  working  up  to  full  service 
requirements.  But  when  reserve  vessels  are  mobil- 
ized and  sent  into  service  for  war,  everything  is  done 
with  the  utmost  haste;  and  the  men,  being  hurriedly 
put  on  board,  cannot  possibly  be  as  well  trained  and 
as  ready  to  do  skilful  work  as  men  sent  on  board  in 
peace  time;  and  when  reserve  vessels  get  to  sea  they 
may  be  required  immediately  to  perform  the  most  ex- 
acting service. 

For  all  these  reasons,  it  is  highly  desirable — it  is 
essential  to  adequate  preparation — that  vessels  should 
be  kept  in  a  state  of  material  readiness  that  is  prac- 
tically perfect.  Every  vessel  on  board  of  which  de- 
fects in  material  develop  after  she  shall  have  been  put 
into  service,  when  war  breaks  out,  will  be  a  liabiHty 
instead  of  an  asset.  She  will  be  able  to  render  no  ef- 
fective service,  and  she  will  require  the  expenditure  of 
energy  by  officers  and  men,  and  possibly  the  assis- 
tance of  other  vessels,  when  their  services  are  needed 
for  other  work. 

But  the  problem  of  how  to  keep  reserve  vessels  in 
a  state  of  material  readiness  is  easier  than  the  problem 
of  how  to  keep  the  reserve  men  in  a  state  of  personnel 
readiness,  which  will  insure  their  reporting  on  board 
of  the  reserve  ships  quickly  enough  and  wdth  adequate 
training.  This  problem  is  so  difficult,  and  its  solution 
is  so  important,  that  in  Great  Britain,  France,  Ger- 
many, Japan,  and  doubtless  other  navies,  men  are 
compelled  to  go  into  the  reserves,  and  to  remain  in 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS      277 

for  several  years  after  completing  their  periods  of 
service  in  the  regular  navy.  In  this  way,  no  breaking 
away  from  the  navy  occurs  until  after  reserve  service 
has  been  completed,  and  every  man  who  enlists  re- 
mains in  the  navy  and  is  subject  to  its  discipline  until 
his  reserve  period  has  been  passed.  Thus  the  ques- 
tion of  the  reserve  is  a  question  that  has  been  an- 
swered in  those  countries,  and  is  therefore  no  longer 
a  question  in  them.  If  battleship  A  in  any  of  those 
countries  is  to  be  mobihzed,  the  government  knows 
just  who  are  to  go  on  board  and  when;  and  knows  that 
every  man  has  recently  served  in  the  regular  navy,  has 
been  kept  in  training  ever  since  he  left  it,  and  that  he 
is  competent  to  perform  the  duties  of  his  allotted  sta- 
tion in  battleship  A . 

The  problem  of  getting  into  service  the  ships  that 
are  to  be  gotten  from  the  merchant  service  is  more 
difficult,  and  is  perhaps  of  more  importance;  that  is, 
it  is  more  important  to  get  into  the  service  some  ves- 
sels from  the  merchant  service  than  some  reserve  ships; 
more  important,  for  instance,  to  get  colliers  to  serve 
the  fleet  with  coal  than  to  commission  some  antiquated 
cruisers.  Naturally,  the  number  and  kinds  of  ships 
that  need  to  be  provided  will  depend  on  the  nature  of 
the  war — whether,  for  instance,  a  very  large  force  is 
to  be  sent  to  the  other  side  of  the  world,  to  meet  a 
powerful  fleet  there,  or  whether  a  sudden  attack  on  our 
Atlantic  coast  is  to  be  repelled.  The  difference,  how- 
ever, is  largely  numerical;  so  that  if  the  plans  provide 


2  78    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

for  a  sufficient  number  to  take  part  in  the  distant  ex- 
pedition, it  will  be  easy  to  get  the  appropriate  num- 
ber to  meet  a  coast  attack. 

To  receive  an  attack  upon  the  coast,  however, 
provision  must  be  made  for  vessels  a*nd  men  not  needed 
on  an  expedition  across  the  seas — that  is,  for  vessels 
and  men  that  will  defend  the  coast  itself  from  raids 
and  similar  expeditions. 

The  work  of  preparing  all  that  part  of  the  naval 
machine  which  in  time  of  peace  is  separate  from  the 
active  fleet  is  purely  one  of  logistics;  it  is  that  part 
of  the  preparation  which  calculates  what  ways  and 
means  are  needed,  and  then  suppHes  those  ways  and 
means.  Logistics,  having  been  told  by  strategy  what 
strategy  plans  to  do,  calculates  how  many  and  what 
kinds  of  vessels,  men,  guns,  torpedoes,  fuel,  food,  hos- 
pital service,  ammunition,  etc.,  are  needed  to  make 
possible  the  fulfilling  of  those  plans;  and  then  pro- 
ceeds to  provide  what  it  has  calculated  must  be  pro- 
vided. 

This  does  not  mean  that  strategy  should  hold 
itself  aloof  from  logistics  and  make  arbitrary  demands 
upon  it;  for  such  a  procedure  would  result  in  making 
demands  that  logistics  could  not  supply;  or,  through 
an  underestimate  of  what  logistics  can  supply,  in  re- 
fraining from  demanding  as  much  as  could  be  supplied. 
Logistics,  of  course,  does  provide  what  strategy  wants, 
in  so  far  as  it  can;  but  in  order  that  satisfactory  re- 
sults may  be  obtained,  the  fullest  co-operation  between 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     279 

strategy  and  logistics  is  essential;  and  to  this  end  fre- 
quent conferences  are  required  between  the  officers 
representing  both. 

The  logistic  work  of  expanding  the  naval  forces 
to  a  war  basis  may  evidently  be  divided  into  two  parts : 
the  adding  of  vessels  and  other  craft  appropriately 
equipped  and  manned  to  the  active  fleet,  and  the  es- 
tabhshment  of  a  coast-defense  force,  which  will  be  dis- 
tributed along  the  coast  and  divided  among  the  most 
important  commercial  and  strategic  centres. 

Adding  to  the  Fleet. — ^Naturally,  the  additions  to 
the  fleet  will  depend  on  the  service  for  which  the  fleet  is 
intended;  that  is,  on  the  plans  of  strategy.  If  the  navy 
were  to  be  gotten  ready  for  a  definite  undertaking,  then 
the  additions  to  carry  out  that  undertaking  could  be 
calculated  and  prepared;  and  of  course  this  condi- 
tion does  come  up  immediately  before  any  war  occurs. 
But  in  addition  to  these  preparations  which  are  to  be 
made  at  the  last  moment  (many  of  which  cannot  be 
made  untfl  the  last  moment),  the  staff  must  prepare 
in  the  leisure  of  profound  peace  for  several  different 
contingencies.  Inasmuch  as  many  of  the  additions 
will  be  needed,  no  matter  with  what  country  the  war 
may  come;  and  inasmuch  as  the  same  general  kind  of 
additions  will  be  made,  it  is  clear  that  there  must 
underlie  all  the  various  plans  one  general  plan,  to 
which  modifications  must  be  made  to  adapt  it  to 
special  conditions.  And  as,  no  matter  w^hether  we  are 
to   take   the   offensive   or   the   defensive,   no   matter 


28o    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

whether  the  fleet  is  to  go  far  away  or  stay  near  our 
coast,  the  matter  of  additions  to  it  is  mainly  a  matter 
of  degree  (whether  for  instance  ten  extra  coUiers  are 
needed  or  a  hundred),  it  seems  clear  that  the  general 
plan  should  be  the  one  demanding  the  greatest  addi- 
tions, so  that  the  modifications  to  adapt  it  to  special 
cases  would  consist  merely  in  making  subtractions 
from  it.  To  carry  out  this  plan,  strategy  must  make  a 
sufficiently  grave  estimate  of  the  situation;  and  logis- 
tics must  make  calculations  to  supply  the  most  diffi- 
cult demands  that  the  estimate  of  the  situation  indi- 
cates as  reasonable,  and  then  arrange  the  means  to 
provide  what  the  calculations  show.  If  one  has  pro- 
vided a  little  more  than  is  necessary,  it  is  much  easier 
to  leave  out  something  later  than  it  is  to  add  more,  if 
one  has  not  provided  enough;  and  one's  natural  indo- 
lence then  acts  on  the  side  of  safety,  since  it  tends  to 
persuade  one  not  to  leave  off  too  much;  whereas  in 
the  opposite  case,  it  tends  to  assure  him  that  it  is  not 
really  necessary  to  take  the  trouble  to  provide  what 
it  might  be  hard  to  get. 

The  Estimate  of  the  Situation. — In  no  field  of  stra- 
tegical work  is  an  accurate  estimate  of  the  situation  more 
clearly  necessary  than  when  it  is  to  form  the  basis  for 
the  precise  calculations  of  logistics.  General  strategical 
plans  require  a  vividness  of  imagination  and  a  bold- 
ness of  conception  that  find  no  field  for  exercise  in 
logistics;  and  tactics  requires  a  quickness  of  decision 
and  a  forcefulness  of  execution  that  neither  strategy 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     281 

nor  logistics  need;  but  neither  strategy  nor  tactics 
calls  for  the  mathematical  exactness  that  logistics 
must  have,  or  be  of  no  avail.  Yet  there  will  be  no  use 
in  working  out  the  mathematically  correct  means  to 
produce  certain  result,  if  the  real  nature  of  the  desired 
result  is  underrated;  there  will  be  no  use  in  working 
out  laboriously  how  many  ships  and  tons  of  coal  and 
oil  are  needed,  if  the  estimate  of  the  situation,  to  meet 
which  those  ships  and  coal  and  oil  are  needed,  is  in- 
adequate. 

The  first  step,  therefore,  in  providing  for  the  ex- 
pansion of  the  navy  for  war,  is  to  estimate  the  situation 
correctly.  The  greatest  difi&culty  in  doing  this  arises 
from  a  species  of  moral  cowardice,  which  tempts  a 
man  to  underestimate  its  dangers,  and  therefore  the 
means  required  to  meet  them.  Probably  no  single  cause 
of  defeat  in  war  has  been  so  pregnant  with  disaster  as  this 
failure  to  make  a  sufficiently  grave  estimate  of  the  situa- 
Hon.  Sometimes  the  failure  seems  due  more  to  care- 
lessness than  to  cowardice;  Napoleon's  disastrous 
underestimate  of  the  difficulties  of  his  projected  Rus- 
sian campaign  seems  more  due  to  carelessness  than  to 
cowardice;  but  this  may  be  due  to  a  difficulty  of  asso- 
ciating cowardice  with  Napoleon.  But  is  it  not  equally 
difficult  to  associate  carelessness  with  Napoleon? 
What  professional  calculator,  what  lawyer's  clerk  was 
ever  more  careful  than  Napoleon  was,  when  dealing 
with  problems  of  war  ?  Who  was  ever  more  attentive 
to  details,  who  more  industrious,  who  more  untiring? 


282    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

And  yet  Napoleon's  plans  for  his  Russian  campaign 
were  inadequate  to  an  amazing  degree,  and  the  inade- 
quacy was  the  cause  of  his  disaster.  But  whether  the 
cause  was  carelessness  or  moral  cowardice  on  his  part, 
the  fact  remains  that  he  did  not  estimate  the  situation 
with  sufficient  care,  and  make  due  plans  to  meet  it. 

This  unwillingness  to  look  a  difficult  situation  in 
the  face  one  can  see  frequently  in  daily  life.  Great 
difficulties  seem  to  appall  some  people.  They  hate 
so  much  to  believe  a  disaster  possible,  they  fear  so 
much  to  let  themselves  or  others  realize  that  a  danger 
is  impending,  they  are  so  afraid  that  other  people  will 
think  them  "nervous,"  and  they  shrink  so  from  recom- 
mending measures  that  would  cause  great  exertions  or 
great  expenditures,  that  they  are  very  prone  to  beHeve 
and  say  that  there  is  no  especial  danger,  and  that 
whatever  danger  there  may  be,  can  be  obviated  by 
measures  that  are  easy  and  cheap  to  carry  out. 

If  we  yield  to  this  feeUng,  we  are  guilty  of  moral 
cowardice,  and  we  vitiate  all  the  results  of  all  our  la- 
bors. We  must  make  a  correct  estimate  of  the  situa- 
tion— or  rather  we  must  estimate  the  situation  to  be 
as  grave  as  it  is — or  our  preparations  will  be  of  no 
avail.  If  we  estimate  the  situation  too  gravely,  we 
may  spend  more  money  and  time  on  our  preparations 
than  is  quite  needed,  and  our  preparations  may  be 
more  than  adequate.  It  may  be  that  the  preparations 
which  Prussia  made  before  1870  for  war  with  France 
were  more  than  adequate.    In  fact,  it  looks  as  if  they 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     283 

were,  in  view  of  the  extreme  quickness  with  which  she 
conquered  France.  But  does  any  miHtary  writer  con- 
demn Prussia  for  having  made  assurance  too  sure  ? 

The  Value  oj  Super  adequate  Preparation. — No,  on 
the  contrary.  The  very  reasons  that  make  adequate 
preparation  valuable  make  superadequate  prepara- 
tion even  more  valuable.  The  reason  is  very  clear,  as 
is  shown  by  the  table  on  page  284  illustrating  the  pro- 
gressive wasting  of  fighting  forces,  which  the  writer 
pubHshed  in  the  U.  S.  Naval  Institute  in  an  essay 
called  "  American  Naval  PoHcy,"  in  April,  1905.* 

These  tables  grew  out  of  an  attempt  to  ascertain 
how  the  values  of  two  contending  forces  change  as  the 
fight  goes  on.  The  offensive  power  of  the  stronger 
force  is  placed  in  the  begirming  at  1,000  in  each  case, 
and  the  offensive  power  of  the  weaker  force  at  900, 
800,  700,  600,  500,  400,  300,  200,  and  100.  These 
values  are,  of  course,  wholly  arbitrary,  and  some  may 
say  imaginary;  but,  as  they  are  intended  merely  to 
show  the  comparative  strength  of  the  two  forces,  they 
are  a  logical  measure,  because  numerical;  there  is  al- 
w^ays  some  numerical  factor  that  expresses  the  com- 
parative value  of  two  contending  forces,  even  though 
we  never  know  what  that  numerical  factor  is.  Two 
forces  with  offensive  powers  of  1,000  and  900  respec- 
tively may  mean  1,000  men  opposed  to  900  men  of 

*  I  have  recently  been  informed  that  Lieutenant  (now  Commander) 
J.  v.  Chase,  U.  S.  N.,  arrived  at  practically  the  same  results  in"i902  by  an  ap- 
plication of  the  calculus;  and  that  he  submitted  them  to  the  U.  S.  Naval 
War  College  in  a  paper  headed,  "  Sea  Fights:  A  Mathematical  Investiga- 
tion of  the  Effect  of  Superiority  of  Force  in." — B.  A.  F. 


284    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 


TABLE  I 


Col. 


Col. 


Col. 
3 


Col. 
S 


Col. 
7 


Col. 


Col. 


Value  of  offensive  power  f  A 

at  beginning IB 

Damage  done  in  ist  pe-  f  A 

riod  by IB 

Value  of  offensive  power  (  A 

at  end  ist  period \  B 

Damage  done  in  2d  pe-  f  A 

riod  by IB 

Value  of  offensive  power  f  A 

at  end  2d  period \  B 

Damage  done  in  3d  pe-  f  A 

riod  by I  B 

Value  of  offensive  power  f  A 

at  end  3d  period 1  B 

Damage  done  in  4th  pe-  f  A 

riod  by IB 

Value  of  offensive  power  /  A 

at  end  4th  period IB 

Damage  done  in  sth  pe-  f  A 

riod  by t  B 

Value  of  offensive  power  /  A 

at  end  5th  period.  .  . .  \  B 
Damage  done  in  6th  pe-  f  A 

riod  by IB 

Value  of  offensive  power  f  A 

at  end  6th  period .  . . .  \  B 
Damage  done  in  7th  pe-  f  A 

riod  by IB 

Value  of  offensive  power  f  A 

at  end  7th  period.  . . .  \  B 
Damage  done  in  Sth  pe-  f  A 

riod  by \  B 

Value  of  offensive  power  f  A 

at  end  Sth  period IB 

Damage  done  in  gth  pe-  f  A 

riod  by IB 

Value  of  offensive  power  f  A 

at  end  gth  period.  ...IB 
Damage    done    in    loth  f  A 

period  by IB 

Value  of  offensive  power  f  A 

at  end  loth  period.  ...IB 
Damage    done    in    nth  f  A 

period  by \  B 

Value  of  offensive  power  I  A 

at  end  nth  period.  ...IB 
Damage   done    in    12  th  |  A 

period  by \  B 

Value  of  offensive  power  f  A 

at  end  12th  period  ...IB 


Total  damage  done  by . 


1000 

1000 

100 

100 

goo 

goo 

go 

go 

810 

810 

Si 

81 

72g 

72g 

73 

73 

656 

656 

65 

6S 

591 

591 

59 

59 

532 

532 

53 

53. 

479 

479 

48 

48 

431 

431 

43 

43 

388 

388 

39 

39 

349 

349 

35 

35 

314 

314 

31 

31 

283 

283 

717 
717 


1000 

goo 

100 

go 

QIO 

Soo 
91 

80 
830 
709 

83 

71 
759 
626 

76 

63 
6g6 
550 

70 

55 

641 

480 

64 

48 

593 

416 

59 

42 

551 

357 

55 

36 

515 

302 

5 

30 

485 

250 

49 

25 

460 

201 

46 

20 

440 

155 

44 

16 

426 

III 

etc. 

789 

574 


1000 

800 

100 

80 

g20 

700 

92 

70 

850 

608 

85 

61 

78g 

523 

79 

52 

737 

444 

74 

44 

693 

370 

69 

37 

656 

301 

66 

30 

626 

23s 

63 

24 

602 

172 

60 

17 

585 

112 

59 
II 

574 

53 

57 

5 

569 


800 
431 


1000 

700 

100 

70 

930 

600 

93 

60 

870 

507 

87 

51 

8ig 

420 

82 

42 

777 

338 

78 

34 

743 

260 

74 

26 

717 

186 

72 

19 

6g8 

114 

70 

II 

687 

44 

6g 

4 
683 


1000 

600 

100 

60 

940 

500 

94 

50 

890 

406 

89 

41 

849 

317 

85 

32 

S17 

232 

82 

23 

794 

150 

79 

15 

779 

71 

78 

7 

772 


1000 

SCO 

100 

50 

950 

400 

95 

40 

gio 

305 

91 

31 

879 

214 

88 

21 

858 

126 

86 

13 

845 

40 

85 

4 

841 


700 
317 


600 
228 


500 
159 


1000  1000 

400  300 

100 

40 


g6o 

300 

96 

30 

930 

204 

93 

20 

910 

III 

91 

II 


400 


100 
30 

97 

200 
97 
20 

950 

103 
95 
10 

940 


1000 
200 
100 


970 


1000 

100 

100 

10 

990 


300 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     285 

equal  average  individual  fighting  value,  commanded 
by  officers  of  equal  fighting  ability;  or  it  may  mean 
10  ships  opposed  to  9  like  ships,  manned  by  officers 
and  men  of  equal  numbers  and  ability;  or  it  may 
mean  two  forces  of  equal  strength,  as  regards  number 
of  men,  ships,  and  guns,  but  commanded  by  officers 
whose  relative  ability  is  as  1,000  to  900.  It  may  be 
objected  here  that  it  is  ridiculous  so  to  compare  offi- 
cers, because  the  ability  of  officers  cannot  be  so  mathe- 
matically tabulated.  This,  of  course,  is  true;  but  the 
fact  that  we  are  unable  so  to  compare  officers  is  no  rea- 
son for  supposing  that  the  abihties  of  officers,  espe- 
cially officers  of  high  position,  do  not  affect  quantita- 
tively the  fighting  value  of  the  forces  they  command; 
and  the  intention  in  mentioning  this  factor  is  simply 
to  show  that  the  relative  values  of  the  forces,  as  indi- 
cated in  these  tables,  are  supposed  to  include  all  the 
factors  that  go  to  make  them  up. 

Another  convention,  made  in  these  tables,  is  that 
every  fighting  force  is  able  to  inflict  a  damage  in  a 
given  time  that  is  proportional  to  the  force  itself;  that 
a  force  of  1,000,  for  instance,  can  do  twice  as  much 
damage  in  a  given  time  as  a  force  of  500  can;  also  that 
a  force  can  do  an  amount  of  damage  under  given  condi- 
tions that  is  proportional  to  the  time  in  which  it  is  at 
work;  that  it  can  do  twice  as  much  damage  in  two 
hours,  for  instance,  as  in  one  hour,  provided  the  con- 
ditions for  doing  damage  remain  the  same.  Another 
convention  follows  from  these  two  conventions,  and  it 


286    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

is  that  there  is  a  period  of  time  in  which  a  given 
force  can  destroy  a  force  equal,  say,  to  one-tenth 
of  itself  under  certain  conditions;  that  there  is  some 
period  of  time,  for  instance,  in  which,  under  given 
conditions,  i,ooo  men  can  disable  loo  men,  or  lo 
ships  disable  i  ship,  or  lo  guns  silence  i  gun.  In  the 
conflicts  supposed  to  be  indicated  in  these  tables,  this 
period  is  the  one  used.  It  will  be  plain  that  it  is  not 
necessary  to  know  how  long  this  period  is,  and  also 
that  it  depends  upon  the  conditions  of  the  fight. 

In  Table  I,  it  is  supposed  that  the  chance  of  hit- 
ting and  the  penetrability  are  the  same  to  each  con- 
testant. In  other  words,  it  is  assumed  that  the  efec- 
tive  targets  presented  by  the  two  forces  are  alike  in  the 
sense  that,  if  the  two  targets  are  hit  at  the  same  in- 
stant by  like  projectiles,  equal  injuries  will  be  done. 
In  other  words,  if  each  contestant  at  a  given  instant 
fires,  say  a  12-inch  shell,  the  injury  done  to  one  will 
be  the  same  as  that  done  to  the  other;  not  proportion- 
ately but  quantitatively.  For  instance,  if  one  force 
has  10  ships  and  the  other  has  9  like  ships,  all  the 
ships  being  so  far  apart  that  a  shot  aimed  at  one  ship 
will  probably  not  hit  another,  the  conditions  supposed 
in  Table  I,  column  2,  are  satisfied;  the  chances  of  hit- 
ting are  identical  for  both  contestants,  and  so  is  the 
damage  done  at  every  hit.  Table  I  supposes  that  the 
chance  of  hitting  and  damaging  does  not  change  until 
the  target  is  destroyed. 

As  the  desire  of  the  author  is  now  to  show  the  ad- 
vantage of  having  a  superadequate  force,  the  follow- 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     287 

ing  table  has  been  calculated  to  show  the  effect  of 
forces  of  different  size  in  fighting  an  enemy  of  a  known 
and  therefore  constant  size* 


TABLE  II 


Col.  I 


Col.  2 


Col.  3 


Value  of  offensive  power  at  beginning 

Damage  done  in  ist  period  by 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  of  ist  period . . . 

Damage  done  in  2d  period  by 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  of  2d  period . . . 

Damage  done  iu  3d  period  by 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  of  3d  period . . . 

Damage  done  in  4th  period  by 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  of  4th  period . . . 

Damage  done  in  sth  period  by 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  of  5th  period . . 

Damage  done  in  6th  period  by 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  of  6th  period . . 

Damage  done  in  7th  period  by 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  of  7th  period. . 

Damage  done  in  Sth  period  by 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  of  Sth  period . . 

Damage  done  in  gth  period  by 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  of  gth  period . . . 

Damage  done  in  loth  period  by 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  of  loth  period . . 

Damage  done  in  nth  period  by 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  of  nth  period. . 


Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  of  i6th  period. 


/A 
\B 


1 100 

1000 

no 

100 

1000 

8go 

100 

8g 

gii 

790 

91 

79 

832 

699 

83 

70 

762 

616 

76 

62 

700 

540 

70 

54 

646 

470 

65 

47 

599 

40s 

60 

41 

558 

345 

56 

35 

523 

28g 

53 

29 

494 

236 

49 

24 

470 

187 
422 


1500 

1000 
150 
100 

1400 

850 

140 

85 

1315 
710 

131 
71 

1244 

579 

124 

58 

n86 

455 

119 

46 

1 140 

336 

114 

34 

1106 

222 

no 

22 

1084 

112 

108 

n 

1073 

4 

4 

o 

1073 


2000 

1000 
200 
100 

I  goo 

800 

I  go 

80 

1820 

610 

182 

61 

i75g 

422 
176 

43 

1716 

252 

172 

25 

i6gr 

80 

i6g 

8 

1683 


288    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

It  will  be  noted  that  if  our  force  is  superior  to  the 
enemy's  in  the  ratio  of  i,ioo  to  i,ooo,  the  fight  wiU 
last  longer  than  if  it  is  superior  in  the  ratio  of  1,500  to 
1,000,  in  the  proportion  of  16  to  9;  and  that  if  it  is 
superior  in  the  ratio  of  1,100  to  1,000  the  fight  will  last 
longer  than  if  it  is  superior  in  the  ratio  of  2  to  i,  in 
the  proportion  of  16  to  6.  We  also  see  that  we  should, 
after  reducing  the  enemy  to  o,  have  forces  represented 
by  422,  1,073,  ^^^  1 5683,  respectively,  and  suffer  losses 
represented  by  678,  427,  and  317,  respectively. 

Now  the  difference  in  fighting  forces  cannot  be 
measured  in  units  of  material  and  personnel  only, 
though  they  furnish  the  most  accurate  general  guide. 
Two  other  factors  of  great  importance  enter,  the  fac- 
tors of  skill  and  morale.  Skill  is  perhaps  more  of  an 
active  agent,  and  morale  is  perhaps  more  of  a  passive 
agent,  like  the  endurance  of  man  or  the  strength  of 
material;  and  yet  in  some  battles  morale  has  been  a 
more  important  factor  in  attaining  victory  than  even 
skill.  It  is  not  vital  to  this  discussion  which  is  the 
more  important;  but  it  is  vital  to  realize  clearly  that 
skill  and  morale  are  not  to  be  forgotten,  when  we  cal- 
culate how  many  and  what  kinds  of  material  and  per- 
sonnel units  we  must  provide  for  a  war;  and  inasmuch 
as  we  cannot  weigh  morale  and  skill,  or  even  be  sure 
in  most  cases  as  to  which  side  will  possess  them  in  the 
superior  degree,  we  are  forced  in  prudence  to  assume 
that  the  enemy  may  possess  them  in  a  superior  degree, 
and  that  therefore  we  should  secure   superadequacy 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     289 

in  units  of  personnel  and  material;  not  so  much  to  win 
victory  with  the  minimum  of  loss  to  ourselves,  as  sim- 
ply to  avert  disaster. 

The  present  war  shows  us  that  the  factors  of  skill 
and  morale,  while  independent  of  each  other,  are  closely 
linked  together,  and  react  upon  each  other.  Nothing 
estabhshes  a  good  morale  more  than  does  the  knowl- 
edge of  exceeding  skill;  and  nothing  promotes  skill 
more  than  does  an  enthusiastic  and  firm  morale. 

But  superadequateness  of  preparation  has  a  value 
greater  than  in  merely  insuring  victory  with  minimum 
loss  to  ourselves,  in  case  war  comes,  because  it  exerts 
the  most  potent  of  all  influences  in  preventing  war, 
since  it  warns  an  enemy  against  attacking.  At  the 
present  day,  the  laws  of  victory  and  defeat  are  so  well 
understood,  and  the  miseries  resulting  from  defeat  are 
so  thoroughly  realized,  that  no  civilized  country  will 
voluntarily  go  to  war,  except  for  extraneous  reasons, 
if  it  realizes  that  the  chances  of  success  are  small. 
And  as  the  cumulative  consequences  of  defeats  are  also 
realized,  and  as  no  country  is  apt  to  assume  that  the 
morale  and  skill  of  its  forces  are  measurably  greater 
than  those  of  a  probable  antagonist,  no  country  and 
no  alliance  is  apt  to  provoke  war  with  a  nation  whose 
armed  forces  are  superior  in  number  of  units  of  per- 
sonnel and  material;  unless,  of  course,  the  nation  is 
markedly  inferior  in  morale  and  skill,  as  the  Persians 
were  to  the  legions  of  Alexander. 

It  is  often  insisted  that  superadequacy  in  armed 


290    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

force  tends  to  war  instead  of  peace,  by  inducing  a 
country  to  make  war  itself;  that  the  very  principles 
which  deter  a  weak  country  from  attacking  a  strong 
country  tend  to  make  a  strong  country  attack  a  weak 
one.  There  is  some  truth  in  this,  of  course,  and  history- 
shows  many  cases  of  strong  countries  deliberately  at- 
tacking weak  ones  for  the  purpose  of  conquest. 

Analysis  of  wars,  however,  in  which  strong  coun- 
tries have  done  this,  shows  that  as  a  rule,  the  "strong" 
country  was  one  which  was  strong  in  a  miHtary  sense 
only;  and  that  the  "weak"  country  was  a  country 
which  was  weak  only  miHtarily,  but  which  was  poten- 
tially strong  in  that  it  was  possessed  of  wealth  in  land 
and  goods.  Most  of  the  great  conquests  of  history 
were  made  by  such  "strong"  over  such  "weak"  coun- 
tries. Such  were  notably  those  wars  by  which  Persia, 
Assyria,  Eg3^t,  Greece,  Rome,  and  Spain  gained  their 
pre-eminence;  and  such  were  the  wars  by  which  they 
later  feU.  Such  were  the  wars  of  Ghenghis  Khan, 
Tamerlane,  Mahomet,  and  Napoleon;  such  were  the 
wars  by  which  most  tribes  grew  to  be  great  nations, 
and  by  which  as  nations  they  subsequently  fell.  No 
greater  cause  of  war  has  ever  existed  than  a  dispropor- 
tion between  countries  or  tribes  of  such  a  character 
that  one  was  rich  and  weak,  while  the  other  was  strong 
and  poor.  Nations  are  much  like  individuals — and 
not  very  good  individuals.  Highwaymen  who  are 
poor  and  strong  organize  and  drill  for  the  purpose  of 
attacking  people  who  are  rich  and  weak;   and  while 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     291 

one  would  shrink  from  declaring  that  nations  which 
are  poor  and  strong  do  the  same,  it  may  nevertheless 
be  stated  that  they  have  often  been  accused  of  doing 
so,  and  that  some  wars  are  explainable  on  that  ground 
and  on  none  other. 

The  wars  of  Caesar  in  Gaul  and  Britain  do  not 
seem  to  fall  in  this  category,  and  yet  they  really  do; 
for  Rome  was  poor  in  Julius  Caesar's  day;  and  while 
Gaul  and  Britain  were  not  rich  in  goods,  they  were 
rich  in  land,  and  Rome  craved  land. 

Of  course,  there  have  been  wars  which  were  not 
due  to  dehberate  attacks  by  poor  and  strong  countries 
on  rich  and  weak  countries;  wars  like  our  wars  of  the 
Revolution,  and  with  Mexico,  our  War  of  the  Rebel- 
lion, and  our  Spanish  War,  and  many  others  in  which 
various  nations  have  engaged.  The  causes  of  many 
wars  have  been  so  numerous  and  so  complex  that  the 
true  cause  is  hard  to  state;  but  it  may  be  stated  in 
general  that  wars  in  which  countries  that  were  both 
rich  and  strong,  as  Great  Britain  and  France  are  now, 
have  deHberately  initiated  an  aggressive  war  are  few 
and  far  apart.  The  reason  seems  to  be  that  countries 
which  are  rich  tend  to  become  not  militaristic  and 
aggressive,  but  effeminate  and  pacific.  The  access  of 
luxury,  the  refinements  of  Hving  that  the  useful  and 
the  deUghtful  arts  produce,  and  the  influence  of 
women,  tend  to  wean  men  from  the  hardships  of  mili- 
tary life,  and  to  engender  a  distaste  for  the  confu- 
sion, bloodshed,  and  "horrors"  of  war.    For  this  rea- 


292    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

son,  the  rich  countries  have  shown  little  tendency  to 
aggression,  but  a  very  considerable  tendency  to  in- 
vite aggression.  Physical  fighting  among  nations 
bears  some  resemblance  to  physical  fighting  among 
men,  in  that  rich  nations  and  rich  men  are  apt  to 
abstain  from  it,  unless  they  are  attacked;  or  unless 
they  think  they  are  attacked,  or  will  be.  The  fact 
of  being  rich  has  the  double  influence  of  removing  a 
great  inducement  to  go  to  war,  and  of  causing  a  dis- 
taste for  it. 

For  all  of  the  reasons  given  above,  it  would  seem 
advisable  when  making  an  "estimate  of  the  situation," 
in  preparation  for  war,  to  estimate  it  as  gravely  as 
reasonable  probability  will  permit.  The  tendency  of 
human  nature  is  to  estimate  it  too  lightly;  but  in  mat- 
ters of  possible  war,  "madness  lies  that  way." 

This  seems  to  mean  that  in  preparing  plans  for 
additions  to  the  fleet  for  war,  we  should  estimate  for 
the  worst  condition  that  is  reasonably  probable.  In 
the  United  States,  this  means  that  we  should  estimate 
for  a  sudden  attack  by  a  powerful  fleet  on  our  Atlantic 
coast;  and,  as  such  an  attack  would  occasion  a  tre- 
mendous temptation  to  any  foe  in  Asia  to  make  a 
simultaneous  attack  in  the  Pacific,  we  must  estimate 
also  for  sending  a  large  fleet  at  the  same  time  on  a 
cruise  across  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

This  clearly  means  that  our  estimate  must  include 
putting  into  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  all  the  naval  ves- 
sels that  we  have,  fully  manned  with  fuUy  driUed 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     293 

crews;  and  adding  besides  all  the  vessels  from  civil 
life  that  will  be  needed.  The  vessels  taken  from  civil 
life  will  be  mostly  from  the  merchant  service,  and  will 
be  for  such  auxiliary  duties  as  those  of  hospital  ships, 
supply  ships,  fuel  ships,  and  ammunition  ships,  with 
some  to  do  duty  as  scouts. 

For  the  purposes  of  the  United  States,  therefore, 
the  office  of  naval  strategy  in  planning  additions  to 
our  fleet  for  war,  is  to  make  a  grave  estimate  of  the 
naval  requirements  in  both  the  Atlantic  and  the 
Pacific;  to  divide  the  total  actual  and  prospective 
naval  force  between  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific  in 
such  a  way  as  shall  seem  the  wisest;  to  assign  duties 
in  general  to  each  force;  and  then  to  turn  over  to 
logistics  the  task  of  making  the  quantitative  calcula- 
tions, and  of  performing  the  various  acts,  which  will  be 
necessary  to  carry  out  the  decisions  made. 

Objection  may  be  made  to  the  phrase  just  used — 
"to  divide  the  total  force,"  because  it  is  an  axiom  with 
some  that  one  must  never  divide  his  total  force;  and 
the  idea  of  dividing  our  fleet,  by  assigning  part  to  the 
Atlantic  and  part  to  the  Pacific,  has  been  condemned 
by  many  officers,  the  present  writer  among  them. 

This  is  an  illustration  of  how  frequently  phrases 
are  used  to  express  briefly  ideas  which  could  not  be 
expressed  fully  without  careful  qualifications  and  ex- 
planations that  would  necessitate  many  words;  and 
it  shows  how  carefully  one  must  be  on  his  guard,  lest 
he  put  technical  phrases  to  unintended  uses,  and  at- 


294    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

tach  incorrect  meanings  to  them.  As  a  brief  technical 
statement,  we  may  say,  "never  divide  your  force"; 
but  when  we  say  this,  we  make  a  condensed  statement 
of  a  principle,  and  expect  it  to  be  regarded  as  such, 
and  not  as  a  full  statement.  The  fuU  statement  would 
be:  "In  the  presence  of  an  active  enemy,  do  not  so 
divide  your  force  that  the  enemy  could  attack  each 
division  in  detail  with  a  superior  force."  Napoleon 
was  a  past  master  in  the  art  of  overwhelming  separate 
portions  of  an  enemy's  force,  and  he  understood  bet- 
ter than  any  one  else  of  his  time  the  value  of  con- 
centration. And  yet  a  favorite  plan  of  his  was  to  de- 
tach a  small  part  of  his  force,  to  hold  a  superior  force 
of  the  enemy  in  check  for — say  a  day — while  he 
whipped  another  force  of  the  enemy  with  his  main 
body.  He  then  turned  and  chastised  the  part  which 
had  been  held  in  check  by  the  small  detachment,  and 
prevented  from  coming  to  the  relief  of  the  force  that 
he  attacked  first. 

When  we  say,  then,  that  strategy  directs  how  our 
naval  force  should  be  divided  between  the  Atlantic 
and  the  Pacific,  this  does  not  mean  that  strategy 
should  so  divide  it  that  both  divisions  would  be  con- 
fronted with  forces  larger  than  themselves.  It  may 
mean,  however,  that  strategy,  in  order  that  the  force 
in  one  ocean  shall  be  sufficient,  may  be  compelled  to 
reduce  the  force  in  the  other  ocean  almost  to  zero. 

Some  may  say  that,  unless  we  are  sure  that  our 
force — say  in  the  Atlantic — is  superadequate,  we  ought 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     295 

to  reduce  the  force  in  the  Pacific  to  actual  zero.  Maybe 
contingencies  might  arise  for  which  such  a  division 
would  be  the  wisest;  but  usually  such  a  condition  ex- 
ists that  one  force  is  so  large  that  the  addition  to  it 
of  certain  small  units  would  increase  the  force  only 
microscopically;  whereas  those  small  units  would  be 
of  material  value  elsewhere — say  in  protecting  har- 
bors from  the  raids  of  small  cruisers.  Practically 
speaking,  therefore,  strategy  would  divide  our  naval 
force  into  Atlantic  and  Pacific  fleets,  but  those  fleets 
might  be  very  unequal  in  size,  owing  to  the  vastly 
greater  commercial  and  national  interests  on  our 
Atlantic  coast,  and  the  greater  remoteness  of  probable 
enemies  on  our  Pacific  coast. 

In  estimating  the  work  to  be  done  by  the  U.  S. 
Atlantic  fleet,  three  general  objects  suggest  themselves : 

1.  To  repel  an  attack  made  directly  on  our  At- 
lantic continental  coast. 

2.  To  repel  an  expedition  striving  to  establish  a 
base  in  the  Caribbean,  preHminary  to  an  attack  on 
our  Atlantic  continental  coast  or  on  the  Panama 
Canal. 

3.  To  make  an  expedition  to  a  distant  point,  to 
prevent  the  occupation  of  territory  by  a  foreign  gov- 
ernment in  the  south  Atlantic  or  the  Pacific. 

First  Object. — To  repel  an  attack  made  directly  on 
the  Atlantic  coast,  the  plan  must  provide  for  getting 
the  needed  additions  to  the  fleet  with  the  utmost  des- 
patch.    Owing  to  the  keen  appreciation  by  European 


296    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

nations  of  the  value  of  secrecy  and  despatch,  any  at- 
tack contemplated  by  one  of  them  on  our  Atlantic 
coast  would  be  prepared  behind  the  curtain,  and  noth- 
ing about  its  preparation  would  be  allowed  to  be  re- 
ported to  the  outside  world  until  after  the  attacking 
force  had  actually  sailed.  For  the  force  to  reach  our 
shores,  not  more  than  two  weeks  would  be  needed, 
even  if  the  fleet  stopped  at  mid-Atlantic  islands  to  lay 
in  fuel.  It  is  very  doubtful  if  the  fact  of  stopping  there 
would  be  allowed  to  be  reported,  as  the  commander- 
in-chief  could  easily  take  steps  to  prevent  it.  It  is  pos- 
sible that  merchant  steamers  might  meet  the  fleet,  and 
report  the  fact  by  radio,  but  it  is  not  at  all  certain.  A 
great  proportion  of  the  steamers  met  would  wiUingly 
obey  an  order  not  to  report  it,  or  even  to  have  their 
radio  apparatus  deranged;  either  because  of  national 
sympathy,  or  because  the  captain  was  "insulted  with 
a  very  considerable  bribe."  The  probability,  there- 
fore, would  be  that  we  should  hear  of  the  departure  of 
the  fleet  from  Europe,  and  then  hear  nothing  more 
about  it  until  it  was  met  by  our  scouts. 

This  reasoning  shows  that  to  carry  out  the  plans 
of  strategy,  logistics  would  have  to  provide  plans  and 
means  to  execute  those  plans,  whereby  our  existing 
fleet,  plus  all  the  additions  which  strategy  demanded, 
would  be  waiting  at  whatever  points  on  the  ocean 
strategy  might  indicate,  before  the  coming  enemy 
would  reach  those  points.  In  other  words,  logistics 
must  make  and  execute  such  plans  that  all  the  fleet 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS      297 

which  strategy  demands  will  be  at  the  selected  points 
in  less  than  two  weeks  from  the  time  the  enemy  leaves 
the  shores  of  Europe. 

Of  course,  the  conditions  will  not  necessarily  be 
such  that  strategy  will  demand  that  all  our  reserve 
ships,  especially  the  oldest  ships,  shall  go  out  to  sea 
with  the  active  fleet,  ready  to  engage  in  battle.  May- 
be some  of  them  will  be  found  to  be  so  slow  and 
equipped  with  such  short-range  guns,  that  they  would 
be  an  embarrassment  to  the  commander-in-chief,  in- 
stead of  an  assistance.  Unless  it  is  clear,  however, 
that  any  ship,  especially  a  battleship,  would  he  an  em- 
barrassment, her  place  is  clearly  with  the  fighting  fleet. 
The  issue  of  the  battle  cannot  be  known  in  advance; 
and  as  everything  will  depend  upon  that  issue,  no 
effort  and  no  instrument  should  be  spared  that  can 
assist  in  gaining  victory.  And  even  if  the  older  ships 
might  not  be  of  material  assistance  in  the  early  stages 
of  a  battle,  they  would  do  no  harm  because  they  could 
be  kept  out  of  the  way,  if  need  be.  In  case  either  side 
gains  a  conclusive  victory  at  once,  the  older  ships  will 
do  neither  good  nor  harm;  but  in  case  a  decisive  result 
is  not  at  once  attained,  and  both  sides  are  severely 
damaged,  the  old  ships,  held  in  reserve,  may  then 
come  in  fresh  and  whole,  like  the  reserve  in  land  en- 
gagements, and  add  a  fighting  force  which  at  that  time 
will  be  most  important  and  may  be  decisive. 

Probably  some  of  the  ships  will  be  too  old,  how- 
ever, to  fill  places  of  any  value  in  the  active  fleet. 


298    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

These  should  be  fuUy  manned  and  equipped,  however, 
for  there  will  be  many  fields  of  usefulness  for  them. 
One  field  will  be  in  assisting  the  land  defenses,  in  pro- 
tecting the  mouths  of  harbors  and  mine-fields,  in  de- 
fending submarine  bases,  and  acting  as  station  ships 
in  the  coast-defense  system. 

Second  Object. — ^To  repel  an  enemy  expedition, 
striving  to  estabhsh  a  base  in  the  Caribbean,  prepara- 
tion would  have  to  be  made  for  as  prompt  a  mobiliza- 
tion as  possible;  for  although  the  threat  of  invasion 
of  our  coast  would  not  carry  with  it  the  idea  of  such 
early  execution  as  would  a  direct  attack  on  New  York, 
yet  the  actual  establishment  of  a  base  so  near  our 
shores  would  give  such  advantages  to  a  hostile  nation 
for  a  future  invasion,  that  measures  to  prevent  it  should 
be  imdertaken  with  the  utmost  possible  thoroughness 
and  despatch;  because  the  operation  of  establishing  a 
base  mvolves  many  elements  of  difficulty  that  an 
active  defender  can  hinder  by  aeroplane  attacks, 
etc.;  whereas,  after  a  base  has  once  been  estabhshed 
and  equipped  with  appropriate  defenses,  attacks  upon 
it  are  much  less  productive  of  results. 

The  endeavor  to  estabhsh  a  base  and  the  oppos- 
ing effort  to  prevent  it,  will  offer  many  opportunities 
for  excellent  work  on  both  sides.  Practically  all  the 
elements  of  naval  force  will  be  engaged,  and  events 
on  the  largest  possible  scale  may  be  expected.  The 
operations  will  naturally  be  more  extended  both  in 
time  and  distance  than  in  the  case  of  a  direct  attack 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     299 

upon  our  coast,  and  therefore  the  task  of  logistics  will 
be  greater.  Actual  battle  between  large  forces;  minor 
engagements  among  aircraft,  scouts,  submarines,  and 
destroyers;  attacks  on  the  train  of  the  invader — even 
conflicts  on  shore — will  be  among  the  probabihties. 

Third  Object. — ^To  send  a  large  expedition  to  carry 
out  naval  operations  in  far  distant  waters — in  the 
south  Atlantic,  for  instance,  to  prevent  the  extension 
of  a  monarchical  government  in  South  America,  or  in 
the  western  Pacific  to  defend  our  possessions  there — 
calls  for  plans  invohang  more  logistical  calculation 
and  execution,  but  permitting  a  more  leisurely  pro- 
cedure. The  distances  to  be  traversed  are  so  great, 
the  lack  of  bases  is  so  distinct  and  so  difficult  to  remedy, 
and  the  impossibiHty  of  arriving  in  time  to  prevent 
the  seizing  of  land  by  any  hostile  expedition  is  so 
evident,  that  they  combine  to  necessitate  great  thor- 
oughness of  preparation  and  only  such  a  measure  of 
despatch  as  can  be  secured  without  endangering  thor- 
oughness. Whether  the  projected  expedition  shall  in- 
clude troops,  the  conditions  at  the  time  must  dictate. 
Troops  with  their  transports  will  much  complicate  and 
increase  the  difficulties  of  the  problem,  and  they  may 
or  may  not  be  needed.  The  critical  results  can  be  ac- 
comphshed  by  naval  operations  only;  since  nothing  can 
be  accomplished  if  the  naval  part  of  the  expedition  fails 
to  secure  the  command  of  the  sea;  and  the  troops  can- 
not be  landed  until  it  has  been  secured,  unless  the  fact 
of  securing  it  can  safely  be  relied  on  in  advance.    For 


300    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

these  reasons,  the  troops  may  be  held  back  until  the 
command  of  the  sea  has  been  secured,  and  then  sent 
out  as  an  independent  enterprise.  This  would  seem 
the  more  prudent  procedure  in  most  cases,  since  one 
successful  night  attack  on  a  group  of  transports  by 
an  active  enemy  might  destroy  it  altogether. 

But  whether  a  military  expedition  should  accom- 
pany the  fleet,  or  follow  a  few  hundred  miles  behind, 
or  delay  starting  until  command  of  the  sea  has  been 
achieved,  it  is  obvious  that  the  logistic  calculations 
and  executive  measures  for  sending  a  modem  fleet  to 
a  very  distant  place,  and  sustaining  it  there  for  an  in- 
definite period,  must  be  of  the  highest  order  of  diffi- 
culty. The  difficulty  will  be  reduced  in  cases  where 
there  is  a  great  probabihty  of  being  able  to  secure  a 
base  which  would  be  able  to  receive  large  numbers  of 
deep-draft  ships  in  protected  waters,  to  repair  ships  of 
all  classes  that  might  be  wounded  in  battle,  and  to 
store  and  supply  great  quantities  of  ammunition,  food, 
and  fuel. 

No  expedition  of  such  magnitude  has  ever  yet 
been  made — though  some  of  the  expeditions  of  ancient 
times,  such  as  the  naval  expedition  of  Persia  against 
Greece,  B.  C.  480,  and  the  despatch  of  the  Spanish 
Armada  in  more  recent  days,  may  have  been  as  diffi- 
cult, considering  the  meagreness  of  the  material  and 
engineering  resources  of  those  epochs. 

But  even  if  no  military  force  accompanies  the  ex- 
pedition,  the  enormous  quantities  of  fuel,   supplies. 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     301 

ammunition,  medical  stores,  etc.,  that  will  be  re- 
quired, especially  fuel;  the  world-wide  interest  that 
will  be  centred  on  the  expedition;  the  international 
importance  attaching  to  it;  and  the  unspeakable 
necessity  that  the  plans  shall  underestimate  no  diffi- 
culty and  overlook  no  factor,  point  with  a  long  and 
steady  finger  at  the  necessity  of  attacking  this  prob- 
lem promptly  and  very  seriously,  and  of  detailing  the 
officers  and  constructing  the  administrative  machin- 
ery needed  to  make  the  calculations  and  to  execute 
the  measures  that  the  calculations  show  to  be  re- 
quired. 

Static  Defense  of  the  Coast. — But  besides  the  mo- 
bile fleet  which  is  a  nation's  principal  concern,  strat- 
egy requires  that  for  certain  points  on  the  coast,  where 
large  national  and  commercial  interests  are  centred, 
arrangements  shall  be  made  for  what  may  be  termed  a 
"static  defense,"  by  vessels,  mine-fields,  submarines, 
aircraft,  etc.,  assigned  as  permanent  parts  of  the  de- 
fense of  these  points,  analogous  to  forts  on  the  land. 
The  naval  activities  of  this  species  of  defense  will  cen- 
tre on  the  mine-fields  which  it  is  a  great  part  of  their 
duty  to  defend.  To  guard  these,  and  to  get  timely 
information  of  the  coming  of  any  hostile  force  or  raid- 
ing expedition,  strategy  says  we  must  get  our  eyes 
and  ears  well  out  from  the  land.  To  do  this,  water 
craft  and  aircraft  of  various  kinds  are  needed;  and 
they  must  be  not  only  sufficiently  numerous  over  each 
area  to  scout  the  waters  thoroughly,  but  they  must  be 


302    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

adapted  to  their  purpose,  manned  by  adequate  and 
skilful  crews,  and  organized  so  as  to  act  effectively 
together. 

The  work  of  this  patrol  system  is  not  to  be 
restricted,  however,  to  getting  and  transmitting  infor- 
mation. Certain  of  the  craft  must  be  armed  suffi- 
ciently to  drive  off  hostile  craft,  trying  to  drag  or  coun- 
termine the  defensive  mine-fields;  some  must  be  able 
to  add  to  the  defensive  mine-fields  by  planting  mines, 
and  some  must  be  able  to  pilot  friendly  ships  through 
the  defensive  mine-fields;  others  still  must  be  able  to 
countermine,  drag,  and  sweep  for  any  offensive  mines 
that  the  enemy  may  plant. 

Vessels  for  this  patrol  work  do  not  have  to  be  very 
large;  in  fact,  for  much  of  the  work  in  the  mine-fields, 
it  were  better  if  they  were  small,  by  reason  of  the  abil- 
ity of  small  vessels  to  turn  in  restricted  spaces. 

It  would  seem  that  for  the  patrol  service,  the  ves- 
sels of  the  Revenue  Marine  and  Lighthouse  Service 
(coast  guard)  are  ideally  adapted;  but,  of  course,  there 
are  only  a  few  in  total.  These  would  have  to  be  sup- 
plemented by  small  craft  of  many  kinds,  such  as  tugs, 
fast  motor-boats,  fishing-boats,  and  trawlers.  To  find 
men  competent  to  man  such  vessels  and  do  the  kind 
of  work  required  would  not  be  so  difficult  as  to  get 
men  competent  to  man  the  more  distinctive  fighting 
ships.  Good  merchant  sailors,  fishermen,  and  tug- 
boat men  would  fit  into  the  work  with  considerable 
ease,  and  in  quite  a  short  time.     Strategy  declares. 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     303 

however,  that  a  coast  guard  may  be  needed  a  very 
short  time  after  war  breaks  out;  and  that  the  vessels 
and  the  men,  with  all  the  necessary  equipment  and 
all  the  necessary  organization  and  training,  should  be 
put  into  actual  operation  beforehand. 

Not  only  the  fleet,  however,  but  all  the  bureaus 
and  offices  of  the  Navy  Department,  all  the  navy-yards, 
and  all  the  radio  stations,  recruiting  stations,  hydro- 
graphic  offices,  training  stations,  and  agencies  for  se- 
curing information  from  foreign  countries,  will  have  to 
pass  instantly  from  a  peace  basis  to  a  war  basis.  To 
do  these  things  quickly  and  correctly  many  prelimi- 
naries must  be  arranged;  but  if  the  General  Staff  pre- 
pares good  plans  beforehand,  arranges  measures  which 
will  insure  that  the  plans  shall  be  promptly  carried  out, 
and  holds  a  few  mobilization  drills  to  test  them,  the 
various  bureaus  and  offices  in  the  department  can  do 
the  rest.  If  the  fires  have  aU  been  lighted,  the  engine 
gotten  ready,  and  the  boilers  filled  in  time,  the  engi- 
neer may  open  the  throttle  confidently,  when  the  criti- 
cal time  arrives,  for  the  engine  will  surely  do  its  part. 

But  if  the  proper  plans  have  not  been  made  and 
executed,  the  sudden  outbreak  of  war,  in  which  any 
coimtry  becomes  involved  with  a  powerful  naval  coim- 
try,  will  create  confusion  on  a  scale  larger  than  any 
that  the  world  has  ever  seen,  and  compared  with 
which  pandemonium  would  be  a  Quaker  meeting.  A 
realization  of  facts  will  come  to  that  country,  and 


304    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

especially  to  the  naval  authorities,  that  will  overwhelm 
them  with  the  consciousness  of  their  inability  to  meet 
the  crisis  marching  toward  them  with  swift  but  unhur- 
ried tread — confident,  determined,  unescapable.  Fear 
of  national  danger  and  the  sense  of  shame,  hopeless- 
ness and  helplessness  will  combine  to  produce  psy- 
chological effects  so  keen  that  even  panic  will  be  pos- 
sible. Ojficers  in  high  places  at  sea  and  on  shore  will 
send  telegrams  of  inquiry  and  suggestion;  civilians 
in  pubhc  and  private  station  will  do  the  same.  No 
fitting  answers  can  be  given,  because  there  will  be  no 
time  for  reflection  and  deliberation.  The  fact  that  it 
would  be  impossible  to  get  the  various  additions  to  the 
fleet  and  the  patrol  services  ready  in  time,  and  the 
consciousness  that  it  would  be  useless  to  do  any  less, 
will  tend  to  bring  on  a  desperate  resolve  to  accept  the 
situation  and  let  the  enemy  do  his  worst.  The  actual 
result,  however,  will  probably  be  like  the  result  of 
similar  situations  in  the  past;  that  is,  some  course  of 
action  will  be  hastily  decided  on,  not  in  the  reasoned- 
out  beUef  that  it  can  accomplish  much,  but  with  the 
feeling  that  action  of  any  kind  will  reheve  the  nervous 
tension  of  the  pubUc  by  giving  an  outlet  for  mental 
and  physical  exertion  and  wfll,  besides,  lend  itself  to 
self-encouragement,  and  create  a  feeling  that  proper 
and  effective  measures  are  being  taken. 

Such  conditions,  though  on  a  much  smaller  scale, 
are  familiar  to  naval  officers  and  are  suggested  by  the 
supposititious  order  "somebody  do  something";   and 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     305 

we  frequently  see  people  placed  in  situations  in  which 
they  do  not  know  what  to  do,  and  so  they  do — not 
nothing,  but  anything;  though  it  would  often  be  wiser 
to  do  nothing  than  to  do  the  thing  they  do  do.  Many 
of  the  inane  remarks  that  people  make  are  due  to  their 
finding  themselves  in  situations  in  which  they  do  not 
know  what  to  say,  but  in  which  they  feel  impelled  to 
say  "something." 

Now  what  kind  of  "something"  would  be  done 
under  the  stimulus  of  the  outbreak  of  a  war  for  which 
a  country  had  not  laid  its  plans  ?  Can  any  worse  situa- 
tion be  imagined — except  the  situation  that  would 
follow  when  the  enemy  arrived?  The  parable  of  the 
wise  and  foohsh  virgins  suggests  the  situation,  both 
in  the  foolishness  of  the  unpreparedness  and  in  the 
despair  when  the  consequent  disaster  is  seen  approach- 
ing. 

In  nearly  all  navies  and  armies,  until  the  recent 
enormous  increase  in  all  kinds  of  material  took  place, 
the  work  of  getting  a  navy  ready  for  war  in  personnel 
and  material  was  comparatively  simple.  This  does 
not  mean  that  it  was  easier  then  than  now;  because 
the  facilities  for  construction,  transportation,  com- 
munication, and  accounting  were  much  less  than  now; 
but  it  does  mean  that  the  actual  number  of  articles 
to  be  handled  was  much  less,  and  the  number  of  kinds 
of  articles  was  also  much  less;  and  it  also  means  that 
the  various  mechanical  improvements,  while  they  have 
facilitated   construction,   transportation,   communica- 


3o6    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

tion,  and  accounting,  have  done  so  for  every  nation; 
so  that  none  of  the  competing  navies  have  had  their 
labors  expedited  or  made  less.  On  the  contrary,  the 
very  means  devised  and  developed  for  expediting  work 
is  of  the  nature  of  an  instrument;  and  in  order  to  use 
that  instrument  successfully,  one  has  to  study  it  and 
practise  with  it;  so  that  the  necessity  for  studying 
and  practising  with  the  instrument  has  added  a  new 
and  difficult  procedure  to  those  before  existing. 

Fifty  years  ago  the  various  mechanisms  of  naval 
warfare  were  few,  and  those  few  simple.  In  our  Navy 
Department  the  work  of  supplying  those  mechanisms 
was  divided  among  several  bureaus,  and  each  bureau 
was  given  the  duty  and  the  accompanying  power  of 
supplying  its  particular  quota.  The  rapid  multiphca- 
tion,  during  the  past  fifty  years,  of  new  mechanisms, 
and  new  kinds  of  mechanisms;  the  increased  expense 
of  those  mechanisms  compared  with  that  of  former 
mechanisms;  the  increased  size  and  power  of  vessels, 
guns,  and  engines;  the  increased  size  and  complexity 
of  the  utilities  in  navy-yards  for  handling  them;  the 
necessity  for  providing  and  using  means  and  methods 
for  despatching  the  resulting  "business"  speedily,  and 
for  guarding  against  mistakes  in  handling  the  multi- 
plicity of  details — the  increase,  in  brief,  in  the  number, 
size,  and  kinds  of  things  that  have  to  be  done  in  prep- 
aration, has  brought  about  not  only  more  labor  in 
doing  those  things  by  the  various  bureaus  assigned  to 
do  them,  but  has  brought  about  even  more  imperiously 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     307 

the  demand  for  means  whereby  the  central  authority 
shall  be  assured  that  each  bureau  is  doing  its  work. 
And  it  has  brought  about  more  imperiously  still  a  de- 
mand that  a  clear  conception  shall  be  formed  first  of 
what  must  be  done,  and  second  of  the  maximum  time 
that  can  be  allowed  for  doing  it. 

Clearly,  the  forming  of  a  correct  conception  should 
not  be  expected  of  men  not  trained  to  form  it;  clearly, 
for  instance,  mere  knowledge  of  electricity  and  mere 
skill  in  using  electrical  instruments  cannot  enable  a 
man  to  devise  radio  apparatus  for  naval  use;  a  cer- 
tain amount  of  knowledge  of  purely  naval  and  nauti- 
cal matters  is  needed  in  addition.  Clearly,  the  con- 
cept as  to  the  kind  of  performance  to  be  required  of 
radio  apparatus  is  not  to  be  expected  of  a  mere  tech- 
nician, but  is  to  be  expected  of  a  strategist — and  equally 
the  ability  to  design,  construct,  and  supply  the  appara- 
tus is  not  to  be  expected  of  a  strategist,  but  it  is  to  be 
expected  of  a  technician. 

A  like  remark  may  be  made  concerning  any 
mechanism — say  a  gun,  a  torpedo,  or  an  instrument,  or 
a  vessel  of  any  kind.  The  strategist,  by  studying  the 
requirements  of  probable  war,  concludes  that  a  cer- 
tain kind  of  thing  is  needed;  and  the  technician  sup- 
plies it,  or  does  so  to  the  best  of  his  ability. 

The  statement  thus  far  made  indicates  a  division 
of  work  into  two  sharply  defined  departments;  and, 
theoretically,  such  a  division  does  exist.  This  does 
not  mean,  however,  that  the  strategist  and  the  tech- 


3o8    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

nician  should  work  independently  of  each  other.  Such 
a  procedure  would  result  in  the  strategist  demanding 
things  the  technician  could  not  supply,  and  in  the 
technician  supplying  things  the  strategist  did  not 
want,  under  a  mistaken  impression  as  to  what  the 
strategist  wanted.  The  fullest  and  most  intimate 
understanding  and  co-operation  must  exist  between 
the  strategist  and  the  technician,  as  it  must  equally 
between  the  architect  and  the  builder  of  a  house. 

From  an  appreciation  of  such  facts  as  these,  every 
great  Navy  Department,  except  that  of  the  United 
States,  has  developed  a  General  Staff,  which  studies 
what  should  be  done  to  prepare  for  passing  from  a 
state  of  peace  to  a  state  of  war;  which  informs  the 
minister  at  the  head  of  the  department  what  things 
should  be  done,  and  is  given  power  to  provide  that  the 
various  bureaus  and  offices  shall  be  able  to  do  them 
when  war  breaks.  This  is  the  scheme  which  all  the 
navy  departments,  except  the  American,  have  de- 
vised, to  meet  the  sudden  and  violent  shock  of  the 
outbreak  of  a  modern  war.  No  other  means  has  yet  been 
devised,  and  no  other  means  is  even  forecasted. 

The  means  is  extremely  simple  in  principle,  but 
complex  beyond  the  reach  of  an  ordinary  imagination 
in  detail.  It  consists  simply  in  writing  down  a  digest 
of  all  the  various  things  that  are  to  be  done,  dividing 
the  task  of  doing  them  among  the  various  bureaus 
and  offices  that  are  authorized  by  law  to  do  them,  and 
then  seeing  that  the  bureaus  shall  be  able  to  do  them 
in  the  time  allowed. 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     309 

The  best  way  of  ascertaining  if  the  bureaus  are 
able  to  do  them  is  to  mobihze — to  put  into  commis- 
sion and  send  out  to  sea  all  the  craft  that  will  be 
needed,  fully  equipped  with  a  trained  personnel  and 
with  a  well-conditioned  material;  and  then  direct  the 
comanander-in-chief  to  solve  a  definite  strategic  prob- 
lem— say  to  defend  the  coast  against  a  hypothetical 
enemy  fleet — the  solution  including  tactical  games  by 
day  and  night. 

Before  attempting  the  solution  of  a  strategic  prob- 
lem by  an  entire  naval  force,  however,  it  is  usual  to 
hold  mobilization  exercises  of  a  character  less  com- 
plete, in  the  same  way  that  any  course  of  training  be- 
gins with  drills  that  are  easy  and  progresses  to  drills 
that  are  difiicult.  The  simplest  of  all  the  preparative 
drills— if  drills  they  correctly  can  be  called — is  the 
periodical  reporting,  once  a  month,  or  once  a  quarter, 
by  each  bureau  and  office,  of  its  state  of  readiness;  the 
report  to  be  in  such  detail  as  experience  shows  to  be 
the  best. 

In  the  days  when  each  bureau's  preparation  con- 
sisted of  comparatively  few  things  to  do,  the  chief  of 
that  bureau  could  be  relied  on  to  do  the  things  required 
to  be  done  by  his  bureau;  and  his  oral  assurance  to 
the  secretary  that — say  all  the  ships  had  enough  am- 
munition, or  that  adequate  provision  had  been  made 
for  coal,  or  that  there  were  enough  enlisted  men — 
would  fulfil  all  requirements.  But  in  the  past  fifty 
years,  the  requirements  have  increased  a  hundredfold, 
while  the  human  mind  has  remained  just  as  it  was. 


3IO    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

So  it  has  seemed  necessary  to  institute  a  system  of 
periodical  preparation  reports,  to  examine  them  care- 
fully, and  to  use  all  possible  vigilance,  lest  any  item  be 
forgotten  or  any  work  done  by  two  bureaus  that 
ought  to  be  done  by  only  one. 

Who  should  examine  the  reports?  Naturally  the 
same  persons  as  decide  what  shoiild  be  done.  The 
same  studies  and  deliberations  that  fit  a  person  to  de- 
cide what  is  needed,  fit  him  to  inspect  the  product  that 
is  offered  to  supply  the  need;  not  only  to  see  if  it 
comes  up  to  the  specifications,  but  also  to  decide 
whether  or  not  any  observed  omission  is  really  impor- 
tant; to  decide  whether,  in  view  of  certain  practical 
difficulties,  the  specifications  may  be  modified;  and 
also  to  decide  whether  certain  improvements  suggested 
by  any  bureau  should  or  should  not  be  adopted. 

This  procedure  may  seem  to  put  the  strategy  offi- 
cers "over"  the  technical  officers,  to  put  a  lieutenant- 
commander  on  the  General  Staff  "over"  a  rear  admiral 
who  is  chief  of  bureau;  but  such  an  idea  seems  hardly 
justified.  In  any  well-designed  organization  relative 
degrees  of  official  superiority  are  functions  of  rank,  and 
of  nothing  else;  superiority  in  rank  must,  of  course,  be 
recognized,  for  the  reason  that  when  on  duty  together 
the  junior  must  obey  the  senior.  But  even  this  supe- 
riority is  purely  ofl&cial;  it  is  a  matter  of  position,  and 
not  a  matter  of  honor.  All  the  honor  that  is  con- 
nected with  any  position  is  not  by  reason  of  the  posi- 
tion itself,  but  by  reason  of  the  honorable  service  which 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     311 

a  man  must  have  rendered  in  order  to  attain  it,  and 
which  he  must  continue  to  render  in  order  to  main- 
tain it.  So,  in  a  Navy  Department,  the  General  Staff 
officers  cannot  be  "over"  the  bureau  officers,  unless 
by  law  or  regulation  certain  of  the  staff  are  made  to 
rank  over  certain  bureau  officers.  A  procedure  like 
this  would  seem  to  be  unnecessary,  except  in  the  case 
of  the  chief  of  staff  himself,  who  might,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  prompt  administration,  be  placed  by  law  over 
the  bureau  chiefs. 

The  importance  of  the  question,  however,  does  not 
rest  on  a  personal  basis,  but  a  national  basis.  It  makes 
no  difference  to  the  nation  whether  Smith  is  put  above 
Jones,  or  Jones  above  Smith;  and  in  all  discussions  of 
national  matters  it  is  essential  to  bear  in  mind  clearly 
not  only  that  national  questions  must  not  be  obscured 
by  the  interjection  of  the  personal  element,  but  also 
that  great  vigilance  is  needed  to  prevent  it.  For  the 
reason  that  questions  of  the  salaries  of  government 
officials  have  been  settled  in  advance,  questions  of 
personal  prestige  and  authority  are  more  apt  to  in- 
trude themselves  among  them  than  among  men  in 
civil  life,  whose  main  object  is  to  "make  a  Hving" — 
and  as  good  a  living  as  they  can.  In  the  long  struggle 
that  has  gone  on  in  the  United  States  Navy  Depart- 
ment between  the  advocates  and  the  opponents  of  a 
General  Staff,  the  personal  element  has  clouded  the 
question — perhaps  more  than  any  other  element.  Not 
only  in  the  department  itself,  but  in  Congress,  the 


312    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

question  of  how  much  personal  "power"  the  General 
Staff  would  have  has  been  discussed  interminably — as 
though  the  personal  element  were  of  any  importance 
whatever. 

Such  an  attitude  toward  "power"  is  not  remark- 
able when  held  by  civilians,  but  it  is  remarkable  when 
held  by  men  who  have  had  a  military  or  naval  training. 
Of  course,  there  is  an  instinct  in  aU  men  to  crave  power; 
but  it  is  not  recognized  as  an  instinct  wholly  worthy. 
It  is  associated  in  most  men's  minds  with  a  desire  for 
material  possessions,  such  as  money  or  poHtical  posi- 
tion, and  not  with  such  aspirations  as  a  desire  for 
honor.  In  other  words,  a  strong  desire  for  wealth  or 
power,  while  natural  and  pardonable,  is  considered  a 
little  sordid;  while  a  desire  for  honor,  or  for  oppor- 
tunity to  do  good  service,  is  held  to  be  commendable. 
So,  when  public  officials,  either  military  or  civilian, 
condemn  a  measure  because  it  will  give  somebody 
"power,"  the  reason  given  seems  to  be  incomplete, 
unless  a  further  reason  is  given  which  states  the  harm 
that  would  be  done  by  conferring  the  "power." 

Mihtary  and  naval  men  exercise  "power"  from 
the  beginning  of  their  careers  until  their  careers  are 
closed;  and  they  exercise  it  under  the  sane  and  restrain- 
ing influence  of  responsibility;  without  which  influ- 
ence, the  exercise  of  power  is  unjustifiable,  and  under 
which  influence  the  exercise  of  power  is  a  burden — and 
oftentimes  a  heavy  one.  That  men  trained  as  mili- 
tary men  are  trained,  should  aspire  to  power  for  power's 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     313 

own  sake,  is  a  little  hard  to  understand — unless  it  be 
confessed  that  the  person  desiring  the  power  appreci- 
ates its  pleasing  features  more  than  its  responsibihties, 
and  regards  its  duties  more  lightly  than  its  glories. 
Few  men,  even  those  who  shoulder  responsibility  the 
most  courageously,  desire  responsibility  for  its  own 
sake — and  so  the  fact  of  a  man  ardently  desiring 
"power"  seems  a  good  reason  for  withholding  power 
from  him. 

And  what  is  "power,"  in  the  sense  in  which  offi- 
cials, both  miHtary  and  civiHan,  use  the  word?  Is  it 
ability  to  do  good  service,  or  is  it  ability  to  bestow 
favors  in  order  that  favors  may  be  received,  to  give 
orders  to  others  coupled  with  authority  to  enforce 
obedience,  or  to  take  revenge  for  injuries  received  or 
fancied?  Of  course,  "power"  is  abihty  to  do  all  these 
things,  good  and  bad.  But  if  a  man  desires  power 
simply  to  do  good  service,  and  if  he  holds  a  highly 
conscientious  view  of  the  accompanying  duties  and 
responsibihties,  will  he  crave  "power"  as  much  as 
some  men  seem  to  do  ? 

It  seems  fundamental,  then,  that  any  strategic 
plan  for  preparing  the  Navy  Department  for  war 
should  be  framed  with  a  strong  endeavor  to  leave  out 
the  personal  element,  and  should  regard  national  use- 
fulness only.  If  this  be  done  successfully,  and  if  good 
selections  be  made  of  the  personnel  to  do  it,  it  wiU  be 
found  that  the  members  of  the  personnel  will  think  no 
more  about  their  "power"  than  does  an  officer  of  the 


314    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

deck  while  handling  a  battleship  in  fleet  formation 
during  his  four  hours  on  the  bridge. 

In  preparing  the  department  for  war,  one  would 
be  in  danger  of  being  overwhelmed  by  the  enormous- 
ness  and  the  complexity  of  the  task,  unless  he  bore  in 
mind  continuously  that  it  is  only  when  we  get  into  de- 
tails that  any  matter  becomes  complex;  and  therefore 
that  if  we  can  get  a  clear  idea  of  the  whole  subject,  the 
principles  that  underlie  it,  and  the  major  divisions 
into  which  it  naturally  is  divided,  we  can  then  make 
those  divisions  and  afterward  subdivide  those  divi- 
sions, and  later  divide  the  subdivisions;  so  that  the 
whole  subject  will  seem  to  faU  apart  as  a  fowl  does 
under  the  hands  of  a  skilful  carver.  The  divisions  and 
subdivisions  of  the  subject  having  been  made,  the  re- 
maining task,  while  onerous,  will  be  largely  a  matter 
of  copying  and  of  filling  in  blank  forms. 

As  aU  navy  departments  have  means  regulated 
by  law  such  that  the  actual  executive  work  of  recruit- 
ing, constructing,  and  supplying  the  necessary  per- 
sonnel and  material  shall  be  done  by  certain  bureaus 
and  offices,  strategy  does  not  need  executive  power, 
except  for  forcing  the  bureaus  and  offices  to  do  the 
necessary  work — should  such  forcing  become  neces- 
sary. Strategy  being  the  art  of  being  a  general  {strat- 
egos),  one  cannot  conceive  of  it  as  bereft  of  executive 
power,  since  we  cannot  conceive  of  a  general  exercising 
generalship  without  having  executive  power.  It  is 
true  that  strategy  occupies  itself  mainly  with  planning 


RESERVES  AND  SHORE  STATIONS     315 

— but  so  does  a  general;  and  it  is  also  true  that  strat- 
egy itself  does  not  make  the  soldiers  march,  but  neither 
does  a  general;  it  is  the  colonels  and  captains  and 
corporals  who  make  the  soldiers  march.  The  general 
plans  the  campaign  and  arranges  the  marches,  the 
halts,  the  bivouacs,  provisions,  ammunition,  etc., 
through  his  logistical  officers,  and  they  give  the  execu- 
tive officers  general  instructions  as  to  how  to  carry  out 
the  general's  plans. 

Strategy  without  executive  functions  would  be 
like  a  mind  that  could  think,  but  was  imprisoned  in  a 
body  which  was  paralyzed. 

Of  course,  strategy  should  have  executive  func- 
tions for  the  purposes  of  strategy  only;  under  the 
guidance  of  policy  and  to  execute  policy's  behests. 
Policy  is  the  employer,  and  strategy  the  employee. 


CHAPTER  XI 

NAVAL  BASES 

THE  nature  of  naval  operations  necessitates  the 
expenditure  of  fuel,  ammunition,  and  supplies; 
wear  and  tear  of  machinery;  fatigue  of  personnel; 
and  a  gradual  fouling  of  the  bottoms  of  the  ships.  In 
case  actual  battles  mark  the  operations,  the  expendi- 
ture of  stored-up  energy  of  all  kinds  is  very  great  in- 
deed, and  includes  not  only  damage  done  to  personnel 
and  material  by  the  various  agencies  of  destruction, 
but  actual  loss  of  vessels. 

To  furnish  the  means  of  supplying  and  replenish- 
ing the  stored-up  energy  required  for  naval  operations 
is  the  office  of  naval  bases. 

A  naval  base  capable  of  doing  this  for  a  large  fleet 
must  be  a  very  great  establishment.  In  such  a  naval 
base,  one  must  be  able  to  build,  dock,  and  repair  ves- 
sels of  all  kinds,  and  the  mechanisms  needed  in  those 
vessels;  anchor  a  large  fleet  in  safety  behind  adequate 
mihtary  and  naval  protection;  supply  enough  fuel, 
ammunition,  and  suppHes  for  aU  purposes,  and  accom- 
modate large  reserves  of  material  and  personnel.  In- 
asmuch as  a  naval  base  is  purely  a  means  for  expend- 
ing energy  for  military  purposes,  and  has  no  other 

cause  for  its  existence,  it  is  clear  that  it  cannot  be  self- 

316 


NAVAL  BASES  317 

supporting.  For  this  reason  it  is  highly  desirable  that 
a  naval  base  shall  be  near  a  great  city,  especially  if  that 
city  be  a  large  commercial  and  manufacturing  centre. 

It  is  true  that  many  large  naval  bases,  such  as 
Malta  and  Gibraltar  are  not  near  great  cities;  and  it 
is  true  that  most  large  naval  bases  have  no  facilities 
for  building  ships.  But  it  is  also  true  that  few  large 
naval  bases  fulfil  all  the  requirements  of  a  perfect 
naval  base;  in  fact  it  is  true  that  none  do. 

The  most  obvious  requirement  of  a  naval  base  is 
a  large  sheet  of  sheltered  water,  in  which  colliers  and 
oil-carriers  may  lie  and  give  coal  and  oil  to  lighting 
craft,  and  in  which  those  fighting  craft  may  lie  tran- 
quilly at  anchor,  and  carry  on  the  simple  and  yet  neces- 
sary repairs  and  adjustments  to  machinery  that  every 
cruising  vessel  needs  at  intervals.  Without  the  abil- 
ity to  fuel  and  repair,  no  fleet  could  continue  long  at 
work,  any  more  than  a  man  could  do  so,  without  food 
and  the  repairs  which  nature  carries  on  in  sleep.  The 
coming  of  oil  fuel  and  the  consequent  ease  of  fuelling, 
the  practicability  even  of  fuelling  in  moderate  weather 
when  actually  at  sea,  subtract  partially  one  of  the  rea- 
sons for  naval  bases;  but  they  leave  the  other  reasons 
still  existent,  especially  the  reasons  connected  with 
machinery  repairs.  The  principal  repair,  and  the  one 
most  difficult  to  furnish,  is  that  given  by  docking  in 
suitable  docks.  The  size  and  expense  of  docks  capable 
of  carrying  dreadnaughts  and  battle  cruisers  are  so 
great,  and  their  vulnerability  to  fire  from  ships  and 


3i8    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

from  aircraft  is  so  extreme,  that  the  matter  of  dry- 
docks  is  perhaps  the  most  troublesome  single  matter 
connected  with  a  naval  base. 

The  necessity  of  anchorage  areas  for  submarines 
is  a  requirement  of  naval  bases  that  has  only  recently 
been  felt;  and  the  present  war  shows  a  still  newer  re- 
quirement in  suitable  grounds  for  aircraft.  The  speed 
of  aircraft,  however,  is  so  great  that  little  delay  or 
embarrassment  would  result  if  the  camp  for  aircraft 
were  not  at  the  base  itself.  Instead  of  the  camp  being 
on  Culebra,  for  instance,  it  might  well  be  on  Porto 
Rico.  The  extreme  delicacy  of  aircraft,  however,  and 
the  necessity  for  quick  attention  in  case  of  injuries,  es- 
pecially injuries  to  the  engine,  demand  a  suitable  base 
even  more  imperiously  than  do  ships  and  other  rugged 
things. 

That  the  vessels  anchored  in  the  base  should  be 
protected  from  the  fire  of  ships  at  sea  and  from  gims 
on  neighboring  shores  is  clear.  Therefore,  even  if  a 
base  be  hidden  from  the  sea  and  far  from  it  as  is  the 
harbor  of  Santiago,  it  must  be  protected  by  guns,  or 
mines,  or  both;  the  guns  being  nearer  to  the  enemy 
than  are  the  ships  in  the  waters  of  the  base.  An  island 
having  high  bluffs,  where  large  guns  can  be  installed, 
and  approached  by  gradually  shoaling  waters  in  which 
mines  can  be  anchored,  with  deeper  water  outside  in 
which  submarines  can  operate,  is  desirable  from  this 
point  of  view. 

Ability  to   store  and  protect  large  quantities  of 


NAVAL  BASES  319 

provisions  is  essential,  and  especially  in  the  case  of 
ammunition  and  high  explosives.  For  storing  the  lat- 
ter, a  hilly  terrain  has  advantages,  since  tunnels  can 
be  run  horizontally  into  hills,  where  explosives  can  lie 
safe  from  attack,  even  attack  from  aircraft  dropping 
bombs  above  them. 

Naturally,  the  country  that  has  led  the  world  in 
the  matter  of  naval  bases  is  Great  Britain;  and  the 
world  at  large  has  hardly  yet  risen  to  a  realization  of 
the  enduring  work  that  she  has  been  quietly  doing  for 
two  hundred  years,  in  establishing  and  fortifying  com- 
modious resting-places  for  her  war-ships  and  merchant 
ships  in  all  the  seas.  While  other  nations  have  been 
devoting  themselves  to  arranging  and  developing  the 
interiors  of  their  countries,  Great  Britain  has  searched 
all  the  oceans,  has  explored  all  the  coasts,  has  estab- 
lished colonies  and  trading  stations  everywhere,  and 
formed  a  network  of  intimate  commercial  relations 
which  covers  the  world  and  radiates  from  London.  To 
protect  her  conmiercial  stations  and  her  merchant  ships 
from  unfair  dealings  in  time  of  peace,  and  from  cap- 
ture in  time  of  war,  and  to  threaten  all  rivals  with  de- 
feat should  they  resort  to  war.  Great  Britain  has  built 
up  the  greatest  navy  in  the  world.  And  as  this  navy 
pervades  the  world,  and  as  her  merchant  ships  dot 
every  sea  and  display  Great  Britain's  ensign  in  every 
port,  Great  Britain  has  not  failed  to  provide  for  their 
safety  and  support  a  series  of  naval  stations  that  belt 
the  globe. 


320    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

Bases  are  of  many  kinds,  and  may  be  divided  into 
many  classes.  An  evident  ground  for  division  is  that 
of  locality  in  relation  to  the  home  comitry.  Looked 
at  from  this  point  of  view,  we  may  divide  naval  bases 
into  two  classes,  home  bases  and  distant  bases. 

Home  Bases. — A  home  base  is,  as  its  name  implies, 
a  base  situated  in  the  home  country.  The  most  usual 
type  of  the  home  naval  base  is  the  navy-yard,  though 
few  navy-yards  can  meet  all  the  requirements  of  a 
naval  base.  The  New  York  navy-yard,  for  instance, 
which  is  our  most  important  yard,  lacks  three  of  the 
most  vital  attributes  of  a  naval  base,  in  that  it  has  no 
means  for  receiving  and  protecting  a  large  fleet,  it  can- 
not be  approached  by  large  ships  except  at  high  tide, 
and  it  could  not  receive  a  seriously  injured  battleship 
at  any  time,  because  the  channel  leading  to  it  is  too 
shallow. 

Home  bases  that  approach  perfection  were  evi- 
denced after  the  battle  ofif  the  Skagerak;  for  the 
wounded  ships  of  both  sides  took  refuge  after  the  bat- 
tle in  protected  bases,  where  they  were  repaired  and 
refitted,  and  resupplied  with  fighting  men  and  fuel. 
These  bases  seem  to  have  been  so  located,  so  pro- 
tected, and  so  equipped,  as  to  do  exactly  what  bases 
are  desired  to  do;  they  were  "bases  of  operations"  in 
the  best  sense.  The  fleets  of  the  opposing  sides  started 
from  those  bases  as  nearly  ready  as  human  means  and 
foresight  could  devise,  returned  to  them  for  refresh- 
ment after  the  operations  had  been  concluded,  and, 


NAVAL  BASES  321 

during  the  operations,  were  based  upon  those  bases. 
If  the  bases  of  either  fleet  had  been  improperly  located, 
or  inadequately  protected  or  equipped,  that  fleet  would 
not  have  been  so  completely  ready  for  battle  as,  in 
fact,  it  was;  and  it  could  not  have  gone  to  its  base  for 
shelter  and  repairs  so  quickly  and  so  surely  as,  in  fact, 
it  did.  Many  illustrations  can  be  found  in  history  of 
the  necessity  for  naval  bases;  but  the  illustration  given 
by  this  battle  of  May  31  is  of  itself  so  perfect  and  con- 
vincing, that  it  seems  hardly  necessary  or  even  desir- 
able to  bring  forward  any  others. 

The  fact  of  the  nearness  to  each  other  of  the  bases 
of  the  two  contending  fleets — the  nearness  of  Germany 
and  Great  Britain  in  other  words — coupled  with  the 
nearness  of  the  battle  itself  to  the  bases,  and  the  fact 
that  both  fleets  retired  shortly  afterward  to  the  bases, 
bring  out  in  clear  relief  the  efficacy  of  bases;  but  never- 
theless their  efficacy  would  have  been  even  more 
strongly  shown  if  the  battle  had  been  near  to  the 
bases  of  the  more  powerful  fleet,  but  far  from  the 
bases  of  the  other  fleet — as  was  the  case  at  the  battle, 
near  Tsushima,  in  the  Japan  Sea. 

Of  course  the  weaker  fleet  in  the  North  Sea  bat- 
tle would  not  have  been  drawn  into  battle  under  such 
conditions,  because  it  would  not  have  had  a  safe  refuge 
to  retreat  to.  It  was  the  proximity  of  an  adequate 
naval  base,  that  could  be  approached  through  protected 
waters  only,  which  justified  the  weaker  fleet  in  dashing 
out  and  taking  advantage  of  what  seemed  to  be  an 


322    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

opportunity.  Similarly,  if  the  Russian  fleet  in  the 
Japan  Sea  had  had  a  base  near  by,  from  which  it  had 
issued  ready  in  all  ways,  and  to  which  it  could  have 
retired  as  soon  as  the  battle  began  to  go  against  it,  the 
Russian  disaster  might  not  have  occurred,  and  full  com- 
mand of  the  sea  by  the  Japanese  might  have  been  pre- 
vented. But  there  being  no  base  or  harbor  of  refuge, 
disaster  succeeded  disaster  in  a  cumulative  fashion,  and 
the  Russian  fleet  was  annihilated  in  deep  water. 

If  a  naval  base  were  lacking  to  the  more  powerful 
fleet,  as  was  the  case  in  the  battle  of  Manila,  the  effect 
would  in  many  cases  be  but  slight — as  at  Manila.  If, 
however,  the  more  powerful  fleet  were  badly  injured, 
the  absence  of  a  base  would  be  keenly  felt  and  might 
entail  disaster  in  the  future,  even  though  the  more 
powerful  fleet  were  actuaUy  victorious.  The  Japanese 
fleet  was  practicaUy  victorious  at  the  battle  of  Au- 
gust lo,  near  Port  Arthur;  but  if  it  had  not  been  able 
to  refit  and  repair  at  a  naval  base,  it  would  have  met 
the  Russian  fleet  later  with  much  less  probabflity  of 
success, 

Mahan  states  that  the  three  main  requirements 
in  a  naval  base  are  position,  resources,  and  strength; 
and  of  these  he  considers  that  position  is  the  most 
important;  largely  because  resources  and  strength  can 
be  artificiaUy  suppUed,  while  position  is  the  gift  of 
nature,  and  cannot  be  moved  or  changed. 

Mahan's  arguments  seem  to  suggest  that  the  bases 
he  had  in  mind  were  bases  distant  from  home,  not 


NAVAL  BASES  323 

home  bases;  since  reference  is  continually  made  by 
him  to  the  distance  and  direction  of  bases  from  im- 
portant strategic  points  of  actual  or  possible  enemies. 

His  arguments  do  not  seem  to  apply  with  equal 
force  to  home  bases,  for  the  reason  that  home  bases  are 
intended  primarily  as  bases  from  which  operations 
are  to  start;  secondarily  as  bases  to  which  fleets  may 
return,  and  only  remotely  as  bases  during  operations; 
whereas,  distant  bases  are  intended  as  points  from 
which  operations  may  continually  be  carried  on,  dur- 
ing the  actual  prosecution  of  a  war.  The  position  of 
a  home  base,  for  instance,  as  referred  to  any  enemy's 
coasts  or  bases,  is  relatively  unimportant,  compared 
with  its  abihty  to  fit  out  a  fleet;  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  position  of  distant  bases,  such  as  Hong- 
Kong,  Malta,  or  Gibraltar,  relatively  to  the  coasts  of 
an  enemy,  is  vital  in  the  extreme.  It  is  the  positions 
of  these  three  bases  that  make  them  so  valuable  to 
their  holders;  placed  at  points  of  less  strategic  value, 
the  importance  of  those  bases  would  be  strategically 
less. 

Home  bases  are  valuable  mainly  by  reason  of 
their  resources.  This  does  not  mean  that  position  is 
an  unimportant  factor;  it  does  not  mean,  for  instance, 
that  a  naval  base  would  be  valuable  if  situated  in  the 
Adirondack  Mountains,  no  matter  how  great  resources 
it  might  have.  It  does  mean,  however,  that  the  "posi- 
tion" that  is  important  for  a  home  base  is  the  position 
that  the  base  holds  relatively  to  large  home  commer- 


324    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

cial  centres  and  to  the  open  sea.  New  York,  for  in- 
stance, could  be  made  an  excellent  naval  base,  mainly 
because  of  the  enormous  resources  that  it  has  and  its 
nearness  to  the  ocean.  Philadelphia,  likewise,  could 
be  made  valuable,  though  Philadelphia's  position  rela- 
tively to  deep  water  is  far  from  good.  "Position,"  as 
used  in  this  sense,  is  different  from  the  "position" 
meant  by  Mahan,  who  used  the  word  in  its  strategic 
sense.  The  position  of  Philadelphia  relatively  to  deep 
water  could  be  changed  by  simply  deepening  the  chan- 
nel of  the  Delaware;  but  no  human  power  could 
change  the  strategic  position  of  Malta  or  Gibraltar. 

Yet  for  even  home  bases,  position,  resources,  and 
strength  must  be  combined  to  get  a  satisfactory  re- 
sult; the  "position"  not  being  related  to  foreign  naval 
bases,  however,  but  to  large  industrial  establishments, 
mainly  in  order  that  working  men  of  various  classes 
may  be  secured  when  needed.  The  requirements  of 
work  on  naval  craft  are  so  discontinuous  that  steady 
employment  can  be  provided  for  comparatively  few 
men  only;  so  that  a  sort  of  reservoir  is  needed,  close 
at  hand,  which  can  be  drawn  up  when  men  are  needed, 
and  into  which  men  can  be  put  back,  whenever  the 
need  for  them  has  ceased.  And  the  same  commercial 
and  industrial  conditions  that  assure  a  supply  of  skilled 
workers,  assure  a  supply  of  provisions  and  all  kinds  of 
material  as  well. 

Distant  Bases. — ^Distant  bases  have  two  fields  of 
usefulness  which  are  distinct,  though  one  implies  the 


NAVAL  BASES  325 

other;  one  field  being  merely  that  of  supplying  a  fleet 
and  offering  a  refuge  in  distress,  and  the  other  field 
being  that  of  contributing  thereby  to  offensive  and  de- 
fensive operations.  No  matter  in  which  light  we  re- 
gard a  distant  naval  base,  it  is  clear  that  position,  re- 
sources, and  strength  must  be  the  principal  factors; 
but  as  soon  as  we  concentrate  our  attention  on  the 
operations  that  may  be  based  upon  it,  we  come  to  real- 
ize how  strong  a  factor  position,  that  is  strategic  posi- 
tion, is.  The  base  itself  is  an  inert  collection  of  inert 
materials;  these  materials  can  be  useful  to  the  opera- 
tions of  a  fleet  that  bases  on  it;  but  if  the  fleet  is  oper- 
ating in  the  Pacific,  a  base  in  the  Atlantic  is  not  imme- 
diately valuable  to  it,  no  matter  what  strength  and 
resources  the  base  may  have. 

The  functions  of  a  home  base  are  therefore  those 
that  the  name  "home"  implies;  to  start  the  fleet  out 
on  its  mission,  to  receive  it  on  its  return,  and  to  offer 
rest,  refuge,  and  succor  in  times  of  accident  and  distress. 

The  functions  of  a  distant  base  concern  more 
nearly  the  operations  of  a  prolonged  campaign.  A  dis- 
tant base  is  more  difficult  to  construct  as  a  rule;  largely 
because  the  fact  of  its  distance  renders  engineering 
operations  difficult  and  because  the  very  exceUence 
of  its  position  as  an  outpost  makes  it  vulnerable  to  di- 
rect attack  and  often  to  a  concentration  of  attacks 
coming  from  different  directions. 

If  naval  operations  are  to  be  conducted  at  consid- 
erable distances  from  home,  say  in  the  Caribbean  Sea, 


326    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

distant  bases  are  necessary,  since  without  them,  the 
fleet  will  operate  under  a  serious  handicap.  Under 
some  conditions,  a  fleet  operating  in  the  Caribbean 
without  a  base  there,  against  an  enemy  that  had  estab- 
lished a  satisfactory  base,  might  have  its  normal  fight- 
ing efficiency  reduced  50  per  cent,  or  even  more.  A 
fleet  is  not  a  motionless  fort,  whose  strength  lies  only 
in  its  ability  to  fire  guns  and  withstand  punishment; 
a  fleet  is  a  very  live  personality,  whose  ability  to  fight 
weU — like  a  pugilist's — depends  largely  on  its  abihty 
to  move  quickly  and  accurately,  and  to  think  quickly 
and  accurately.  The  best  pugilists  are  not  usually  the 
strongest  men,  though  physical  strength  is  an  impor- 
tant factor;  the  best  pugiHsts  are  men  who  are  quick 
as  well  as  strong,  who  see  an  advantage  or  a  danger 
quickly,  and  whose  eyes,  nerves,  and  muscles  act  to- 
gether swiftly  and  harmoniously.  A  modem  fleet, 
filled  with  high-grade  machinery  of  all  kinds,  manned 
by  highly  trained  men  to  operate  it,  and  commanded 
by  officers  fit  to  be  intrusted  with  such  responsibilities, 
is  a  highly  developed  and  sensitive  organism — and,  like 
all  highly  developed  and  sensitive  organisms,  exists  in 
a  state  of  what  may  be  called  "imstable  equihbrium." 
As  pointed  out  in  previous  pages,  the  high  skiU  needed 
to  perform  well  any  very  difficult  task  can  be  gained 
only  by  great  practice  in  overcoming  difficulties  and 
ehminating  errors  of  many  kinds;  and  when  the  diffi- 
culties are  manifold  and  great,  a  comparatively  small 
increase  or  decrease  in  the  overcoming  of  them  makes 


NAVAL  BASES  327 

a  great  difference  in  the  results  attained.  An  in- 
teresting though  possibly  not  very  correct  analogy  is  to 
be  seen  in  the  case  of  a  poHshed  surface;  for  we  readily 
note  that  the  more  highly  polished  the  surface  is,  the 
more  easily  it  is  sulUed.  Another  analogy  may  be 
found  in  the  performance  of  a  great  pianist  or  violinist; 
for  a  very  small  failure  in  his  skill  for  even  an  instant 
will  produce  a  painful  feeUng  that  could  not  be  pro- 
duced by  a  much  greater  failure  in  an  ordinary  per- 
former. Another  analogy  is  to  be  foimd  in  the  case  of 
a  ship  that  is  going  at  the  upper  limit  of  her  speed;  for 
a  very  minor  failure  of  any  part  of  her  machinery  will 
produce  a  much  greater  slowing  than  it  would  if  her 
speed  were  slower. 

Perhaps  apologies  are  in  order  for  dwelling  so  long 
on  what  may  seem  to  some  an  academic  question,  but 
it  does  not  seem  to  the  writer  to  be  academic  at  all. 
Certainly,  the  "condition"  of  a  pugilist,  or  a  fleet, 
about  to  fight,  is  not  an  academic  consideration;  and 
if  it  is  not,  no  matter  which  affects  this  condition  can 
rightfully  be  considered  academic.  The  whole  useful- 
ness of  bases  is  due  to  their  abihty  to  put  fleets  into 
good  fighting  condition  and  to  maintain  them  in  it; 
and  it  seems  a  very  proper  and  useful  thing  to  note 
that  the  more  highly  trained  a  fleet  is,  and  the  more 
highly  organized  the  various  appUances  the  fleet  con- 
tains, the  more  difference  results  from  a  falling  off  in 
the  condition  of  its  personnel  and  material. 

This  shows  the  advantage  of  having  a  base  as  close 


328    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

to  the  place  where  a  fight  is  going  to  happen  as  may  be 
possible.  This  does  not  mean,  of  course,  that  a  fleet, 
should  remain  for  long  periods  within  its  base;  because 
a  fleet,  like  any  other  practiser  of  any  art,  needs  con- 
stant practice.  It  merely  means  that  the  closer  the 
base  is  to  the  scene  of  the  operations  or  the  actual  bat- 
tle, the  better  "tuned  up"  the  personnel  and  material 
will  be.  It  also  means  that  this  consideration  is  of  the 
highest  practical  importance. 

Advanced  Bases. — The  extreme  desirability  of  hav- 
ing a  base  near  the  scene  of  operations,  even  if  the  base 
be  only  temporarily  held,  has  led  to  the  use  of  what 
are  called  "advanced  bases."  An  excellent  and  mod- 
ern illustration  of  an  advanced  base  is  the  base  which 
the  Japanese  established  at  the  Elliot  Islands  about 
sixty  miles  from  Port  Arthur,  which  the  Japanese  were 
besieging.  The  Russian  fleet  could  issue  from  their 
base  at  Port  Arthur  whenever  the  Russians  wished, 
and  return  to  it  at  wiU.  While  inside,  until  the  Japa- 
nese had  landed  and  attacked  them  from  the  land  side, 
the  Russians  could  make  their  preparations  in  secu- 
rity and  leisure,  and  then  go  out.  The  Japanese  fleet, 
on  the  other  hand,  until  they  had  estabhshed  their 
base,  were  forced  to  remain  under  way  at  sea,  and  to 
accept  action  at  the  wiU  of  the  Russians;  so  that, 
although  Port  Arthur  was  besieged,  the  advantages  of 
the  offensive,  to  some  extent,  resided  with  the  Rus- 
sians. The  establishment  of  the  base  did  not,  of  course, 
change  the  situation  wholly;   but  it  permitted  a  very 


NAVAL  BASES  329 

considerable  relaxation  of  vigilance  and  mental  strain 
on  the  part  of  the  Japanese,  and  a  considerable  ease- 
ment of  the  motive  power  of  their  ships.  Naturally, 
the  Japanese  made  arrangements  whereby  their  heavy 
ships  could  remain  in  comparative  tranquillity  near 
the  base,  while  destroyers  and  scouts  of  various  kinds 
kept  touch  with  Port  Arthur,  and  notified  the  base  by 
wireless  of  any  probable  sortie  by  the  Russian  fleet. 

The  temporary  advanced  base  at  the  Elliot  Is- 
lands was,  as  temporary  advanced  bases  always  must 
be,  quite  incomplete  in  every  way  as  compared  with 
the  permanent  bases  at  home.  It  fulfilled  its  mission, 
however,  and  was  in  fact  as  good  a  base  as  really  was 
required.  The  strategic  ability  of  the  Japanese  was 
indicated  quite  early  in  the  war  by  the  promptness 
and  skill  with  which  they  estabhshed  this  base. 

Of  course,  all  advanced  bases  are  distant  bases, 
but  the  words  usually  imply  temporariness,  as  does  in 
fact  the  word  "advance."  An  instance  of  an  advanced 
base  that  has  been  far  from  temporary  is  the  island  of 
Jamaica,  and  another  is  the  island  of  Bermuda;  an- 
other is  Malta,  and  still  another  is  Gibraltar.  These 
bases  form  stepping-stones,  by  which  Great  Britain's 
navy  may  go  by  easy  stages  from  one  position  to  an- 
other, stopping  at  a  base  when  desired,  or  going  be- 
yond it  without  stopping,  secure  in  the  knowledge  that 
the  base  is  "under  her  lee"  in  case  of  accident  or  dis- 
tress. 

Viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  operations  in  an 


330    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

actual  war,  the  strategic  value  of  a  certain  position  for 
a  base  is  important,  no  matter  whether  the  operations 
are  offensive  or  defensive;  and  the  same  factors  that 
make  a  position  good  for  defensive  operations  make  it 
good  for  offensive  operations  also.  For  instance,  if  we 
wish  to  send  a  fleet  on  a  hostile  expedition  to  a  distant 
point,  it  is  well  to  have  a  base  on  a  salient  as  far  out  as 
practicable  from  the  coast,  in  order  that  the  fleet  may 
be  able  to  start,  full  of  fuel  and  supplies,  from  a  place 
near  the  distant  point;  and  equally,  if  we  are  to  re- 
ceive an  attack  upon  the  coast,  it  is  well  to  have  a  base 
far  out,  in  order  to  embarrass  the  transit  of  the  enemy 
toward  our  coast,  by  the  threat — first  against  his  flank, 
and  later  against  his  rear  and  his  communications. 
Naval  bases  looked  at  from  this  point  of  view  resem- 
ble those  forts  that  European  nations  place  along  their 
frontiers. 

It  is  true  that  any  base  placed  at  a  salient  has  the 
weakness  of  all  sahents,  in  that  fire  can  be  concentrated 
on  it  from  several  directions;  and  a  naval  base  has  the 
added  disadvantage  of  a  more  difficult  withdrawal,  if 
attacked  by  an  overwhelming  force,  and  a  longer 
line  of  communications  that  has  to  be  protected.  But 
this  weakness  all  distant  bases  have,  from  the  fact 
that  they  are  distant;  and,  naturally,  the  more  distant 
they  are,  the  more  difficult  it  is  to  support  them,  be- 
cause the  longer  are  their  lines  of  communications. 

Distant  naval  bases,  therefore,  are  vulnerable  in 
a  high  degree;   they  are  \nilnerable  both  to  direct  at- 


NAVAL  BASES  331 

tack  and  to  an  attack  on  their  lines  of  communica- 
tions; and  the  factors  that  help  a  base  in  one  way  in- 
jure it  in  another.  If  a  naval  base  is  placed  on  a  rock, 
or  a  rugged  little  island  that  holds  nothing  else,  and 
on  which  a  hostile  army  could  not  land,  it  is  very  safe 
from  land  attack;  whereas,  if  it  is  placed  on  a  large 
and  fertile  island,  on  which  an  invading  army  could 
easily  land,  it  is  extremely  vulnerable  to  land  attack. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  naval  base  on  the  inacces- 
sible island  could  be  starved  out  by  simply  breaking 
its  lines  of  communications,  while  the  naval  base  on 
the  large  and  fertile  island  might  be  able  to  survive 
indefinitely,  even  though  the  communications  were 
wholly  ruptured. 

The  establishment  of  any  permanent  distant 
naval  base  is  a  matter  of  great  expense,  even  if  the  nat- 
ural conditions  are  favorable.  But  favorable  condi- 
tions have  rarely  existed;  and  the  expense  of  estab- 
lishing such  bases  as  Malta,  Gibraltar,  and  Heligoland 
has  been  tremendous.  An  important  consideration 
has  been  the  fact  that,  unless  the  base  were  made  so 
strong  that  it  could  not  be  taken,  it  might  be  better 
not  to  attempt  to  fortify  it,  on  the  theory  that  it  would 
be  better  to  let  a  poor  naval  base  fall  into  the  hands  of 
the  enemy  than  a  good  one.  To  this  reasoning,  the 
answer  is  usually  made  that  no  base  can  be  made  ab- 
solutely impregnable,  and  that  sufficient  defense  wiU 
be  provided  if  it  makes  the  task  and  cost  of  capturing 
the  base  greater  than  the  base  is  worth.    This  means 


332    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

simply  that  the  more  valuable  the  base  is,  the  more 
money  should  be  spent  in  defending  it;  and  that  it  is 
worse  than  useless  to  defend  it  by  any  means  that  is  obvi- 
ously too  small,  in  proportion  to  its  value. 

It  often  happens  that  the  places  that  have  the 
best  position  are  weak  in  strength  and  resources;  a 
notable  instance  is  Gibraltar,  another  is  Culebra,  and 
the  most  notable  of  all  is  Guam.  None  of  these  places 
is  fortunate  in  either  resources  or  natural  strength, 
though  Gibraltar  was  strong  for  the  artillery  of  the 
time  when  the  base  was  established  there.  In  fact,  it 
is  hard  to  think  of  any  place  that  combines  in  itseK 
the  three  advantages  of  a  fine  strategical  position,  large 
resources,  and  great  strength.  The  three  attributes 
seem  almost  incompatible;  for  how  can  a  base  far  dis- 
tant from  its  home  be  well  placed  with  reference  to 
attacking  the  lines  of  communication  of  any  enemy 
intending  to  attack  the  home  coast,  and  yet  have  its 
own  lines  of  communications  safe  ?  How  can  it  have  a 
sheet  of  water,  just  deep  enough  but  not  too  deep  to 
anchor  a  large  fleet  in,  with  aU  of  its  auxiliaries  exten- 
sive enough  to  accommodate  all  the  vessels  and  far 
enough  from  the  sea  to  be  safe  from  gun-fire,  and  yet 
be  on  an  island  so  small  and  so  rugged,  that  an  enemy 
could  not  land  troops  near  the  base  and  capture  it 
from  the  land  side,  as  the  Japanese  captured  Port 
Arthur?  The  natural  strategic  advantages  of  a  large 
and  sheltered  sheet  of  water  seem  to  entail  the  dis- 
advantages of  a  large  island,  or  a  continent. 


NAVAL  BASES  sss 

There  seems  only  one  way  in  which  to  solve  the 
problem  of  where  and  how  to  establish  a  permanent 
naval  base  at  a  distant  point,  and  that  is  the  way  in 
which  the  world's  preceptor — Great  Britain — has 
solved  it;  and  the  solution  is  to  select  a  place  that  has 
already  the  advantage  of  position,  and  then  add  to  it 
the  artificial  advantages  of  resources  and  military 
strength. 

This  brief  statement  makes  the  matter  seem  a  lit- 
tle too  simple;  and  so  it  will  have  to  be  modified  by 
adding  that  the  mere  fact  of  a  place  having  a  fine  posi- 
tion is  not  quite  sufficient,  because  the  place  must  be 
of  such  a  character  that  it  is  capable  of  having  re- 
sources and  strength  added  to  it ;  a  sharp  pinnacle  rock 
in  the  middle  of  the  Mediterranean,  for  instance,  might 
have  a  fine  strategic  position,  and  yet  be  unavailable 
as  a  naval  base.  Even  here,  however,  we  must  pause 
to  note  that  energy  and  wiU  could  do  much  toward 
making  even  a  pinnacle  rock  a  naval  base;  for  we  see 
the  gigantic  fortress  of  Heligoland  erected  on  what 
was  little  but  a  shoal;  and  we  see  the  diminutive  water 
areas  of  Malta  and  Gibraltar  made  to  hold  in  safety 
the  war-ships  of  the  greatest  navy  in  the  world. 

Despite  the  paramount  importance  of  strategic 
position,  we  must  not  forget  that  a  naval  base  should 
have  sufficient  military  strength  to  be  able  to  hold 
out  for  a  long  time  against  hostile  operations,  as 
many  bases,  notably  Gibraltar  and  Port  Arthur,  have 
done,  without  the  assistance  of  the  fleet.    The  German 


334    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

base  at  Kiao-chau  held  out  for  more  than  two  months 
in  191 4,  without  any  external  aid.  During  all  the  time 
of  siege,  even  if  surrender  is  ultimately  to  occur,  the 
enemy's  forces  are  prevented  from  being  utilized  else- 
where. This  condition  was  clearly  shown  during  the 
siege  of  Port  Arthur,  because  the  large  force  of 
Japanese  troops  required  to  conduct  the  siege  were 
urgently  needed  in  Manchuria — to  which  region  they 
were  sent  as  soon  as  Port  Arthur  fell. 

From  this  point  of  view,  naval  bases  again  look 
much  like  fortresses  on  the  land;  fortresses  like  Metz 
and  Strasburg,  that  had  to  be  subdued  before  an  enemy 
could  safely  pass  them. 

Strategic  Position  of  Distant  Bases. — Since  the 
strategic  position  of  an  outlying  naval  base  is  the  prin- 
cipal factor  that  goes  to  make  its  value,  it  may  be  well 
to  consider  what  elements  make  a  strategic  position 
good. 

To  make  the  problem  clear,  let  us  take  a  concrete 
case,  that  of  our  own  country,  and  consider  what  ele- 
ments would  constitute  a  good  strategic  position  for  a 
naval  base  of  the  United  States,  leaving  out  of  con- 
sideration for  the  moment  any  questions  of  resources 
and  military  strength. 

In  the  case  of  a  war  with  a  nation  that  had  only 
one  naval  home  base,  it  is  clear  that  the  best  position 
for  our  distant  base  would  be  one  as  close  to  the 
enemy's  base  as  possible;  because,  if  placed  there,  our 
fleet,  if  it  were  the  more  powerful,  could  do  more  to 


NAVAL  BASES  335 

injure  the  enemy's  fleet,  or  prevent  its  going  out,  than 
if  placed  at  any  point  more  distant  from  the  enemy's 
base;  and  if  it  were  less  powerful,  it  could  do  more  to 
cut  the  enemy's  communications,  because  it  could  at- 
tack them  at  or  near  their  source. 

A  poor  position  would  be  one  far  away  from  both 
countries,  and  far  away  from  the  line  joining  them. 
In  the  case  of  a  war  between  this  country  and  Norway, 
for  instance,  a  very  poor  position  for  a  naval  base  would 
be  a  spot  near — say  Juan  Fernandez — in  the  south 
Pacific. 

In  case  the  enemy  country  has  two  home  bases 
of  equal  importance,  the  best  position  for  our  base 
clearly  would  be  one  equidistant  from  them,  and  as 
near  to  each  as  practicable.  If  the  distance  from  our 
base  to  a  point  half-way  between  the  two  bases  is 
shorter  than  is  the  distance  to  it  from  either  base,  then 
a  fleet  at  our  base  could  probably  prevent  the  junction 
of  two  forces  issuing  from  those  two  bases — assuming, 
of  course,  that  we  had  a  proper  system  of  scouting. 
Our  fleet  would  be  able  to  operate  on  what  are  often 
called  "interior  lines" — a  technical  expression  that 
has  great  efficacy  in  confusing  a  simple  matter.  It  is 
also  assumed  that  our  fleet  is  considerably  stronger 
than  either  of  the  two  separated  enemy  forces;  other- 
wise our  case  would  be  hopeless. 

If  the  two  home  bases  of  the  enemy  are  unequal 
in  importance,  it  would  seem  that  our  base  should  be 
nearer  to  the  important  base  than  to  the  other.    More 


336    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

strictly  speaking,  it  should  be  nearer  to  the  base  from 
which  the  larger  force  may  be  expected  to  come  out. 

If  the  enemy  country  have  three  or  more  bases, 
from  which  parts  of  a  fleet  may  be  expected  to  come 
out,  the  question  seems  a  little  more  complex;  but 
nevertheless,  since  the  first  duty  of  our  fleet  would 
probably  be  to  prevent  junctions  or  a  junction,  of  the 
separated  parts  of  the  enemy's  fleet,  the  best  position 
for  our  home  base  would  be  at  a  point  about  equally 
distant  from  them  all,  and  as  close  to  them  as  possi- 
ble. In  the  wars  between  Great  Britain  and  France  in 
the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the  base  of 
the  British  fleet  for  operations  on  the  western  and 
northern  coasts  of  France  was  as  close  to  the  enemy 
home  bases  as  practicable — though  the  base  was  Eng- 
land itself.  For  operations  on  France's  southern  coast, 
the  base  was  at  Gibraltar,  or  some  Mediterranean 
island. 

That  any  country  should  be  able  to  hold  a  distant 
base  close  to  the  home  base  of  a  possible  naval  enemy 
might  seem  impossible,  if  we  did  not  know  that  Great 
Britain  holds  Bermuda  and  Jamaica  near  to  our  own 
coast,  and  Hong-Kong  actually  inside  of  China,  all 
far  away  from  Britain;  besides  Malta  and  Gibraltar 
in  the  Mediterranean,  nearer  to  the  coasts  of  some- 
time enemies  than  to  her  own.  That  the  United  States 
should  own  a  base  far  from  her  own  coasts,  and  near 
those  of  other  countries,  might  seem  improbable,  were 
it  not  for  the  fact  that  Guam  is  such  a  base,  and  is  so 


NAVAL  BASES  337 

situated.  It  is  true  that  Guam  is  not  strictly  a  naval 
base,  because  it  is  not  so  equipped  or  fortified;  but 
we  are  thinking  now  of  position  only. 

In  case  the  enemy  country  has  several  home  bases, 
and  it  is  impossible  to  have  our  distant  base  so  near  to 
them  as  to  prevent  the  junction  of  parts  of  a  fleet  issu- 
ing from  them,  the  value  of  the  base  is  less  than  it 
otherwise  would  be. 

In  this  case,  which  is  the  one  in  which  our  coun- 
try is  actually  concerned,  because  of  its  great  distance 
from  other  countries,  its  value  becomes  merely  the 
usual  value  attaching  to  a  naval  base;  and  the  fact 
that  the  entire  enemy  fleet  can  operate  as  a  unit,  that 
it  can  divide  into  separate  forces  at  will  near  its  own 
shores,  or  send  out  detachments  to  prey  on  the  long 
line  of  communications  stretching  from  our  distant 
base  to  that  base's  home,  necessitates  that  the  base  be 
fortified  in  the  strongest  possible  way,  and  provided 
with  large  amounts  of  suppHes.  Its  principal  func- 
tion in  war  would  be  to  shorten  the  long  trip  that  our 
vessels  would  have  to  make  without  refreshment,  and 
therefore  the  length  of  their  lines  of  communications, 
and  to  enable  our  vessels  to  arrive  in  enemy's  waters 
in  better  condition  of  readiness  for  battle  than  would 
otherwise  be  the  case. 

We  have  thus  far  considered  the  best  position  for 
an  advanced  naval  base,  in  the  case  of  operations 
against  one  country  only. 

It  seems  clear  that,  if  we  are  to  consider  opera- 


3^8    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

tions  against  two  countries  separately,  and  at  differ- 
ent times,  we  should  be  led  to  conclude  that  the  case 
of  each  country  should  be  decided  individually;  in 
the  case  of  wars  with  Norway  and  Portugal,  for  in- 
stance, the  best  places  for  our  two  bases  would  be  as 
close  to  the  home  bases  of  those  countries  as  possible; 
and  even  in  the  case  of  fighting  two  simultaneously, 
the  conclusion  would  be  the  same,  if  the  two  countries 
were  in  widely  different  directions  from  us — as  are 
Switzerland  and  China.  If  we  consider  the  case  of 
war  against  two  contiguous  countries  simultaneously, 
however,  it  would  seem  better  to  have  one  base,  situ- 
ated similarly  toward  the  home  bases  of  the  two  coirn- 
tries  as  toward  two  different  home  bases  in  one  coun- 
try— since  the  two  countries  would  be,  in  effect, 
allies;  and  their  fleets  would  act  in  reality  like  sepa- 
rated portions  of  one  fleet. 

As  the  United  States  possesses  no  island  on  the 
Atlantic  side  which  is  nearer  to  foreign  countries  than 
to  our  own,  and  as  our  interests  for  the  immediate  fu- 
ture lie  mostly  on  the  Atlantic  side,  it  may  be  well 
now  to  apply  the  general  principles  just  considered  to 
the  question  of  where  is  a  naval  base  most  urgently 
needed  under  actual  conditions. 

Imagining  a  war  between  us  and  some  one  Euro- 
pean naval  Power,  and  imagining  a  war  also  between 
us  and  two  or  three  allied  European  naval  Powers,  and 
realizing  the  length  of  our  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts, 
extending  from  Maine  to  Panama,  a  glance  at  the  map 


NAVAL  BASES  339 

shows  us  that,  apart  from  the  home  naval  bases  on 
our  continental  coasts,  the  position  on  American  soil 
which  is  the  closest  to  European  bases  is  on  the  little 
island  of  Culebra,  which  occupies  a  salient  in  the 
northeastern  end  of  the  Caribbean  Sea.* 

The  only  reason  an  enemy  would  have  for  entering 
the  Caribbean  would  be  an  intention  to  attack  the 
Panama  Canal  region,  or  an  intention  to  establish  an 
advanced  base,  from  which  he  could  conduct  more  or 
less  dehberate  siege  of  our  Atlantic  coast  and  cities. 
In  either  case,  our  fleet  would  be  seriously  handicapped 
if  it  had  no  adequate  base  in  the  Caribbean;  because 
its  line  of  communications  north  would  be  exposed 
to  the  enemy's  operations  at  all  times;  and  seriously 
woimded  American  ships  would  have  Httle  chance  of 
getting  repairs;  little  chance  even  of  making  success- 
fully the  long  trip  to  Norfolk  or  New  York. 

In  case  the  enemy  fleet  should  start  from  Europe 
fully  prepared  in  every  way,  we  should  be  in  ignorance 
of  its  intended  destination;  and  as  the  enemy  fleet 
would  be  stronger  than  ours  (otherwise  it  would  not 
start)  it  would  doubtless  be  able  to  destroy  our  unde- 
fended station  at  Guantanamo,  seize  some  suitable 
place  in  the  West  Indies,  say  the  Bay  of  Samana,  and 
then  establish  a  base  there,  unless  we  had  first  seized 
and  fortified  all  suitable  localities;  and  the  United 
States  would  then  find  itself  in  the  anomalous  position 

*  The  acquisition  by  the  United  States  of  the  island  of  Saint  Thomas, 
about  20  miles  east  of  Culebra,  if  accomplished,  will  extend  the  salient  just 
so  much  farther  toward  Europe. 


340    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

of  being  confronted  near  its  own  coasts  with  an  enemy 
fleet  well  based  for  war,  while  her  own  fleet  would  not 
be  based  at  all.  Not  only  would  the  enemy  fleet  be 
superior  in  power,  but  it  would  possess  the  strategical 
advantage,  though  far  from  its  own  shores.  The  situa- 
tion, therefore,  about  a  month  after  the  foreign  fleet 
left  Europe,  would  be  that  the  Caribbean  Sea  would 
contain  a  hostile  fleet  which  was  not  only  superior  to 
ours  in  power,  but  was  securely  resting  on  a  base; 
while  ours  had  no  base  south  of  Norfolk,  the  other 
side  of  Hatteras.  Our  fleet  would  be  in  a  position 
similar  to  that  of  the  Russian  fleet  when  it  rushed  to 
its  destruction  in  Tsushima  Straits,  though  not  in  so 
great  a  degree;  because  it  would  have  had  more  recent 
docking  and  refitting  in  our  home  ports,  and  the  per- 
sonnel would  be  fresher. 

In  case,  however,  we  had  a  naval  base  strongly 
fortified  and  thoroughly  equipped,  at  a  salient  in  the 
Caribbean  region,  say  at  Culebra,  and  if  our  fleet  were 
based  upon  it,  a  hostile  fleet,  even  if  it  were  consider- 
ably superior  to  our  own,  would  hesitate  to  pass  it  and 
enter  the  Caribbean,  by  reason  of  the  continuous 
threat  that  the  fleet  would  exert  on  its  communica- 
tions. Even  if  the  hostile  fleet  should  pass  Culebra, 
and  establish  a  base  farther  on,  an  American  force 
based  on  Culebra  would  continue  to  exert  this  threat 
on  the  communications  between  the  hostile  base  and 
its  mother  country. 

An  American  base — say  at  Guantanamo — would 


NAVAL  BASES  341 

be  very  effective  in  embarrassing  hostile  operations 
west  of  Guantanamo,  because  it  would  be  on  the  flank 
of  the  line  of  communications  extending  from  Europe; 
but  it  would  be  comparatively  ineffective  in  embar- 
rassing operations  east  of  it,  since  the  hostile  line  of 
communications  would  be  protected  from  it  by  the 
interposition  of  its  own  main  body;  this  interposition 
necessitating  the  despatch  of  defending  forces  around 
that  main  body.  The  coming  hostile  force  would  push 
before  it  all  resistance,  and  leave  the  sea  free  for  the 
passage  of  its  auxiliaries  and  supplies.  A  defending 
force,  operating  from  Guantanamo,  in  endeavoring  to 
prevent  a  hostile  fleet  from  establishing  a  base  to  the 
eastward  of  it,  would  act  much  less  effectively  than  a 
force  operating  from  Culebra.  Not  only  would  the 
force  from  Guantanamo  have  to  pass  around  the  main 
body  to  attack  the  train;  it  would  again  have  to  pass 
around  the  main  body  to  get  back  to  Guantanamo; 
whereas  a  force  operating  from  Culebra  could  make  a 
direct  attack  upon  the  enemy's  train,  and  then  a  direct 
retreat  to  Culebra. 

This  comparison  assumes,  as  has  been  said,  that 
the  matter  of  resources  and  strength  are  not  in  ques- 
tion; that  is,  that  they  are  equal  in  our  two  supposi- 
tion bases.  But,  as  in  practice  they  would  not  be 
equal,  the  practical  point  to  consider  is  how  much 
strength  and  resources  can  compensate  for  inferiority 
of  position,  and  how  much  position  must  be  insisted  on. 

Of  course,  no  correct  quantitative  answer  can  be 


342    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

given,  except  by  accident.  The  problem,  unfortu- 
nately, cannot  be  solved  by  mathematics,  for  the  simple 
reason  that  no  quantitative  values  can  be  assigned  to 
the  various  factors,  and  because  no  mathematical 
formula  now  exists  that  expresses  their  relations  to 
each  other.  It  may  be  pointed  out,  however,  that  if 
a  position  be  good,  strength  and  resources  can  be 
artificially  suppHed;  and  that  the  cost  of  doing  this, 
even  on  a  tremendous  scale,  is  relatively  small  com- 
pared to  the  cost  of  the  fleet  which  the  base  will  sup- 
port, and  in  distress  protect.  In  other  words,  we  may 
be  able  to  form  an  estimate  of  the  relative  values  of 
bases,  say  at  Guantanamo  and  Culebra,  even  if  we 
cannot  ascribe  arithmetical  values  to  each,  and  com- 
pare arithmetically  those  arithmetical  values.  If,  for 
instance,  we  see  that  a  fleet  costing  $500,000,000, 
v/ould,  if  it  operated  from  a  base  at  Culebra,  be  10  per 
cent  more  effective  than  if  it  operated  from  Guanta- 
namo, and  that  it  would  cost  $20,000,000  more  to 
make  a  strong  base  there  than  to  make  an  equally 
strong  one  at  Guantanamo,  we  should  conclude  that, 
since  10  per  cent  of  $500,000,000  is  $50,000,000,  it 
would  be  wise  to  spend  that  $20,000,000,  even  if  we 
had  to  forego  the  building  of  one  battleship. 

We  should  come  to  the  same  conclusion,  if  we 
realized  that  no  matter  what  their  comparative  values 
might  be,  a  base  at  one  place  would  not  meet  our 
necessities,  and  a  base  at  the  other  place  would.  If  a 
base  at  Guantanamo  would  not  meet  our  necessities 


NAVAL  BASES  343 

in  case  of  an  invasion  of  the  Caribbean  by  a  naval 
fleet  superior  to  ours,  then  it  seems  idle  to  discuss  the 
value  of  Guantanamo  relative  to  some  other  place,  no 
matter  how  good  the  position  of  Guantanamo  may  be, 
and  no  matter  how  nearly  it  may  approximate  to  ade- 
quacy. There  is  no  real  usefulness  in  having  a  naval 
base  any\vhere,  unless  that  naval  base  can  accom- 
plish the  purpose  for  which  it  is  desired.  A  naval  base 
is  desired  for  purposes  of  war,  and  for  no  other  pur- 
pose whatever;  and  to  decide  on  a  position  for  a  base 
without  keeping  this  fact  clearly  in  view,  is  to  act  on 
an  underestimate  of  the  situation,  the  folly  of  which 
has  been  pointed  out  in  previous  pages. 

We  may  conclude,  then,  that  in  deciding  on  the 
place  for  a  distant  permanent  naval  base,  on  which 
the  operations  of  a  whole  fleet  are  to  base  for  war,  we 
should  select  the  best  site  available,  even  if  military 
strength  and  resources  may  have  to  be  added  to  it 
artificially — unless  in  the  case  of  any  site  considered 
the  difficulties  of  adding  them  are  insuperable. 

The  last  sentence  may  seem  Hke  shirking  the  whole 
question,  because  it  does  not  state  what  "insuperable" 
means;  so  it  may  be  well  to  add  that  in  modem  days 
few  engineering  difficulties  are  insuperable,  as  the  ex- 
istence of  the  fortress  at  Heligoland  shows.  If  the 
submarine  and  the  mine  did  not  exist,  the  difficulties 
would  be  greater  than  they  actually  are;  because  guns 
alone,  no  matter  how  carefully  mounted  and  pro- 
tected, could  hardly  be  expected  to  keep  off  indefinitely 


344    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

the  attack  of  a  heavy  fleet,  or  even  to  save  from  injury 
the  fighting  and  auxihary  vessels  anchored  in  its 
waters.  But  the  submarine  and  mine  combine  to  keep 
fighting  ships  at  distances  greater  than  those  over 
which  ship's  guns  can  fire,  and  reduce  the  amount  of 
fortification  required  on  shore. 

One  of  the  principal  sources  of  expense  in  estab- 
lishing bases  at  some  points  would  be  that  of  dredg- 
ing out  harbors  sufficiently  extensive,  while  harbors 
sufiiciently  extensive  are  provided  already  by  nature 
in  such  locaHties  as  Samana.  But,  as  pointed  out  be- 
fore, harbors  on  large  islands  can  be  taken  from  the 
land  side,  as  was  Port  Arthur;  and  adequate  protec- 
tion from  land  attack  is,  in  many  cases,  almost  impos- 
sible if  the  enemy  has  command  of  the  sea,  as  a  su- 
perior hostile  fleet  would  have  in  the  Caribbean;  while 
the  hills  and  waters  of  Culebra  and  Vieques  Sound 
could  long  defy  not  only  actual  invasion,  but  any 
fleet  attack. 

This  brings  us  face  to  face  with  the  fact  that  it 
may  be  less  expensive  to  establish  and  protect  a  naval 
base  situated  on  a  little  island,  even  if  an  artificial 
harbor  has  to  be  constructed,  than  to  establish  and 
protect  a  base  on  a  large  island,  even  if  the  base  on  the 
large  island  has  a  large  natural  harbor  and  can  be  more 
easily  defended  against  bombardment  from  the  sea. 
It  would  be  cheaper,  for  instance,  to  protect  a  base 
on  Culebra  than  one  at  Guantanamo,  or  even  Samana, 
if  the  enemy  commanded  the  sea;  and  cheaper  to  pro- 


NAVAL  BASES  345 

tect  a  base  on  the  forbidding  rocks  of  Polillo  or  Guam 
than  on  the  large  and  fertile  island  of  Luzon,  with  its 
extensive  gulfs  and  bays,  in  many  of  which  a  fleet  in 
command  of  the  sea  could  land  its  force;  because 
protecting  a  base  on  a  large  island  would  require 
covering  a  very  large  area,  and  perhaps  a  long  extent 
of  coast. 

Aircraft  may  exercise  an  important  influence  on 
the  choice  of  the  position  of  a  base,  perhaps  in  the  di- 
rection of  choosing  a  base  on  a  large  island  rather  than 
on  a  small  one;  since  the  great  speed  of  aircraft  tends 
to  lessen  the  importance  of  having  the  base  out  a  great 
distance  from  home — so  far  as  purposes  of  scouting  are 
concerned.  It  seems  probable  also  that  aircraft  will 
soon  be  recognized  as  inherently  adapted  to  prevent- 
ing the  landing  of  hostile  troops,  by  dropping  bombs 
on  the  troops,  while  they  are  in  process  of  disembarka- 
tion, while  proceeding  in  small  boats  to  the  shore,  and 
while  in  the  act  of  landing  on  the  beach,  with  their 
guns,  ammunition,  supplies,  horses,  and  impedimenta 
of  various  kinds. 

Co-operating  Bases. — Discussion  of  the  relative 
values  of  positions  for  bases,  say  in  the  Caribbean, 
should  not  blind  our  eyes  to  the  fact,  however,  that  no 
nation  is  prevented  from  estabHshing  as  many  bases 
as  it  needs,  wherever  its  flag  may  float;  that  the 
United  States,  for  instance,  is  not  debarred  from  es- 
tabHshing permanent  naval  bases  at  both  Guanta- 
namo  and  Culebra,  should  such  a  procedure  seem  de- 


346    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

sirable.  The  fact  that  each  locality  has  advantages 
that  the  other  does  not  have,  suggests  the  idea  that 
two  bases,  placed  in  those  localities,  would  form  a 
powerful  combination.  In  fact,  the  great  value  of  the 
position  of  Culebra  being  its  distance  toward  the 
enemy,  which  necessitates  a  great  distance  away  from 
our  continental  coast,  and  a  long  line  of  communica- 
tions from  that  coast  suggest  an  intermediate  base  as 
a  support  and  stepping-stone.  Analogous  cases  are 
seen  in  all  the  countries  of  Europe,  in  the  fortresses 
that  are  behind  their  boundary-lines — the  fortresses 
existing  less  as  individuals  than  as  supporting  mem- 
bers of  a  comprehensive  scheme. 

Two  bases,  one  at  Guantanamo  and  one  at 
Culebra,  would  in  time  of  war  in  the  Caribbean,  add 
a  value  to  our  fleet  that  might  make  the  difference  be- 
tween defeat  and  victory.  The  effective  work  that  a 
fleet  can  do  is  a  function  of  the  material  condition  of 
the  ships  themselves,  and  of  the  physical  and  mental 
condition  of  the  personnel  that  man  them.  Fighting 
is  the  most  strenuous  work  that  men  can  do;  it  calls 
for  the  last  ounce  of  strength,  the  last  effort  of  the  in- 
tellect, the  last  struggle  of  the  will;  it  searches  out 
every  physical  imperfection  in  men,  in  ships,  in  en- 
gines, in  joints,  in  valves.  Surprise  has  sometimes 
been  expressed  at  the  quickness  with  which  the  Japa- 
nese defeated  the  Russians  at  Tsushima;  but  would 
any  one  express  surprise  if  a  pugilist,  fresh  from  rest, 
quickly  defeated  another  pugilist  who,  exhausted  from 


NAVAL  BASES  347 

long  travelling,  staggered  hopelessly  into  the  ring? 
And  how  would  the  betting  be  before  a  football  match, 
if  it  were  known  that  one  of  the  teams  would  enjoy  a 
rest  of  twenty-four  hours  before  the  game,  whereas  the 
other  team  would  walk  from  the  railroad  to  the  ball 
grounds  after  a  trip  across  the  continent? 

These  analogies  may  seem  forced — ^but  are  they? 
A  living  animal  requires  hours  of  rest  and  refreshment, 
in  order  that  the  tissues  expended  in  action  may  be 
repaired  by  the  internal  mechanism  of  the  body,  and 
the  food  consumed  be  supplied  from  some  external 
source.  A  fleet  is  in  exactly  the  same  category,  even 
when  operating  in  times  of  peace:  and  in  time  of  war 
it  needs,  in  addition,  a  station  in  which  injuries  may 
be  repaired — a  station  analogous  to  that  of  the  hos- 
pital for  wounded  men. 

In  the  Caribbean  it  would  seem  necessary  to  suc- 
cessful operations,  therefore,  to  have  two  bases,  one 
say  at  Guantanamo  and  one  at  Culebra;  the  one  at 
Culebra  to  be  the  principal  base,  and  the  one  at  Guan- 
tanamo the  auxiliary.  Culebra,  by  reason  of  the  great 
work  to  be  accomphshed,  and  the  engineering  diffi- 
culties to  be  encountered,  cannot  be  gotten  ready  for 
several  years.  Reliance,  meanwhile,  will  have  to  be 
placed  on  Guantanamo;  and  as  the  coming  of  any 
war  is  not  usually  very  long  foretold,  the  urgency  of 
fortifying  Guantanamo  stands  out  in  clear  reUef. 

The  mutual  relations  of  Guantanamo  and  Cule- 
bra are  much  like  the  mutual  relations  of  Pearl  Harbor 


348    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

in  Hawaii  and  Guam — and  so  are  the  joint  relations 
of  each  pair  to  the  mother  country.  Culebra  and 
Guam  are  the  potential  bases  of  the  United  States 
farthest  away  from  the  coast  in  the  Atlantic  and  the 
Pacific  respectively;  and  the  nearest  to  countries  in 
Europe  and  Asia  with  any  one  of  which,  of  course,  war 
will  be  always  possible,  and  sometimes  probable. 
Each  is  a  small  and  rugged  island,  admitting  of  tre- 
mendous mihtary  strengthening  by  guns,  fortifica- 
tions, mines,  and  submarines,  but  connected  to  the 
motherland  by  a  long  line  of  cormnunications.  The 
line  of  cormnunications  of  Culebra  would,  of  course, 
be  safer  than  that  of  Guam,  because  it  is  shorter  than 
would  be  the  line  of  an  enemy  attacking  it;  whereas, 
the  line  of  communications  of  Guam  would  be  longer. 
Guantanamo  and  Pearl  Harbor  are  both  stations  about 
half-way  from  the  home  country  to  Culebra  and 
Guam  respectively;  and  though  greater  danger  to 
our  vital  and  commercial  interests  exists  in  the  At- 
lantic than  in  the  Pacific,  Pearl  Harbor  has  been  for- 
tified, and  Guantanamo  has  not — and  neither  has 
Culebra.  This  sentence  is  not  intended  as  a  criticism 
of  the  government  for  fortifying  Pearl  Harbor.  The 
Hawaiian  Islands  occupy  the  most  valuable  strategic 
position  in  the  Pacific,  and  Pearl  Harbor  is  the  most 
important  strategic  place  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands; 
and  it  ought  to  have  been  strengthened  many  years 
ago,  and  to  a  greater  degree  even  than  is  contemplated 
now.    But  the  sentence  is  intended  as  a  protest  against 


NAVAL  BASES  349 

our  continued  inertness  in  failing  to  establish  any 
suitable  naval  bases  whatever,  especially  in  the  Carib- 
bean. 

Distant  Base  in  the  Philippines. — The  difficulty 
of  finding  suitable  positions  for  bases  is  exemplified  in 
the  PhiHppines,  for  no  suitable  island  is  to  be  found 
there,  except  some  that  are  within  the  archipelago 
itself;  and  these  are  so  placed  that,  to  reach  them, 
our  fleet  would  have  to  go  through  long  reaches  of 
water,  ideally  suited  for  destroyer  and  submarine  at- 
tack. A  possible  exception  is  the  island  of  PoHllo, 
twenty  miles  east  of  the  eastern  coast  of  Luzon;  and 
in  many  ways  Polillo  seems  ideal.  The  practical  diffi- 
culties are  so  great,  however,  the  status  of  the  islands 
in  our  national  policy  is  so  ill  defined,  and  the  futility  of 
strengthening  it,  unless  Guam  be  adequately  strength- 
ened also,  is  so  apparent,  that  the  question  has  been 
hardly  even  mooted.  Polillo  made  impregnable,  with 
Guam  defenseless,  supported  by  an  undefended  line 
of  communications  several  thousand  miles  long  to 
the  main  country,  would  in  case  of  war  with  an  active 
Asiatic  power  be  reduced  to  the  zero  of  effectiveness 
in  whatever  was  the  length  of  time  in  which  its  accu- 
mulated stores  would  be  exhausted. 

This  sentence  may  be  modified  by  saying  that 
the  time  might  be  lengthened  by  the  occasional  arrival 
of  supply  ships  and  coUiers  that  might  come  by  way  of 
the  Mediterranean,  or  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  or  any 
other  route  which  approached  the  Philippines  from  the 


350    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

southward;  and  it  is  possible  that,  in  the  unfortunate 
event  of  a  war  between  us  and  some  Asiatic  power, 
our  relations  with  European  countries  might  be  such 
as  to  make  the  use  by  us  of  such  routes  feasible  and 
safe.  In  view,  however,  of  the  conditions  of  island 
possession  in  the  Pacific  as  they  actually  are,  and  be- 
cause of  the  rapid  and  abrupt  changes  that  characterize 
international  relations,  the  probability  of  being  able 
to  use  such  routes  seems  too  small  to  receive  grave 
consideration. 

Other  Bases  in  the  Pacific. — ^The  Pacific  Ocean  is 
so  vast,  and  the  interests  of  the  United  States  there 
will  some  day  be  so  great,  that  the  question  of  estab- 
lishing naval  bases,  in  addition  to  bases  at  Pearl  Har- 
bor, the  Philippines,  and  Guam,  will  soon  demand 
attention.  The  localities  that  are  the  most  obvious 
are  the  Panama  Canal  Zone  and  the  Samoan  Islands 
in  the  south,  and  the  Aleutian  Islands  in  the  north.  A 
moderately  far-seeing  policy  regarding  the  Pacific,  and 
a  moderately  far-seeing  strategy  for  carrying  out  the 
policy,  would  dictate  the  establishment  and  adequate 
protection  of  bases  in  both  the  southern  and  the  north- 
ern regions;  so  that  our  fleet  could  operate  without 
undue  handicap  over  the  long  distances  required.  The 
same  principles  that  govern  the  selection  of  positions 
and  the  establishment  of  bases  in  the  Atlantic  apply 
in  the  Pacific;  the  same  requirements  that  a  base  shall 
be  near  where  the  fleet  will  conduct  its  operations — no 
matter  whether  those  operations  be  offensive  or  de- 


NAVAL  BASES  351 

fensive,  no  matter  whether  they  concern  direct  at- 
tack or  a  threat  against  conmiimications. 

In  view  of  the  great  value  of  naval  bases,  one  may 
be  pardoned  perhaps  for  a  feeling  of  surprise  that  the 
United  States  has  no  real  naval  base,  home  or  distant. 
Our  large  navy-yards  are  our  nearest  approximation 
to  real  bases.  The  yards  at  Norfolk  and  Bremerton 
seem  to  combine  the  three  factors  of  position,  strength, 
and  resources  better  than  do  any  other  stations; 
though  both  are  surpassed  in  resources  by  New  York, 
Philadelphia,  and  Boston.  Bremerton  has  the  greatest 
natural  mihtary  strength  of  all  our  stations;  in  fact, 
it  is  naturally  very  strong  indeed,  because  of  the  length 
and  nature  of  the  waterway  leading  to  it  from  the 
sea  and  the  ease  with  which  it  could  be  denied.  Nor- 
folk is  fortunate  in  its  nearness  to  Chesapeake  Bay 
and  Lynn  Haven  Roads,  and  the  ease  with  which 
the  entrance  to  the  Chesapeake  from  seaward  could 
be  defended;  but  the  fact  that  it  is  only  18  miles 
from  the  Atlantic  coast-line  makes  it  more  vulnerable 
than  Bremerton  to  the  attack  of  troops  landed  by  an 
enemy  fleet.  The  yard  at  Mare  Island,  near  San  Fran- 
cisco, is  faultily  placed  as  regards  deep  water;  but 
dredging  could  rectify  this.  The  Panama  Canal  Zone 
has  great  facilities  for  repairs,  docking,  and  supplies; 
but  it  must  be  adequately  fortified  in  order  to  be  a 
trustworthy  base  in  the  case  of  operations  in  its  vicin- 
ity. 


352    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

New  York,  by  reason  of  its  enormous  wealth  of 
every  kind,  its  steamer  terminals,  and  its  excessively 
vulnerable  position,  within  gunshot  of  ships  out  in  the 
deep  water  (a  position  without  parallel  in  the  large 
cities  of  the  world)  must,  of  course,  be  protected.  The 
cheapest  way  to  protect  it  is  to  do  so  locally,  by  means 
of  fortifications,  and  other  shore  defenses.  The  only 
other  means  would  be  by  a  fleet  permanently  kept 
near  New  York,  a  measure  that  would  be  expensive 
beyond  reason. 

In  case  the  enemy  should  inform  us  that  he  would 
reach  the  vicinity  of  New  York  at  a  certain  time,  and 
in  case  he  should  fulfil  his  promise,  the  fact  that  New 
York  was  properly  strengthened  would  not  be  very 
important;  since  our  fleet  would  go  there,  and  the 
whole  war  would  be  settled  by  one  "stand-up  fight." 
But  wars  are  not  so  conducted  and  never  have  been. 
From  the  oldest  times  till  now,  and  even  among  savage 
tribes,  finesse  has  always  been  employed,  in  addition 
to  actual  force — more  perhaps  by  the  weaker  than  by 
the  stronger  side,  but  very  considerably  also  by  the 
stronger.  A  coming  enemy  would  endeavor  to  keep 
his  objective  a  close  secret,  and  even  to  mislead  us; 
so  that  our  fleet  would  have  to  take  a  position  out  at 
sea,  perhaps  far  away,  which  would  leave  our  bases 
open  to  attack  by  the  enemy  fleet  or  at  least  exposed 
to  raids. 

The  most  effective  local  defense  of  a  naval  base  is 
a  combination  of  mine-fields  and  heavy  guns,  which 


NAVAL  BASES  353 

also  give  protection  to  which  the  wounded  vessels  can 
retire,  as  the  German  vessels  did  after  the  North  Sea 
battle.  Unless  such  protection  be  provided,  swift  de- 
stroyers can  complete  the  work  that  guns  began,  as 
the  Japanese  destroyers  did,  after  the  artillery  battle 
at  Tsushima. 

In  addition  to  their  value  in  defending  navy-yards 
from  raids,  and  in  giving  wounded  ships  a  refuge,  the 
military  strengthening  of  home  bases,  if  such  home 
bases  are  wisely  placed  near  large  commercial  centres, 
prevents  actual  destruction  of  those  commercial  cen- 
tres themselves,  in  case  an  attack  is  made  upon  them, 
either  in  the  absence  of  the  defending  fleet,  or  after 
that  fleet  may  have  been  destroyed.  The  line  of  en- 
gineering advance  during  recent  years,  although  it  has 
greatly  increased  the  offensive  power  of  war-ships,  has 
increased  even  more  greatly  the  defensive  power  of 
land  works.  For  this  reason,  it  is  perfectly  possible 
to  defend  successfully  almost  any  land  position  against 
attack  by  ships;  and  it  is  so  easy,  that  not  to  do  so, 
is,  in  the  case  of  large  commercial  centres,  a  neglectful- 
ness  of  the  extremest  character. 

One  important  reason,  therefore,  for  placing  a 
permanent  home  base  near  a  large  commercial  centre 
is  the  fact  that  the  fortification  of  one  is  also  the  for- 
tification of  the  other. 

Assuming  that  New  York  is  to  be  defended  lo- 
cally, we  can  state  at  once  that  the  New  York  naval 
station  can  easily  be  made  to  be  a  permanent  naval 


354    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

base  of  the  highest  order,  and  of  the  most  efficient 
type.  In  fact,  it  can  be  made  into  a  naval  base  bet- 
ter than  any  other  now  in  the  world,  because  of  the 
large  sheets  of  water  tributary  to  it  in  New  York  Bay, 
Hudson  River,  and  Long  Island  Sound;  the  proximity 
of  the  sea;  the  untold  resources  in  money,  supphes, 
and  men  that  it  could  on  demand  produce,  and  the 
ease  with  which  it  could  be  defended.  To  make  such 
a  base,  it  would  be  necessary  to  fortify  the  vicinity  of 
Coney  Island  and  the  entrances  from  the  ocean  to 
the  Lower  Bay,  and  Long  Island  Sound;  to  deepen 
the  channel  to  the  navy-yard,  and  to  make  clear  and 
safe  the  waterway  from  the  East  River  to  Long  Island 
Sound.  It  would  be  necessary  also  to  enlarge  the  navy- 
yard;  and  to  this  end,  to  buy  back  the  land  adjoin- 
ing it,  which  the  government  most  unwisely  sold  to 
private  parties  about  twenty-five  years  ago. 

Owing  to  the  position  of  Block  Island,  relatively 
to  the  lines  of  communication  of  a  hostile  force  coming 
from  Europe  to  attack  our  eastern  coast,  and  because 
of  the  sheltered  waters  held  within  it,  suitable  for 
small  craft,  the  advisability  of  estabhshing  a  small 
naval  base  there  is  apparent.  With  a  suitable  base 
there  and  another  on  Martha's  Vineyard,  and  the  pres- 
ent canal  from  Massachusetts  Bay  to  Buzzards  Bay 
sufficiently  enlarged,  the  whole  coast  from  Boston  to 
New  York,  including  Narragansett  Bay,  could  be  made 
to  form  one  naval  base  which  would  have  three  exits. 
Our  own  ships  could  pass  from  one  point  to  another, 
and  concentrate  at  will  near  Sandy  Hook,  Block  Is- 


NAVAL  BASES  355 

land,  or  Massachusetts  Bay;  and,  which  is  equally 
important,  the  estabUshment  of  an  enemy  base  near 
New  York  would  be  made  almost,  if  not  quite,  impos- 
sible. 

In  case  of  an  attack  on  our  eastern  coast,  made 
directly  from  Europe,  which  could  be  accomplished 
easily  during  the  calm  months  of  the  summer,  the  de- 
gree of  efficiency  shown  by  the  bases  at  Norfolk,  Phila- 
delphia, New  York,  and  Boston  would  influence  vitally 
the  condition  in  which  our  fleet  would  go  to  battle. 
Owing  to  the  traditional  pohcy,  or  rather  lack  of  policy, 
of  the  United  States,  and  the  consequent  unreadiness 
of  our  preparations,  we  may  reasonably  assume  that 
war  wiU  find  us  in  such  a  condition  that  the  utmost 
haste  wfll  be  necessary  to  get  our  whole  naval  force 
out  to  sea  in  time  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  making 
an  actual  bombardment  of  our  shores.  We  have  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  the  ships  actually  cruising  in 
our  active  fleet  will  not  be  ready;  we  have  every  rea- 
son to  believe  that  they  wdll  be  ready.  But  it  is  incon- 
ceivable that  we  should  not  try  to  oppose  such  an  at- 
tack with  all  the  naval  force  that  we  could  muster; 
which  means  that  we  should  try  to  send  out  many 
ships  from  our  home  bases  to  join  the  active  fleet  at 
sea. 

The  ease  with  which  the  passage  of  an  enemy^s 
fleet  up  the  Delaware  or  Chesapeake  could  be  pre- 
vented, in  case  any  means  of  national  defense  what- 
ever be  attempted,  compared  with  the  difficulty  of 
defending  New  York,  and  combined  with  the  greater 


356    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

damage  that  an  enemy  could  inflict  on  New  York, 
mark  the  vicinity  of  New  York  as  the  probable  ob- 
jective of  any  determined  naval  attack  upon  our  coast; 
no  matter  whether  that  attack  be  made  directly  from 
Europe,  or  indirectly  from  Europe  by  way  of  the  Carib- 
bean. To  meet  such  an  attack,  various  parts  of  the 
fleet  would  have  to  issue  from  their  bases;  even  parts 
of  the  active  fleet  would  probably  have  had  to  go  to 
their  home  ports  for  some  needed  repairs  or  sup- 
plies. The  first  thought  of  an  attacking  fleet  would 
naturally  be  to  prevent  our  ships  from  getting  out,  as 
it  was  the  thought  of  Nelson  and  other  British  com- 
manders to  prevent  the  issuing  of  forces  from  the  ports 
of  France.  But  in  view  of  the  great  distance  from 
Europe  to  our  coast,  and  the  impossibility  of  pre- 
venting the  knowledge  reaching  us  of  the  departure 
of  the  fleet  (unless  indeed  aU  the  powers  of  Europe 
combined  to  prevent  it),  it  seems  probable  that  no 
such  issuing  could  be  prevented,  and  that  a  very  con- 
siderable American  force  would  have  time  to  take  its 
station  out  at  sea,  prepared  to  meet  the  coming  foe. 

The  home  bases  if  properly  prepared  would  exert 
a  powerful  effect  on  a  battle  near  them  by  equipping 
the  fleet  adequately  and  promptly,  and  also  by  pre- 
venting a  possible  defeat  from  becoming  a  disaster, 
by  receiving  wounded  ships  before  they  sank.  The 
wounded  ships  of  the  enemy,  on  the  other  hand,  would 
have  no  base  near  by,  and  only  those  inconsiderably 
injured  could  probably  be  gotten  home. 


CHAPTER  XII 
OPERATING   THE  MACHINE 

THE  naval  machine,  including  the  various  vessels 
of  all  kinds,  the  bases  and  the  personnel,  having 
been  designed,  put  together,  and  prepared  for  its  ap- 
pointed task  of  conducting  war,  and  the  appointed 
task  having  at  last  been  laid  upon  it,  how  shall  the 
machine  be  operated — how  shall  it  be  made  success- 
fully to  perform  its  task? 

In  order  to  answer  this  correctly,  we  must  first 
see  clearly  what  is  its  task. 

War. — War  may  be  said  to  be  the  act  of  two  na- 
tions or  two  sets  of  nations,  by  means  of  which  each 
tries  to  get  its  way  by  physical  force.  The  peaceful 
methods  of  diplomacy  having  been  exhausted,  argu- 
ments and  threats  having  been  tried  in  vain,  both 
parties  resort  to  the  oldest  and  yet  the  latest  court; 
the  same  court  as  that  to  which  resort  the  lions  of  the 
desert,  the  big  and  little  fishes  of  the  sea,  the  fowls  of 
the  air,  and  even  the  blades  of  grass  that  battle  for 
the  sunshine. 

The  vastness  of  the  issue  decided  by  war,  the  fact 
that  from  its  decision  there  is  no  appeal,  the  great- 
ness of  the  forces  that  nations  can  produce,  the 
length  of  experience  of  war  extending  through  8,000 

357 


358    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

wars,  and  during  more  than  three  thousand  years  of 
recorded  history,  the  enormous  Hterature  of  the  sub- 
ject, and  the  fact  that  more  brain  power,  energy,  and 
character  have  been  devoted  to  war  than  to  any  other 
fruit  of  man's  endeavor — combine  to  give  to  the  con- 
duct of  war  an  importance  that  no  other  subject  can 
possess. 

The  thing  that  each  side  brings  forward  against 
the  other  side  is  force;  "that  which  moves  or  tends 
to  move  matter."  In  all  ages,  it  has  been  directed 
primarily  against  the  physical  bodies  of  individual 
men,  threatening  each  individual  man  with  suffering 
and  death.  It  appeals  to  the  primal  instinct  of  men, 
self-preservation,  and  is  the  ultima  ratio  regum,  the  last 
argument  of  kings — and  not  only  of  kings,  but  of  all 
other  living  things  as  well. 

The  first  feeUng  aroused  by  the  threat  against  life, 
or  physical  well-being,  is  fear;  and,  therefore,  the  first 
force  with  which  to  oppose  the  threat  is  a  force  of  the 
same  spiritual  nature  as  fear,  but  opposite  in  direction. 
This  force  is  called  in  the  English  language  "cour- 
age." Without  courage  every  man  and  every  nation 
would  be  at  the  mercy  of  every  man  or  nation  that 
made  a  threat  against  it.  The  inherent  necessity  for 
courage  is  thus  apparent;  and  the  reason  is  therefore 
apparent,  for  the  fact  that  in  every  nation  and  tribe 
physical  courage  has  been  esteemed  the  greatest  vir- 
tue in  a  man.  In  Latin,  we  know,  the  word  virtus 
meant  courage,   and   also  virtue — showing   that  the 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  359 

Romans  held  the  two  quahties  to  be  identical  or  simi- 
lar. 

In  discussing  the  operations  of  war,  little  is  usu- 
ally said  of  courage.  The  reason,  however,  is  not  that 
its  value  is  unrecognized,  but  that  its  existence  is  as- 
sumed; in  the  same  way  as  that  in  which  all  the  other 
faculties  among  the  men  are  assumed,  such  as  physical 
health,  ability  to  march,  etc.  Movements  to  inspire 
fear,  however,  actions  to  break  down  the  morale,  are 
of  frequent  use;  because,  if  the  morale  of  the  opposing 
side  is  broken  down,  its  power  of  resistance  is  de- 
stroyed. 

In  the  operations,  therefore,  of  two  contending 
parties,  force  is  opposed  by  force.  If  the  forces  on  both 
sides  could  be  concentrated  at  a  single  point,  and  ex- 
erted in  opposite  directions,  the  result  would  be  de- 
cided in  an  instant.  Such  an  arrangement  has  never 
yet  been  brought  about;  though  fairly  close  approxi- 
mations have  been  made,  when  two  parties  have  se- 
lected two  champions  who  have  fought  for  them — the 
victory  going  by  agreement  to  the  side  whose  cham- 
pion became  the  victor. 

Barring  such  rare  occasions,  contests  in  war  have 
usually  been  between  two  forces  spread  over  consid- 
erable areas  of  land  or  water;  and  the  contest  has 
usually  been  decided  by  the  defeat  of  one  of  the 
two.  If  in  any  individual  combat,  all  the  forces  pos- 
sessed by  both  sides  had  been  engaged,  and  if  either 
force  had  been  annihilated,  the  entire  war  between 


36o    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

the  two  parties  would  have  been  decided.  This  was 
nearly  the  case  in  the  naval  battle  off  Tsushima  be- 
tween the  Russian  and  Japanese  fleets — and  the  treaty 
of  peace  was  signed  soon  after.  Usually,  however, 
neither  party  to  the  quarrel  has  had  all  its  forces  on 
the  field  in  any  one  battle,  and  neither  force  in  the 
battle  has  been  annihilated.  Usually,  only  partial 
forces  have  been  engaged,  and  only  partial  victories 
have  been  won;  with  the  result  that  wars  between 
contending  nations  have  usually  consisted  of  a  series 
of  battles,  with  intervals  of  rest  between. 

If  two  opposing  forces  in  any  battle  were  exactly 
equal  in  fighting  power,  neither  side  in  any  battle 
would  gain  a  victory,  the  two  sides  would  inflict  iden- 
tical amounts  of  damage  on  each  other,  and  the  two 
sides  would  end  the  battle  stiU  equal  in  force.  At  rare 
intervals,  such  conditions  have  been  approximated; 
but  usually  one  side  has  had  more  fighting  power  than 
the  other,  and  has  inflicted  more  damage  of  various 
kinds  than  it  has  received,  with  the  result  that  it  at- 
tained an  advantage  more  or  less  important  over  the 
other,  and  with  the  further  result  that  the  original  dis- 
proportion between  the  two  forces  was  increased.  The 
increase  may  not  necessarily  have  been  due  to  a  greater 
number  of  kiUed  and  wounded  or  even  to  a  greater 
loss  of  material,  such  as  guns  or  ships;  there  may  have 
been  no  increase  in  inequality  in  either  of  these  ways, 
for  the  increase  in  inequality  may  have  consisted  in 
the  fact  that  the  weaker  force  was  driven  to  a  posi- 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  361 

tion  less  advantageous  to  it  for  conducting  operations 
in  the  future.  But  whatever  the  nature  of  the  ad- 
vantage gained  by  the  stronger  side,  the  result  has 
been  that  the  weaker  side  has  come  out  of  the  battle 
relatively  weaker  than  it  was  before. 

For  this  reason,  it  is  highly  desirable  to  each  side 
to  win  each  battle.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  loss 
of  any  one  battle  by  either  party  to  a  war  means  that 
the  party  losing  that  battle  will  necessarily  lose  the 
war;  for  many  battles  may  be  fought  by  such  small 
portions  of  the  whole  nations'  forces,  or  be  lost  by  such 
small  margins  that  the  loss  of  one  battle,  or  even  sev- 
eral battles,  may  be  retrieved;  in  fact,  in  few  wars 
have  the  victories  been  all  on  one  side.  It  does  mean, 
however,  that  each  lost  battle  is  a  backward  step ;  and 
that  for  this  reason  the  effort  must  be  that  no  battle 
shall  be  lost. 

Strategy  and  Tactics. — Now,  to  win  battles,  two 
things  combine,  strategy  and  tactics.  The  strategy  of 
each  side  tries  to  arrange  matters  so  that  the  forces 
on  its  side  shall  enter  each  battle  with  the  greatest 
chance  of  victory;  tactics  tries  to  handle  the  forces 
with  which  it  enters  a  battle  in  such  a  way  that  its 
side  shall  gain  the  victory.  Strategy  prepares  for  bat- 
tles;  tactics  fights  them. 

The  tactics  of  any  battle  must  be  in  the  hands  of 
the  commanders-in-chief  on  both  sides.  Any  other  ar- 
rangement is  inconceivable;  but  the  strategy  con- 
trolling the  series  of  battles  in  any  war  cannot  now  be 


362    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

committed  to  them  solely;  though  it  was  usually  com- 
mitted to  them  until  lately.  In  the  days  when  Alex- 
ander went  to  war,  or  even  when  Napoleon  and  Nelson 
went  to  war,  twenty-one  centuries  later,  no  telegraph 
by  sea  and  land  made  swift  communication  possible; 
and  the  commanders  on  the  spot  were  the  only  ones 
in  possession  of  enough  information  about  the  con- 
tending forces  to  decide  what  measures  should  be 
taken.  Even  in  those  days,  however,  the  capitals  of 
the  countries  engaged  in  war,  by  reason  of  their  knowl- 
edge of  what  was  passing  in  the  way  of  policy,  exerted 
an  influence  on  the  strategy  of  the  forces  on  both  sea 
and  land;  Caesar,  for  instance,  was  embarrassed  in 
many  of  his  operations  by  the  Roman  Senate,  and  it 
was  for  this  reason  that  he  crossed  the  Rubicon  and 
passed  from  Gaul  into  Italy.  When  WiUiam  I  and 
Napoleon  III  went  to  war  in  1870,  however.  Von 
Moltke  had  foreseen  the  effects  of  the  telegraph  and 
of  rapid-mail  communications,  in  giving  to  the  head- 
quarters of  the  army  information  of  a  much  greater 
scope  and  reliability  than  had  previously  been  the 
case,  and  had  estabhshed  a  General  Staff  which  had 
elaborated  plans  whereby  not  only  would  the  com- 
manders-in-chief in  the  field  have  the  assistance  of  in- 
formation compiled  at  headquarters,  but  whereby  the 
general  nature  of  the  operations  of  a  war,  especially 
those  operations  at  the  outset  on  which  the  future  con- 
duct of  the  war  would  largely  depend,  would  be  de- 
cided and  laid  down  in  advance  and  during  times  of 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  363 

peace.  The  reason  for  the  rapid  victory  of  the  Prus- 
sians over  the  French  in  1870  was  that  the  Prussians 
were  better  prepared  in  almost  every  way;  especially 
in  the  most  important  thing — the  war  plans. 

Now,  these  war  plans  could  not,  of  course,  be  of 
such  a  kind  that  they  would  foresee  every  contingency 
and  prescribe  the  conduct  to  be  followed,  so  that  a 
commander  in  the  field  could  turn  to  page  221  of  vol- 
ume 755,  and  get  directions  as  to  what  he  ought  to  do; 
nor  could  they  furnish  the  chief  of  staff.  Von  Moltke, 
with  printed  recommendations  which  he  should  offer 
to  the  King.  In  other  words,  the  war  plans  could  be 
only  plans  and,  like  all  plans  for  future  action,  could 
be  only  tentative,  and  capable  of  being  modified  by 
events  as  they  should  come  to  pass.  They  were  only 
plans  of  preparation,  not  plans  of  operation. 

Yet  there  were  plans  of  preparation  for  opera- 
tions; plans  prepared  in  accordance  with  the  princi- 
ples of  strategy,  and  based  on  information  as  to  the 
enemy's  resources,  skill,  point  of  view,  and  probable 
intentions.  They  formed  the  general  guide  for  future 
operations. 

Since  1870,  the  invention  and  practical  develop- 
ment of  the  wireless  telegraph,  and  especially  its  de- 
velopment for  use  over  very  great  distances,  has  modi- 
fied the  relations  of  commanders  on  the  spot  to  home 
headquarters,  and  especially  of  naval  commanders  to 
their  navy  departments.  The  wireless  telegraph, 
under  circumstances  in  which  it  operates  successfully, 


364    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

annihilates  distance  so  far  as  communication  is  con- 
cerned, though  it  does  not  annihilate  distance  so  far 
as  transportation  is  concerned.  It  improves  the  send- 
ing and  receiving  of  news  and  instructions,  both  for 
the  commander  at  sea  and  for  his  department  at  home; 
but  it  does  it  more  effectively  for  the  department 
than  for  the  man  at  sea,  because  of  the  superior  facili- 
ties for  large  and  numerous  apparatus  that  shore  sta- 
tions have,  and  their  greater  freedom  from  interrup- 
tions of  aU  kinds. 

This  condition  tends  to  place  the  strategical  han- 
dling of  all  the  naval  machine,  including  the  active 
fleet  itself,  more  in  the  hands  of  the  department  or 
admiralty,  and  less  in  the  hands  of  the  commander- 
in-chief:  and  this  tendency  is  confirmed  by  the  superior 
means  for  discussion  and  reflection,  and  for  trial  by 
war  games,  that  exist  in  admiralties,  compared  with 
those  that  exist  in  ships. 

The  general  result  is  to  limit  the  commander-in- 
chief  more  and  more  in  strategical  matters:  to  confine 
his  work  more  and  more  to  tactics. 

Such  a  condition  seems  reasonable  in  many  ways. 
The  government  decides  on  a  policy,  and  tells  the 
Navy  Department  to  carry  it  out,  emplo}dng  the  exec- 
utive ofiices  and  bureaus  to  that  end,  under  the  gui- 
dance of  strategy.  Strategy  devotes  itself  during  peace 
to  designing  and  preparing  the  naval  machine,  and 
in  war  to  operating  it,  utilizing  both  in  war  and  peace 
the  bureaus  and  ofiices  and  the  fleet  itself.     And  in 


OPERATING  THE   MACHINE  365 

the  same  way  as  that  in  which  the  bureaus  and  offices 
perform  the  calculations  and  executive  functions  of 
logistics,  for  furnishing  the  necessary  material  of  aU 
kinds,  the  fleet  performs  those  of  tactics.  From  this 
point  of  view,  strategy  plans  and  guides  all  the  acts 
of  navies,  delegating  one  part  of  the  practical  work 
needed  to  carry  out  those  plans  to  logistics,  and  the 
other  part  to  tactics. 

Operating  the  naval  machine  in  war  means  prac- 
tically operating  the  active  fleet  in  such  a  way  as  to 
cause  victories  to  occur,  to  cause  the  fleet  to  enter 
each  battle  under  as  favorable  conditions  as  practi- 
cable, and  to  operate  the  other  activities  of  the  navy 
in  such  a  way  that  the  fleet  will  be  efficiently  and 
promptly  supplied  with  all  its  needs.  Strategy  em- 
ploys tactics  and  logistics  to  bring  these  things  to 
pass;  but  this  does  not  mean  that  strategy  stands 
apart  and  simply  gives  logistics  and  tactics  tasks  to 
do.  The  three  agencies  are  too  mutually  dependent 
for  any  such  procedure  and  require  for  their  success- 
ful working,  both  individually  and  together,  the  most 
thorough  mutual  understanding  and  support. 

Flanking,  T-ing,  etc. — It  being  a  fact  that  no  na- 
tion can  put  a  force  upon  the  sea  that  is  concentrated 
at  one  point;  it  being  a  fact  that  every  naval  force 
must  be  spread  over  a  considerable  area  and  made 
up  of  various  parts,  and  that  the  efficacy  of  the 
various  parts  in  exerting  force  upon  a  definite  enemy 
depends  on  the  unity  of  action  of  the  various  parts, 


366    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

it  results  that  the  most  effective  way  in  which  to  at- 
tack any  naval  force  is  not  to  attack  aU  the  parts  at 
once,  thus  enabling  all  to  reply,  but  to  attack  the 
force  in  such  a  way  that  all  the  parts  cannot  reply. 
If  we  attack  a  ship  for  instance,  that  can  fire  lo  guns 
on  a  broadside  and  only  4  guns  ahead,  it  is  clear 
that  we  can  do  better  by  attacking  from  ahead  than 
from  either  side.  Similarly,  if  10  ships  are  in  a  col- 
umn, steaming  one  behind  the  other,  each  ship  being 
able  to  fire  10  gims  from  either  side  and  only  4  ahead, 
the  10  ships  can  fire  100  guns  on  either  side  and  only  4 
ahead;  and  therefore  it  would  be  better  to  attack  the 
column  from  ahead  (to  "T"  it),  than  to  attack  it  from 
either  side. 

It  is  curious  to  note  how  widely  this  simple  illus- 
tration can  be  made  to  apply  to  both  strategy  and  tac- 
tics; how  the  effort  of  each  is  to  dispose  our  force  so 
toward  the  enemy's  force  that  we  can  use  our  weapons 
more  effectively  than  he  can  use  his.  An  extreme 
illustration  might  be  made  by  imagining  1,000  soldiers 
standing  in  line  and  unable  to  face  except  to  the 
front;  in  which  case  it  is  clear  that,  no  matter  how 
perfectly  they  might  be  armed,  or  how  quickly  and 
accurately  they  could  fire,  one  man  standing  on  the 
flank,  or  behind  them,  could  kill  one  soldier  after  the 
other,  until  all  the  1,000  were  killed,  and  be  in  no 
danger  himself. 

In  case  of  attacking  a  ship  or  a  column  of  ships 
from  ahead,  or  of  attacking  a  line  of  soldiers  on  the 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  367 

flank,  the  effectiveness  of  the  method  of  attack  lies  in 
the  fact  that  a  number  of  the  weapons  that  are  pres- 
ent in  the  force  attacked  cannot  be  used  in  reply. 

Concentration  and  Isolation. — The  value  of  "con- 
centration" is  often  insisted  on,  but  the  author  de- 
sires to  call  attention  to  a  misunderstanding  on  this 
point,  to  which  he  called  attention  in  an  essay  in  1905. 
To  the  author,  it  seems  that  concentration  is  a 
means  and  not  an  end,  and  that  the  end  is  what  he 
called  "isolation"  in  the 

essay.     If  a  man  con-       ^  "_ —':^^^''^ 

centrates  his   mind   on       w"'"     .---'^V''  U 

any  subject,  the  advan-       §--'''    ^^''^  0 

tage  he  gains  is  that  he       i--''''  A 

prevents  other  subjects 
from  obstructing  the  ap- 
plication of  his  mental  powers  to  that  subject;  he 
pushes  to  one  side  and  isolates  all  other  subjects. 
In  this  particular  activity  it  does  not  matter  whether 
we  call  his  act  "concentration"  or  "isolation,"  be- 
cause the  whole  operation  goes  on  inside  of  his  own 
skull,  and  concentration  on  one  subject  automatically 
produces  isolation  or  elimination  of  all  others.  But 
when  concentration  is  attempted  on  external  ob- 
jects, the  case  is  very  different,  for  concentration  may 
not  produce  isolation  at  all.  For  instance,  if  4  ships 
in  column  A  concentrate  their  fire  on  the  leading 
ship  in  column  B,  the  other  3  ships  in  column  B  are 
not  isolated,  and  can  fire  on  the  ships  of  column  A, 


368    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

even  more  effectively  than  if  column  A  was  not  con- 
centrated on  the  leading  ship  of  B,  because  they  are 
.^  _  undisturbed  by  bein?  fired  at.    If, 

^^   ^^    ^>    ^^A 

\      1      ;      /         however,  the  4  ships  of  A   "flank" 
or  "T"  the  ships  of  column  B,  as 


/ 


>    I 


,    ,    .    /  shown  in  Fig.  2,  and  concentrate  on 

\  '.  I  I  the  leader  of  B,  they  thereby  isolate 

\  ;  ;  /  the  other  ships,  and  practically  nul- 

lify  their  ability  to  fire  at  A. 

This  effect  is  approximated  by 
an  approximate  "T-ing"  or  "flank- 
A  ing,"  such  as  is   shown  in  Fig.   3; 

A®  because  the  average  distance   from 

the  ships  of  A  to  the  leading  ship 
^  in  J5  is  less  than  the  average  dis- 

tance from  the  ships  in  5  to  any 
ship  in  ^;  and  because  the  direction  of  fire  from  each 
ship  in  ^  is  more  nearly  abeam  than  is  the  direction 
of   fire   from  the  ^ 

ships  of  5.   These  ,  ^    \ 

positions  are  very         #,     \  \ 

difficult   to  gain,     ^"-^ ^-x'^\\ 

even  if  A's  speed  ^  ~^  i 

is    considerably  a  a 

greater  than  B^s;  b  C 

since  aU  B  has  to  ^  " 

do  to  prevent  it  0  i 

is  to  head  to  the  ^'°-  ^ 

right,  unless  shoals  or  other  dangers  such  as  enemy 
battleships,  C,  are  on  that  side,  co-operating  with  A. 


OPERATING  THE   MACHINE  369 

An  interesting  position  is  that  shown  in  Fig.  4, 
which  may  be  assumed  by  A,  either  for  flight,  or  to 
get    the    advantage   in    torpedo   fire. 
The  advantage  is  that  the  A  ships       i     i    i     i 
are  running  away  from  torpedoes  fired 
by  B,  while  B  is   running  into   tor- 
pedoes fired  by  A.     This  advantage  is 
not  great  if  the  distance  between  A 
and  B  is  so  little  that  B^s  torpedoes 
can  reach  A.     But  if  A   is  able  to       A     A     A     A 
make  this  distance  equal  to  the  en- 

Fig.  4 

tire  range  over  which  B's  torpedoes 

can  run,  or  near  it,  B^s  torpedoes  cannot  reach  A  at  aU. 
A  similar  advantage,  though  in  a  modified  degree, 

is  that  shown  as  possessed  by  ^4  in  Fig.  5.    Due  to  the 

direction  of  movement  of  the  A  and  B  fleets,  it  is  easier 
.  for  A's  torpedoes 

^  to  reach  B,  than 

i  for  B's  torpedoes 

§  to  reach  A. 

I  Positions  of 

Oadvantaere    are 
i      usually  gained  by 
0  I      superior    speed. 

Q  A^     One  of  the  main 

A  .        reasons  for  the  de- 

velopment  of  the 

Fig.  5  ^        ,  .        ■, 

battle  cruiser  has 
been  the  fact  that  her  high  speed  and  great  offensive 
power  enable  her  to  gain  positions  of  advantage  and 


370    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

utilize  them.  The  A  positions  shown  in  the  figures 
are  attainable  by  battle  cruisers  against  battleships, 
and  are  very  effective. 

A  procedure  analogous  to  that  of  flanking  is  one 
in  which  part  of  a  force  is  attacked  when  it  is  sepa- 
rated from  the  rest  of  the  force,  and  cannot  be  sup- 
ported by  it — in  that  some  of  the  weapons  of  one 
force  cannot  be  used.  The  effect  is  similar  in  the  two 
cases,  but  the  events  leading  up  to  the  two  conditions 
may  be  quite  different. 

In  the  former  case,  that  of  being  flanked,  or  T'd, 
the  force  caught  at  a  disadvantage  was  together,  and 
was  able  to  operate  effectively  as  one  force  against  a 
force  located  in  a  given  direction;  but  was  attacked  by 
a  force  located  in  another  direction;  while  in  the  latter 
case,  the  force  was  divided,  and  one  part  was  caught, 
while  distant  from  and  entirely  unsupported  by  the 
other  part.  The  former  condition  is  more  likely  to  re- 
sult from  tactical  operations,  and  the  latter  from  stra- 
tegical operations — and  yet,  especially  in  land  opera- 
tions, the  flanking  of  one  force  may  be  brought  about 
by  the  carefully  planned  strategical  combinations  of 
the  other  force;  and  catcliing  one  part  of  the  enemy's 
force  unsupported  by  the  other  parts  may  take  place 
during  the  tactical  maneuvers  of  an  actual  or  a  simu- 
lated battle. 

In  naval  operations,  the  catching  of  separated 
parts  of  an  enemy's  force  is  a  more  frequent  attempt 
and  accomplishment  than  is  that  of  getting  a  position 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  371 

where  a  column  of  ships  can  be  attacked  from  ahead 
or  astern.  It  seldom  happens,  with  the  great  number 
of  vessels  of  all  kinds  which  compose  a  modern  fleet, 
that  it  is  practicable  to  keep  the  various  parts  to- 
gether, or  that  it  would  be  desirable  to  do  so.  The 
closest  approximation  to  keeping  a  large  naval  force 
together,  is  keeping  them  in  column;  because  in  that 
formation,  the  ships  can  be  made  simply  to  "follow 
the  leader "  without  signal,  and  act  like  one  long,  flexi- 
ble body.  But  the  vessels  of  a  modern  fleet  would 
make  a  column  many  miles  long — a  column  of  20  bat- 
tleships alone  would  be  5  miles  long,  and  the  ad- 
dition of  the  various  cruisers,  destroyers,  and  other 
vessels,  would  make  a  column  so  long  that  it  would 
be  unwieldy;  and  if  its  ends  were  attacked,  the  other 
vessels  could  not  come  to  their  relief.  Besides,  the 
duties  of  battleships,  battle  cruisers,  scouts,  destroy- 
ers, and  submarines,  are  distinct — with  the  result  that, 
as  in  land  operations,  bodies  of  the  various  types 
operate  separately  and  apart  from  those  of  other  types. 

Not  only,  also,  do  the  various  types  operate  sepa- 
rately, but  often  the  necessities  of  a  case  demand  that 
a  certain  number — say  of  battleships — be  sent  away 
from  the  main  body  on  some  mission;  or  that  a  cer- 
tain number  of  destroyers  be  sent  away  from  the  main 
body  of  destroyers. 

Any  such  diversion  entails  a  danger  that  is  some- 
times great,  and  sometimes  small;  but  such  diversions 
and  risks  cannot  be  avoided,  and  should  not  be  avoided 


372    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

when  they  are  necessary,  any  more  than  a  man  should 
avoid  going  out  of  doors,  though  that  act  always  en- 
tails some  danger.  Suppose,  for  instance,  that  in  the 
operations  of  a  war  carried  on  in  the  Caribbean,  the 
Navy  Department  should  get  trustworthy  informa- 
tion that  the  enemy  had  detailed  3  battle  cruisers 
to  speed  north  and  bombard  New  York.  The  de- 
partment would  probably  have  to  detach  a  force  from 
the  fleet  and  send  it  north,  to  prevent  the  bombard- 
ment. Yet  not  only  would  the  force  so  sent  be  in  dan- 
ger until  it  returned  of  an  attack  by  a  superior  force, 
but  the  main  body  from  which  it  was  detached  would 
be  thereby  weakened;  furthermore,  the  information 
might  have  been  incorrect — it  might  have  been  origi- 
nated and  given  out  by  the  enemy,  in  the  hope  that  it 
would  cause  such  a  diversion  of  force. 

Every  operation  in  war  entails  a  risk  more  or  less 
great;  and  if  no  risks  were  to  be  taken,  it  would  be 
better  not  to  go  to  war.  It  is  true  that  some  wars  have 
been  undertaken  in  which  the  preponderance  of  force 
was  so  great  that  there  was  very  little  doubt  of  the 
actual  outcome,  and  very  little  risk  taken  by  one  of 
the  two  parties.  Such  wars,  however,  have  been  very 
few;  and  they  were  hardly  wars  in  the  usual  sense, 
any  more  than  the  beating  of  a  little  boy  by  a  big  boy 
could  properly  be  called  a  "fight." 

Reference  may  again  be  made  here  to  Table  I  on 
next  page,  which  shows  the  way  in  which  fights  between 
unequal  forces  proceed,  and  the  advantage  of  fighting 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE 


373 


TABLE  I 


Col. 


Col. 


Col. 
3 


Col. 
5 


Col. 

7 


Col.  I  Col. 
9 


Col. 


Value  of  oflEensive  power  f  A 

at  beginning \  B 

Damage  done  in  ist  pe-  (  A 

riod  by 1  B 

Value  of  offensive  power  f  A 

at  end  ist  period IB 

Damage  done  in  2d  pe-  f  A 

riod  by IB 

Value  of  offensive  power  j  A 

at  end  2d  period IB 

Damage  done  in  3d  pe-  I  A 

riod  by IB 

Value  of  offensive  power  f  A 

at  end  3d  period IB 

Damage  done  in  4th  pe-  /  A 

riod  by I  B 

Value  of  offensive  power  f  A 

at  end  4th  period IB 

Damage  done  in  5th  pe-  f  A 

riod  by IB 

Value  of  offensive  px)wer  f  A 

at  end  sth  period.  ...IB 
Damage  done  in  6tli  pe-  i  A 

riod  by IB 

Value  of  offensive  power  f  A 

at  end  6th  period.  ...IB 
Damage  done  in  7th  pe-  f  A 

riod  by IB 

Value  of  offensive  power  f  A 

at  end  7th  period. .  . .  \  B 
Damage  done  in  8tli  pe-  f  A 

riod  by IB 

Value  of  offensive  power  f  A 

at  end  Sth  period IB 

Damage  done  in  gth  pe-  f  A 

riod  by I  B 

Value  of  offensive  power  I  A 

at  end  gth  period.  ...IB 
Damage    done    in    loth  f  A 

period  by IB 

Value  of  offensive  power  f  A 

at  end  loth  period.  . . .  \  B 
Damage    done    in    iithfA 

period  by IB 

Value  of  offensive  power  f  A 

at  end  i  ith  period ....  IB 
Damage    done    in    12th  f  A 

period  by IB 

Value  of  offensive  power  I  A 

at  end  12th  period  ...IB 


Total  damage  done  by . 


100 
900 
goo 
go 
go 
810 
810 


81 

72g 

72g 

73 

73 

656 

656 

65 

65 

SQi 

5QI 

59 

59 

532 

532 

53 

53 

479 

479 


431 

431 

43 

43 

388 

388 

39 

39 

349 

349 

35 

35 

314 

314 

31 

31 

283 

283 

717 
717 


I  coo 

goo 

100 

go 

gio 

800 

91 

80 

830 

7og 

83 

71 

759 

626 

76 

63 

6g6 

S50 

70 

55 

641 

480 

64 

48 

593 

416 

59 

42 

551 

357 

55 

36 

515 

302 

52 

30 

485 

250 

49 

25 

460 

201 

46 

20 

440 

155 

44 

16 

426 

III 

etc. 

789 

574 


1000 

800 

100 

80 

g20 

700 

92 

70 

850 

608 

85 

61 

789 

523 

79 

52 

737 

444 

74 

44 

693 

370 

69 

37 

656 

301 

66 

30 

626 

235 

63 

24 

602 

172 

60 

17 

585 

112 

59 

II 

574 

53 

57 

5 

569 


800 
431 


1000 

700 

100 

70 

930 

600 

93 

60 

870 

507 

87 

51 

8ig 

420 

82 

42 

777 

338 

78 

34 

743 

260 

74 

26 

717 

186 

72 

19 

698 

114 

70 

II 

687 

44 

69 

4 

683 


1000 

600 

100 

60 

940 

500 

94 

SO 

890 

406 

89 

41 

849 

317 

85 

32 

817 

232 

82 

23 

794 

150 

79 

IS 

779 

71 

78 

7 

772 


1000 

SCO 

100 

SO 

9SO 

400 

95 

40 

910 

305 

91 

31 

879 

214 

88 

21 

858 

126 

86 

13 

845 

40 

85 

4 


40c 

100 

40 

960 

300 

96 

30 

930 

204 

93 

20 

910 

III 

91 

II 

899 


1000 

300 

100 

30 

970 

200 

97 

20 

950 

103 

95 

10 

940 


1000 
200 

ICO 

20 
g8o 
100 


1000 

100 

100 

10 

990 


970 


700 
317 


600 
228 


500 
159 


400 


3C0 


374    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

the  separated  parts  of  an  enemy  rather  than  the 
united  force.  We  can  see  this  clearly  if  we  note  that, 
if  two  forces  each  aggregating  i,ooo  were  in  each  other's 
vicinity,  and  if  the  entire  force  A  was  able  to  engage 
half  of  B,  or  500,  it  would  whip  half  of  B,  and  have 
841  remaining,  with  which  to  engage  the  other  half 
(500)  of  B.  Reference  to  the  end  of  the  third  period 
in  this  table  shows  also  that  if  a  force  of  789  engages 
a  force  of  523,  it  will  have  569  left,  after  the  other  has 
been  reduced  to  zero.  So,  a  force  of  1,000  that  engages 
two  forces  of  500  separately,  will  have  more  than  500 
left,  after  the  others  have  both  been  reduced  to  zero: 
whereas,  if  it  engages  both,  when  they  are  united,  both 
sides  will  be  gradually  reduced  to  zero,  remaining 
equal  aU  the  time. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  how  this  simple  fact  is  the 
key  to  most  of  the  operations  of  strategy  and  tactics; 
how — the  mechanical  tools  in  the  way  of  ships  and 
guns  and  torpedoes  having  been  suppHed — the  key 
to  their  successful  use  is  simply  to  take  advantage  of 
all  opportunities  of  isolating  one  part  of  the  enemy's 
force  from  the  rest,  and  then  attacking  one  of  the 
parts  with  a  force  superior  to  it.  Opportunities  lack- 
ing, one  must,  of  course,  try  to  create  opportunities  by 
inducing  the  enemy  to  detach  some  part  of  his  force, 
under  circumstances  such  that  you  can  attack  it,  or  the 
weakened  main  body,  with  a  superior  force.  Natu- 
rally, one  must  try  to  prevent  a  similar  procedure  by 
the  enemy. 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  375 

This  does  not  mean  that  the  sole  effort  of  naval 
operations  is  finesse  in  either  strategy  or  tactics ;  some- 
times the  sole  effort  is  to  force  a  pitched  battle  by  the 
side  that  feels  superior,  and  to  avoid  a  pitched  battle 
by  the  side  that  feels  inferior.  Before  the  actual  in- 
feriority or  superiority  has  been  ascertained,  however, 
the  strategy  of  each  commander  is  to  bring  about  a 
situation  in  which  his  force  shall  have  the  advantage. 
The  advantage  having  been  gained  and  recognized  (or 
an  advantage  existing  and  being  recognized),  strategy 
insists  on  forcing  a  battle,  for  the  reason  that  every 
contest  weakens  the  loser  more  than  it  does  the  winner. 

This  does  not  mean  that  it  is  always  wise  to  en- 
gage a  weaker  force  that  is  temporarily  separated 
from  its  main  body.  It  is  readily  understandable,  for 
instance,  that  it  would  be  unwise  in  two  cases : 

I.  A  case  in  which  the  weaker  force  were  so  little 
weaker,  and  were  part  of  a  force  so  much  larger  than 
the  total  of  the  smaller  force,  that  the  gain  as  between 
the  two  forces  actually  engaged  would  not  be  great 
enough  to  compensate  for  the  loss  entailed.  For  in- 
stance, a  reference  to  Table  I  shows  that  an  A  force 
of  1,000  engaging  a  B  force  of  800  would  have  569  left 
when  B  was  reduced  to  zero.  This  is  impressive:  but 
if  the  B  force  of  800  were  part  of  a  total  B  force  of 
2,000,  in  other  words  if  there  were  an  A  force  of  1,200 
near  at  hand,  B  would  have  569  left  with  which  to  op- 
pose 1,200,  a  proportion  a  little  less  advantageous  than 
the  proportion  he  started  with — 1,000  to  2,000. 


376    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

2.  A  case  by  which  the  B  force  may  have  divided 
with  the  express  purpose  of  luring  A  to  attack;  ar- 
rangements having  been  made  whereby  the  inferior  B 
force  would  simply  hold  the  A  force  until  the  whole  B 
force  could  come  to  its  assistance;  arrangements  hav- 
ing been  also  made  that  this  would  be  accomplished 
before  the  detached  part  of  B  should  get  very  badly 
damaged. 

Attention  is  invited  to  Table  III,  which  is  a 
continuation  of  Table  I.  It  represents  what  would 
happen  if  a  force  of  i,ooo  should  fight  separately  two 
forces,  one  of  800  and  the  other  of  200.     In  column 

1,  ^  is  supposed  to  have  engaged  the  200  first,  and  so 
to  have  become  reduced  to  970,  and  to  engage  800 
afterward.  In  column  2,  ^  is  supposed  to  have  en- 
gaged 800  first,  thereby  becoming  reduced  to  569,  and 
then  to  engage  the  200  force.  The  table  indicates 
that  it  makes  no  difference  whether  A  engages  the 
stronger  or  the  weaker  force  first. 

Column  3  shows  that  a  force  of  841,  the  part  re- 
maining after  a  force  of  1,000  had  annihilated  a  force 
of  500,  would  have  653  left  after  annihilating  a  second 
force  of  500.    Taken  in  connection  with  columns  i  and 

2,  this  indicates  that  it  is  easier  to  defeat  two  sepa- 
rated equal  forces  than  two  separated  unequal  forces  of 
the  same  aggregate  value;  that  the  weakest  way  in 
which  to  divide  a  force  is  into  equal  parts.  This  fact 
is  mathematically  demonstrated  by  Mr.  F.  W.  Lan- 
chester  in  a  recent  book  called  "  Air  Craft  in  Warfare." 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE 


377 


TABLE  III 


Col.  I 


Col.  2 


Col.  3 


Value  of  offensive  power  at  beginning S  ^ 

Damage  done  in  ist  period  by /A 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  ist  period /A 

Damage  done  in  2d  period  by /A 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  2d  period /  ^ 

Damage  done  in  3d  period  by /A 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  3d  period /  ^ 

Damage  done  in  4th  period  by /A 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  4th  period /A 

Damage  done  in  sth  period  by /A 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  5  th  period /  ^ 

Damage  done  in  6th  period  by /A 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  6th  period /  ^ 

Damage  done  in  7th  period  by /A 

I  B 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  7  th  period /A 

Damage  done  in  Sth  period  by /A. 

I  B 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  Sth  period i  ^ 

Damage  done  in  gth  period  by /A 

I  B 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  gth  period . . . .  /  ^ 

Damage  done  in  loth  period  by /A 

I  B 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  loth  period . . .  /  ^ 

Damage  done  in  i  ith  period  by /A 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  nth  period /  ^ 

Damage  done  in  12th  period  by i  ^ 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  12th  period.  •  ■  ■  /  6 


970 

800 

97 

80 

890 

703 

89 

70 

820 

614 

82 

61 

759 

532 

76 

53 

706 

456 

71 

46 

660 

385 

66 

39 

621 

319 

62 

32 

589 

257 

59 

26 

563 

198 

56 

20 

543 

142 

54 
14 

529 

88 

S3 

9 

520 

35 

52 

4 

516 


569 
200 

57 

20 

549 

143 

55 

14 

535 

88 

54 

9 

526 

32 

53 

3 

523 


500 
84 
50 
791 
416 
79 
42 

749 

337 

75 

34 

71S 

262 

72 

26 

689 

190 

69 

19 

670 

121 

67 

12 

658 

54 

66 

5 

653 


378    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

The  main  advantage  of  superior  speed  in  naval 
operations  is  the  abihty  it  gives  to  secure  tactical 
positions  of  advantage,  and  to  make  desirable  strategic 
dispositions;  ability,  for  instance,  to  T  or  flank  an 
enemy  force,  and  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  T-ing  or 
flanking;  also  to  catch  separated  parts  of  an  enemy 
fleet  before  they  can  unite,  while  retaining  the  ability 
to  divide  one's  own  force  without  undue  risk.  For 
these  purposes,  speed  is  an  element  of  the  highest 
value;  but  the  high  price  that  it  costs  in  gun  power 
or  armor  protection — or  both — and  the  fact  that 
speed  cannot  always  be  counted  on  by  reason  of  pos- 
sible engine  breakdowns  and  foul  bottoms,  result  in 
giving  to  war-ships  a  lower  speed  than  otherwise  they 
would  have. 

Owing  to  the  fact  that,  for  any  given  horse-power 
put  into  a  ship,  the  speed  attainable  increases  with  her 
length;  and  owing  to  the  further  fact  that  the  weight 
that  any  ship  can  carry  increases  more  rapidly  than 
the  displacement  (weight  of  the  ship  complete),  the 
best  combination  of  gun  power,  armor  protection,  and 
speed  is  attainable  in  the  largest  ship.  In  other  words, 
the  larger  the  ship,  the  more  power  it  can  carry  in 
proportion  to  its  size,  and  the  more  quickly  that  power 
can  be  placed  where  it  can  do  the  most  good. 

Strategic  Operations. — These  may  be  divided  into 
two  classes,  offensive  and  defensive.  The  two  classes 
are  distinct;  and  yet  there  is  no  sharp  dividing-line 
between  them  any  more  than  there  is  between  two  con- 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  379 

tiguous  colors  in  the  spectrum.  Defensive  operations 
of  the  kind  described  by  a  popular  interpretation  of 
the  word  "defense"  would  be  operations  limited  to 
warding  off  or  escaping  the  enemy's  attack,  and  would 
be  just  as  efhcacious  as  the  passive  warding  off  of  the 
blows  of  fists.  Such  a  defense  can  never  succeed,  for 
the  reason  that  the  recipient  is  reduced  progressively 
in  power  of  resistance  as  the  attacks  foUow  each  other, 
while  the  attacker  remains  in  unimpaired  vigor,  ex- 
cept for  the  gently  depressing  influence  of  fatigue. 
Reference  to  Table  I  will  render  this  point  clear,  if 
we  make  the  progressive  reductions  of  the  power  of 
one  contestant,  and  no  reductions  of  the  power  of  the 
other  contestant. 

Defensive  operations,  therefore,  include  "hitting 
back";  that  is,  a  certain  measure  of  offensive  opera- 
tions, intended  to  weaken  the  abihty  of  the  enemy  to 
do  damage.  In  fact,  no  operations  are  more  aggres- 
sively offensive,  or  more  productive  of  damage  to  the 
enemy's  personnel  and  material,  than  operations  that 
are  carried  on  in  order  to  defend  something.  No  animal 
is  so  aggressively  belligerent  as  a  female  "defending" 
her  young. 

Offensive  and  defensive  operations  are  neverthe- 
less quite  different,  especially  in  two  particulars,  one 
being  the  use  of  the  initiative  or  attack,  and  the 
other  the  distance  to  the  home.  In  offensive  opera- 
tions, the  attack  is  made;  in  defensive  operations,  the 
attack  is  resisted;  and  even  if  the  resistance  takes  an 


38o    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

aggressive  character,  and  drives  the  original  attacker 
back  to  the  place  he  started  from,  yet  the  side  which 
has  made  the  original  attack  has  carried  on  offensive 
operations,  and  the  other  side  defensive.  Offensive 
operations  are,  as  a  rule,  carried  on  farther  from  home 
than  defensive  operations.  If  A  is  carrying  on  offensive 
operations  against  ^,  yl  is  usually  farther  away  from 
his  home  than  B  is  from  his  home.  We  see  from  this 
that  the  offensive  has  the  advantage  of  the  initiative, 
of  making  an  attack  for  which  the  enemy  may  be  unpre- 
pared, and  has  the  disadvantage  of  being  far  from  its 
home  bases;  whereas  the  defensive  has  the  disadvan- 
tage of  not  knowing  when  or  where  or  whence  an  at- 
tack is  to  come,  and  the  advantage  of  the  support  of 
various  kinds  given  by  home  bases.  In  other  words, 
the  offensive  has  the  advantage  except  in  so  far  as  it 
is  impaired  by  unfavorable  conditions. 

For  this  reason,  every  military  nation  at  the  out- 
set of  war  desires  to  be  able  to  assume  the  offensive; 
and  only  refrains  from  the  offensive  from  motives  of 
prudence  or  because,  in  a  particular  case,  the  dis- 
tance between  the  adversaries  is  so  great,  that  the 
lack  of  bases  would  be  of  greater  weight  than  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  initiative — or  because  the  situations 
of  the  contending  parties  would  be  such  that  the  side 
accepting  the  defensive  role  and  staying  near  home, 
might  be  able  to  carry  on  aggressive  attacks  better 
than  could  the  other.  An  illustration  of  a  mistake  in 
taking  the  offensive,  and  the  wisdom  of  the  other 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  381 

side  in  accepting  the  defensive,  may  be  seen  in  Napo- 
leon's expedition  against  Russia;  for  the  Russians 
were  able  to  repel  his  attack  completely,  and  then  to 
assume  a  terrible  offensive  against  his  retreating,  dis- 
organized, and  starving  army.  Another  illustration 
was  the  expedition  made  by  a  weak  Spanish  fleet  under 
Cervera  to  the  Caribbean  in  1898.  Another  illustra- 
tion was  that  of  the  Russians  in  the  war  of  1904;  the 
practical  disadvantages  under  which  the  Russian  fleet 
operated  at  Tsushima  were  too  great  to  be  balanced 
by  the  advantage  of  the  attack;  especiaUy  as  the 
situation  was  such  that  the  Japanese  were  able  to  fore- 
tell with  enough  accuracy  for  practical  purposes  the 
place  where  the  attack  would  be  delivered,  and  the 
time. 

Operations  on  the  sea,  like  operations  on  the  land, 
consist  in  opposing  force  to  force,  in  making  thrusts 
and  making  parries.  If  two  men  or  two  ships  contend 
in  a  duel,  or  if  two  parallel  colimms — say  of  ten  ships 
each — are  drawn  up  abreast  each  other,  the  result  will 
depend  mainly  on  the  hitting  and  enduring  powers  of 
the  combatants;  the  conditions  of  the  "stand-up 
fight"  are  realized,  and  there  is  little  opportunity  for 
strategy  to  exert  itself. 

But  if  any  country — say  the  United  States — finds 
herself  involved  in  war  with — say  a  powerful  naval 
Power  or  Powers  of  Europe,  and  the  realization  of  the 
fact  comes  with  the  suddenness  that  characterized  the 
coming  of  war  in  August,  1914,  and  we  hear  the  same 


382    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

day  that  a  fleet  of  battleships,  battle  cruisers,  destroy- 
ers, submarines,  aircraft,  and  auxiliaries  has  left  the 
enemy's  country,  followed  by  a  fleet  of  transports 
carrying  troops — there  wiU  be  immediate  need  for 
strategy  of  the  most  skilful  kind;  and  this  need  will 
continue  until  either  the  United  States  or  her  enemy 
has  been  made  to  acknowledge  herself  beaten,  and  to 
sue  for  peace. 

As  such  a  war  will  be  mainly  naval,  and  as  naval 
wars  are  characterized  by  great  concentration  of  force, 
by  each  side  getting  practically  all  its  naval  force  into 
the  contest,  by  each  side  staking  its  aU  on  the  issue  of 
perhaps  a  single  battle  (as  the  Russians  and  Japanese 
did  at  Tsushima)  one  fleet  or  the  other  wiU  be  prac- 
tically annihilated,  and  its  country  will  be  exposed 
naked  to  the  enemy. 

The  first  effort  on  hearing  of  the  departure  of  the 
hostfle  fleet  will  be,  of  course,  to  get  our  fleet  out  to 
sea,  reinforced  as  much  as  practicable,  by  our  reserve 
ships;  and  to  get  the  coast-guard  on  their  patrol  sta- 
tions. As  we  should  not  know  the  destination  of  the 
enemy,  we  should  either  have  to  assume  a  destination 
and  send  our  fleet  to  that  place  (leaving  the  other 
places  undefended)  or  else  send  our  fleet  out  to  sea  to 
some  position  from  which  it  woifld  despatch  scouts  in 
different  directions  to  intercept  the  enemy,  in  order 
that  our  fleet  might  meet  it  and  prevent  its  farther 
advance. 

Of  course,  the  latter  procedure  could  not  be  car- 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  383 

ried  out  reasonably,  unless  we  had  a  great  enough  num- 
ber of  trained  scouts  to  make  the  interception  of  the 
enemy  fleet  probable;  because  otherwise  the  probabili- 
ties would  be  that  an  enemy  having  the  battle  cruis- 
ers and  scouts  that  European  navies  have,  would  suc- 
ceed in  evading  our  fleet  and  landing  a  force  upon  our 
shores;  and  it  could  not  be  carried  out  reasonably 
either,  if  we  knew  that  our  fleet  was  markedly  inferior 
to  the  comuig  fleet;  because  to  send  out  our  fleet  to 
meet  a  much  more  powerful  one  in  actual  battle 
would  be  to  commit  national  suicide  by  the  most  ex- 
peditious method. 

In  case  the  departure  of  the  enemy  fleet  occurred 
in  the  stormy  months  of  the  winter,  we  might  feel  war- 
ranted in  guessing  that  its  immediate  destination  was 
the  Caribbean;  yet  if  our  fleet  were  in  the  Caribbean 
at  the  time,  and  if  our  coast  lacked  shore  defenses  as 
at  present,  we  might  argue  that  the  enemy  would  take 
the  opportunity  to  make  a  direct  descent  upon  our 
coast,  seize  a  base — say  on  the  eastern  end  of  Long 
Island — and  march  directly  on  New  York.  It  would 
be  very  difi&cult  to  plan  the  development  of  a  hne  of 
scouts  in  such  a  way  that  the  scouts  would  intercept 
an  attack  directed  at  some  unknown  point  between 
Boston  and  the  West  Indies,  perhaps  in  the  southern 
part  of  the  West  Indies — say  Margarita  Island.  In 
fact,  it  would  be  impossible;  with  the  result  that,  un- 
less we  intercepted  it  by  simple  good  luck,  the  enemy 
would  succeed  in  landing  a  force  on  our  eastern  coast, 


384    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

or  else  in  the  seizing  of  a  base  in  the  West  Indies  or 
the  southern  part  of  the  Caribbean  Sea. 

Either  one  of  these  acts,  successfully  performed 
by  an  enemy,  would  give  him  an  advantage;  that  is, 
it  would  make  his  position  relatively  to  ours  better 
than  it  was  before.  It  would  have  the  same  effect, 
therefore,  as  winning  a  battle;  in  fact  it  would  con- 
stitute the  winning  of  a  battle — not  a  physical  battle 
but  a  strategic  battle. 

It  may  be  objected  that,  unless  we  knew  our  fleet 
to  be  more  powerful  it  would  be  wiser  and  more  com- 
fortable for  all  concerned  to  withdraw  our  ships  to 
the  shelter  of  their  bases,  and  let  the  enemy  do  his 
worst — on  the  theory  that  he  could  not  do  anything 
else  so  ruinous  to  us  as  to  sink  our  fleet. 

There  is  of  course  considerable  reasonableness  in 
this  point  of  view;  and  strategy  declares  the  unwis- 
dom of  engaging  in  battles  that  are  sure  to  be  lost. 
It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  the  coming 
fleet  will  operate  at  a  considerable  strategic  disadvan- 
tage, owing  to  the  necessity  for  guarding  the  "train" 
of  auxiliary  ships  that  will  come  with  it,  holding  fuel 
and  supplies  of  various  kinds;  that  this  handicap  will 
offset  a  considerable  advantage  in  offensive  strength; 
and  that  the  handicap  will  be  still  greater  if  the  enemy 
fleet  have  near  it  a  flotilla  of  transports  carrying 
troops.  It  must  be  remembered  also  that  in  all  prob- 
ability, we  should  not  have  detailed  information  as  to 
the  number  of  vessels  coming,  and  should  not  really 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  385 

know  whether  it  was  superior  to  ours  or  not:  though 
we  should  be  justified  in  assuming  that  the  coming 
fleet  believed  itself  to  be  superior  to  ours  in  actual 
fighting  power.  Absence  of  trustworthy  information 
on  such  points  is  usual  in  warfare,  and  is  one  of  the  ele- 
ments that  is  the  most  difficult  to  handle.  The  Navy- 
Department  would  be  more  able  to  form  a  correct 
estimate  on  this  point  than  the  commander-in-chief 
until  such  time  as  our  scouts  might  come  into  abso- 
lute contact  with  the  enemy's  main  body;  but,  until 
then,  all  that  the  department  and  fleet  would  know 
would  be  that  a  large  hostile  force  had  left  Europe. 
They  would  not  know  its  size  or  destination. 

Clearly,  the  first  thing  we  should  need  would  be 
information.  To  get  this  after  war  has  broken  out, 
the  only  means  is  scouts. 

Scouting  and  Screening. — Scouts  are  needed  by 
every  navy;  but  they  are  most  needed  by  a  navy  that 
has  a  very  long  coast-fine  to  protect.  If  the  great 
commercial  centres  and  the  positions  that  an  enemy 
would  desire  for  advanced  bases  along  the  coast,  have 
local  defenses  adequate  to  keep  off  a  hostile  fleet  for, 
say,  two  weeks,  the  urgency  of  scouts  is  not  quite  so 
absolute;  since,  even  if  the  hostile  fleet  evades  our 
scouts  and  our  fleet,  and  reaches  our  shores,  our  fleet 
will  have  two  weeks  in  which  to  get  to  the  place  at- 
tacked. But  if  the  coast  is  not  only  long  but  also  un- 
guarded by  shore  defenses,  the  urgency  is  of  the  high- 
est order. 


386    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

If  we  knew  our  fleet  to  be  the  weaker,  but  if  we 
did  not  believe  it  to  be  so  much  the  weaker  as  to  force 
it  to  seek  safety  in  flight,  our  natural  plan  would  be 
that  of  Napoleon's  in  Italy  in  1797 — to  keep  our  force 
together,  and  to  hurl  it  against  detached  parts  of  the 
enemy's  force,  whenever  possible.  This  plan  might 
not  be  difficult  of  execution,  if  the  enemy  were  accom- 
panied by  his  train  of  auxiliary  and  supply  ships; 
since  such  ships  are  vulnerable  to  almost  any  kind  of 
attack,  have  almost  no  means  of  defense  whatever, 
and  therefore  require  that  a  part  of  the  fighting  force 
of  the  main  body  be  detached  to  guard  them.  Whether 
the  enemy  would  have  his  train  quite  close  to  him,  or 
a  day's  steaming  behind,  say  240  miles,  we  should  not, 
of  course,  know. 

How  could  we  ascertain? 

If  the  enemy  came  along  with  no  scouts  ahead, 
and  if  we  happened  to  have  some  scouts  located  along 
his  line  of  advance,  these  scouts  faster  than  his  ships, 
and  so  heavily  armed  as  not  to  fear  to  venture  near, 
our  scouts  might  proceed  along  the  flank  of  the  enemy 
in  daylight,  pass  along  his  rear,  go  entirely  around 
him,  and  then  report  to  our  commander-in-chief  by 
wireless  telegraph  exactly  what  craft  of  all  kinds  com- 
prised the  force,  what  formation  they  w^ere  in,  the  di- 
rection in  which  they  were  steaming,  and  the  speed. 
Such  information  would  be  highly  appreciated  by  our 
commander-in-chief,  as  it  would  enable  him  to  decide 
what  he  had  better  do.     If,  for  instance,  the  scouts 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  387 

reported  that  the  enemy  fleet  were  steaming  at  a  speed 
of  10  knots  an  hour,  and  that  the  train  was  proceed- 
ing behind  the  fighting  fleet  without  any  guards  of 
any  kind  around  them,  our  commander-in-chief  might 
decide  to  keep  just  out  of  sight  until  after  dark,  and 
then  rush  in  with  all  his  force  of  heavy  ships  and  tor- 
pedo craft,  and  destroy  the  train  entirely. 

But  suppose  the  enemy  fleet  should  advance  with 
a  "screen"  consisting  of  a  line  10  miles  long  of,  say, 
50  destroyers,  50  miles  ahead  of  the  main  body;  fol- 
lowed by  a  line  of,  say,  10  battle  cruisers,  25  miles 
behind  the  destroyers;  and  with  destroyers  and 
battle  cruisers  on  each  flank — say,  20  mfles  distant 
from  the  main  body.  How  could  our  scouts  find  out 
anything  whatever  about  the  size,  composition,  and 
formation  of  the  enemy — even  of  his  speed  and  di- 
rection of  advance?  The  purpose  of  the  "screen"  is 
to  prevent  our  ascertaining  these  tilings;  and  each 
individual  part  of  the  screen  will  do  its  best  to  carry 
out  that  purpose.  All  the  vessels  of  the  screen  and  of 
the  main  body  will  be  equipped  with  wireless- telegraph 
apparatus  and  a  secret  code,  by  means  of  which  in- 
stant communication  wiU  be  continuously  held,  the 
purport  of  which  cannot  be  understood  by  our  ships. 
Any  endeavor  of  any  of  our  scouts  to  "penetrate  the 
screen"  will  be  instantly  met  by  the  screen  itself,  out 
of  sight  of  the  enemy's  main  body;  and  the  screen  can- 
not be  penetrated  in  the  daytime,  unless  we  can  defeat 
those  members  of  the  screen  that  try  to  hold  us  off. 


388    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

Now,  inasmuch  as  all  the  considerable  naval  Powers 
of  Europe  have  many  battle  cruisers,  and  we  have  no 
battle  cruisers  whatever,  and  no  scouts  of  any  kind, 
except  three  inefficient  ones  (the  Birmingham,  Ches- 
ter, and  Salem)  the  degree  of  success  that  we  should 
have  penetrating  the  screen  in  the  daytime  can  be  esti- 
mated by  any  lawyer,  merchant,  or  schoolboy. 

The  laws  of  successful  scouting  and  of  the  use  of 
"search  curves"  have  been  worked  out  mathemati- 
cally, and  they  are  used  to  find  an  enemy  of  which 
one  has  certain  information;  but  they  are  also  used 
by  the  enemy  to  avoid  being  found,  and  they  aid  the 
enemy  that  is  sought  almost  as  much  as  they  aid 
the  seeker.  And  the  sought  has  the  advantage  that  the 
use  of  force,  if  force  can  be  employed,  breaks  up  the 
application  of  the  mathematics  of  the  seeker. 

It  is  true  that  two  main  bodies  of  two  fleets  may 
stumble  against  each  other  in  the  night-time,  or  in  a 
fog  or  heavy  mist.  To  prevent  this  possible  occurrence, 
or  to  prevent  a  night  attack  by  destroyers,  no  sure 
means  has  yet  been  found  except  examination  before 
dark  of  a  very  large  area  around  the  fleet  that  is  sought; 
but  the  area  is  too  great  for  a  search  rigid  enough  to 
give  complete  security,  and  will  probably  be  so  until 
swift  aircraft  can  scout  over  long  distances  at  sea. 
Accepting  for  the  minute  the  convention  that  the  main 
body  of  each  side  goes  at  the  cruising  speed  of  lo 
knots,  and  that  darkness  lasts  12  hours,  each  side  will 
go  120  miles  in  darkness;   and  if  the  two  main  bodies 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  389 

happen  to  be  going  directly  toward  each  other  they 
will  approach  240  miles  in  the  darkness  of  one  night. 
Therefore,  a  coming  fleet,  in  order  to  feel  entirely  safe, 
would  in  daylight  have  to  inspect  by  its  scouts  a  circle 
of  120  miles  radius.  To  insure  safety  against  de- 
stroyer attack,  the  area  would  have  to  be  much  greater 
on  account  of  the  greater  speed  of 
destroyers. 

Unless  our  defending  fleet  knew 
with  reasonable  sureness,  however, 
the  location,  speed,  and  direction  of 
motion  of  the  coming  fleet,  so  that     ^   ^^  •  •       r  „   . 

^    ^        '  F — Position  of  fleet 

it  could  make  its  dispositions  for  at-       ,   at  sundown. 

F — Same  at  sunrise. 

tack,  it  would  hardly  desire  to  meet 
the  enemy  at  night,  unless  it  were  confident  that  it 
would  meet  the  train  and  not  the  main  fleet  or  the  de- 
stroyers. Night  attacks,  both  on  sea  and  land,  are 
desirable,  if  the  attacker  can  inflict  surprise  on  the  at- 
tacked, and  not  be  surprised  himself.  In  the  dark- 
ness a  flotilla  of  destroyers  may  make  an  attack  on 
the  various  vulnerable  colliers  and  supply  vessels  of  a 
fleet,  or  even  on  the  main  body,  and  achieve  a  marked 
success,  because  that  is  the  role  they  are  trained  to 
play.  But  the  tremendous  power  and  accuracy  of 
battleships  cannot  be  utiHzed  or  made  available  in 
darkness;  and  therefore  a  commander-in-chief,  anx- 
ious to  defeat  by  superior  skiU  a  coming  fleet  larger 
than  his  own,  would  hardly  throw  away  all  chance  of 
using  skill  by  risking  his  main  body  in  a  night  en- 


390    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

counter.  Every  operation  planned  by  strategy  is  sup- 
posed to  result  from  the  "decision"  which  follows  the 
estimate  of  the  situation;  even  if  in  some  simple  or 
urgent  cases,  the  decision  is  not  laboriously  worked 
out,  but  is  almost  unconscious  and  even  automatic. 
Now,  it  is  hardly  conceivable  that  any  estimate  of  the 
situation  would  be  followed  by  a  decision  to  go  ahead 
and  trust  to  luck,  except  in  very  desperate  circum- 
stances. In  such  circumstances,  when  hope  is  almost 
gone,  a  desperate  blow,  even  in  the  dark,  may  save  a 
situation — as  a  lucky  hand  at  cards  may  redeem  a 
gambler's  fortune  at  even  the  last  moment.  But 
strategy  is  opposed  to  taking  desperate  measures;  and 
pugilists  and  even  gamblers  recognize  the  fact  that 
when  a  man  becomes  "desperate,"  his  judgment  is 
bad,  and  his  chances  of  success  are  almost  zero. 

While  it  is  possible,  therefore,  that  the  main  bod- 
ies of  hostile  fleets  may  come  together  in  the  night,  we 
may  assume  that  it  will  not  be  as  part  of  any  planned 
operations,  and  therefore  not  within  the  scope  of  this 
discussion;  and  that  any  combat  which  may  result 
wiU  be  one  in  which  strategy  will  play  no  part,  and  in 
which  even  tactics  will  yield  first  place  to  chance. 

But  while  our  defending  fleet  will  have  to  base 
most  of  its  decisions  on  guesses,  the  coming  fleet,  on 
the  other  hand,  having  accepted  the  strategical  disad- 
vantage of  leaving  its  base  far  in  rear,  will  advance  with 
aU  the  advantage  of  the  offensive,  especially  in  know- 
ing where  it  intends  to  go  and  what  it  desires  to  do. 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  391 

Coining  over  on  a  definite  mission  it  will  have  been  able 
to  know  what  preparations  to  make;  and  as  the  naval 
Powers  of  Europe  understand  the  need  of  co-ordina- 
tion between  policy  and  strategy,  the  fleet  will  doubt- 
less have  had  time  to  make  those  preparations;  it  will 
not  have  started,  in  fact,  and  war  will  not  have  been 
declared,  until  all  those  preparations  have  been  made. 

We  may  assume  that  the  coming  fleet  will  come 
across  with  all  possible  precautions  for  protecting 
itself  against  detection  by  the  defender's  scouts,  and 
therefore  against  an  unexpected  attack,  by  night  or 
by  day.  It  cannot  receive  an  unexpected  attack  un- 
less surprised;  and  how  can  it  be  surprised,  if  it  has 
more  scouts,  faster  scouts,  and  more  powerfully  armed 
scouts  than  the  defending  fleet  has? 

The  possession  of  the  more  powerful  scouts,  how- 
ever, will  be  valuable  to  the  enemy,  not  only  for  form- 
ing a  screen  as  a  protection  against  enemy  scouts,  but 
also  for  scouting  and  thereby  getting  information  for 
itself.  A  numerous  squadron  of  scouts  of  different 
kinds,  sent  out  ahead  and  on  each  flank  would  see  any 
of  our  scouts  that  saw  them;  and  the  scouts  that 
were  the  more  powerful  would  force  t|he  weaker  scouts 
back  to  the  arms  of  their  own  main  body,  toward 
which  the  more  powerful  scouts  would,  of  course,  ad- 
vance. The  weaker  scouts,  therefore,  would  have  no 
value  whatever  as  a  screen,  save  in  retarding  the  ad- 
vance of  the  stronger  scouts,  and  in  delaying  their 
getting  information. 


392    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

If  the  coming  fleet  is  more  powerful  than  the  de- 
fending fleet,  and  has  a  more  numerous  and  powerful 
scouting  force,  it  will,  therefore,  be  able  to  push  back 
the  defending  fleet,  whether  an  actual  battle  occurs 
or  not;  and  it  wiU  be  able  to  bring  over,  also,  a  large 
invading  force  in  transports  if  its  fighting  superiority 
be  great  enough.  Furthermore,  if  we  have  not  fortified 
and  protected  the  places  which  the  enemy  would  wish 
to  seize  and  use  as  advanced  naval  bases,  the  enemy 
will  be  able  to  seize  them,  and  will  doubtless  do  so. 

Of  course,  this  is  so  obvious  as  to  seem  hardly 
worth  declaring;  and  yet  some  people  hesitate  even 
to  adlSiit  it,  and  thereby  they  assume  a  passive  condi- 
tion of  moral  cowardice;  for  they  know  that  a  strong 
force  has  always  overcome  a  weaker  force  that  opposed 
it  in  war;  and  that  it  always  wiU  do  so,  until  force 
ceases  to  be  force.  They  know  that  force  is  that  which 
moves,  or  tends  to  move,  matter;  and  that  the  greater 
the  force,  the  more  surely  it  will  move  matter,  or  any- 
thing that  opposes  it. 

If,  however,  we  establish  naval  bases  near  our 
valuable  commercial  and  strategic  ports,  both  on  our 
coast  and  in  the  Caribbean,  and  if  we  fortify  them  so 
that  an  enemy  could  not  take  them  quickly,  the  con- 
dition of  the  enemy  fleet  will  be  much  less  happy; 
because  it  will  have  to  remain  out  on  the  ocean,  where 
fuelling  and  repairing  are  very  difficult,  and  where  it 
wiU  be  exposed,  day  and  night,  especially  at  night,  to 
attack  by  destroyers  and  submarines;    and  in  case 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  393 

necessity  demands  the  occasional  division  of  the  force, 
it  must  beware  of  attacks  on  the  separated  portions  of 
the  fleet.  The  condition  of  a  large  fleet  under  way  on 
an  enemy's  coast  is  one  requiring  much  patience  and 
endurance,  and  one  in  which  the  number  of  vessels  is 
liable  to  be  continuously  reduced  by  the  guerilla  war- 
fare of  the  defenders. 

In  the  case  of  our  attempting  offensive  operations 
against  the  distant  coast  of  an  enemy,  we  would  be 
in  the  same  position  as  a  foreign  enemy  would  be  in 
when  attacking  our  coast,  in  that  our  chances  of  suc- 
cess would  be  excellent  if  our  fleet  were  considerably 
superior  to  the  defending  fleet  in  fighting  power,  and 
in  the  number  and  strength  of  scouts,  and  if  the  enemy 
coast  possessed  numerous  undefended  bays  and  islands 
which  we  could  seize  as  bases.  Bat  even  if  the  supe- 
riority of  our  fleet  in  fighting  power  and  scouts  was  con- 
siderably greater  than  the  enemy's  our  ultimate  suc- 
cess would  be  doubtful,  if  the  enemy's  coast  and 
islands  were  so  protected  by  guns  and  mines  and  sub- 
marines that  we  could  not  get  a  base  near  the  scene 
of  operations.  It  is  true  that  the  British  were  able  to 
maintain  blockades  of  the  French  coast  during  many 
weary  months  without  any  base  nearer  than  England 
— a  place  far  away  to  ships  whose  only  motive  power 
was  sails;  but  destroyers  and  submarines  and  mines 
did  not  then  exist,  and  these  agencies  are  much  more 
valuable  to  the  defender  than  to  the  blockader  who  has 
no  base  at  hand. 


394    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

Our  operations  without  a  base  on  a  distant  enemy 
coast  would  be  apt  to  degenerate  into  warding  off  a 
continual  series  of  more  or  less  minor  attacks  by  the 
minor  craft  of  the  defender.  The  commander  of  our 
fleet  would  be  constrained  to  keep  his  fighting  force 
pretty  close  together,  thus  restricting  his  initiative; 
lest  the  entire  enetny  fleet  catch  a  detached  part  out 
of  supporting  distance  of  the  main  body,  and  annihi- 
late it  with  little  loss  to  themselves.  We  could  prob- 
ably shut  off  most  of  the  enemy's  sea-borne  commerce; 
and  the  war  would  become  one  of  endurance  between 
our  fleet,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  economic  forces 
and  the  morale  of  the  enemy  country  on  the  other 
hand. 

In  the  case  of  operations  carried  on  far  away  from 
the  bases  of  both  fleets,  operations  like  those  that  the 
French  and  British  carried  on  in  the  West  Indies,  the 
commanders-in-chief  will  naturally  be  much  less  di- 
rected by  the  admiralties  at  home  than  wiU  a  com- 
mander-in-chief operating  near  home;  and  the  strate- 
gical advantage,  as  affected  by  the  proximity  of  bases, 
and  by  the  possession  of  the  better  chance  for  the  in- 
itiative, will  be  reduced  to  its  minimum. 

Of  course,  the  victory  wiU  go  to  the  more  powerful 
force;  but  so  many  factors  go  to  make  up  power,  that 
it  may  be  difficult  to  determine  which  is  the  more 
powerful,  until  after  victory  itself  shall  have  decided 
it.  Supposing  the  skill  to  be  equal  on  both  sides,  the 
victory  will  go  to  the  side  that  possesses  the  most 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  395 

numerous  and  powerful  vessels  of  all  kinds.  But  un- 
less there  is  a  very  great  disproportion,  it  may  be  diffi- 
cult to  determine  which  side  has  the  more  powerful 
ships,  even  though  we  may  know  which  side  has  the 
more  numerous.  It  is  extremely  difficult  to  compare 
even  two  single  war-ships  because  we  do  not  know  the 
relative  values  of  their  factors.  Suppose  two  ships, 
for  instance,  to  be  equal  in  all  ways,  except  that  one 
ship  has  ten  14-inch  guns,  and  the  other  has  twelve 
12-inch  guns  of  higher  initial  velocity.  Which  is  the 
more  powerful  ship?  Suppose  one  ship  has  more  ar- 
mor, another  more  speed.  Formulae  designed  to  as- 
sign numerical  values  to  fighting  ships  have  been  la- 
boriously worked  out,  notably  by  Constructor  Otto 
Kretschmer  of  the  German  navy;  but  the  results  can- 
not be  accepted  as  anything  except  very  able  approxi- 
mations. Furthermore,  if  ship  A  could  whip  ship  B 
under  some  conditions,  B  could  whip  A  under  other 
conditions.  An  extreme  illustration  would  be  battle- 
ship A  engaged  with  submarine  B  at  close  quarters; 
B  being  on  the  surface  in  one  case,  and  submerged  in 
the  other  case. 

Aircraft. — The  influence  of  aircraft  on  naval  opera- 
tions is  to  be  very  great  indeed,  but  in  directions  and 
by  amounts  that  it  would  not  be  wise  to  attempt  to 
predict.  The  most  obvious  influence  will  be  in  distant 
scouting,  for  which  the  great  speed  of  aircraft  will 
make  them  peculiarly  adapted,  as  was  demonstrated  in 
the  battle  near  the  Skagerak.    It  is  the  belief  of  the 


396    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

author,  however,  that  the  tune  is  close  at  hand  when 
aeroplanes  and  dirigibles  of  large  size  will  be  capable 
of  offensive  operations  of  the  highest  order,  including 
the  launching  of  automobile  torpedoes  of  the  White- 
head type. 

Skill. — The  question  of  skill  bears  a  relation  to 
the  question  of  the  material  power  directed  by  it  that 
is  very  vital,  but  very  elusive.  If,  for  instance,  ship  C, 
firing  ten  12-inch  guns  on  a  side,  fights  ship  D,  firing 
five  like  guns  on  a  side,  the  advantage  would  seem  to 
be  with  C ;  but  it  would  not  be  if  each  gun  on  D  made 
three  hits,  while  each  gun  on  C  made  one  hit;  a  rela- 
tive performance  not  at  all  impossible  or  unprec- 
edented. Similarily,  if  the  head  of  the  admiralty  of 
the  E  fleet  were  a  very  skilful  strategist,  and  the  head 
of  the  admiralty  of  the  F  fleet  were  not,  and  if  the  vari- 
ous admirals,  captains,  lieutenants,  engineers,  and 
gunners  of  the  E  fleet  were  highly  skilled,  and  those 
of  the  F  fleet  were  not,  the  E  fleet  might  be  victorious, 
even  if  materially  it  were  much  the  smaller  in  ma- 
terial and  personnel.  In  case  the  head  of  the  admiralty 
of  the  E  fleet  were  the  more  skilful,  while  the  officers  of 
the  F  fleet  were,  on  the  average,  more  skilful  than 
those  of  the  E  fleet,  it  would  be  impossible  to  weigh 
the  difference  between  them;  but  as  a  rough  state- 
ment, it  may  be  said  that  if  the  head  of  the  admiralty 
of  either  fleet  is  more  skilful  than  the  other,  his  officers 
will  probably  be  more  skilful  than  the  officers  of  the 
other;  so  pervasive  is  the  influence  of  the  chief. 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  397 

The  effectiveness  of  modern  ships  and  guns  and 
engines  and  torpedoes,  when  used  with  perfect  skill, 
is  so  great  that  we  tend  unconsciously  to  assume  the 
perfect  skill,  and  think  of  naval  power  in  terms  of  ma- 
terial units  only.  Yet  daily  life  is  full  of  reminders 
that  when  two  men  or  two  bodies  of  men  contend, 
the  result  depends  in  large  though  varying  measure 
on  their  relative  degrees  of  skill. 

Whenever  one  thinks  of  using  skiU,  he  includes 
in  his  thought  the  thing  in  the  handling  of  which  the 
skill  is  employed.  One  can  hardly  conceive  of  using 
skill  except  in  handling  something  of  the  general  nature 
of  an  instrument,  even  if  the  skill  is  employed  in  han- 
dling something  which  is  not  usually  called  an  instru- 
ment. For  instance,  if  a  man  handles  an  organization 
with  the  intent  thereby  to  produce  a  certain  result,  the 
organization  is  the  instrument  whereby  he  attempts 
to  produce  the  result. 

If  a  man  exercises  perfect  skill,  he  achieves  with 
his  instrument  100  per  cent  of  its  possible  effect.  If  he 
exercises  imperfect  skill,  he  achieves  a  smaller  per- 
centage of  its  possible  effect. 

To  analyze  the  effectiveness  of  skill,  let  us  coin 
the  phrase,  "effective  skill,"  and  agree  that,  if  a  man 
produces  100  per  cent  of  the  possible,  his  effective  skill 
is  100  per  cent,  and,  in  general,  that  a  man's  effective 
skill  in  using  any  instrument  is  expressed  by  the  per- 
centage he  achieves  of  what  the  instrument  can  accom- 
plish;   that,  for  instance,  if  a  gun  is  fired  at  a  given 


398    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

range  under  given  conditions,  and  lo  per  cent  hits  are 
made  in  a  given  time,  then  the  effective  skill  employed 
is  lo  per  cent. 

From  this  standpoint  we  see  that  imperfect  skill 
is  largely  concerned  with  errors.  If  a  man  uses,  say,  a 
gun,  with  perfect  skill,  he  commits  no  error  in  handling 
the  gun;  and  the  smaller  the  sum  total  of  errors  which 
he  commits  in  handling  the  gun,  the  greater  his  effec- 
tive skill  and  the  greater  the  number  of  hits. 

The  word  "errors,"  as  here  used,  does  not  simply 
mean  errors  of  commission,  but  means  errors  of  omis- 
sion as  well.  If  a  man,  in  firing  a  gun,  fails  to  press  the 
button  or  trigger  when  his  sights  are  on,  he  makes  an 
error  just  as  truly  as  the  man  does  who  presses  the 
button  or  trigger  when  the  sights  are  not  on. 

Suppose  that,  in  firing  a  gun,  under  given  condi- 
tions of  range,  etc.,  the  effective  skill  employed  is  lo 
per  cent.  This  means  that  lo  per  cent  of  hits  are 
made.  But  it  means  another  thing  equally  important 
— it  means  that  90  per  cent  of  misses  are  made.  To 
what  are  these  misses  due?  Clearly  they  are  due  to 
errors  made,  not  necessarily  by  the  man  who  fires  the 
gun,  but  by  aU  the  people  concerned.  If  the  correct 
sight-bar  range  were  given  to  the  gun,  and  if  the  gun 
were  correctly  laid  and  the  pointer  pressed  the  button 
at  precisely  the  right  instant,  the  shot  would  hit  the 
target,  practically  speaking.  But,  in  actual  practice, 
the  range-finder  makes  an  error,  the  spotter  makes  an 
error,  the  plotting-room  makes  an  error,  the  sight-set- 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE 


399 


ter  makes  an  error,  and  the  gun-pointer  makes  an  error. 
The  smn  total  of  all  of  these  errors  results  in  90  per 
cent  of  misses. 

Suppose  that  by  careful  training  these  errors  are 
reduced  in  the  relation  of  9  to  8,  so  that  instead  of 
there  being  90  per  cent  of  misses  there  are  only  80  per 
cent.  This  does  not  seem  a  very  difficult  thing  for 
training  to  accomplish,  but  note  the  result:  the  hits 
are  increased  from  10  per  cent  to  20  per  cent.  In  other 
words,  by  a  decrease  in  errors  in  the  relation  of  9  to  8, 
the  effective  skill  and  the  hits  are  doubled. 

Conversely,  if  the  errors  increased  in  the  ratio  of 
9  to  10,  the  misses  would  increase  from  90  per  cent  to 
100  per  cent,  and  the  hits  would  be  reduced  from  10 
per  cent  to  o. 

Suppose  now  that  the  conditions  are  so  very  diffi- 
cult that  only  i  per  cent  of  hits  is  made,  or  99  per 
cent  of  misses,  and  that  by  training  the  misses  are  re- 
duced from  99  per  cent  to  98  per  cent.  Clearly,  by  a 
decrease  of  errors  of  hardly  more  than  i  per  cent  the 
effective  skill  and  the  hits  are  doubled. 

Conversely,  if  the  errors  increased  in  the  ratio  of 
99  to  100,  the  misses  would  increase  from  99  per  cent 
to  100  per  cent,  and  the  hits  would  be  reduced  from  i 
per  cent  to  o. 

But  suppose  that  the  conditions  are  so  easy  that 
90  per  cent  of  hits  are  made  and  only  10  per  cent  of 
misses.  Clearly,  if  the  errors  were  divided  by  10,  so 
that  only  i  per  cent  of  misses  was  made,  instead  of  10 


400    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

per  cent,  the  number  of  hits  would  increase  only  9 
per  cent,  from  90  per  cent  to  99  per  cent. 

Of  course,  this  is  merely  an  arithmetical  way  of 
expressing  the  ancient  truths  that  skill  becomes  more 
and  more  important  as  the  difl&culties  of  handling  an 
instrument  increase;  and  that,  no  matter  how  effective 
an  instrument  may  be  when  used  with  perfect  skill, 
the  actual  result  obtained  in  practice  is  only  the  prod- 
uct of  its  possible  performance  and  the  effective  skill 
with  which  it  is  used. 

Applying  this  idea  to  naval  matters,  we  see  why 
the  very  maximum  of  skill  is  required  in  our  war  mech- 
anisms and  war  organizations,  in  their  almost  infinite 
variety  and  complexity.  The  war  mechanisms  and  war 
organizations  of  the  military  nations  are  capable  of 
enormous  results,  but  only  when  they  are  used  with 
enormous  skill.  There  are  no  other  instruments  or  or- 
ganizations that  need  so  much  skill  to  handle  them, 
because  of  the  difficulties  attending  their  use  and  the 
issues  at  stake.  Their  development  has  been  a  proc- 
ess long  and  painful.  On  no  other  things  has  so  much 
money  been  spent;  to  perfect  no  other  things  have  so 
many  Hvesbeen  sacrificed;  on  no  other  things,  except- 
ing possibly  reUgion,  have  so  many  books  been  written; 
to  no  other  things  has  the  strenuous  exertion  of  so  many 
minds  been  devoted;  in  operating  no  other  things  has 
such  a  combination  of  talent  and  genius  and  power  of 
will  and  spirit  been  employed. 

A  battleship  is  an  instrument  requiring  skill  to 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  401 

handle  well,  considered  both  as  a  mechanism  and  as 
an  organization.  Its  effective  handling  calls  for  skill 
not  only  on  the  part  of  the  captain,  but  on  the  part  of 
all  hands.  The  finest  dreadnaught  is  ineffective  if 
manned  by  an  ineffective  crew.  The  nmnber  and  com- 
plexity of  the  mechanisms  on  board  are  so  great  as  to 
stagger  the  imagination;  and  the  circmnstances  of 
modem  warfare  are  so  difficult  that,  as  between  two 
forces  evenly  matched  as  to  material,  a  comparatively 
sHght  advantage  in  errors  made  will  turn  the  scale  in 
favor  of  the  more  skilful.  A  difference  in  errors,  for 
instance,  in  the  relation  of  9  to  8,  under  the  conditions 
mentioned  above,  between  two  fleets  having  an  equal 
number  of  similar  ships,  would  give  one  side  twice  as 
many  hits  as  the  other  in  any  given  length  of  time. 

In  March,  1905,  the  writer  pubHshed  an  essay 
in  the  Proceedings  of  the  U.  S.  Naval  Institute  called 
"American  Naval  Policy,"  in  which  the  effect  of  initial 
superiority  in  gun-fire  was  shown  in  tables.  One  table 
showed  that  an  initial  advantage  of  only  10  per  cent 
secured  an  overwhelming  victory  by  an  accimiulative 
effect.  Now  a  difference  of  10  per  cent  in  hits,  under 
conditions  in  which  the  hits  were  about  10  per  cent 
of  the  maximum,  would  mean,  roughly  speaking,  the 
difference  between  10  hits  and  9  hits  in  a  given  length 
of  time,  or  a  difference  between  90  misses  and  91 
misses;  a  difference  in  errors  made  of  a  Uttle  more  than 
I  per  cent. 

The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  is  too  obvious  to  be 


402    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

stated.  Perhaps  the  conclusion  is  not  broadly  new; 
but  possibly  the  idea  is  new  that  so  small  a  difference 
in  errors  made  will,  under  conditions  of  sufficient  dif- 
ficulty, produce  such  a  tremendous  difference  in  re- 
sults. 

Now,  a  division  is  more  complex  and  more  diffi- 
cult to  handle  perfectly  than  is  a  battleship;  a  squad- 
ron more  so  than  a  division;  a  fleet  more  so  than  a 
squadron;  a  navy  more  so  than  a  fleet. 

Necessity  for  Knowledge  of  the  Naval  Machine. — 
There  is  no  machine  or  tool  so  simple  that  knowledge 
of  it  is  not  needed  in  order  to  use  it  skilfuUy.  This 
does  not  mean  that  intimate  knowledge  of  the  details 
of  construction  of  a  machine  is  necessary  in  order  to 
operate  it;  it  does  not  mean,  for  instance,  that  a  sharp- 
shooter must  have  a  profound  knowledge  of  the  met- 
aUurgy  of  the  metal  of  which  his  gun  is  mainly  made, 
or  of  the  laws  of  chemistry  and  physics  that  apply  to 
powder,  or  of  the  laws  of  ballistics  that  govern  the 
ffight  of  the  bullet  to  its  target.  But  it  does  mean 
that  any  skilful  handler  of  any  machine  must  know 
how  to  use  it;  that  a  sharpshooter,  for  instance,  must 
know  how  to  use  his  machine — the  gun. 

Of  course,  a  sharpshooter's  skill  is  exercised  in 
operating  imder  very  limited  conditions,  the  condi- 
tions of  shooting;  and  it  does  not  include  necessarily 
the  maintenance  of  his  gun  in  good  condition.  The 
operating  of  some  machines,  however,  includes  the 
maintenance  of  those  machines;    and  a  simple  illus- 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  403 

tration  is  that  of  operating  an  automobile.  An  auto- 
mobile is  constructed  to  be  operated  at  considerable 
distances  from  home;  and  a  man  whose  knowledge 
and  skill  were  limited  to  steering,  stopping,  starting, 
and  backing  the  car — who  had  no  knowledge  of  its 
details  of  construction  and  could  not  repair  a  trifling 
injury — would  have  very  Httle  value  as  a  chauffeur. 

A  like  remark  might  truthfully  be  made  about 
the  operation  of  any  complex  machine;  and  the  more 
complex  the  machine,  the  more  aptly  the  remark 
would  apply.  The  chief  engineer  of  any  electric  plant, 
of  any  municipal  water-works,  of  any  railroad,  of  any 
steamship  must  have  the  most  profound  and  intimate 
knowledge  of  the  details  of  construction  and  the 
method  of  operation  of  the  machine  committed  to  his 
charge.  Recognition  of  this  fact  by  the  engineering 
profession  is  so  complete  and  perfect  as  to  be  almost 
unconscious;  and  no  man  whose  reasoning  faculties 
had  been  trained  by  the  exact  methods  of  engineering 
could  forget  it  for  a  moment.  The  whole  structure 
of  that  noble  science  rests  on  facts  that  have  been 
demonstrated  to  be  facts,  and  the  art  rests  on  actions 
springing  from  those  facts;  and  neither  the  science 
nor  the  art  would  now  exist,  if  machines  created  by 
engineering  skill  had  been  committed  to  the  charge  of 
men  unskilled. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  more  complicated  in  con- 
struction any  machine  is,  the  more  time  and  study 
are  needed  to  understand  it  fully;  and  that  the  more 


404    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

complicated  its  method  of  operation  is,  the  more  prac- 
tice is  needed  in  order  to  attain  skill  in  operating  it. 

The  more  simple  the  method  of  operation,  the 
more  closely  a  machine  approaches  automatism;  but 
even  automatic  machines  are  automatic  only  in  so  far 
as  their  internal  mechanisms  are  concerned;  and  the 
fact  of  their  being  automatic  does  not  eliminate  the 
necessity  for  skill  in  using  them.  An  automatic  gun, 
for  instance,  no  matter  how  perfectly  automatically 
it  discharges  bullets,  may  be  fired  at  an  advancing 
enemy  skilfully  or  unskilfully,  effectively  or  ineffec- 
tively. 

In  operating  some  machines,  such  as  a  soldier's 
rifle,  or  a  billiard  cue,  the  number  of  mental,  nervous, 
and  muscular  operations  is  apparently  very  few;  yet 
every  physician  knows  that  the  number  is  very  great 
indeed,  and  the  operations  extremely  complex — com- 
plex beyond  the  knowledge  of  the  psychologist,  physi- 
cist, chemist,  and  biologist.  The  operation  of  more 
complex  mechanisms,  such  as  automobiles,  seems  to 
be  more  difficult,  because  the  operator  has  more  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  things  to  do.  Yet  that  it  is  really  more 
difficult  may  be  doubted  for  two  reasons;  one  being 
that  each  single  operation  is  of  a  more  simple  nature, 
and  the  other  reason  being  that  we  know  that  a  much 
higher  degree  of  skill  is  possessed  by  a  great  biUiardist 
than  by  an  automobile  chauffeur.  Of  course,  the  rea- 
son of  this  may  be  that  competition  among  biUiardists 
has  been  much  more  keen  than  among  chauffeurs; 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  405 

but  even  if  this  be  true,  it  reminds  us  that  the  difficulty 
of  operating  any  machine  depends  on  the  degree  of  skill 
exacted.  It  also  reminds  us  that,  if  a  machine  is  to  be 
operated  in  competition  with  another  machine,  the 
skill  of  the  operator  should  be  as  great  as  it  can  be 
made. 

The  steaming  competitions  that  have  been  car- 
ried on  in  our  navy  for  several  years  are  examples  on 
a  large  scale  of  competitive  trials  of  skill  in  operating 
machines.  These  machines  are  very  powerful,  very 
complex,  very  important;  and  that  supreme  skill  shall 
be  used  in  operating  them  is  very  important  too.  For 
this  reason,  every  man  in  the  engineering  department 
of  every  ship,  from  the  chief  engineer  himself  to  the 
youngest  coal-passer,  is  made  to  pass  an  examination 
of  some  kind,  in  order  that  no  man  may  be  put  into 
any  position  for  which  he  is  unfit,  and  no  man  ad- 
vanced to  any  position  until  he  has  shown  himself 
qualified  for  it,  both  by  performance  in  the  grade  from 
which  he  seeks  to  rise,  and  by  passing  a  professional 
examination  as  to  the  duties  in  the  grade  to  which  he 
desires  to  rise. 

The  same  principles  apply  to  all  machines;  and 
the  common  sense  of  mankind  appreciates  them,  even 
if  the  machines  are  of  the  human  tjpe.  A  captain  of 
a  company  of  soldiers,  in  all  armies  and  in  all  times, 
has  been  trained  to  handle  a  specific  human  ma- 
chine; so  has  the  captain  of  a  football  team,  so  has  the 
rector  of  a  church.    The  traming  that  each  person  re- 


4o6    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

ceives  gives  him  such  a  subconscious  sense  of  the 
weights  and  uses  of  the  various  parts  of  the  machine, 
that  he  handles  them  almost  automatically — and  not 
only  automatically  but  instantly.  The  captain  on  the 
bridge,  when  an  emergency  confronts  him,  gives  the 
appropriate  order  instantly. 

Now  the  word  "machine"  conveys  to  the  minds 
of  most  of  us  the  image  of  an  engine  made  of  metal, 
the  parts  of  which  are  moved  by  some  force,  such  as 
the  expansive  force  of  steam.  But  machines  were  in 
use  long  before  the  steam-engine  came,  and  one  of  the 
earUest  known  to  man  was  man  himself — the  most 
perfect  machine  known  to  him  now,  and  one  of  the 
most  complicated  and  misused;  for  who  of  us  does 
not  know  of  some  human  machine  of  the  most  excel- 
lent type,  that  has  been  ruined  by  the  ignorance  or 
neghgence  of  the  man  to  whose  care  it  was  com- 
mitted ? 

A  machine  is  in  its  essence  an  aggregation  of  many 
parts,  so  related  to  each  other  and  to  some  external 
influence,  that  the  parts  can  be  made  to  operate  to- 
gether, to  attain  some  desired  end  or  object.  From 
this  point  of  view,  which  the  author  believes  to  be  cor- 
rect, a  baseball  team  is  a  machine,  so  is  a  political 
party,  so  is  any  organization. 

Before  the  days  of  civilization,  machines  were 
few  in  type;  but  as  civiHzation  progressed,  the  neces- 
sity for  organizations  of  many  kinds  grew  up,  and  or- 
ganizations of  many  kinds  appeared.    Then  the  neces- 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  407 

sity  for  knowledge  of  how  to  operate  those  organiza- 
tions brought  about  certain  professions,  first  that  of  the 
miHtary,  second  that  of  the  priesthood,  and  later  those 
of  the  law,  medicine,  engineering,  etc.  As  time  has 
gone  on,  the  preparation  required  for  these  profes- 
sions, especially  the  progressive  professions,  has  be- 
come increasingly  difficult  and  increasingly  demanded; 
and  the  members  of  the  professions  have  become  in- 
creasingly strict  in  their  requirements  of  candidates  for 
membership. 

Now  the  profession  that  is  the  most  strict  of  all, 
that  demands  the  greatest  variety  of  qualifications, 
and  the  earliest  apprenticeship,  is  the  military.  The 
miHtary  profession  serves  on  both  the  land  and  the 
sea,  in  armies  and  navies;  and  while  both  the  land 
and  the  sea  branches  are  exacting  in  their  demands, 
the  sea  or  naval  branch  is  the  more  exacting  of  the 
two;  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the  naval  profession 
is  the  more  esoteric,  the  more  apart  from  the  others, 
the  more  pecuhar.  In  all  the  naval  countries,  suit- 
able youths  are  taken  in  hand  by  their  governments, 
and  initiated  into  the  "mysteries"  of  the  naval  pro- 
fession— mysteries  that  would  always  remain  myster- 
ies to  them,  if  their  initiation  were  begun  too  late  in 
Hfe.  Many  instances  are  known  of  men  who  obtained 
great  excellence  in  professions  which  they  entered 
late  in  Hfe;  but  not  one  instance  in  the  case  of  a  man 
who  entered  the  naval  profession  late  in  life.  And 
though  some  civiHan  heads  of  navies  have  shown 


4o8    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

great  mental  capacity,  and  after — say  three  years' — 
incumbency  have  shown  a  comprehension  of  naval 
matters  greater  than  might  have  been  expected,  none 
has  made  a  record  of  performance  like  those  of  the 
naval  ministers  of  Germany  and  Japan;  or  of  Admiral 
Barham,  as  first  lord  of  the  admiralty,  or  Sir  John 
Fisher  as  first  sea  lord,  in  England. 

A  navy  is  so  evidently  a  machine  that  the  expres- 
sion "naval  machine"  has  often  been  applied  to  it. 
It  is  a  machine  that,  both  in  peace  and  in  war,  must 
be  handled  by  one  man,  no  matter  how  many  assis- 
tants he  may  have.  If  a  machine  cannot  be  made  to 
obey  the  will  of  one  man,  it  is  not  one  machine.  If 
two  men  are  needed,  at  least  two  machines  are  to  be 
operated;  if  three  men  are  needed  there  are  at  least 
three  machines,  etc.  One  fleet  is  handled  by  one  man, 
called  the  commander-in-chief.  If  there  are  two  com- 
manders-in-chief, there  are  two  fleets;  and  these  two 
fleets  may  act  in  conjunction,  in  opposition,  or  with- 
out reference  to  each  other. 

The  fact  of  a  machine  being  operated  by  one  man 
does  not,  however,  prevent  the  machine  from  com- 
prising several  machines,  operated  by  several  men.  A 
vessel  of  war,  for  instance,  is  operated  as  a  unit  by  one 
man;  the  words  "vessel  of  war,"  meaning  not  only 
the  inert  hull,  but  all  the  parts  of  personnel  and  ma- 
terial that  make  a  vessel  of  war.  The  captain  does 
not  handle  each  individual  machine  or  man;  but  he 
operates  the  mechanism  and  the  personnel,  by  means 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  409 

of  which  all  the  machines  and  men  are  made  to  per- 
form their  tasks. 

Now  the  naval  machine  is  composed  of  many 
machines,  but  the  machines  that  have  to  be  "oper- 
ated" in  war,  using  the  word  "operated"  in  the  usual 
miHtary  sense,  are  only  the  active  fleet,  the  bureaus 
and  offices  and  the  bases;  including  in  the  bases  any 
navy-yards  within  them.  Using  the  word  "oper- 
ated" still  more  technically,  the  only  thing  to  be  oper- 
ated in  war  is  the  fleet:  but  the  head  of  the  Navy 
Department  must  also  so  direct  the  logistical  efforts  of 
the  bureaus  and  offices  and  bases,  that  the  fleet  shall 
be  given  the  material  in  fuel,  supphes,  and  ammuni- 
tion with  which  to  conduct  those  operations.  Like  the 
chief  engineer  of  a  ship,  he  must  both  operate  and 
maintain  the  machine. 

The  fleet  itself  is  a  complex  machine,  even  in  time 
of  peace.  In  war  time  it  is  more  so,  for  the  reason 
that  many  additions  are  made  to  the  fleet  when  war 
breaks  out;  and  these  additions,  being  largely  of 
craft  and  men  held  in  reserve,  or  brought  in  hurriedly 
from  civil  Hfe,  cannot  be  so  efficient  or  so  rehable  as 
are  the  parts  of  the  fleet  that  existed  in  time  of  peace. 

The  active  fleet  consists  of  battleships,  battle 
cruisers,  cruisers  of  various  speeds  and  sizes,  destroy- 
ers, submarines,  and  aircraft.  The  fleet  is  under  the 
immediate  command  of  its  commander-in-chief,  just 
as  the  New  York  naval  station  is  under  the  command 
of  its  commandant;    but  the  commander-in-chief  of 


4IO    THE  NAVY  AS  A  FIGHTING  MACHINE 

the  fleet  is  just  as  strictly  under  the  command  of  the 
head  of  the  admiralty  or  Navy  Department  as  is  the 
commandant.  The  commander-in-chief  is  the  princi- 
pal part  of  the  naval  machine  that  is  operated  in  war; 
and  the  ultimate  success  of  the  naval  machine  in  war 
depends  largely  on  the  amount  and  degree  of  under- 
standing that  exists  between  the  commander-in-chief 
and  the  head  of  the  Navy  Department.  That  good- 
will and  kindly  feeling  should  exist  between  them  may 
be  assumed,  since  both  have  the  same  object  in  view; 
but  that  real  understanding  should  exist  between  them 
is  more  difficult  to  assume,  especially  if  they  have  been 
trained  in  different  schools  and  have  not  known  each 
other  until  late  in  life.  In  the  latter  case,  misunder- 
standings are  apt  to  arise,  as  time  goes  on;  and  if 
they  do,  the  most  cordial  good  feeUng  may  change 
into  mutual  distrust  and  suspicion,  and  even  hatred. 
To  see  that  such  things  have  happened  in  the  past, 
we  do  not  have  to  look  further  back  in  history  than 
the  records  of  our  own  Civil  War,  especially  the  records 
of  the  mutual  relations  of  the  head  of  the  War  De- 
partment and  some  generals.  That  a  situation  equally 
grave  did  not  exist  between  the  head  of  the  Navy 
Department  and  any  of  the  admirals  may  be  attrib- 
uted to  the  fact  that  the  number  of  naval  defeats  was 
less  than  the  number  of  defeats  on  land,  to  the  lesser 
number  of  persons  in  the  navy,  and  to  the  smaller 
number  of  operations.  Perhaps  a  stiU  greater  reason 
was  the  greater  confidence  shown  by  civilians  in  their 


OPERATING  THE  MACHINE  411 

ability  to  handle  troops,  compared  with  their  confi- 
dence in  their  abihty  to  handle  fleets. 

Even  between  the  Navy  Department  and  the 
oflficers,  however,  mutual  respect  and  understanding 
can  hardly  be  said  to  have  existed.  This  did  not  pre- 
vent the  ultimate  triumph  of  the  Union  navy;  but 
that  could  hardly  have  been  prevented  by  any  means, 
since  the  Union  navy  was  so  much  superior  to  the  Con- 
federate. 

Co-operation  between  the  Navy  Department  and  the 
Fleet. — In  any  war  with  a  powerful  navy,  into  which 
the  U.  S.  navy  may  enter,  the  question  of  co-operation 
between  the  department  and  the  fleet  wiU  be  the  most 
important  factor  in  the  portentous  situation  that  will 
face  us.  We  shall  be  confronted  with  the  necessity  of 
handling  the  most  complex  and  powerful  machine 
known  to  man  with  the  utmost  possible  skill;  and  any 
lack  of  understanding  between  the  fleet  and  the  de- 
partment, and  any  slowness  of  apprehension  or  of 
action  by  the  department,  may  cause  a  national  dis- 
aster. One  of  the  most  important  dangers  to  be 
guarded  against  will  be  loss  of  time.  In  naval  opera- 
tions the  speed  of  movement  of  the  forces  is  so  great 
that  crises  develop  and  pass  with  a  rapidity  unexam- 
pled formerly;  so  that  delays  of  any  kind,  or  due  to 
any  causes,  must  be  prevented  if  that  be  possible.  If 
a  swordsman  directs  a  thrust  at  the  heart,  the  thrust 
must  be  parried — in  time. 


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UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACIUTY 


AA    000  931  272    9 


